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Abstract 
This report presents the results of the conceptual and empirical work conducted as part of 
the JRC research on “Exploring Digital Government Transformation: understanding public 
sector innovation in a data-driven society” conducted within the framework of the 
“European Location Interoperability Solutions for eGovernment (ELISE)" Action of the ISA2 
Programme on Interoperability solutions for public administrations, businesses and 
citizens, coordinated by DIGIT. Building on the systematisation of the state of the art 
carried out in the previous phase of the research, the report presents an original conceptual 
framework for assessing the impacts of Digital Government transformation in the EU and 
discusses the results of case studies carried out using an experimental or quasi-
experimental approach to test and validate it, carried out in different policy areas in various 
EU countries. The report concludes outlining the final proposal of DigiGov F 2.0, which 
defines the dimensions and elements of analysis for assessing the effects that can be 
generated by digital innovation in the public sector and the impacts they have at social, 
economic and political levels in different policy-cycle phases and governance contexts. 
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Foreword 
This report presents the results of the conceptual and empirical work conducted as part of 
the JRC research on “Exploring Digital Government Transformation: understanding public 
sector innovation in a data-driven society” conducted in collaboration with the Consortium 
led by PPMI.  
The study was conceived in line with the orientations of the JRC2030 strategy and the Work 
Programme of the ELISE Action of the ISA2 Programme of DIGIT, to contribute to provide 
evidence and indications on how to shape the future research agenda and policy 
development in the field of Digital Government and public sector innovation in the EU.  
The aim of the research is in fact to better understand how innovation in the public sector, 
enabled by digital technologies, can transform governance systems, especially in terms of 
new approaches to use geospatial/location data for policy design and service delivery, so 
that governments can better address systemic problems.  
To this end, building on the systematisation of the state of the art carried out in the 
previous phase of the research, available as JRC Science for Policy Report entitled Exploring 
Digital Government transformation in the EU - Analysis of the state of the art and review 
of literature,1 an original conceptual framework for assessing the impacts of Digital 
Government transformation in the EU has been developed. This takes into consideration 
the various modes of organization and implementation in different Member States and the 
multiple effects that transformations enabled by digital technologies can have on policy-
making mechanisms, governance processes and service delivery.  
To test and validate the conceptual framework, empirical research and case studies with 
experimental approach have been carried out to determine direct and indirect impacts of 
Digital Government transformation in different contexts and phases of the policy-cycle. 
The objective was to identify key drivers and barriers to successful implementation and 
the consequences of digital policy interventions, so to categorise - at different levels of 
abstraction - strategies and initiatives implemented within the framework of public sector 
reforms in selected EU Member States.  
The four case studies cover different contexts and policy areas: the Tvarkau Vilnių case 
in Lithuania, which investigates the use and impact of the platform developed to support 
city management by streamlining the process of gathering information from citizens; the 
impact of the implementation of the use of Body Worn Cameras in the context of policing 
in the UK, drawing also on existing experiments and studies in different countries; the Kids 
Go Green project implemented in the schools of the city of Trento and Ferrara in Italy, to 
assess the impact of gamification on education and sustainable mobility and, using a 
different methodology, the Online experiment on the relationship between citizens’ 
privacy and trust conducted in Germany and Spain, to investigate the effects of the 
introduction of digital public services, under hypothetical scenarios, in four different policy 
domains (transport, health, security and voting). 
This report describes in details the proposed conceptual framework developed in 
collaboration between JRC and the consortium, which aims to set the basis for assessing 
in a theoretically-informed manner and in a consistent and scientifically robust way, the 
effects of Digital Government initiatives on governance systems and policy-making.  
For this purpose, a well-grounded conceptualisation of public sector innovation in Digital 
Government has been elaborated, in order to assure the framework’s ability to find testable 
implications on an empirical base. This entailed the elaboration of categories of analysis to 
inform the proposal for a framework able to show the association between Digital 
Government strategies and their consequences to transform the modus operandi of public 
sector organisations on service delivery, regulatory governance systems and policy-making 
mechanisms. 
                                           
1 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/exploring-digital-
government-transformation-eu  
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In doing so, the framework defines the required dimensions and elements of analysis for 
assessing the effects that can be generated by digital innovation in public sector 
organisations and the impacts they have at social, economic and political levels in different 
contexts and policy-cycle phases. 
The case studies and experiments conducted had therefore the twofold objective of 
illustrating the possible impacts of Digital Government transformation in different contexts 
and policy areas and, at the same time, testing different dimensions of the conceptual 
framework proposed, adjusting and refining it against the analysis of the empirical findings. 
In this respect, the results of this phase of the DIGIGOV research has shown that Digital 
Government transformation and public sector innovation broadly speaking, are frequently 
still at the discussion or at piloting stage, while raising funding and political support for 
further investment may be difficult, because of limited resources and, sometimes, little 
evidence that previous innovations have delivered the promised efficiency gains.  
At one level, this calls for some careful and theory-informed analysis as to why such 
expected gains were not realized. For example, were the expectations unrealistically 
inflated from the very beginning, or is there something in the policy process that did not 
allow to achieve the original objectives?  
At another level this also calls for broader, more systematic discussion, using also foresight 
techniques and forward looking approaches. At this level, the key question is three-fold: 
(a) may be expectations that we entertain with regard to ICT-based innovations are wrong 
and we are missing some important objectives?; (b) what combination of technology, 
procedures and resources makes an innovation possible?; (c) how the new technologies 
are changing and challenging the power balance between the public authorities, companies 
and citizens, and how this balance should be reimagined for the benefit of society? 
These issues are investigated further in the concluding part of the DIGIGOV study, and will 
set the basis for future research and innovative policy directions that are much needed to 
exploit the benefits of Digital Government transformation.  
In this perspective, it should be noted that since this report was already completed and 
under publication since March 2020, the impact of the COVID-19 is not discussed.  
However, it is clear that the need of a real transformation of governance systems and 
policy-making mechanisms, adopting digital technologies to innovate and improve public 
services and government practices emerged as a crucial element to navigate through the 
“Pandemic Society” we have just entered.  
It is therefore imperative to turn the Coronavirus crisis into an opportunity, embracing the 
complexity of public sector innovation and ensure to move away from what we have warned 
in our first DIGIGOV Report in 2019, and “differentiate between evidence and hope!”  
And for hope to become reality, tangible changes of procedures, functions and institutional 
redesigns as well as an overall cognitive reframing of public sector innovation is needed; 
which concerns not only policy and organisational processes, rather values, culture and 
shared understandings of the impacts of Digital Government transformation in the EU.  
 
 
 
Gianluca Misuraca 
DIGIGOV Scientific and Project Leader for JRC 
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1 Introduction 
This technical report brings together the work carried out as part of the study ‘Exploring 
Digital Government Transformation in the EU: understanding public sector innovation in a 
data-driven society’, firstly to develop a conceptual framework for understanding and 
exploring the digital transformation of the public sector (henceforth DigiGov-F), and then 
to produce case studies/experiments that explore the impact of digital transformation and 
are at the same time triangulated with the conceptual framework to validate/refine it. 
In this introduction, we briefly illustrate the objectives, scope and methodological approach 
followed in building the proposed conceptual framework. (The methodology used for 
experiments differs by case. Each methodology is presented in the relevant chapter). In 
Chapter 2, we present the DigiGov-F 1.0 framework and the various components that 
underpin it. This was the version consolidated as a result both of internal activities 
conducted by the research team, and of consultation with experts and stakeholders carried 
out during two workshops and via DigiGov online communities. In Chapter 3, we present 
in full the results from the case studies / experiments. Chapter 4 concludes presenting a 
summary of the results and implications of the empirical research, and how these have 
been reflected in the final proposal of DigiGov-F 2.0, the final version of the framework, 
which has been modified and refined in the light of the findings from the case studies.  
The overall aim of this study is to systematise and reconceptualise Digital Government 
transformation within the scope of public sector innovation, in light of the efforts made to 
enhance the quality of public services in a data-driven society. As suggested by Barcevičius 
et al. (2019), despite significant interest in Digital Government Transformation over recent 
years, definitions of the term remain varied and sometimes contradictory. The same 
applies to the way in which digital transformation relates to other widely used expressions 
such as e-Government, ICT-enabled government and Transformational Government (or T-
Government). The specific focus of this study is on artificial intelligence (AI), as well as 
other new and related predictive and cognitive technologies. It also examines other 
supporting technologies and applications such as those delivering geospatial/location data 
for policy design and service delivery. The study explores the possible use and impacts 
that can be achieved by combining new and existing technologies that go beyond those 
traditionally regarded as the ‘nuts and bolts’ of e-Government.  
In this report, we define Digital Government Transformation (DGT) as follows:  
DGT is the introduction into government operations of radical changes, alongside more 
incremental ones, within both internal and external processes and structures, to achieve 
greater openness and collaboration within and beyond governmental boundaries. DGT is 
enabled by the introduction of a combination of existing ICTs and/or new data-driven 
technologies and applications, and by a radical reframing of both organisational and 
cognitive practices. It may encompass various forms of public sector innovation across 
different phases of the service provision and policy cycles, to achieve key context-specific 
public values and related objectives including increased efficiency, effectiveness, 
accountability and transparency, in order to deliver citizen-centric services and policies 
that increase inclusion, and enhance trust in government. 
This general definition posits that a true transformation involves radical changes at various 
levels. It is particularly suited to the scientific and research-based exploration conducted 
in this study, as it encompasses many dimensions that merit investigation by scholars as 
either barriers to, or drivers of, transformation. These include institutional, organisational, 
cultural, technological, cognitive and behavioural factors.  
The proposed DigiGov-F framework contributes to the systematising and reconceptualising 
of Digital Government Transformation within the scope of public sector innovation. It does 
so by highlighting the key dimensions and factors that should be further studied in order 
to understand how ICT-enabled innovation can transform governance and policy making. 
By doing so, the framework paves the way for a more in-depth assessment of the effects 
of digital transformation.  
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The rationale behind DigiGov-F is therefore to systematise insights from a multidisciplinary 
body of literature in order to shape future policy research and prepare the ground for the 
assessment of the effects of digital transformation. The elaboration of DigiGov-F is 
informed by theory and scientifically grounded. It rests on a clear definition of what a 
conceptual framework is, and on a step-by-step methodology for concept building. It 
follows the literature that specifically discusses conceptual frameworks (Jabareen, 2009; 
Imenda, 2014; Rocco and Plakhotnik, 2009), as well as more general and classic sources 
on the epistemology and methodology of social research (Creswell, 2003; Fox and Bayat, 
2007; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Levering, 2002; Liehr and Smith 1999; Merriam, 2001; 
Miles and Huberman, 1994; Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Wacker, 1998). 
First, it is important to clarify that a conceptual framework is not the same thing as a 
theory, a model, or a theoretical framework. Our framework is -informed by theory and 
scientifically robust, given the methodological steps followed (see infra), but it does not 
aim to provide a theoretical explanation of ‘what causes what’ within the broadly defined 
ecosystem of digital government. Conceptual frameworks are usually the first step when 
dealing with very complex phenomena, where knowledge is spread across different bodies 
of literature that must be pulled together to provide a first map and understanding of the 
given phenomenon. As Jabareen puts is, (2009, p. 50): “most social phenomena are 
complex and linked to multiple bodies of knowledge that belong to different disciplines. For 
this reason, better understanding of such phenomena requires a multidisciplinary 
approach”. Hence, tapping into different literatures, a conceptual framework “lays out the 
key factors, constructs, or variables, and presumes relationships among them” (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, p. 440). The same authors also state that a conceptual framework can 
be “rudimentary or elaborate, theory-driven or commonsensical, descriptive or causal” 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 18).  
As a type of intellectual artefact, a conceptual framework “relates concepts, empirical 
research, and relevant theories to advance and systematize knowledge about related 
concepts or issues” (Rocco and Plakhotnik, 2009, p. 128). Imenda (2014) shows that 
although ‘conceptual frameworks’ and ‘theoretical frameworks’ are often used as synonyms 
in the literature, they are different constructs both by definition and in terms of the way in 
which they are constructed. While both start from a review of relevant literature, they each 
use these sources in different ways. A theoretical framework is constructed deductively, 
extracting theories/hypotheses for formal testing. Meanwhile, using the sources inductively 
leads to the development of a conceptual framework (2014). A conceptual framework is 
not intended to provide a causal/analytical basis for theoretical explanation, but instead 
provides an initial lens through which social reality can be interpreted. As such, conceptual 
frameworks are “indeterminist in nature and therefore do not enable us to predict an 
outcome” (Jabareen, 2019, p. 51).  
To further appreciate the difference between a conceptual framework and a theoretical 
framework (or a theory or model2), we should consider whether or not one’s main aim is 
to test a theory, which is a different exercise from generating hypotheses or laying the 
groundwork for emergent theories. As illustrated by Cresswell (2003), a theoretical 
framework is crucial for quantitative studies that aim to test a theory. A theory (see 
footnote) presented for formal testing entails a set of terms and concepts, as well as a set 
of variables and the relationships between them. It also possesses a precisely delimited 
and narrow domain of application, and some explanatory/predictive claims. In qualitative 
studies, or within initial explorations of a phenomenon (which may subsequently lead to a 
quantitative study), the aim is not to test a given theory, but rather to shed light on under-
                                           
2 A model is used to explore reality when its complexity is beyond empirical description and testing. A theory is 
a set of assumptions, propositions or accepted facts intended to explain some very specific phenomenon, at times 
independently of the explanandum. According to Fox and Bayat (2007, p. 29) a theory presents a systematic 
point of view specifying the relationships between a set of variables, with the aim of predicting and explaining a 
phenomenon. A similar definition can also be found in Liehr and Smith (1999, p. 8). A more analytical definition 
of a theory is presented by Wacker (1998, pp. 363-364), according to whom a theory has four components: (a) 
definition of terms, concepts or variables; (b) a domain within which the theory is applicable; (c) a set of 
relationships between the variables; and (d) specific predictive claims.  
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studied aspects of the phenomenon, to generate hypotheses, and to search for emergent 
theories. To this end, a conceptual framework is required to ground the exploration in 
existing bodies of knowledge, whether in published documents or obtained via field work, 
interviews and consultations with experts. So, whereas a theoretical framework is used to 
investigate a specific theory, a conceptual framework is extracted from the relevant 
theoretical and empirical work (Rocco & Plakhotnik, 2009). 
As Jabareen (2009) argues, one can build a conceptual framework using as inspiration a 
grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Although 
grounded theory is usually considered a qualitative method in case studies, it can be used 
to develop a conceptual framework that can be elaborated using not only primary evidence 
but also secondary sources. Indeed, we have applied grounded theory as an inspiration by 
extracting our proposed framework from secondary sources, which were integrated with 
expert consultations and, in the final validation step, contrasted against primary sources 
derived from field work (case studies). Below, we briefly list and explain the steps both 
followed and to be followed for the development of DigiGov-F. 
1. Mapping of sources 
We selectively mapped the sources first gathered by Barcevičius et al. (2019), then 
integrated them with additional sources considered relevant (i.e. general theory of 
innovation, literature on public sector innovation, literature on public administration 
features and reforms, literature on evaluation and measurement, etc.). 
2. Reading and extrapolation of relevant and applicable insights  
We extensively read the sources, categorised them in term of the relevance of their 
contribution to the understanding of Digital Government Transformation, and extracted 
key elements (i.e. building the institutional and cognitive dimension, identifying applicable 
elements from innovation theories, etc.). 
3. Deconstructing and reconstructing concepts/elements 
We read and reread the selected data to deconstruct, reconstruct, and ‘discover’ concepts 
and elements relevant to our purpose. This is the main inspiration from grounded theory 
that we have applied to secondary sources. For instance, out of numerous (and at times 
contradictory) concepts and definitions of innovation and transformation, we have 
elaborated our own definition of four types of public sector innovations. From these, we 
developed a typology of digital innovation in a syncretic fashion – i.e. integrating insights 
from public sector innovation with those coming from the literature on digital government, 
in particular Janowski (2015). 
4. Integrating concept/elements and making sense 
We grouped together concepts/elements that showed similarities in order to reduce 
complexity and produce a manageable conceptual framework. In doing so, however, we 
have strived to exhaustively include the most important elements from all the literature 
reviewed. To use an analogy from a particular quantitative technique (data envelope 
analysis), we have tried to envelope the reviewed literature so as to define as sort of 
frontier including all the most important insights from all the sources reviewed. In doing 
this, we strived also to maintain the ‘indeterminist’ and ‘non-linear’ nature of the 
framework. 
5. Validation 
Our first source of validation were interactions with both academic experts and 
stakeholders during the workshops organised in 2019, as well as via the DigiGov online 
community. A second source of validation came from contrasting the framework with the 
case studies presented in Chapter 3 of the present report.  
As a result of the five steps above, the proposed DigiGov-F framework must be seen as a 
comprehensive and exhaustive, heuristic conceptual framework that is informed by theory 
and scientifically robust. It systematises and reconceptualises digital government within 
the field of public sector innovation and the institutional settings of public administration. 
The framework paves the way for further assessment of the effects of Digital Government 
Transformation, and for the generation of new hypotheses. 
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2 DigiGov-F 1.0 
In the first three sections of this chapter, we present the building blocks upon which the 
framework is constructed: the innovation dimension (2.1); the institutional dimension 
(2.2); and the technology dimension (2.3). In Section 2.4, we present DigiGov-F 1.0. 
Section 2.5 looks at the effects of digital transformation, while Section 2.6 provides 
examples of how DigiGov could be used in practice. 
2.1 Innovation dimension 
In this section, which brings together insights from a vast body of literature, we consider 
public sector innovation, and review the various types of innovation proposed in the 
literature (2.1.1), the antecedents for the adoption and implementation of innovation 
(2.1.2), and sum up our synthesis in Section 2.1.3. 
2.1.1 Types of innovation 
Table 1 below reports the nine different types of innovation extracted from the various 
literature sources. The first six types are presented by De Vries et al. (2016) in the most 
recent systematic review of empirically applied studies focusing on public sector innovation. 
This is complemented by other sources adding other elements of interest. As is evident 
from the table, some overlap exists between these nine types, and the terminology used 
in the various sources may give rise to some misunderstanding. For instance, one definition 
of process innovation talks about improvement in both internal and external processes, 
while the latter also falls to some extent within the domain of governance innovation. 
Furthermore, the term ‘processes’ itself may be misleading, as processes characterise not 
only the internal functioning of a public sector organisation, but also its interactions and 
collaboration with external actors. 
Table 1. Types of innovation: synoptic overview of the literature. 
Type of innovation Definition and sources 
(1) Processes 
innovation 
Improvement of the quality and efficiency of internal and 
external processes (Walker 2014, as reported in De Vries et al., 
2016); changes in organisational structures and routines 
(Windrum, 2008); creation of new organisational forms, the 
introduction of new management methods and techniques, new 
working methods (Bertot et al, 2016; de Vries et al, 2016). 
(2) Administrative 
Process innovation 
Creation of new organisational forms, the introduction of new 
management methods and techniques and new working 
methods (De Vries et al., 2016); implementation of methods for 
the production and provision of goods and services that are 
either new or significantly improved compared to existing 
processes (Hartley, 2010) 
(3) Technological 
process innovation 
Creation or use of new technologies, introduced within an 
organisation to render services to users and citizens (De Vries et 
al., 2016). 
(4) Service 
innovation 
Creation of new public services or products (De Vries et al., 
2016); new service or significant improvement to an existing 
service (Windrum, 2008); new services or new users (Walker, 
2002); service delivery innovation: new ways of supplying 
services (Windrum, 2008); creation of new public services or 
products or improvement of the existing ones Bessant et al, 
2010; de Vries et al, 2016; Misuraca & Viscusi, 2014). 
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(5) Governance 
innovation 
Development of new forms and processes to address specific 
societal problems (De Vries et al., 2016); systematic innovation 
as new or improved ways of interacting with other organisations 
and/or knowledge bases (Windrum, 2008); participatory 
government, open government or public-private-people-
partnerships (Hartley, 2010); creation of new governance 
methods, involvement of new actors, new patterns of co-
creation and interaction (Bertot et al, 2016; de Vries et al, 
2016). 
(6) Conceptual 
innovation 
Introduction of new concepts, frames of reference or new 
paradigms that help to reframe the nature of specific problems 
as well as their possible solutions (De Vries et al., 2016); 
development of new ways of thinking that challenge the 
assumptions that underlie processes, services and products 
(Windrum, 2008) 
(7) Policy 
innovation 
Changes to the thoughts or behavioural intentions underlying 
policy development (Windrum, 2008); improvement in 
identifying the needs of constituents and shortening the time 
required to develop, test, implement and diffuse a policy (Bertot 
et al, 2016; de Vries et al, 2016). 
(8) Rhetorical 
innovation  
New languages and concepts (Hartley, 2010) 
(9) Communication 
innovation 
Implementation of a new method of promoting the organisation 
or its services and goods, or new methods to influence the 
behaviour of individuals or others (Hartley, 2010) 
Source: elaborated by the authors from the sources cited. 
The distinction between ‘internal process innovation’ and ‘administrative process 
innovation’ is blurred and not clear-cut, plus it does not capture the creation of new 
institutions and agencies (a main result of the application of New Public Management [NPM] 
reforms). Innovation types (6), (7) and (8) share common elements, as they all relate to 
the more intangible cognitive-normative dimension of change. Type (9) overlaps between 
the previous three types, as well as type (5). In view of these considerations, in Section 
2.1.3 we present a synthesis instrumental to the proposed framework. 
2.1.2 Antecedents of innovation 
In this Section, we consider the antecedents of innovation as they appear in the broader 
literature on innovation. Antecedents can be either drivers or barriers, depending on their 
presence or absence in a specific context.  
Innovation level (intrinsic attributes). Traditional innovation literature, inspired by 
Rogers’s innovation diffusion theory (2003), focuses mainly (if not exclusively) on those 
intrinsic attributes of innovations that may increase or decrease the likelihood of their 
adoption, and/or the feasibility of their implementation. These attributes may be objective, 
or may simply be perceived subjectively. The key attributes are:  
a) Relative advantage: there should be sufficient confidence and possibly evidence 
that introducing an innovation will bring benefits (in terms of economic return, but 
also social prestige, convenience and satisfaction) compared to the status quo.  
b) Compatibility: the innovation must be perceived as being compatible with existing 
practices and values.  
c) Complexity: innovations perceived as less complex are more likely to be adopted.  
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d) ‘Triability’: if an innovation can initially be piloted on a limited scale, this increases 
the chances of it being introduced and implemented.  
Rogers’s approach, which is also rooted in theories of S-shaped innovation diffusion3, 
suffers from a number of limitations. Above all, it presupposes a sort of linear optimism 
that may fit well the trajectories of self-contained and fixed products, but is not entirely 
appropriate for complex technology-driven innovations entailing additional and complex 
complementary changes. There is a rationalist assumption that runs as follows: the more 
obvious the relative advantages of an innovation become, the more influence they exert, 
and the more visible the network effects, which in turn increases adoption. Yet, especially 
in the public sector, empirical evidence shows that things do not always work that way. 
The intrinsic attributes of an innovation are certainly relevant to include in a comprehensive 
framework, but must be integrated alongside the other dimensions discussed below. 
Organisational level (internal factors). The seminal contribution that sheds light on 
the organisational dimension of innovation is Damanpour (1991), which stresses in 
particular the availability of ‘slack’ resources (money, time, technology, skills, employees), 
complexity and functional differentiation, and the origin of professional knowledge. Larger 
organisation’s size should increase the chances of slack resources being available, which 
in turn provides a wider set of assets for the adoption and implementation of innovation. 
Larger organisations are more structurally differentiated, and those with slack resources 
were thought to be the more likely adopters of innovation. Empirical studies and meta-
reviews yield important but inconclusive evidence on the explanatory power of such 
dimensions. In other words, they explain some of the variations in innovation diffusion, 
but not all of them4. Other, ‘softer’ dimensions include organisational processes and 
culture. As early as 1975, a seminal empirical work found that innovation pilot projects 
were almost all successful in their limited area, but failed to spread and be accepted due 
to wider organisational resistance (Walton, 1975). The author concluded that success of 
innovation must be understood in terms of choices and social processes within the inner 
organisational context. This means we must also consider antecedents such as leadership 
and the capacity for organisational processes to absorb new knowledge and practices. 
Another additional aspect to consider is the innovation-system fit – that is to say, whether 
an innovation fits with the organisational values, norms and processes, as well as skills, 
that support legacy technologies5, in addition to an organisation’s absorptive capacity6. 
Organisational antecedents can therefore be summarised with the following five issues: (a) 
slack resources; (b) leadership; (c) organisational structures and processes; (d) 
organisational culture (i.e. risk aversion or learning style); e) incentives. As part of the 
internal organisational context, important dimensions include organisational cultures, 
behavioural patterns, and the normative and cognitive routine used. In this respect, the 
contributions reviewed earlier that stress conceptual and behavioural innovation are of 
relevance (reviewed in De Vries et al., 2016 and see in particular Windrum, 2008). 
Organisations introduce these intangible dimensions, such as new concepts, frames of 
                                           
3 For quite a long time, and still today, the diffusion of innovation has been simply described using an S-shaped 
curve, broken down into different phases that matched with ‘early adopters’, ‘early majority’, ‘late majority’ and 
‘laggards’. The basic idea behind this descriptive approach was first introduced in 1903 by the French social 
psychologist Gabriel Tarde (Tarde, 1903). Tarde formulated the law of imitation to explain why only a few ideas 
or products spread widely: a few influential individuals invent or adopt a new product, which then spreads as a 
result of social imitation. In 1943, two American rural sociologists, Ryan and Gross (Ryan and Gross, 1943) 
studied the diffusion of "hybrid seed" among Iowa farmers, and formulated the typology of 'early adopters', 'early 
majority', 'late majority', and 'laggards' plotted over a typical S-shaped curve. Working almost in parallel, a group 
of medical sociologists at Columbia University studied the diffusion of new drugs and came to very similar 
conclusions (Greenhalgh et al., 2005, pp. 53-55). Early studies on innovation, operationalising insights from 
Tarde’s law of imitation, stressed the importance of interpersonal communication and influence, and especially of 
the social networks of the early adopters. For instance, in discussing medical innovations, Coleman et al. 
formulated the hypothesis that the rate of diffusion of a new drug depends largely on the size and quality of the 
doctors who first start to prescribe them (Coleman et al., 1966). 
4 See chapter 7 in Greenhalgh et al., 2005. 
5 See chapter 4 in Greenhalgh et al., 2005. 
6 This is an important aspect first developed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). They argued that the ability of a 
firm to recognise the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends, is critical 
to its innovative capabilities. They labelled this capability a firm’s ‘absorptive capacity’. 
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reference or paradigms in their efforts to define issues and how to tackle them. Innovating 
thus requires organisations to develop new ways of thinking, in order to challenge the 
assumptions underlying those processes and structure that need to be changed. It also 
entails changes in the thought and behavioural intentions behind the development of 
services and/or policies, such as improvements in the methods and sources used to identify 
the needs of constituents, and reducing the time taken to develop, test, implement and 
diffuse a transformed service or policy.  
Thus, an organisation’s conceptual and cognitive repertoire for action as an institution can 
function either as a driver of, or a barrier to, innovation. At any given time, this repertoire 
is an internal characteristic of the individual organisation, but is dynamically influenced and 
shaped by its external context. The same applies to the types of technological innovation 
an organisation decides to implement. These two elements, indeed, are a bridge between 
the internal and external context – as demonstrated by the application of Big Data and 
data analytics within the public sector. These concepts have acquired momentum in a 
broader context, and have been adopted in the public sector even in situations where 
simple traditional statistics would suffice, or when the data infrastructure is not yet ready 
and/or the necessary paradigm shift in interpreting the data has not yet permeated the 
organisation’s cognitive repertoire. Organisations are made up of people, and may 
therefore possess or lack resources at an individual level. At this level, important 
antecedents are the presence within the organisation of ‘intrapreneurs’ who can overcome 
risk-averse cultures; empowered and motivated employees; commitment and shared 
values; and the availability of skills related to the technical nature of the innovation 
introduced. As De Vries et al. (2016, p. 158) observed, agents play an important role in 
enabling innovation, both at the organisational level (focus on leadership), and the 
individual level (where there is a strong focus on innovative employees and their 
characteristics). 
The decision to adopt an innovation and to make certain implementation choices – as well 
as the results of the innovation itself – are also influenced by a number of environmental 
factors that can be considered external, as those who adopt and implement innovations 
work within organisations embedded in particular social and institutional contexts. If 
innovation was originally seen as a discrete event resulting from knowledge developed by 
isolated actors, subsequent studies have come to regard it as the result of a process based 
on interactions between various internal and external factors. The external environment 
antecedents include: (a) the objective or perceived demands that must be met by the 
innovation; (b) political and institutional settings and levers; and (c) networks of inter-
organisational influence, collaboration and competition. Of course, this is a conceptual 
simplification: in practice, the factors grouped under these three headings may interact 
and/or overlap.  
Environmental level: external demands. Innovation may be undertaken because its 
relative advantage is perceived as a way to respond to the unmet needs or demands from 
a specific constituency. This unmet demand may be objective or subjectively perceived, 
and pressure to meet it may be exerted by the media and, in turn, by politicians. More 
generally, the decision to innovate results from a co-evolution of different demands/needs, 
related pressures, new ways of thinking, and trends that stem from separate but closely 
related environments (e.g. public opinion, politics, media, academia, management gurus 
and consulting companies), which interact/overlap with the dimension of networks 
discussed below. A good example are the changes launched within the public sector since 
the 1980s under various headings. The starting points for these were new consumerist 
expectations among users of public services; the need to make public administration more 
efficient and less costly; as well as the pressure exerted by globalisation on governments 
to increase the competitiveness of their economies. While these trends were to some extent 
empirical, they have been championed by the media, by academia, in business literature, 
in bestsellers by business gurus, and propagated through the practice of management 
consulting companies. This momentum heavily shaped the perception of the need to 
innovate, and the definition of how to do it. This in turn has heavily influenced politics and 
policy, giving rise to a wave of institutionalised and standardised changes. 
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Environmental level: institutional factors. We use this expression to generically refer 
to aspects than can be considered as part of broadly defined political institutions: politics, 
government, laws and regulations, policy, and all of government governance. In practice, 
this dimension has two components: one more stable and long-term; and the second more 
dynamic and short-term. The first has to do with the institutionalised characteristics of 
public administration we discuss in the next section. The second refers to the dynamic, 
short-term influences, pressures, and levers that can spring from, or be exerted by, 
politics, policy, and regulation. Politics may also be placed within the previous dimension 
of external demands, and is not considered within our conceptual framework, but digital 
government is more directly influenced by policy and regulation, and also by mechanisms 
of governance. Policy goals, where they are enforceable, can directly shape the choices 
and methods used to implement innovation. Regulatory measures can constrain 
innovation, but can also push it or shape it in better ways. If the innovators are the ‘makers’ 
and the regulators are the ‘shapers’, striking a good balance between the two can ensure 
better outcomes and reduce negative effects. Such collaboration between ‘makers’ and 
‘shapers’ is especially necessary in the case of innovations such as those driven by artificial 
intelligence, to drive innovation while at the same time ensuring privacy and ethical 
concerns are addressed. For a public agency, the institutional settings within which it 
operates, politics, policies, regulation, and all of government governance mechanisms, can 
all be considered to some extent as external factors. 
Environmental level: networks. The role of inter-organisational and inter-personal 
networks and communication channels in innovation has been widely recognised in the 
literature7. This aspect is related to the notion of institutional isomorphism, a process that 
leads organisations in the same field to become more similar, as defined by (Di Maggio 
and Powell, 1991)8. Institutional isomorphism is a process of “convergent inertia or 
change”, whereby organisations do or try to do what is considered legitimate in their own 
institutional environment. In order to become legitimised in their environment, 
organisations tend to replicate the routines and templates for action of those organisations 
that are considered the most legitimate and successful. At any given time, there is a fixed 
and legitimised set of organisational routines upon which most organisation 
conform/converge. So how can change and innovation occur, breaking fixed routines and 
resulting in a new institutionalised routine? If innovation initiated by a few is able to spread, 
this will unleash a mimetic process of “institutional isomorphism”. Most organisations will 
converge towards the innovation, which will eventually become institutionalised within a 
given population of organisations. Change can also occur if an innovation adopted in one 
highly legitimised population of organisations also creates normative pressures to conform 
for organisations belonging to a different population. An example of this occurred when 
the hype relating to the private sector ‘Dotcom’ boom of the mid-1990s spilled over into 
the public sector, contributing to the launch of the first wave of investments and initiatives 
in eGovernment. 
 
                                           
7 The foundations for the importance of networks and social embeddedness were laid down in two seminal articles 
by Granovetter (1973; 1985) and applied in insightful ways by other economic sociologists such as Burt (1992). 
Social network analysis has been widely applied to organisations in the context of studies focusing on inter-
organisational networks (Baum et al., 2000; Hansen, 1999; Kang et al., 2010; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Lorenzoni 
and Lipparini, 1999; Monge and Contractor, 2003; Nelson and Sidney, 1982; Nooteboom, 1999; Powell et al., 
1996; Schilling, 2005). Collaborative practices and networks are considered viable methods of innovation through 
knowledge creation and transfer (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). The evolutionary 
theory of economic and organisational changes stresses that networks bridge already existing knowledge / 
experience on innovation (Nelson and Sidney, 1982). Networks are studied to identify nodes that enable 
organisations to share information and knowledge (Hansen, 1999; Monge and Contractor, 2003). 
8 A similar account, applied to managerial trends and fashion, is also provided by Abrahamson (1991) and by 
Abrahamson and Fairchild (1999). 
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2.1.3 Summing up 
For the purposes of the framework, we propose the following synthesis of the nine types 
of innovation extracted from the literature (see Table 2).  
Table 2. Types of innovation: our synthesis. 
Type of innovation Definition 
(1) Organisational 
innovation 
Improvement of the quality and efficiency of internal and 
external processes through changes in organisational structures 
and routines; creation of new organisational forms and/or new 
structures. 
(2) Service and/or 
policy innovation 
Creation of new public services and introduction of new policies 
and/or new ways of delivering them, to increase reach and 
personalisation. 
(3) Governance 
innovation 
Development of new forms and processes to address specific 
societal problems through new or improved ways of interacting 
with other organisations outside the public sector and with 
citizens, bridging different knowledge bases through 
participatory government, open government data, public-
private-people-partnerships, enabling new patterns of co-
creation and interaction through the use of innovative methods 
of communicating and promoting the organisation or its services. 
(4) Conceptual 
innovation 
Introduction of new concepts, normative and cognitive routines 
concerning the internal function of organisations and in relation 
to their external environment, which help to reframe the 
definition of problems and their solutions, leading to new ways 
of thinking that change the thoughts or behavioural intentions 
underlying the development and deployment of policies and 
services. Improving the identification of the needs of 
constituents and shortening the time required to develop, test, 
implement and diffuse a policy; adopting new languages and 
concepts and new methods to influence behaviour. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Table 1. 
In Section 2.4.3, we use these four types to define a typology of digital government 
innovation. We dispense with the use of the term ‘processes’ to characterise innovations, 
and introduce a new and more comprehensive definition of conceptual policy innovation 
that, as we argue later, is fundamental to the proposed framework. 
Below we list the five groups of antecedents identified: 
 Innovation attributes: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, triability 
 Organisational factors: resources and leadership, structure and processes, 
culture, cognitive and behavioural routines and frames, committed and skilled 
employees 
 External demands: constituency needs/demands and related 
discourses/pressures from public opinion, media, academia, politics, etc.  
 Institutional factors: institutional settings, policy and regulatory levers, 
governance mechanisms 
 Networks: participation in inter-organisational and/or inter-personal networks 
possibly leading to processes of isomorphism 
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The antecedents listed above are generally applicable to the study of digital government 
innovation and transformation, along with some additional specifications that we present 
in part here, and which are also the subject of the next two sections. The literature 
reviewed deals mostly with the generation and adoption of innovation but can also be 
applied to its implementation, which is relevant to our framework. For this reason, it is 
important also to consider some key aspects of institutional and technological dimensions. 
The institutional setting for innovation influences external antecedents (i.e. regulation and 
processes of conformity) and also organisational antecedents (governance mechanisms). 
Most importantly, it can shape the structure of incentives that may or may not favour the 
adoption and implementation of the innovation inside a public sector organisation. The 
specific characteristics of the technologies involved may be influenced by the antecedents 
relating to innovation attributes (i.e. compatibility and triability), by organisational 
antecedents (i.e. slack resources), and by individual level antecedents (i.e. skills); some 
requisites and challenges related to the specific technologies may impact the 
implementation processes. 
2.2 Institutional dimension 
2.2.1 Public administration characteristics and traditions 
The Weberian model (M. Weber, 1968 [1924]), which lies at the core of what has been 
termed ‘Progressive-era Public Administration’ or PPA (Hood, 1995), exerted a strong 
influence on the formation of most Western administrative systems. The Weberian model 
or PPA remained the dominant yardstick and source of legitimacy for public administration 
systems from the late 19th century until the 1970s. Since then, it has lost appeal as a 
result of various waves of public sector reforms (see infra); and yet its legacy is still visible 
in the way in which institutions of government actually function, regardless of the 
prescriptions and rhetoric surrounding subsequent reforms. If we consider the three 
models of organisation identified in organisational studies – rational systems, natural 
systems and open systems (Scott, 2003) – the Weberian model corresponds to a closed 
rational system, whereas the open systems model for the public sector captures to a large 
extent the new discourses on open governance. Meanwhile, institutionalism (Selznick, 
1948, 1949) and related neo-institutionalist approaches fit the natural model: “the most 
important thing about organizations is that, though they are tools, each nevertheless has 
a life of its own” (Selznick, 1949, p. 10).  
The main principles of the Weberian model include hierarchy, formal rules, uniformity, 
legitimacy, standardisation of procedures, division of labour, impersonality, meritocracy 
and technical qualifications. It is a hierarchical, paper-based system; a universalist but 
vertically specialised form of ‘command-and-control’ administration (Dunleavy and Hood, 
1994). The Weberian model rests on four key tenets: (a) the idealisation of career public 
service professionals insulated from the general labour market; (b) a set of generalised 
rules that limit the discretionary power of public servants; (c) universalistic and equal 
treatment of citizens in the manner of the rule of law; (d) vertical specialisation and 
separation as a democratic principle, to avoid encroachment upon citizens by an all-
pervasive and fully integrated government machine. Under the principles and practice of 
this system, data were centralised in filing systems and only started to be digitised in the 
1960s during the first wave of office automation in the public sector. As a rational, closed-
system model it remains externally opaque, not only in the sense of not opening data and 
information to citizens, but also in not using information held about them to understand 
their needs and behaviour for service delivery and policy making. Under this model, 
information for policy and service design comes from census statistics and from ad hoc 
collection by national statistics offices. As such, if the legacy of this model remains strong 
and rigidly applied in a part of the government machinery, any digital transformation made 
possible by new technologies would find experience severe barriers and bottlenecks9.  
                                           
9 Among the potential challenges identified in the OECD paper on the data-centric public sector, some of those 
listed spring directly from of this model of public sector functioning (van Ooijen, Welby and Ubaldi, 2019). 
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In this sense, our definition of Digital Government Transformation stresses the need for 
changes that are radical, not simply incremental, in organisational structures, processes 
and cognitive / behavioural repertoires. These changes should move away from the legacy 
of the siloed bureaucratic model. The Weberian model has influenced various 
administrative systems in different ways, giving rise to different national traditions. 
Without entering into the history of how this classic model became differentiated, we 
present below a brief and mostly synthetic summary of the various models and the main 
dimensions for a comparative analysis of administrative systems, based on selected key 
sources (Bleiklie and Michelsen, 2013; Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 2014; Lampropoulou and 
Oikonomou, 2018; Loughlin, 2002; Painter and Peters, 2010; Pierre, 2011; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2017; Rugge, 2003; Thijs, Hammerschmid and Palaric, 2017). The schemes 
presented below are idealised types, with only a few indications of the country to which a 
particular model might apply. It is beyond the scope of this publication to present a full 
characterisation based on up-to-date observations placing all EU 28 MSs within this 
typology – and in any case, such as comparison has been already compiled (Thijs, 
Hammerschmid and Palaric, 2017). Below, we descriptively present the models and 
consider their implications later in Section 2.2.3. With considerable analytical simplification, 
cultural administrative traditions have been positioned first as either ‘public interest’ or 
‘rechtstaat’ models (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Figure 1. ‘Rechstaat’ versus ‘public interest’: discursive characterisation. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors, based on the sources cited. 
Figure 2. Rechstaat versus public interest: stylised characterisation. 
 
Source: Pierre (2011, p. 5). 
Rechtstaat Public Interest
Key norms and values Legality and equality Service and managerialism 
Key objectives Legal security Efficiency
Model of client Citizen Customer
Definition of rights Group rights Individual rights
Type of legal system Public law Common law
Accountability Upward Upward and downward
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A more nuanced characterisation (Figure 3) identifies the four administrative traditions 
depicted below in self-explanatory fashion, requiring no further commentary. 
Figure 3. Four administrative traditions. 
 
Source: Painter and Peters (2010, as reported in Bleiklie and Michelsen, 2013, p. 121) 
By combining the traditions with other characteristics, Figure 4 presents an abbreviated 
outline of the dimensions that can be applied for a comparative analysis of public 
administrations. (A more detailed version that can be found in the public administration 
literature and that has been empirically used in Thijs, Hammerschmid and Palaric, 2017.) 
Figure 4. Six dimensions of administrative regimes. 
 
Source: Synthesised by the authors from Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017); Thijs, Hammerschmid, and Palaric (2017); 
and Bleiklie & Michelsen (2013). 
 
In the figure above, the first dimension (state structure) has two sub-dimensions: vertical 
dispersion and horizontal coordination (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017, pp. 49-51); the vertical 
dispersion of authority ranges from a unitary state (e.g. the UK) to federal states (e.g. 
Germany), while in the middle lies a non-federal but decentralised state (e.g. Italy).  
Anglo-American Napoleonic Germanic Scandinavia
Legal basis for the state No Yes Yes Yes
State-society relations Pluralist Interventionist Organic
Organic/welfareist 
‘‘open government’’
Policy style Pragmatic incremental Legal
Corporatist/legal 
Technocratic 
consensual
Organisation of 
government
Limited, unitary 
government
Indivisible / hierarchical
Integrated cooperative 
federalism, interlocking 
coordination 
Decentralized through 
administrative or 
political 
decentralization 
Civil service
High status, unified, 
neutral, generalist 
permanent
Very high status 
permanent, specialized, 
elite training, 
segmented corps
Very high status, 
permanent, legal 
training, upper ranks 
permanent, openly 
partisan
High status, 
professional, non-
politicized
Countries 
(exemplificative)
UK France, Italy, Portugal
Germany, Austria, 
Netherlands
Denmark, Sweden
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This difference in structure can also be measured by the number of administrative tiers 
that, in Europe, range from just two to up to five depending on the Member State (see 
Thijs, Hammerschmid and Palaric, 2017, p. 12). The horizontal sub-dimension refers to 
the level of coordination or fragmentation among the various ministries/department at 
central government level (e.g. in the UK, the Treasure performs a coordinating function, 
making central government less fragmented than it is in Germany, France or Italy). The 
nature of the executive relates to the electoral systems used and the ways in which 
majorities are formed. Here, we identify three types, although Pollit and Bouckaert (2017) 
make further distinctions (single party, minimally winning coalition, etc.) The combination 
of state structure and the nature of executive can influence the formation of public policy, 
as well as the introduction of reforms and all of government innovations. ‘Majoritarian’ 
executives, as opposed to ‘consensual’, and centralised as opposed to decentralised, can 
affect decision making and implementation. Relationships between politicians and 
bureaucrats can be analysed according to two dimensions: whether or not their careers 
are strictly separated, and whether or not they are politicised or depoliticised. This, 
obviously, influence the structure of incentives for top-level bureaucrats and the choices 
they make to achieve visibility and legitimacy, including through the introduction of 
innovations.  
Sources of advice is another important dimension, as it concerns the influences that shape 
important policy decisions as well as the introduction of innovation. In relation to this, the 
expression ‘mandarin’ is used to refer to top civil servants; ‘cabinet’ to the bodies providing 
advice to the executive; and ‘external source’ refers to diverse advisors from consultants 
to think tanks and academics, etc. (see Thijs, Hammerschmid and Palaric, 2017, pp. 32-
34, based on Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017). We expand this category to include advice from 
civil society and citizens, as citizen participation is not included as a separate dimension in 
the figure but is accounted for as a source of advice or as a factor contributing to 
implementation. Obviously, greater diversity of sources from which advice is taken 
increases the possibility of new ideas being introduced, but also acts an additional channel 
for the process of institutional isomorphism. In this respect, it is worth briefly digressing 
to anticipate a topic discussed later with respect to waves of reform and governance. 
Although mandarins and cabinets are still prominent in EU Member States, their monopoly 
on advice is no longer as firm and complete as before. This monopoly has been weakened 
by several external pressures (internationalisation, Europeanisation and multi-level policy-
making processes), as part of a trend that has been described as a shift from government 
to governance, with formal hierarchies being supplemented as well as challenged by 
alternative organisational forms such as networks (Peters and Pierre, 1998; Peters and 
Pierre, 2006; Rhodes, 1988; Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes, 1997). This is, to the extent that it 
has been empirically confirmed, a change that must be considered when discussing the 
environmental antecedents of innovation and the processes of institutional isomorphism. 
The initial Weberian benchmark and the way it shaped the above characteristics, depending 
on country-specific histories and circumstances since the 1980s, has been swept by waves 
of public sector reform over the last four decades. Indeed, as Muccio and Mauri (2012) 
noted, over the past 30 years the public sector in Europe, as in most parts of the world, 
has been shaken by various intellectual and political waves of (attempted) reforms. These 
have gone under various names: ‘New Public Management’ (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994); 
‘Public Value Management’ (O’Flynn, 2007); ‘Reinventing Government’ (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1993); ‘New Governance’ (Osborne, 2006; Rhodes, 1996); ‘Digital Era 
Governance’ (Dunleavy et al., 2005, 2006); and ‘ICT-enabled public sector innovation’ 
(Misuraca et al., 2013). The economic managerialism of New Public Management (Hood, 
1991; Osborne and Gaebler, 1993), was followed in the late 1990s by the theories of 
governance that identified new modes of collaboration between the state and social-
economic spheres (Peters and Pierre, 1998; Peters and Pierre, 2006; Rhodes, 1988; 
Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes, 1997). Other narratives signalled the retreat of government, as in 
the ideology of the ‘Big Society’ launched in Great Britain by David Cameron’s government 
(Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012).  
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The pertinent question in this research is to ask whether these waves of reform have 
radically changed the organisational structures and mental frames prevalent in public 
agencies in such a way that they provide more conducive setting for digital government 
and the transformation it is expected to bring. To consider this, we briefly discuss below 
two of these waves: NPM, prominent from 1980s to the 2000s; and from the 2000s 
onwards, Digital Era Governance (DEG), which has been a product of new discourses on 
governance and the emergence of new digital possibilities.  
For around two decades, NPM predicated and implemented a management-inspired 
modernisation of public administration that rested on the deconstruction and 
disaggregation of large public bodies (‘agentification’); the introduction of competition and 
quasi-markets within the public sector; and performance-based incentives to public officials 
(Pollit and Bouckaert, 2011). NPM was short-lived and not fully implemented, leaving big 
chunks of government still operating according to Weberian bureaucracy. Moreover, where 
it was implemented, it did not deliver the expected benefits. Under this model, 
agentification and outsourcing produced a marginalisation of digital technology, as IT 
operations were either assigned to separate, specialised agencies or contracted out to 
global service providers. Digital expertise lay outside of government, and sources of data 
were fragmented. The comprehensive gathering, storage, use and interpretation of citizen 
information, data, and feedback was out of reach. The widespread use of private service 
contracts protected by commercial confidentiality also limited accountability and 
transparency.  
The lessons of this for Digital Government Transformation are obvious, in that the 
mechanical transposition into government of private sector practices should be avoided or 
at least handled with care. Moreover, such practices are irrelevant when attempting to 
improve policy making and governance. Some elements of the move away from NPM such 
as decentralisation, networked governance, social innovation and social enterprise, 
transparency and participation, found a natural match with the potential of digital 
technologies. This led to the emergence of the broadly defined Digital Era Government 
(DEG) paradigm. One example of this pairing of policy with technology is the wave of Open 
Data initiatives (Clarke and Margetts, 2014).  
DEG can be subdivided into three main waves: (a) the mechanical digitisation of 
government services; (b) a holistic approach to citizens’ needs; and (c) a focus on 
transparency, engagement and participation. This last wave also occurred under pressure 
from the demands of austerity, with digital channels being introduced that were shared by 
default, in order to enhance efficiency and ‘do more with less’, including by encouraging 
citizens to co-produce and co-create to generate cost-savings (Clarke and Margetts, 2014; 
Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013).  
The ‘digital by default’ ideal of DEG makes information and data strategic, and placing 
them at the core of innovation and change. A citizen-centric approach, Open Data, 
transparency, engagement and participation, the use of social media as novel way to 
understand citizens’ needs and opinions, are all part of various digital initiatives prescribed 
in policy pronouncements and implemented under various programmes. Particularly during 
the third wave of DEG, the idea emerged, taken from the private sector, of an ‘intelligent 
centre/devolved delivery design in the management of data across tiers of government’ 
(Clarke and Margetts, 2014, p. 396). Yet, the new technologies considered in this study 
are geared toward a new, fourth wave of data-driven, context-aware, and context-smart 
DEG. This new wave of DEG will require some of the previous challenges to be faced, as 
well as the bridging of the gap between technology and institutional settings. It will also 
require initiatives to go beyond the mostly rhetorical and insufficiently deep measures 
undertaken in the domain of Open Data, engagement, participation and the use of social 
media. 
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2.2.2 Governance 
Governance10 is part and parcel of the main institutional characteristics and settings 
characterising government and the public sector as a whole; however, the concept is 
surrounded by a number of ambiguities that need be cleared up11. In particular, two uses 
of the term ‘governance’ may generate misunderstanding. The first is the one in which 
governance is always associated with the adjective ‘good’ in a prescriptive manner 
(typically in the United Nation and World Bank usage of this expression); this normatively 
coloured concept is not relevant to our framework, and will not be used or further 
discussed. The second, typical of the broadly defined literature on ICT in public 
administration, is the use of ‘governance’ merely to mean openness and participation. From 
this use derives the misleading practice of defining governance outcomes as being separate 
from the outcomes of service provisions or policy making. In reality, if digital innovation 
has impacts on governance processes, these will be horizontal, also affecting service 
provision and policy making.  
In its purest and most original sense, the term ‘governance’ is neutral and empirical (i.e. 
its form needs to be ascertained). However, in political science the term has come to be 
used to describes the structures and processes by which a social organisation or an 
ecosystem of agents – from the family to corporate business to international institutions – 
steers itself. These range from centralised control to self-regulation. In certain analyses, 
the term is associated with the process of de-centralising authority, and of fragmentation 
among public and private actors on multiple levels – national, sub-national, local and 
international – that is alleged to accompany globalisation. The usage of ‘governance’ rather 
than ‘government’ is justified by the fact that it can refer to social interactions that are co-
ordinated and organised, not just to formally exerted state authority. We propose the 
following as a working definition: “Governance denotes the structures and processes that 
enable a set of public, private, and social actors and stakeholders to coordinate their 
independent needs and interests through the making and implementation of binding 
decisions integrating and/or going beyond the parameters springing from mandatory 
regulations and laws emanating from state-vested authorities at various levels”. 
Table 3. Different coordination modes and their characteristics 
 Hierarchy Agency Association Governance 
Mechanism Vertical: 
‘command and 
control’ 
Vertical: 
delegation 
Horizontal: 
vote 
Horizontal: 
exchange, 
negotiation 
Objectives Top-down Set by principal Shared Shared 
Membership Closed, possibly 
heterogeneous 
Open and 
functionally 
homogeneous 
Closed and 
homogeneous 
Open and 
heterogeneous 
Boundaries Formally 
defined 
Formally 
defined 
Defined by 
statute 
Informal, 
floating 
Strengths  Capacity to 
impose optimal 
Capacity to 
impose optimal 
High 
legitimacy and 
Shared optimal 
decisions, 
                                           
10 The term governance, left unused for a very long time, was brought back into the vocabulary of the social 
sciences for the first time in the seminal 1937 article ‘The Nature of the Firm’ by Ronald Coase, in the form of the 
expression ‘corporate governance’, indicating the coordination mechanisms, different from those provided by 
both the formal hierarchies and the market, characterising the complex and diverse contexts of large corporations 
and conglomerate groups. 
11 For a review of the debate on governance and for empirical evidence from the political science literature, see, 
among many others, the earlier cited sources (Peters and Pierre, 1998; Peters and Pierre, 2006; Rhodes, 1988; 
Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes, 1997). 
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decisions, 
shape 
environment, 
sanction 
opportunism 
decisions, 
specific 
expertise, 
flexibility to 
changes 
transparency 
of process, 
capacity of 
bearing 
externality 
managing 
change and full 
delivery 
processes, 
including 
externalities 
Problems ‘Routinisation’, 
hysteresis, 
internalisation 
of externalities, 
high cost of 
control of sub-
ordinates 
Typical risk of 
principal/agent 
relationship, 
lack of capacity 
to act on 
externality 
outside sector 
of competence 
Time-
consuming 
decision 
making, only 
pareto-optimal 
solutions, low 
control over 
post-decision 
making phases 
Blurred 
accountability 
and definition of 
membership, 
high 
management 
costs, low 
capacity to 
sanction 
opportunism 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
Governance (possibly blurred, networked or participative) is one of many types of 
coordination mechanism that an ecosystem of separate but interconnected actors may 
enact, depending on the ecosystem’s characteristics and its highly contingent goals. As 
illustrated in the table below, when problems and situations require a multi-level and 
blurred governance approach, this differs substantially from the traditional coordination 
ensured by regulation and laws emanating from the top downwards. 
Table 4. Government versus governance. 
Stakes Government Governance 
Defining problems  
Parties, executive, 
bureaucracies 
Epistemic community, 
advocacy coalition, networks 
Solving problems 
Parties, executive, 
bureaucracies 
Epistemic community, 
advocacy coalition, networks 
Prioritising problems  Executive 
Issue network, advocacy 
coalition, policy community, 
policy sub-system/ sub-
government 
Making the solution 
public 
Legislative / executive 
Policy community, policy sub-
system/ sub-government 
Defining the solution 
to be implemented 
Parties (experts), executive, 
high bureaucracies 
Policy community, policy sub-
system/ sub-government, Iron 
duet 
Who implements  
the solution? 
Bureaucracy 
Policy community, policy sub-
system/ sub-government, 
implementation network 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
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It is important to stress that no scale exists stating that one form of coordination is better 
than another, or that multi-level blurred governance is always better than a government-
ensured form of coordination. The suitability of such forms depends entirely on the 
characteristics of the ecosystem in question, and particular contingent situation of the 
innovative intervention being launched. In situation A, innovation X may be better steered 
by top-down government regulation, whereas in situation B the same innovation X may be 
more effectively guided by a networked and multi-level governance approach. In the 
following section, we extract from this clarification some important aspects that are 
relevant to consider in the proposed framework. 
2.2.3 Summing up 
In the previous paragraphs, we elucidate some key points concerning the peculiarity of the 
public sector, which shape the way in which some of the innovation antecedents should be 
approached. The greater relative length of this summing-up reflects the importance of this 
aspect. We will deal with the various issues in the order in which they have been discussed 
in previous paragraphs, although some areas of overlap will require a certain amount of 
cross-referencing between them. 
Incentives. To discuss incentives and the decision to invest in innovation, we borrow some 
insights from the literature on the economics of innovation12. Where separation exists 
between ownership and management, managers may invest in innovation more or less 
than would be desirable, as a result of what is termed a ‘moral hazard’. This is classic, 
textbook Principal-Agent situation. Managers (the agent) may spend on ‘innovation’ 
activities that benefit them more than they do the shareholders (the principal) –, such as, 
for instance, the innovation to grow the firm beyond the scale of efficiency, or simply to 
keep up with current trends. Alternatively, managers may be risk-adverse and therefore 
forego opportunities for innovation. In the public sector, we face exactly this Principal-
Agent situation, and there is a lack of direct and intuitive monetary incentives for the public 
sector innovators. In the public sector, there is no incentive to maximise profit, and in the 
vast majority of public sector institutions, costs are funded by the public budget. In 
addition, the public sector is characterised by multi-layered Principal-Agent situations and 
related their moral hazards. This situation may produce two opposite results. On the one 
hand, due to a lack of real incentives public sector managers may invest less in innovation 
than is required to increase the return to society as a whole through a positive outcome. 
On the other hand, because costs are borne by the public budget, managers may invest in 
innovation more than is warranted by the possible positive outcomes. Incentives can be 
part of the governance mechanisms at all levels of government. 
Institutional isomorphic innovation. Public sector managers may launch innovations 
just to increase the legitimacy of their organisations, or to follow currently hyped trends, 
precisely as a result of the process of institutional isomorphism we described earlier. This 
can produce ‘mirror’ effects that should be avoided: following a trend among other 
organisations, or simply digitising analogue procedures or service provisions without 
changing them. The core premise of this critique is that administrative agencies are 
fundamentally concerned with securing their own legitimacy, in the sense of meeting 
societal expectations about appropriate structures, practices, rhetoric or output (Scott, 
1991, p. 169), By being perceived as legitimate for drawing on expert knowledge, an 
organisation seeks ‘epistemic authority’, which it can use to ensure its goal prevails in the 
event that its policy domain is contested. Thus, organisations tend to undertake processes 
of convergent change in order to appear legitimised within their institutional environment 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991). Through mimetic processes, individual organisations 
imitate the most legitimate and/or successful players in their environment, in order that 
they too will acquire legitimacy, thus producing institutional isomorphism. A similar process 
can result in the institutionalisation of recurrent innovations13.  
                                           
12 Based on Hall and Rosenthal (2011); Hall (2005). 
13 See two example of new-institutionalist approaches in sociology and economics: D'Aunno, Succi and Alexander 
(2000) and Nee (2005).  
 26 
The characteristics of public administration can also compound these processes (see 
below). In this sense, external exogenous factors can intervene to increase the objectively 
and subjectively perceived legitimacy and desirability of a given innovation, ensuring there 
is no over- or under-investment in innovations within the public sector. Herein lies the 
important role of higher-level policy making and governance: the legitimacy of certain 
innovations can be increased through more or less direct, or softer and harder, policy 
measures. Conversely, they can be put in check where signs of copycat innovations are 
detected. This can happen as a result of governance and regulation mechanisms, as well 
as through evaluation, performance monitoring and benchmarking – an aspect to which 
we shortly turn. 
Public administration institutional settings. All else being equal, unitary states with a 
high level of horizontal coordination, and which use a majoritarian system to form their 
executive, should be in a better position to introduce uniform innovation than decentralised 
states with a low level of horizontal coordination and consensually formed governments, 
where a lot of negotiation and compromise are needed. Deep and rapid structural reform 
tends to be more difficult in consensual systems than in majoritarian systems. Majoritarian 
systems focus on political will and the designation of winners and losers. The more 
consensual the regime, the more likely it is to achieve the opposite result. Consensual 
systems are less inclined towards, and less capable of, radical reform. Centralised countries 
find it less difficult to carry out radical reform than decentralised countries. On the other 
hand, abrupt policy changes produce winners and losers. The more consensual the regime, 
the more likely it is that losers will be represented in the executive. This leads to the 
likelihood that polices will become diluted in the process. At the same time, majoritarian 
policies may also fall victim to abrupt policy shifts. An extreme top-down approach creates 
a lack of ownership at the lower level, where innovation must be implemented. In 
consensual systems, by contrast, if agreement is reached as to what to do, fewer problems 
are encountered with ownership at lower levels. In federal states, the opportunity exists 
for particular regions to become places of experimentation and innovation.  
For the sake of simplicity, when comparing the two extreme types of Public Interest and 
Rechtsstaat tradition, ex-ante one can expect that certain changes that are required for 
the introduction of digital innovation may be easier in the latter, thanks to there being less 
need for new legislation. Which sources of advice are used, and whether or not bureaucrats 
are politicised and their careers linked to those of politicians, can influence the selection of 
innovations and may be a channel of copycat innovation. Further, broad sources of advice 
can foster innovation, and the ambition of public servants can lead them to deliver the 
necessary leadership. Which type of organisational model prevails (along with its practices, 
norms, structures, and processes) will impact the chances that new data-centric digital 
government innovations will be successfully implemented. (Adoption is less of a problem, 
as such reforms are already part of a new wave being adopted everywhere.) Where 
traditional practices still resemble the Weberian model, barriers will exist to data sharing 
and usage. On the other hand, where NPM has left as its legacy the fragmentation of IT 
systems and expertise, this too will be a barrier. Where a given agency has already made 
progress towards a DEG (Digital Era Government) model, this will be a driver for success. 
In order for governments to take advantage of data and the analytics techniques that use 
them, they must change their organisational structures/practices, and both conceive of 
and use information and knowledge through a new lens. This means adopting new ways of 
thinking as part of the institutionalised conceptual and cognitive repertoire of the internal 
organisation and the way it interacts with external actors, from citizens and interest groups 
to other governmental stakeholders. This final observation is key and instrumental to our 
proposed framework.  
Finally, a disclaimer on the trade-off between generality and granularity. While our analysis 
of public administration characteristics has been broad and mostly from the perspective of 
central government, the same dimensions of analysis can be operationalised at a different 
level (including from the perspective of a single public agency). There are very marked and 
important cultural and structural differences between countries that can only be dealt with 
at the level of concrete case studies and at the level of a conceptual framework.  
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To illustrate this, we offer two examples that focus on the issues of impacts and their 
measurement. First, indicators of cost savings in terms of human resources or improved 
effectiveness must take into account the fact that in certain countries, rules and 
regulations, as well as issues such as negotiations over labour contracts between the public 
sector and trade unions, can hinder and/or delay the exploitation of such gains. In such 
instances, it would be difficult for a strictly defined indicator of cost savings in terms of 
human resources to be accepted by all administrations in EU Member States. Second, to 
measure inter-operability and the degree of joined-up services, one must take into account 
the fact that the likelihood of achieving such objectives also depends on the structure of 
the state. It is reasonable to assume that such objectives would be more difficult to achieve 
in decentralised and federalist states. To accommodate these variations, the framework 
we have produced must therefore remain at a relatively high level of abstraction. 
Governance mechanisms and the importance of evaluation. From the perspective of 
introducing digital innovation that requires an open governance approach, it is worth noting 
some challenges: 
 Who participates in multi-level decision making? 
o How representative are the stakeholders involved in a network, with respect 
to all those who are possibly interested and/or affected? 
o Who is the gatekeeper, and who can solve the above question? 
 Risk of self-referential closure in multi-level decision making networks: 
o Risk of technocratic drift (if dominated by experts). 
o Risk of a ‘solution in search of a problem’ (if dominated by IT experts and 
industry) 
o Risk of populism / demagogy (if dominated by user representatives). 
 Blurred accountability: 
o Networked co-decision, but who is responsible if outcomes are not achieved 
and/or if something goes really wrong? 
o Need for strong evaluation and measurement to monitor performance. 
 
A governance approach requires some mechanisms to define the expected outcomes and 
establish the accountability of different actors. In order to control against the hazard of 
over-investment, it is crucial to measure and evaluate the relative advantage of innovation 
versus carrying on business as usual. In general, the introduction of ICT into any industry 
faces the challenge of low product differentiation14, switching costs15, and technical 
compatibility (i.e. inter-operability)16.  
                                           
14 The ICT industry is driven by the economy of networks rather than by economies of scale; the ICT system of 
firm 'A' needs to be integrated with that of firm 'B' (i.e. a travel agent with an airline). This causes the production 
of ICT that can be supplied to both A and B. Further, there is positive feedback: the more an ICT product 
commands a large market share, the more likely it is that such a share will grow even bigger. This results in 
lower product differentiation, which has been proven to explain why, on average, the adoption of ICT tends to be 
slower (and even lower) than that of other technologies characterised by greater product differentiation. 
15 ICT brings with it several sources of switching costs: a) the need to bring paper records into a digital format; 
b) the need to integrate with legacy technological systems (both ICT and non-ICT); c) the need to interlink several 
ICT components (hardware, storage support, software for the  elaboration of stored information, software for 
communication, etc.) These may lock-in the organisations using the ICT to only one supplier and, thus, either 
constrain change or impose higher costs. In addition, there are intangible switching costs in terms of 
reorganisation and the training of personnel. 
16 Technological inter-operability plays a much more prominent role in the adoption of ICT than in any other forms 
of technology. The value of any ICT is fundamentally linked to its ability to connect via a common technical 
standard with other electronic means of data storage and communication. 
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These issues are greatly compounded by the specific characteristic of the public sector17: 
(a) multi-layered and interlinked agents and players; and (b) the heterogeneity of users’ 
needs and ways to address them. Heterogeneity also compounds the problem of low 
product differentiation. Switching costs are compounded by the fact that all the players 
listed depend on each other for the use of the same associated technology. The daunting 
challenge of inter-operability in this context is an order of magnitude greater than in any 
other industry value chain. All of these aspects make evaluation and measurement more 
challenging, but at the same time, more urgently required. Finally, to avoid under-
investment due to a lack of incentives, multi-level governance mechanisms aimed at 
fostering innovation need to create the right incentives. 
2.3 Technology dimension 
2.3.1 Focus and approach 
As noted in the introduction, this study focuses on the eight technologies/ applications 
described in Table 5 below18.  
Table 5. Selected technologies / applications. 
Acronym Description 
AI  
Artificial intelligence. This umbrella term refers to any machine or 
algorithm that is capable of observing its environment, learning and taking 
intelligent action, based on the knowledge and experience gained.  
BPA 
Behavioural and predictive analytics. The process of using data mining, 
statistics and modelling to make predictions about future outcomes. 
Behavioural and predictive analytics lies at the crossroads of AI and Big 
Data. Historical data are used by machines to determine what behaviour 
can be expected in the future. This process can incorporate behavioural 
insights. 
RPA 
Robotic process automation. RPA is the AI-enabled automation of 
various aspects of government operations. It uses special software to 
automate routine clerical work such as data entry into a system. It mimics 
the actions of a human employee and interacts with applications in the same 
way that a human would. 
IoT 
Internet of Things. IoT is a General-Purpose Technology (GPT) that 
enables physical objects to be linked together through the use of embedded 
sensors, actuators and other devices that collect and transmit information 
about real-time activity within a given ecosystem network (e.g. 
transportation and mobility, energy, smart cities) 
GSLD 
Geo-spatial and location data. A GPT that provides geographical and 
location information on various data objects that are connected with a 
specific place or location, which can then be mapped. 
DLED 
Distributed ledger (blockchain). A set of GPTs that enable 
information/data sharing and digital transactions within a distributed 
network involving government-to-government (G2G) interactions, as well 
as broader interactions involving government, societal and economic actors. 
                                           
17See, for example, an analysis that considers health care but is applicable to public sector more generally 
(Christensen and Remler, 2007). 
18 Open Government data and social media/collaboration platforms are not technologies per se, but are 
applications resulting from the combination of different technologies. 
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OGD 
Open Government data. Application of a set of technologies enabling the 
realisation of policies promoting transparency, accountability and value 
creation by making government data available to all. 
SM/CP 
Social media/Collaborative platforms. It is the use of social media and 
other platforms to source information/insights from citizens and business 
and/or for co-creation and collaboration between government and all other 
actors of economy and society. 
Source: elaborated by the authors. 
 
The starting point for moving from e-Government to Digital Government Transformation is 
the application of new and emerging technologies. These cannot, however, be considered 
in isolation from other factors (considered in the previous two sections); from their possible 
combination; and from the specific characteristics of such technologies. 
Full transformation is most likely to occur as a result of the combination of different 
technologies and innovations, since the value of digital transformation is less about the 
tools used in delivery and more about the way in which governments can now engage with 
their users to gather insights and design responses to best address their needs. This 
process is enabled by increasingly ubiquitous and affordable personal technology and the 
wealth of data produced. We will further discuss the technologies/application presented in 
Table 5 above. These are assumed to support governments to: better understand their 
citizens in order to design better policies and services; find new solutions to policy 
challenges; implement their everyday functions and provide services more effectively and 
efficiently; engage with citizens, businesses and other external stakeholders in new ways 
to develop new policies, services and delivery models; operate more transparently and 
accountably, leading to increased government legitimacy. 
The technologies presented in Table 5 are not to be considered as independent from one 
other, but rather as part of the digital transformation that is ultimately rooted in the 
creation, collection, use and advanced analysis of large amounts of data, driven by the 
potential of unprecedent computing power. For this reason, expressions such as ‘data-
driven society’ and ‘data-driven governments’ are used to explain that digital 
transformation is based on the intensive use of data. Here, we introduce a brief description 
of the most relevant technologies, and discuss how they are used by governments to 
improve both internal processes as well as public services and policy design. Please note 
that we use the term ‘technology’ in a general sense to describe both the disruptive 
technologies and the application of them. 
As mentioned above, the digital transformation in government does not originate from a 
single technology or the application of it, but rather from the combination of technologies 
which make it possible to harness the potential of large amounts of data. It can be argued 
that governments have never suffered from a lack of data; the problem was how to extract 
the value from such data. Governments now use computing technology to capture and 
harvest this data and ultimately extract value from it. To simplify, we can divide the 
technologies concerned into those that serve as source of data, and those that analyse 
data to improve services and policies. The former category includes the Internet of Things, 
geo-spatial data, Open Government data, social media/collaborative platforms and 
blockchain. The digital transformation of government occurs only when there is access to 
a constellation of different sources of information that can be linked together. In the second 
category, we include AI, predictive analytics and RPA. It is important to stress here that 
maximising the potential of these technologies requires important preparatory work: data 
must be sourced, structured, engineered, linked and integrated before it can be processed 
using innovative analytical techniques and finally embedded into the internal functioning 
of government organisations.  
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Let us consider the example of the RPA implemented by the Swedish municipality of 
Trelleborg to handle social assistance and welfare applications such as home care 
applications, sickness and unemployment benefits (Barcevičius et al., 2019). 
Administrative tasks such as the calculation of home care fees were automated and are 
now executed by a case handler RPA. For this to be possible, internal data and data about 
the applicant needed to be structured and engineered, while administrative processes had 
to be analysed and redesigned. This shows how Digital Government Transformation starts 
with the internal functioning of a government organisation. Changes in the internal 
functioning are horizontal to the types of innovation described earlier. 
Box 1. Data gathering technologies: examples of use by governments.  
The use of IoT technologies is not completely new, but governments are increasingly 
applying them across several broad domains including transportation, energy, smart 
cities, and defence as a powerful way of gathering and using data. IoT devices generate 
huge amounts of data, which can be combined with data from other devices and systems 
to deliver new insights. For this reason, analysts emphasise the potential of IoT to 
transform the public sector, by bringing together the major technical and business trends 
of mobility, automation and data analytics. Lastly, IoT plays a role in what is often 
referred-to as smart or intelligent government, and is among the key trends that 
governments need to follow in the near future. 
The collection of geospatial data (GSLD) has been accelerated by the application of 
IoT and geographical positioning technologies. Its full potential is becoming realised 
thanks to AI and Big Data analytics, cloud computing, and the expansion of wireless and 
broadband, among other technologies. Geospatial and location data, often coupled with 
other data, can provide a granular historical and predictive view for every location on 
the map. When analysed, this data can improve policymaking on complex localised 
situations and enables the provision of location-based services. GSLD requires localised 
data to be integrated with other data in order for a point on the map to yield actionable 
insights. It also requires data governance agreements, as per IoT.  
The core tasks of DLED technologies such as blockchain are the registration, 
identification, verification and authentication of digital transactions. The literature 
explores potential cases for the application of this technology by public administrations, 
including personal records, land registry, supply chain management, contract and vendor 
management processes. The use of blockchain technology promises to reduce fraud, 
errors and the cost of paper-intensive processes. It can also increase security and 
privacy both for data sharing and digital transactions. This can ultimately foster 
transparency and trust over government data and transactions. 
Open Government data (OGD) is expected to improve the overall quality of 
democratic systems and trust by increasing transparency, accountability and citizen 
engagement. Moreover, by opening up the huge quantities of data and information 
collected by public organisations and encouraging their use, governments can promote 
business creation (e.g. companies such as LinkedIn, Kayak, Zillow, and Esri use 
government data in their work) and innovative citizen-centric services.  
Box 2. Data analytics technologies: examples of use by governments.   
The umbrella term artificial intelligence (AI) covers several technologies including 
machine learning, deep learning, predictive analytics, computer vision and natural 
language processing, among others. A number of studies have examined a variety of 
applications for AI in the public sector, from models used to predict the prices of awards 
for public infrastructure projects, to the use of Big Data from cities as a policy tool to 
advance the goals of urban development, and the use of AI for medical diagnosis and 
many other examples. Behavioural and predictive analytics, as a form of AI, can provide 
insights that improve policy design and enable the implementation of pre-emptive 
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measures. AI can also enable the provision of faster, better, personalised, and context-
specific services. It can help to simulate situations and the effects of potential measures 
in real time. It must be noted, however, that the current AI practices/solutions in the 
public sector are in the early stages of process automation and predictive analytics.  
Governments are already applying robotic process automation (RPA) to 
administrative tasks such as calculating benefits and taxes, anti-fraud checks and 
processing licensing applications, as well as in other sectors such as policing (e.g. fixed 
penalty processing, crime reporting), health (e.g. coding, diagnostics) and education 
(e.g. admissions and enrolments, student timetabling). In general, RPA can be used to 
implement numerous tasks and can often replace traditional government services. Aside 
from RPA, which denotes the use software robots with no physical presence, physical 
robots (humanoid and non-humanoid) are also being introduced into public service 
provision in some countries. 
The introduction of disruptive technology is probably the central pillar for a digital 
transformation – but organisational, social and cultural factors are also necessary. Some 
of these cultural aspects relate specifically to these new technologies, with their potential 
only being realised through the introduction of new concepts and thinking. For instance, 
Big Data needs to be treated with new analytical techniques that require a change in the 
culture of modelling toward abductive, algorithm-based analysis (Veltri, 2017). 
Government research into citizens’ needs, attitudes and behaviours has been based on 
limited sample methods, most of which (except experiments) are based on self-reported 
information that may be filtered and can suffer from biases. Big Data can yield real-time 
information about what people really do (e.g. transactional and activity-generated data) 
or think (e.g. social media). New analytical and data capacities can improve policy 
implementation by better targeting communications and provisions to different audiences, 
combining the power of Big Data analytics with insights from behavioural economics and 
the ‘nudge’ approach. Applying this potential requires a new culture of data gathering and 
engineering, as well as a paradigm shift in the way new insights are sought and used. 
2.3.2 Prerequisites and challenges  
At the core of the digital government innovations considered in this study is a shift towards 
a Data-Driven Public Sector (DDPS), outlined in Figure 5 below.  
Figure 5. The Data-Driven Public Sector.  
 
Source: van Ooijen, Welby and Ubaldi, 2019, p. 11. 
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Further forms of innovation exist that are not entirely driven by data, but data provide the 
core engine of those considered here. In this respect, a number of prerequisites and 
challenges that can be drawn from the OECD working paper mentioned earlier (van Ooijen, 
Welby and Ubaldi, 2019). Figure 5 above, taken from the OECD paper, is extremely 
effective in mapping the complexity of establishing a DDPS. It elucidates the value chain 
in a way that is not simply linear but recursive, incorporating a feedback loop within the 
necessary steps and indicating the creation of public value. After the first two steps, there 
is a loop between sharing and using/ re-using that, once launched, can retroactively feed 
and positively reinforce the first two steps. For the digital transformation promises of a 
DDPS to be realised, intense work is needed to make sure data are available and able to 
be put to use. This means work on internal and external processes that requires innovations 
in organisation and governance, combinations of data and analytical technologies, and 
eventually a conceptual shift – that is, changes in the organisation’s cognitive and 
behavioural repertoires. Data must be sourced, linked and integrated, stored, structured 
and engineered, before use can be made of them via innovative analytics.  
Figure 6. Challenges to fostering a Data-Driven Public sector. 
 
Source: van Ooijen, Welby, & Ubaldi, 2019, p.29. 
From their analysis, the OECD researchers identified the challenges (barriers) to the 
creation of a DDPS summarised in Figure 6 above. These can be seen in terms of 
prerequisites specifically relating to the technologies involved, into which must be 
integrated an analysis of innovation antecedents and the other contextual factors 
presented in previous sections, although some overlaps exist between them.  
As illustrated in the figure, there are four main challenges/ prerequisites. First, the 
availability and quality of data. Second, the conditions that make possible the sharing of 
data. Third, the availability of skills and capabilities, to which we would add the need for a 
reframing of conceptual and mental models. Fourth are issues concerning legitimacy and 
public trust in relation to the ethical use of data by public sector organisations, privacy, 
transparency and the risks that governments and citizens need to be aware of.  
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The second condition is clearly related to public administration models and structural 
characteristics; the third condition is related to the individual antecedents of innovation; 
whereas the fourth condition can be seen either as part of the regulatory environment or 
as an intervening factor that may foster or hamper digital government innovation. This is 
a very important factor that is worth considering in further detail to prepare for the 
discussion of possible side-effects presented in Chapter 4 of this report. 
Concerns over feedback loops based on the surveillance of users using their personal data 
and extracting behavioural surplus have emerged with respect to the application of 
machine learning and other data analytics techniques (Zuboff, 2019). In the context of 
individuals’ behavioural limitations and aggressive practices by industry, the EU Ethics 
Advisory Group has expressed concern over the relationship between personhood and 
personal data, the risks of discrimination as a result of data processing, and the risks of 
undermining the foundations of democracy (Ethics Advisory Group, 2018). Machine 
learning and deep learning algorithms are increasingly used and can produce outstanding 
results such as analysing images to detect potentially cancerous cells (Al-shamasneh and 
Obaidellah, 2017). At the same time, there are worrying examples of biased and 
discriminatory decisions (Pasquale, 2015; Ziewitz, 2015) such as wrong decisions on 
recidivism risks that discriminate racially, because differences in arrest rates between racial 
groups may be replicated by algorithms calculating such a risk (Chouldechova, 2017), or 
in hiring decisions where the underrepresentation of women in particular jobs leads the 
hiring algorithm to determine a rule that men are preferable candidates19. The roots of 
biases in ML and deep learning lie in the data, testing, and decision models used. It is not 
true that the scale of Big Data ensures its validity and accuracy – the quality of the data 
still matters (Domingos, 2012). If key data is withheld by design or chance, the algorithm’s 
performance is weakened (Olhede and Wolfe, 2017). The implicit and often-made 
assumption that once we collect enough data, algorithms will not be biased, is not justified 
(Barocas and Selbst, 2016). Bias can arise in algorithms in several ways. First, the data 
collected may have been preferentially sampled, and therefore the data sample itself is 
biased (Olhede and Wolfe, 2018). Second, bias can arise because the collected data reflects 
existing societal bias (Caliskan et al., 2017). To the extent that society contains inequality, 
exclusion or other forms of discrimination, so too will the data (Goodman and Flaxman, 
2017). Article 22 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) establishes the right 
to an explanation of a decision taken by an algorithm, and has spurred a debate on the 
possibility of introducing a legal requirement for algorithm transparency (Buiten, 2019; 
Goodman and Flaxman, 2017; Wachter et al., 2018). The GDPR represents the first step 
in regulating the protection of personal data, but many aspects remain controversial and 
not fully binding. The ways in which the GDPR will be applied in practice are still not clear. 
In this area, digital government should set examples and establish good practices of the 
way in which data are used for the public good. This represents a great challenge in 
achieving trust and legitimacy, and the lack of an adequate approach could give rise to the 
negative side-effects discussed in Section 2.5.4. 
2.3.3 Summing up 
The main points discussed above in relation to technology, some of which inform the 
framework proposed, are as follows: 
 Technologies should not be considered in isolation. 
 It is the combination of technologies and other innovations that offers the power to 
transform (although our framework we cannot depict all of the possible 
combinations, and we will thus need to simplify them). 
 Among those technologies that comprise the focus of this study, two groups can be 
identified: those that serve as a source of data, and those that analyse data to 
                                           
19 See for instance: ‘Amazon scraps secret AI recruiting tool that showed bias against women’ (Reuters, 10 
October 2018: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-
secret-ai-recruiting-tool-thatshowed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G) 
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improve services and policies. The former group include the Internet of Things, geo-
spatial data, Open Government data, social media/collaborative platforms and 
blockchain. The digital transformation of government will occur only when there is 
access to a constellation of different sources of information that can be linked 
together. In this second category, we include artificial intelligence, predictive 
analytics and robotic process automation. Only by combining the two groups can 
Digital Government Transformation be achieved within a Data-Driven Public Sector 
(DDSP) 
 The value chain required to achieve a DDSP and fulfil the potential for Digital 
Government Transformation is complex. As a result, some technology-specific 
antecedents/prerequisites must be addressed in order that they do not become 
barriers:  
o Fragmentation of siloed IT systems and expertise.  
o The need for system integration (including the engineering and structuring 
of data). 
o The availability of data (internally to a single agency, from other public 
agencies, personal data). 
o Data sharing of sources both within and beyond government boundaries, 
complying with GDPR and considering the issues of privacy and security for 
the sake of public trust (see below). 
 
Technological possibilities and regulatory/policy interventions. On the one hand 
new technologies (especially AI) are raising concerns in relation to the use of personal data 
and the potential human jobs and skills to be replaced by machines. On the other hand, 
policy and regulatory measures can either constrain technological innovation, or they can 
enable it by channelling it towards acceptable and sustainable solutions. Technological and 
institutional dimensions therefore interact and overlap when it comes to dealing with 
regulatory and ethical frameworks for AI and the risk of unemployment posed by the 
automation and robotisation of routine tasks. Violations of personal privacy, discrimination 
by algorithms, or massive unemployment due to robots displacing humans, could all cause 
a strongly negative backlash against digital transformation, especially if they concern 
government, which is the actor expected to set the best example. In this pessimistic 
scenario, public trust and legitimacy would plunge to all-time lows rather than being 
reinforced by the digital transformation of government. Hence, policy measures and 
regulations can actually support digital innovation by minimising potential negative effects. 
They can tackle issues such as job loss, lack of skilled personnel, ethical concerns and lack 
of trust over privacy and security issues. Policy-supporting measures could aim to reduce 
job losses and increase the availability of skills through retraining initiatives, while the 
introduction of an ethical regulatory framework for AI, together with measures on privacy 
and security, could offset the risk of low trust and legitimacy. A clear framework for the 
exchange, sharing and purchasing of data could speed up the adoption of technology and 
increase the potential for its promised effects to be realised. A clear legal framework that 
protects privacy and security would fully open up access to data. The lack of such a 
framework could turn into an important barrier. Restrictions on data flow and data 
sovereignty, particularly in relation to initiatives that use geolocation data, could seriously 
limit opportunities to take advantage of new technologies. Therefore, a GDPR-compliant 
regulatory framework should facilitate accessibility to data by governments. 
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2.4 DigiGov-F 
In Section 2.4.1 of this chapter, we review the various antecedents previously discussed, 
bridging the perspectives of innovation and organisational change. By doing so, we 
illustrate the main external and internal factors included in the proposed conceptual 
framework. Section 2.4.2 presents a graphical representation of Digi-Gov-F and briefly 
explained. Finally, Section 2.4.3, in response to the requirement to systematise digital 
government within the literature on public sector innovation, we first present a conceptual 
map of digital government innovation. 
2.4.1 Bridging innovation and organisational change 
Figure 7 below integrates, in a syncretic manner, our earlier analysis of innovation 
antecedents, institutional settings and technology, with the organisational change 
perspective applied to the ICT-enabled transformation of government as presented, for 
example, by Weerakkody, Janssen and Dwivedi (2011). Our perspective adds external 
factors, and borrows from Weerakkody, Janssen and Dwivedi some insights on internal 
organisational change and on the move from the ‘as is’ to the ‘to be’ situation – in this 
case, by way of digital government innovation. 
Figure 7. From antecedents to internal and external change factors. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors.  
In considering a hypothetical public agency, the starting point is considered to be an 
appraisal of the current situation as being not entirely satisfactory. Based on internal vision 
and strategy, a certain need of a given constituency may be identified as being not fully 
met. More generally, the agency may decide to become more responsive to its user base 
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These will include some kind of ex-ante vision as to how it can achieve the desired 
transformation (‘to be’ state), with improved performance. An important motivating factor 
when considering an innovation’s attributes will be the perception of how the innovation 
could increase the legitimacy of innovator’s organisation. In this way, external pressures 
and influence can shape both the appraisal of the innovation’s attributes and the strategy 
for change chosen by the agency. Should the innovation’s relative advantage not be clear 
and supported by evidence, this could lead to the moral hazard of under- or over- 
investment. Policy and governance levers (incentives and top-down mandatory directives) 
can, however, positively impact the agency’s motivation and offset the risk of moral 
hazard. Political leadership and public administration norms and values (considered part of 
the institutional setting) together with the presence of champions from previous successful 
experiences (organisational readiness) are also important factors. Networks and influence-
shaping public discourse on innovation can increase the perceived legitimacy of an 
innovation, which may lead to its adoption as a result of institutional isomorphism. Strong 
societal demands and needs have a clear impact on how the relative advantage of an 
innovation is framed and, subsequently, evaluated.  
When an innovation is adopted and the process of implementing change begins, internal 
change factors come to the fore. If we assume that the starting point is a siloed 
organisational structure and fragmented information systems and data storage, the 
challenging job of redesigning organisational processes and structure will go hand in hand 
with the integration of IT, as well as the engineering and structuring of data sources. This 
task becomes even more challenging when the digital innovation is not self-contained in a 
single public agency, but involves other actors within government and possibly also non-
governmental actors and data sources. In this scenario, policy and regulation levers, 
together with governance mechanisms, are a strategic external input to provide both 
incentives for sharing and collaborating and the regulatory and ethical framework for the 
use of personal data. The availability (or lack) of slack resources, leadership and committed 
and skilled employees can function as a driver (or barrier) to these processes.  
Aside from the tangible internal factors described above, equally important are changes in 
organisational culture towards sharing and collaboration and, in particular, to the 
organisation’s cognitive and behavioural frames and routines. We refer here to the 
introduction of new concepts, as well as to normative and cognitive routines concerning 
the internal function and external environment. These help to reframe the definition of 
problems and their solutions, leading to new ways of thinking that change the thoughts or 
behavioural intentions underlying the development and deployment of policies and 
services. This can lead to improvements in the identification of the needs of constituents, 
as well as shortening the time required to develop, test, implement and diffuse a policy, 
and promoting the adoption of new languages and concepts and new methods to influence 
behaviour.  
This reframing is important, since the digital transformation of government will only occur: 
(a) when there is access to a constellation of different sources of information that can be 
linked together; and (b) new analytical techniques are employed using a new and 
appropriate frame of mind. This is to say that the transformative potential of the new 
technologies is linked to the introduction of new concepts and new ways of thinking that 
challenge the assumptions that underlie processes, services and products. It also requires 
a change in the behavioural intentions that underpin policy development. For example, Big 
Data must be handled using new analytical techniques that require a change in the culture 
of modelling and entail extensive algorithm-based analysis (Veltri, 2017). Previously, 
research into citizens’ needs, attitudes and behaviours has been based on limited sample 
methods, most of which (except experiments) relied on self-reported information that 
could suffer from biases. Big Data now provides real-time information about what people 
really do (e.g. transactional and activity-generated data) or think (social media). New 
analytical and data processing techniques can improve policy implementation by better 
targeting different audiences and combining the power of Big Data analytics with insights 
from behavioural economics and the ‘nudge’ approach.  
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To take advantage of this, the public sector must develop a new culture of data gathering 
and engineering (alongside improvements in its internal analytical capacity and a 
restructuring of the underlying sourcing and storing processes). There is also a need for a 
paradigm shift in the way new insights are sought and used. This must be combined with 
new approaches to data governance that ensure security and privacy. Finally, cognitive 
change is also required in relation to the way governments view collaboration and co-
creation, in order to advance beyond hype and rhetoric. This entails creating trust and 
opening up to insights and contributions from outside government. 
2.4.2 DigiGov-F 
Figure 8 shows a graphical representation of the DigiGov-F 1.0 framework, which 
condenses all of the discussion presented in the previous sections. As such it requires only 
a very concise narrative illustration that highlights a few key points.  
Figure 8. Graphical representation of DigiGov-F.  
 
Source: elaborated by the authors.  
 
Most importantly, DigiGov-F 1.0 is not a linear and prescriptive framework, and does not 
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The lines connecting the various steps in the centre have no arrows and only convey 
possible linkages without assuming any deterministic or linear flow. The red circles are 
placed linearly only because they are considered as different phases, one following the 
other.  
In practice, there could be substantial lag between one phase and the next and, although 
this cannot be rendered graphically, the possibility cannot be excluded that at a certain 
time the initiative may be stopped and will therefore not reach the subsequent phases. We 
make the technology factor more visible not as a result of technological determinism but 
in light of the discussion presented in Section 2.3.  
While the combination of technologies/applications adopted can contribute to the 
achievement of transformative effects, it cannot do so alone, but only if integrated and 
supported by other elements of the framework. The fact that strategic objectives are 
defined first and only afterwards is the combination of technologies selected may be a 
conceptual simplification (they may occur together), but it is adequate for our purposes. 
2.4.3 Conceptual map of digital government innovations 
Our conceptual map is not part of the conceptual framework, but is complementary to it. 
The map does not attempt to rank and label different forms of digital innovation as more 
or less transformative and impactful. The definition of Digital Government Transformation 
provided in the introduction to this report, and reproduced below, must be regarded as 
something that can be approached but probably never fully achieved.  
DGT is the introduction into government operations of radical changes, alongside more 
incremental ones, within both internal and external processes and structures, to achieve 
greater openness and collaboration within and beyond governmental boundaries. DGT is 
enabled by the introduction of a combination of existing ICTs and/or new data-driven 
technologies and applications, and by a radical reframing of both organisational and 
cognitive practices. It may encompass various forms of public sector innovation across 
different phases of the service provision and the policy cycles to achieve key context-
specific public values and related objectives including  increased efficiency, effectiveness, 
accountability and transparency, in order to deliver citizen-centric services and policies 
that increase inclusion and enhance trust in government. 
This definition serves as a benchmark to strive for, achievable to varying degrees and from 
different angles via various forms of digital innovation. Furthermore, the map is a 
conceptual, ex-ante instrument that can be put to use and tested empirically. Possible 
forms of digital innovation are organised conceptually in such a way that hypotheses about 
their transformative potential and impacts may be generated and then explored 
empirically. 
To reconceptualise the phenomenon of DGT within the scope of public sector innovation, 
we build on the discussion presented in the previous sections. There, we define four types 
of public sector innovation: organisational innovation, service/policy innovation, 
governance innovation, and conceptual innovation. In doing so, we also attempt to align 
to some extent our typology with that of Janowski (2015).  
The typology, illustrated graphically in Figure 9, combines two dimensions that should be 
considered as a continuum rather than binary, in order to accommodate the nuances that 
will surely emerge when the typology is applied to empirical cases. We call these two 
dimensions ‘Innovation Depth’ and ‘Innovation Reach’.  
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Figure 9. Typology of digital government innovation. 
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.  
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We define ‘radical reframing’ as the combination of all four types of innovation. 
‘Incremental change’ refers to a situation in which no substantial innovation accompanies 
the introduction of new technologies. We consider conceptual innovation as being possibly 
the most crucial and strategic type. In defining the dimension of Innovation Depth in this 
way, we combine elements from public sector innovation literature and from Janowski 
(2015) in a syncretic manner. In a sense, the dimension of reframing also includes the 
internal organisation of governments and the ways in which they interact with external 
actors. These include citizens, interest groups, as well as other governmental stakeholders. 
Reframing also captures Janowsky’s distinction between those changes to internal 
functioning that also affect external relationships, and those that do not. When reframing 
occurs, we can observe what we defined as ‘transformation’, ‘expansion’, 
‘contextualisation’, and ‘enablement’, in decreasing order of the depth of reframing. When 
it does not occur, we see simple ‘addition’, defined by Janowsky (2015). This involves the 
introduction of new elements to internal working without radically affecting or changing 
practices and structures. As depicted in the figure above, when simple addition is applied 
to cross domains, we may observe copycat mirror digitisation, possibly as a result of 
pressure to conform with hyped trend, or to perform better in an international 
benchmarking exercise (institutional isomorphism).  
The illustrative boxes below present three cases that we can preliminarily map based on 
the proposed typology. The Vilnius case (Box 3) links several domains and entails a 
reframing with regard to the use of data, the attempt to introduce behavioural changes, 
as well as in the way collaboration and data sharing are harnessed beyond the borders of 
the public actor involved. At the opposite end, the Trelleborg case (Box 4) appears limited 
to service provision. As such, the reframing involved is limited to the internal functioning 
of a single government agency. The Slovenian initiative in (Box 5) lies somewhere in 
between: to some extent it is sectoral, but it entails a clear reframing in the adoption of 
data-driven decision making. 
Box 3. Transportation services in Vilnius (Lithuania). 
In recent years, municipal agency Susisiekimo paslaugos (Transportation services) has 
undertaken multiple initiatives using data analytics to improve the provision of public 
transport in the city of Vilnius. Examples include an open data platform that allows the 
public to see all data relating to the use of public transport, heavy traffic conditions, 
sensor-enabled counting of passengers on municipal buses, and a partnership with 
private company Trafi that combines data on public transport with that from other modes 
of transport (including bikes, car-sharing and taxis), and uses real-time traffic and geo-
spatial data to provide passengers with travel recommendations. Civic engagement has 
followed the initiatives to share municipal data: a group of coders called Code for Vilnius 
are using open data and IoT technologies to create open-sourced projects that improve 
the quality of public transport.  
This is a truly integrated initiative covering service, policy and governance issues, and 
using Big Data and behavioural analysis in a new way. It targets several forms of 
interaction: Government-to-Citizens (G2C), Government-to-Business (G2B) and 
Business-to-Government (B2G).  
The transformative elements include data-driven decision making, the opening and 
sharing of data to enable co-creation, and personalised service recommendations. The 
following new technologies are deployed: Open Data, Big Data analytics, geo-spatial 
data analytics, IoT, and machine learning algorithms. 
The expected outputs and outcomes are: co-creation; improved public transport 
planning; behavioural change towards increased public transport use; reduced traffic 
congestion and improved air quality. These initiatives can improve the efficiency (lower 
costs of data collection for decision making) and effectiveness (geo-spatial and Big Data 
analysis allows better prediction of traffic patterns and issues) of policy design, while at 
the same time increasing the transparency of the municipality’s choices. Their 
implementation can reduce the burden on the municipality through crowdsourcing 
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(efficiency), as well as improving personalised recommendations through data sharing 
(effectiveness), and fostering civic engagement (legitimacy). The use of Big Data can 
make evaluation quicker, less expensive, and more accurate, as well as fostering 
accountability and transparency. 
Box 4. Automated social support and welfare in Trelleborg (Sweden). 
Trelleborg municipality employs robotic process automation (RPA) in processes relating 
to welfare support, such as home care applications, sickness, unemployment benefits, 
tax and duties. Thanks to RPA, some administrative tasks such as the calculation of 
home care fees are now executed by a case handler program. In the future, the use of 
artificial intelligence will allow the case handler program to learn how to perform more 
complex tasks, widening the scope of process automation within the Swedish public 
sector. The success of the programme has led the National innovation agency, Vinnova, 
and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, to create a partnership 
with Trelleborg municipality with the goal of implementing automation in other Swedish 
municipalities.  
This is a more vertical and delimited innovation, mostly concerning the back office of 
service provision and targeting Government-to-Citizens (G2C) and Government-to-
Government (G2G) interactions.  
The transformative element is limited to process automation, and is realised by deploying 
AI and RPA. 
The expected outputs and outcomes of the initiative are: faster processes and potential 
savings in labour costs; an increase in the amount of time employees can spend on core 
services and direct contact with citizens; and the improved effectiveness (fewer errors) 
of the services provided, resulting in reduced welfare-related costs. The initiative has no 
relevance for policy design, but affects implementation through the timely handling of 
applications and faster procedures; the freeing up of financial and human resources 
(efficiency); allowing employees to focus on core services and specifically on direct 
relationships, enabling services to become more personalised and effective 
(effectiveness); and ensuring the impartial and legally secure handling of applications 
(legitimacy). 
Box 5. Using Big Data to improve the efficiency of public administration in Slovenia. 
The use of Big Data analysis to improve the efficiency of HR is a pilot project aimed at 
exploring potential efficiency gains in public administration. It is part of the Slovenian 
national strategy for the promotion of data-driven decision making in public 
administration. The project began in 2017 within the Ministry of Public Administration, 
in collaboration with an external partner, EMC Dell. Anonymised internal data relating to 
employees, together with data on finance and procurement and some external data 
(weather and geographical) were used to pinpoint employees’ behaviour patterns and 
average performance; to conduct predictive analytics on the use of facilities; and 
perform text analytics to identify purchasing behaviours across the ministry.  
While limited to Government-to-Government (G2G) interactions, the Slovenian case is 
an ‘all-of-government’ initiative focusing on policy making and the overall innovation of 
public administration, with a governance dimension at least within government.  
Its transformative element is data-driven decision making in public administration, 
realised via the deployment of Big Data analytics (predictive analytics, text analytics, 
etc.). 
The expected outputs and outcomes of the initiative are: lower costs of public 
procurement, the increased efficiency of public administration, and the creation of a 
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favourable environment for economic development. The initiative improves policy design 
by: (a) lowering the cost of data collection for decision-making purposes (efficiency); 
(b) enabling the identification of organisational patterns and the pinpointing critical 
aspects, allowing public administration to formulate measures to improve its functioning 
(effectiveness); and (c) increasing the transparency of public administration through the 
adoption of data-driven decision making (legitimacy). Since being implemented, it has 
decreased the cost of public procurement and highlighted promising potential efficiency 
gains in many other aspects of the organisation (efficiency). Big Data analytics has 
provided a solid and effective basis for the process of prediction, planning policies and 
decision making at all managerial levels in public administration (effectiveness). It can 
also reduce the cost and increase the accuracy of evaluations, increasing accountability. 
 
In concluding this section, it is worth stressing that the typology presented above is a 
theory-informed, conceptual typology that will have to be corroborated by empirical 
evidence.  
It makes the assumption, derived from the literature and also from common wisdom, that 
the real potential of the various technologies and the innovation they enable springs from 
their combination and aggregation. One would expect, therefore, that moving toward the 
top-left quadrant would deliver greater effects than, for instance, different forms of 
expansionary innovation, and certainly compared to mere addition or 
digitisation/datification.  
In creating this typology, we generate the testable hypotheses that the Tender 
Specifications stipulated as one of the objectives of the framework. In the best traditions 
of socio-economic research we are, however, ready to be surprised by the evidence.  
Perhaps we may discover that a well-defined and delimited initiative focusing solely on 
service provision can deliver more tangible, better measurable, and higher effects?  
Questions such as whether an intervention to which this framework is applied entails a 
radical reframing or constitutes a simple addition, and whether it can be described as a 
transformative or an enabling digital innovation, remain to be ascertained empirically 
through field work. 
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2.5 Effects 
One of the objectives of the proposed framework, and of this study as a whole, is to pave 
the way for the assessment of the effects of digital government innovation and of Digital 
Government Transformation (where a set of innovations qualify as transformation). In this 
chapter, we present our high-level and very preliminary sketch of possible effects. This 
remains generic and flexible enough to be applied, after opportune operationalisation, to 
most digital government initiatives.  
We present here the potential effects separately from the overall framework, both to 
reduce complexity and to ensure that no determinism can be read into our approach. 
Effects are not linked to specific technologies or factors, but are simply presented using 
the well-known distinction made in logical frameworks between outputs, outcomes and 
impacts. The question of what causes what in a domain in which everything is linked to 
everything else is beyond the scope of our framework and points instead in the direction 
of complexity approaches. Aside from complexity, several other methodological challenges 
surround the issues of evaluation and measurement. We discuss these briefly below. 
Measuring and evaluating the effects of digital government initiatives, as with any initiative 
involving the use of public funds, is of great strategic importance for any public sector 
organisation. It is important for the sake of accountability, for the monitoring of progress 
and project management, as well as understanding what works and why, for the purposes 
of learning and fine-tuning interventions. Depending on an organisation’s aim in setting 
out to measure and evaluate the effects of its initiatives, various approaches can be taken 
– each with its own pros and cons. However, we want to stress a challenge that is specific 
to digital government transformations. Because traditional eGovernment projects have a 
start and end date, a fixed budget, and a time of deployment, they are more easily 
measurable than digital government transformation. The latter, in fact, is an ongoing 
process without a clear-cut end status; rather, it is a continuous process that renders any 
measurement and evaluation even more complicated (Mergel et al., 2019).  
First, we must make a simple distinction between measurement and evaluation. 
Measurement is about counting ‘what is’. It is the process by which the attributes or 
dimensions of a phenomenon are determined and counted. Evaluation, while requiring the 
measurement of relevant variables, is something different and more difficult than 
measurement. A measurement indicator may indicate that at the end of a given 
intervention Y (at time T1), variable X increased by 10% (compared to T0). This is an 
objective, statistical fact. It is a different matter to attribute the 10% variation entirely to 
intervention Y, and not to other factors. Evaluation, in its purest sense, is the making of a 
causal attribution and assigning to it a value (e.g. monetary). Hence, evaluation requires 
a theory of causation, or at least some ex-ante hypotheses about the possible effects of a 
given intervention. Evaluation can be seen as requiring three steps: (a) the formulation of 
causal hypotheses that can be extracted from existing theory or from cumulative empirical 
evidence, logic, practical experience and, if need be, even imagination; (b) a causal 
identification strategy; (c) the empirical testing of the hypotheses using measured 
variables to estimate causal parameters (Heckman, 2008). Only the formulation of initial 
hypotheses on effects and the subsequent formulation of measurement indicators are part 
of our framework. Although a causal identification strategy and empirical testing clearly lie 
outside the scope of this work, we briefly discuss different approaches below.  
When the goal is simply to monitor an intervention, without attempting to fully establish a 
causal attribution, measurement indicators are sufficient. Even if measurement is just 
about counting, it should nonetheless be valid and reliable.  
First, there is the conceptual dimension concerning the extent to which measures reduce 
complexity but remain well founded and correspond to the real world, and are relevant to 
the object being measured. This agenda is about validity, which (briefly) concerns the 
accuracy of measurements and the degree to which they accomplish the purpose for which 
they are intended. Conceptual progress is achieved when measurements are a better proxy 
for the underlying concept/phenomenon.  
 44 
Second is a technical dimension that mostly concerns the calculation of measures and their 
reliability (consistency, precision and the repeatability of the selected measurement 
indicators). Progress here is measured by technical sophistication. Third is a politico-
administrative dimension: measurement is also a social process, and we would add that it 
is often characterised by what has been termed institutional isomorphism (Codagnone et 
al., 2015) – that is, ‘copycat’ benchmarking indicators that are well established but possibly 
no longer valid. This dimension concerns who is responsible for producing the numbers and 
why; what reactions there are to the measurement; and what are the social mechanisms 
via which the measures acquire a ‘taken for granted character’ and become authoritative.  
The underlying, theory-informed pillars of the proposed DigiGov-F will enable us to propose 
in its next iteration a set of indicators that address these three dimensions, together with 
a set of step-by-step guidelines on how to select and measure them.  
Moving on to evaluation, we enter a domain riddled with disputes between different 
conceptions of causality (i.e. successionist versus generative causality)20 and 
methodological approaches (Misuraca, Codagnone and Rossel, 2013)21.  
Compared to the issues of monitoring and measuring, things become more complicated if 
one asks the question: can observed effects be attributed solely to the intervention being 
evaluated? One way to approach this question is to apply counterfactual evaluation based 
on experimental or quasi-experimental design, using strictly quantitative and formalised 
methods (Holland, 1986; Shadish et al., 2002). Counterfactual Impact Evaluation (CIE) is 
widely used but has been criticised in some respects (Dawid, 2007; Ni Bhrolchain and 
Dyson, 2007; Pawson and Tilley, 1997). First, it provides a causal description determining 
the ‘effects of causes’ but is unable to provide a causal explanation that explains the ‘causes 
of effects’. Second, it has a strong internal validity, but its external validity may be limited 
and experiments must be repeated in different settings in order to generalise. (In relation 
to this, it is worth noting that the experiment we are conducting as part of the case studies 
is just a preliminary exploration, from which will arise no claim towards generalisation.) 
Third, in order to maintain strict protocols on the data-generating process, it disregards 
the actors that enact an intervention and which may play an important role.  
If the objective of evaluation is to learn and understand how and why a given intervention 
did or did not work, a causal explanation of the ‘causes of effects’ is needed. Whereas 
counterfactual experimental evaluation simply analyses intervention and effect discretely 
and in isolation, understanding why and how requires the simultaneous consideration of a 
large set of variables, based on the perspective of “everything being linked to everything 
else”. To this end, econometricians have built analytical models (solved with data) that are 
referred to as ‘structural evaluation’ (Heckman, 2008, 2010).  
As an alternative to the formalised analytical (counterfactual and structural evaluation) or 
computational (modelling simulation) described above, there are mostly qualitative 
approaches inspired by a generative notion of causation, and generically referred to as 
‘theory-based evaluation’22.  
                                           
20 The notion of ‘successionist’ causation is traceable to David Hume (Hume, 1739). In this notion, causality is 
considered ‘external’ and unobservable: causal inference is about unobserved quantities from observed facts 
(statistics) controlling for unobserved ones. The notion of causality that is most opposed to the successionist 
approach is the ‘generative’ theory of causality (Harré, 1972). The generative theory sees causation as internal 
and seeks to explain the causal mechanisms; it looks at the causes of effects, also considering the views and 
actions of the involved actors. 
21What follows is a short summary developed using a large body of evaluation literature, out of which we 
selectively report only a few of the sources used. We have looked at several alternative reconstructions and 
reviews (Henry, 2001; Patton, 1997; Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Shadish et al., 1991); key and fundamentals 
works on and of experimentalism (Campbell, 1957, 1969; Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Morgan and Winship, 
2007; Shadish et al., 2002); but also some examples of pragmatist (i.e. (Patton, 1997; Patton, 1982; Weiss, 
1976; Weiss, 1980, 1986); and constructivist (Guba and Lincoln, 1989), approaches. We have analysed in greater 
depth the counterfactual approaches in statistics (Rubin, 1974, 1986, 2007) and econometrics (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009; Blundell and Dias, 2009; Heckman, 2001, 2005, 2008; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Lee, 2005). 
22 As noted by Rogers (2008), theory-based evaluation has been variously referred to as ‘programme theory’, 
‘programme logic’, ‘theory of change’ (Weiss, 1995), ‘theory-driven evaluation’ (Chen, 2005; Chen, 2006; Chen 
and Rossi, 1980; Coryn et al., 2011; Donaldson, 2007), ‘realistic evaluation’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997), and 
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Although nuances exist between the different approaches that fall under this label, simply 
stated they link programme inputs and activities into a chain of intended or observed 
outcomes, and then use this model to guide the evaluation. Unlike counterfactual impact 
evaluation, theory-based evaluation programmes are not considered monoliths. Neither 
are the beneficiaries and stakeholders simply regarded as passive recipient and ‘takers’ of 
the programme ‘treatments’. Their views are crucial to performing the evaluation. The 
views of policy makers, stakeholders, experts and programme participants are collected 
via interviews or as embodied in relevant documents (programme documents, multi-
annual plans, research agendas, project documents) and treated as ‘theories’ of change 
and action. These are used as hypotheses to be triangulated with empirical evidence. 
Second, also differing from the counterfactual approach, context is not controlled for 
statistically, but it is instead viewed as key to understanding the interplay between 
programmes and effects. Again, contextual variables are ‘measured’ both from the 
perspective of the players involved and through available external sources of evidence 
(e.g. statistics, review of the relevant literature). Theory-based evaluation adopts 
qualitative or mixed qualitative and quantitative methods23. Despite its merits and 
progress, theory-based evaluation remains based on theoretically or logically derived 
assumptions that are only triangulated against mostly qualitative evidence. It therefore 
does not ensure the same level of empirical causal attribution provided by counterfactual 
methods. The approach nonetheless represents a good alternative when quantitative 
evidence for formalised method is lacking. 
As is evident from our discussion so far, in what follows we cannot perform most of the 
complex types of analysis described above. Neither can we at this stage develop 
hypotheses and detailed logic models for all possible combinations of initiatives that may 
result from the diversity of technologies, types of innovation and domains of application 
that the framework needs to cover. As anticipated, it remains at a relatively high level. We 
must therefore stress that the potential effects described in this chapter are based simply 
on ex-ante assumptions that are highly uncertain and in need of empirical validation; we 
do not stake any claim as to the existence of a direct and linear causality between digital 
government initiatives and such effects.  
As anticipated, using the findings from the literature review conducted by Barcevičius et 
al. (2019), we will distinguish between outputs, outcomes and impacts, following the 
definitions used by Mergel et al. (2019). We define here “output” to mean a quantitative 
result following Boyne's (2002) definition: “Outputs include the quantity of a service and 
its quality (as indicated for example by speed of delivery, and accessibility of provision, 
both in terms of geography and opening hours).” The result of digital transformation 
outputs therefore includes concrete and measurable services, products, processes or skills. 
Next, we define “outcome” (Bretschneider et al., 2004) as the effect that results from a 
new service, or from a change in processes or the quality of the organisation's relationships 
with others (such as increased simplicity, accessibility, quality, advantages, efficiency, 
                                           
‘contribution analysis’ (Mayne, 2001; Mayne, 2008; Mayne, 2011; Mayne, 2012). The application of such 
approaches has increased in the last 20 years, as documented in a recent systematic review (Coryn et al., 2011). 
23 Qualitative research has been the object of a long and controversial debate (Bryman, 2006; Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005), as it is difficult to establish an equivalent to the three ‘’truths’ of quantitative methods (validity, reliability, 
and generalisation). Several scholars hold that external confirmation of qualitative findings through well designed, 
purposive sampling, checking and triangulation of methods/sources can enhance the credibility and validity of 
qualitative research (Bryman, 2006; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Seale and Silverman, 
1997). For instance, ensuring the representativeness of selected cases and including the use of combined 
qualitative and quantitative methods can support generalisations (Bryman, 1988). Well-designed purposive 
sampling can offset the limits of not drawing the samples randomly and support the development of grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Since the 1990s, a new consensus has emerged over the complementary 
relationship between qualitative and quantitative perspectives, which recognises the different utility of each for 
the researcher. Studies that combine both qualitative and quantitative methods (mixed or ‘‘Q2’’ methods) are 
becoming more and more common (Brannen, 1992; Bryman, 1988, 2004; Bryman, 2006; Cresswell, 2007; 
Creswell, 2003; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). In this sense, we end up with three distinct approaches to 
research: quantitative; qualitative; and what is variously called ‘multi-method’ (Brannen, 1992), ‘multi-strategy’ 
(Bryman, 2004), ’mixed methods’ (Creswell, 2003; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Mixed methods research 
increasingly contributes to ‘‘evidence-based’’ policy including through evaluation studies that adopt such an 
approach (Veltri et al., 2014). 
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speed, inclusion, responsiveness, competitiveness, security, transparency). Following the 
distinctions made in Barcevičius et al., 2019, we also include in “outcomes” the results of 
innovations that contribute to the development of (better) policies and the digital 
environment. With regard to outcomes, we retain the three dimensions that were identified 
in the first version of the conceptual framework, and will define them in this chapter: 
productivity and efficiency; effectiveness, inclusion and sustainability; and legitimacy. We 
will include long-term “impacts”, which include changes across the whole organisation or 
public administration; as well as the ways in which transformation leads to the creation of 
public value, or strengthens democratic principles (e.g. supporting citizen inclusion, 
regulation, legal and political frameworks) (Alford & O'Flynn, 2009). In brief, these include 
the ways in which digital transformation brings about a whole range of societal and 
environmental benefits that are experienced by different stakeholders and may not be as 
immediately visible as some of the outcomes that we will describe (e.g. the reduction of 
operational costs, personalised services), but are nevertheless important long-term results 
in the areas of social inclusion and civic participation24.  
Finally, in describing the outputs, outcomes and impacts generated by digital 
transformation, we will consider the stakeholders affected by such results. In line with the 
latest OECD report, ‘The impact of digital government on citizen well-being’ (2019), we 
stress that digital transformation has the potential to impact every aspect of our lives. 
Whilst this provides opportunities to improve lives, there is also a risk that it may disrupt 
things in ways that negatively impact people’s well-being. We recognise that government, 
politics and civic participation are not actively recognised or acknowledged in some people’s 
day-to-day lives. They may use public services such as schooling and transport 
infrastructure, or witness political discussion on the news, but by and large their lives are 
lived without direct exposure to the public sector or full awareness of its role. However, 
For others, however, the civic sphere is a constant feature of their lives, either through the 
active experience of accessing services or via citizen activism.  
Figure 10. The results of digital transformation. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors. 
 
                                           
24 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/impact-assessment-review-directive-200398ec-reuse-
public-sector-information 
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2.5.1 Outputs 
The literature review conducted by Barcevičius et al. (2019) presents a long list of outputs 
of digital transformation in governments. These exist take the form of new services, new 
processes, new skills or new products. Our conceptual framework groups these into four 
main areas of outputs: 
1. Internal processes 
2. Governance 
3. Policy Making 
4. Service delivery 
 
Internal processes. One of the triangulation most frequently cited in the literature is the 
creation of new processes that require no human involvement. Artificial intelligence is 
expected to take over tedious and repetitive tasks that are usually carried out by public 
sector employees. Other new technologies have already been adopted, producing diverse 
outputs that improve the internal processes of pubic administrations and government 
agencies. For instance, the German Patent and Trademark Office has applied RPA in order 
to direct individuals to the appropriate patent examiners, and to improve the distribution 
of patent applications. In 2018, Austria and Finland also explored automated solutions for 
patent pre-classification and distribution. Distributed ledger is another technology that has 
been used in process innovation. For example, the Danish blockchain project Vehicle Wallet 
is said to ease supply chain management processes by documenting a vehicle’s entire 
lifecycle. One distributed ledger contains all data on the car, which remains accessible 
throughout the supply chain25. 
 
Governance. By generating new relationships and dynamics, involving actors and 
resources outside public organisations, and modifying the ways in which the value 
embedded in services is produced, technological innovations allow for bottom-up control 
over public services, as well as empowering citizens and other stakeholders to contribute 
to or lead the creation of public value. This is often recognised as one of the key features 
of digital government transformation. Janowski et al. framed this in terms of changing 
governance paradigms, which reshape citizen-administration relationships. The outputs 
produced in this area are not only of interest to stakeholders working in the public sector, 
but also to citizens, who are now able to participate more easily to the public sphere. These 
developments in civic engagement have been enabled by social media, mobile devices, 
Open and Big Data, data analytics, crowdsourcing, visualisation, gaming and other 
technologies. AI can power deliberation platforms, the aggregation of opinion and the 
validation of decisions. Information can be sourced from social media and analysed to 
identify problems and gauge public sentiments during the phases of agenda-setting/policy 
design. In other examples, AI robots are employed to spot anomalies in a congress 
member’s spending, enabling citizens to gain more information about their politicians and 
make better-informed decisions. Some people are also excited about the prospect of 
blockchain-backed eVoting systems. Internet voting has shown some success in Estonia, 
Canada, Brazil, France and Switzerland; however, experiences in Norway also point to 
security concerns regarding election fraud. Blockchain could arguably help to address these 
security issues. Moreover, numerous OGD initiatives have been launched in various 
countries, and other proposals have been discussed. For instance, the UN advocates for 
the creation of “data commons” where free, public and government data can be accessed 
globally, to reduce the barriers to entry for anyone seeking to work with AI26.  
                                           
25 Berryhill., J. (2018). New OPSI guide to blockchain in the public sector. OPSI. Retrieved from https://oecd-
opsi.org/new-opsi-guide-to-blockchain-in-the-public-sector/   
26 http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Documents/UNPAN98900.pdf 
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Commons can provide the technical framework for the collection, cleaning, labelling and 
use of AI tools and datasets. They can serve as a platform on which local, national, or 
international Open Data initiatives can be shared and integrated, in turn allowing 
researchers, civic coders and others from around the world to access data, find projects, 
discuss ideas, and contribute solutions. 
 
Policymaking. According to numerous researchers, digitalisation may aid policy 
innovation. For example, Open Data, Big Data and predictive analytics provide 
opportunities both for the precise assessment of problems and for clarity as to policy 
options. AI computing, coupled with an abundance of data and computing power, enable 
governments to aggregate and examine information from a variety of sources. Some 
researchers argue that this also makes governments better at prediction and prevention – 
once the predictive analytics models become advanced enough. Predictive analytics allows 
the public sector to focus more on prevention instead of simply reacting to societal 
problems. These tools have been applied to develop targeted, personalised interventions 
and ‘nudges’ in healthcare, education and other social services of general interest. Police 
departments use predictive models to decide where they want their officers to patrol, while 
data mining and network analytics help to uncover tax fraud. Advanced analytics using AI 
and Big Data give policymakers the ability to test potential solutions in advance. This 
provides an opportunity to test policy options and discover unintended consequences, 
before undertaking a policy measure. AI and machine learning can improve budget 
allocation methods, and Big Data analysis helps to identify areas that need to be funded 
first. Data analytics may also help to improve public procurement. 
 
Service delivery. Certain areas of service delivery are widely discussed in the literature, 
due to the extensive use of new technologies: health care, public safety and security. Due 
to the widespread adoption of online medical consultations, patient portals and other care 
delivery channels enabled by digital innovations, recent trends in healthcare sector include 
shifts from traditional face-to-face care to e-health, mobile health (m-health) and 
ubiquitous health (u-health), characterised by real-time information collection about the 
patient. Moreover, the adoption of disease surveillance systems that allow faster responses 
and greater accuracy in preventing the spread of infectious diseases. In relation to public 
safety, predictive technologies powered by machine learning enhance the ability of law 
enforcement authorities to predict crimes, and to identify both the perpetrators and 
victims: to anticipate where, when and by whom crimes are more likely to be committed. 
Numerous examples from the area of security also exist in the literature. In the aftermath 
of the earthquake in Emilia Romagna, Italy, real-time data was used to allocate housing 
solutions for victims27. Besides IoT, other digital technologies, often based on geo-spatial 
data, allow citizens to articulate their demands. For example, websites and apps that 
enable city residents to report incidents relating to municipal affairs, from issues with stray 
pets to public transport, by selecting a specific location on the map where the issue 
occurred. As shown by a case study conducted by RAND Europe28, a partner of the 
consortium for this study, wearable technologies provide an opportunity to address several 
problems faced by law enforcement officers in an increasingly complex and technologically 
challenging environment. For instance, body-worn cameras (BWCs) have been proposed 
as a new way to reduce the use of force by the police, as well as assaults against officers. 
                                           
27 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2018). UN E-Government Survey 2018. United Nations. 
28https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/investigating-the-effects-of-body-worn-police-
cameras.html 
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Figure 11. Examples of outputs of digital transformation.  
 
Source: elaborated by the authors. 
2.5.2 Outcomes 
According to our earlier definition, outcomes are the results that are generated by the 
introduction of new services, processes or skills as a result of digital transformation in 
governments. Outcomes are often more difficult to measure or identify, due to the difficulty 
of building a causal link that ensures a specific outcome was caused by a particular output. 
However, despite the challenges of causation theory, some of the outcomes we introduce 
in this conceptual framework are easier to measure using certain indicators, while other 
are more complex and unobservable. Following the typology developed in the Inception 
Report and the first version of the framework, we will divide outcomes into three main 
categories: productivity and efficiency (PEF); effectiveness, inclusion and sustainability 
(EIS); and Legitimacy (LEG).  
Productivity and efficiency. From an economic perspective, the primary impact of the 
use of ICT in government (including new digital technologies such as AI, blockchain and 
predictive analytics) is on productivity and internal efficiency. As reported by the Italian 
Digital Transformation Team29, AI-transformed public administration has had direct and 
positive effects on the operations of the civil service, public services and policy making. 
From administrative operations to resource management, technology applications can 
reduce costs, ensure the timely delivery of public goods and services, and optimise the use 
of existing resources. A vast body of literature exists on the economics of ICT that is beyond 
our scope to review here. According to economic models that use a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, there are two main channels for the effects of digital transformation. 
Conceived as a form of investment, it might raise workers’ productivity. Conceived as 
technological progress, it might improve the efficiency of a single organisation or of the 
general economic milieu30. The first case is trivial: investment in ICT means more 
                                           
29 Digital Transformation Team. (2018). Digital transformation of the public administration; Digital Transformation 
Team. (n.d.). Digital innovation for citizens and for the development of the country. Retrieved from 
https://teamdigitale.governo.it/en/  
30 Since productivity and efficiency are often wrongly used interchangeably, it is worth briefly recalling how they 
should be distinguished. Productivity is the ratio of the outputs produced to the inputs involved in the process of 
production. Efficiency is all about the comparison between what is actually being produced or performed with 
what can be produced using the same amount of resources. Technical efficiency defines the production frontiers 
OUTPUTS
1. Internal processes
• Automated repetitive tasks
• Blockchain for land register
• Patents pre-classification
2. Governance
• Deliberation platforms
• Blockchain-backed eVoting
• Social media analysis
3. Policy-making
• Personalised interventions
• Precise problem assessment
• Modelling for testing policies
4. Service delivery
• Disease surveillance systems
• Body-warn cameras for police
• IoT for transport services
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equipment for the labour force (capital deepening). Alternatively, these new factors of 
production might substitute workers at some stage of the production process, raising the 
productivity of other types of workers. In the second case, ICT could affect economic 
performance through a reorganisation of the production process, a widening of either the 
scale or the capital intensity of production, an improvement in the organisation’s 
technology (so-called ‘embodied technological progress’), or any other effect on the 
efficiency of a production unit taken as a whole. Alternatively, it could improve business 
conditions and the environment in which organisations operate, for example through 
networks or other externalities, improvements in human capital, knowledge, education, 
learning-by-doing phenomena, or through personalisation and the improved quality of 
products and services.  
The main outcomes we can therefore expect from the introduction of advanced 
technologies are an increase in efficiency and productivity, due to a reduction in the 
number of hours taken to perform tasks or deliver services. Another important outcome 
that is possible, thanks to use of predictive analytics, is improved human resource planning 
and the optimal deployment of resources in real time. In a public hospital, for instance, 
predictive analytics can anticipate spikes in hospitalisation or personnel absenteeism, and 
resource allocation can be planed to cope at critical points. The literature review revealed 
many other examples of cost savings, such as dematerialisation, a reduction in errors (the 
case of Trelleborg), the reduced cost of public procurement (in Slovenia). However, 
increased efficiency and productivity apply not only to the internal processes of public 
administrations and service delivery, but also to the processes of policy making. Examples 
of more efficient policy making include the lower cost of data collection for decision making, 
real-time monitoring of implementation, and less expensive policy evaluation through the 
analysis of Big Data.  
Effectiveness, inclusion and sustainability. Within this dimension we include outcomes 
that in some way improve the provision of public services, internal processes, the 
relationship between citizens and government, and the policies implemented. First, new 
technologies can improve the effectiveness of services both for citizens and business. 
Distributed ledgers, for instance, reduce administrative burden while increasing privacy 
and security. More efficient services can reduce waiting time for citizens. Broadly defined, 
AI can help predict and enable governments to implement pre-emptive and/or personalised 
policies, or to fine-tune service delivery. Improving the prediction and detection of 
problems can produce more effective policy decisions aimed at achieving inclusive 
outcomes, link them to service provision, and carry out smart, real-time steering and 
evaluation of the implementation. As shown by the Impact Assessment carried out on the 
review of the Directive 2003/98/EC on the re-use of public sector information, it is 
estimated that Open Data has the potential to save 7,000 lives yearly thanks to quicker 
responses in the event of cardiac arrest, and 1,425 lives from road traffic accidents (i.e. 
5.5% of European road fatalities)31. More generally, geo-spatial and location data (GSLD) 
can be used to improve policymaking for complex localised situations and to offer location-
based services. Big Data analytics can be used by governments to improve existing 
services and to draw on novel datasets to drive entirely new public services. Behavioural 
Predictive Analytics (BPA) allows a government to deliver better services; and, importantly, 
it provides the possibility for interventions to occur before problems develop, leading to 
both improved outcomes and savings.  
In certain types of public service, such as health care, there are important outcomes that 
can be measured in order to assess the increased effectiveness achieved by digital 
transformation. Digital innovations hold the potential to improve the quality health care 
quality, especially when it comes to health care analytics, e-delivery, personalisation and 
                                           
of the maximum possible outputs that can be produced from each input level. Allocative efficiency is that mix of 
capital and labour that produce a given amount of output at minimum cost. Simply stated, an increase in 
productivity means ‘doing more with the same resources’, whereas an increase in efficiency means ‘doing the 
same with less’. 
31 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/impact-assessment-review-directive-200398ec-reuse-
public-sector-information 
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social media. For instance, the macro-level analysis of public health risks can enable well-
targeted, pre-emptive action to avoid disease outbreaks. One study shows that the 
adoption of disease surveillance systems based on machine learning algorithms led to a 
reduction of more than 90% in outbreaks of norovirus in hospitals in Hampshire, UK32. 
Health care analytics can potentially lead to the discovery of more effective, personalised 
treatment for patients – predicting which treatments a patient is most likely to respond to, 
and spotting symptoms early33. Lastly, richer communication through social media and 
other ICT-based channels is associated with the empowerment of patients. For example, a 
study on the impacts of social media in the Danish public health care sector found that 
“health informatics tools can enhance the continuity of care, through the patients’ 
increased ability to stay in control, which reduces the dependence on the healthcare 
professionals.”’34  
Legitimacy. Various contributions reviewed by Barcevičius et al. (2019) credit the new 
wave of technologies with having the potential to: increase participation and civic 
engagement; make government more responsive, transparent, and accountable; and 
introduce forms of eDemocracy and smart participatory democracy. As a result of these, 
one may expect an increase in trust towards government and in electoral participation. 
This can be achieved by creating real-time decision making, rapidly aggregating opinion 
data, and helping to introduce more direct forms of democracy that can reinforce and 
improve representative democracy. As we mentioned earlier, AI can enable the creation of 
deliberation platforms, the aggregation of opinion, and the validation of decisions. By 
applying machine learning to online and social media, governments can become more 
responsive to citizen sentiment, ushering in a new dimension in civic engagement. 
Information can be sourced from social media and analysed to identify problems and gauge 
public sentiments during the phases of agenda-setting/policy design. As one might expect, 
within this dimension, the causal chain is the longest, and the main end effect – ‘trust in 
government’ – is intangible and unobservable.  
Figure 12. Examples of outcomes of digital transformation. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors. 
                                           
32 Mitchell, C., et al. (2016). Reducing the number and impact of outbreaks of nosocomial viral gastroenteritis: 
Time-series analysis of a multidimensional quality improvement initiative. BMJ Quality and Safety 25(6), 466–
474. 
33 Horgan, D. (2018). From here to 2025: Personalised medicine and healthcare for an immediate future. 
European Alliance for Personalised Medicine; Nimmesgern, E., Benediktsson, I. and Norstedt, I. (2017). 
Personalized medicine in Europe. Clinical and translational science, 10(2), 61-63. 
34 Bjørnes, C. (2011). The patients’ health informatics tool – Exploring the possibilities. A Web 2.0 application for 
men with prostate cancer. Virtual Centre for Health Informatics, Aalborg University, Aalborg.  
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2.5.3 Impacts 
As expressed by some of the experts consulted by Mergel et al. (2019), the main aims of 
digital transformation are seen as being the achievement of broader impacts on public 
administration, on democracy and on the wellbeing of the population. In line with the OECD 
definition of digital government, we can briefly say that the aim of such transformations is 
the creation of public value through the use of digital technologies, as an integrated part 
of governments’ modernisation strategies. First, the long-term impacts include sustainable 
changes across the whole organisation, creating a better image of the public sector as an 
efficient, inclusive and participatory organisation that provides better workplaces and 
better services. The key stakeholders affected by these long-term impacts are public sector 
employees, who would benefit from the better functioning of the whole organisation. 
Indirectly, such transformation would also impact the citizens and businesses that engage 
with the public administration.  
However, the most interesting long-term impacts are arguably those that directly affect 
citizens and governments in their experience of civic engagement and public services. 
Some tangible long-term impacts deriving from digital transformation may include 
economic growth and social cohesion, as a result of the better, more effective and inclusive 
policies presented in the previous section. Others may be a reduction in pollution, as well 
as safer cities, as a result of improved services that make use of IoT, Big Data and other 
technologies. However, as suggested by some of the experts who attended the first 
workshop for this study, in order to maximise the relationship between the activities of 
digital government and the well-being of citizens, the focus should not be exclusively on 
the material benefits that come from the improved quality of services. It should also reflect 
the intellectual and emotional benefits derived from a different approach to a government’s 
interactions with its constituents.  
Figure 13. Examples of impacts of digital transformation.  
 
Source: elaborated by the authors. 
2.5.4 Negative effects and side-effects 
Here, we discuss some of the possible negative side-effects that emerge from the literature 
review conducted by Barcevičius et al. (2019). Positive effects can be maximised and 
negative ones minimised, as well as barriers removed, if the countervailing measures are 
effective. The final impact achieved therefore depends on what can be termed ‘intervening 
factors’ – namely, effective, ineffective or a lack of, countervailing measures.  
IMPACTS
1. Organisational change
• New image of public sector
• Better workplace
• Inclusive organisation
2. Value creation 
• Strengthen democratic principles
• Transparent government
• More equal society
3. Citizens’ well-being 
• Personal security
• Civic engagement
• Subjective well-being
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Job losses to automation. The long-standing trend towards routine task automation35 
could be accelerated by AI and robotics36, producing job losses in the public sector37, which 
is a very large employer in EU countries. The automation and digitisation of governmental 
processes could lead to a significant reconfiguration of work and employment patterns, 
with implications in terms of new skills requirements, unemployment or intermittent 
employment, and the further polarisation of the labour force. Often, public administrations 
report that the labour savings made through automation enable them to redeploy staff to 
other tasks, including core tasks. Yet, in situations where there is less flexibility for 
governments redeploy staff to new jobs, or where the employees previously carrying out 
the tasks being routinised do not possess the skills necessary to perform other, more 
interactive or cognitively advanced tasks, the possibility of lay-offs cannot be ruled out. 
These may be offset if public sector employees are retrained to acquire the skills needed 
to become part of digital government transformation. This would, at the same time, reduce 
the risk of job losses and help to tackle the lack of skilled workers in public administration 
as a barrier to the full adoption of AI and the exploitation of the potential of Big Data. If 
employees are retrained and new roles created to attract skilled professionals, negative 
side-effects on employment may be contained. Meanwhile, the new skills developed 
internally or attracted from outside will increase the potential to reap all of the benefits of 
AI and other new technologies.  
Unfairness, AI accountability and discrimination. Concerns also exist over a potential 
decrease in fairness, neutrality and accountability within the public sector as a result of the 
adoption of AI. Analysing independently and learning from their environments, advanced 
algorithms may introduce unconscious biases by excluding or failing to include some 
individuals from the outset, such as those who have the least and no access to technology, 
or by neglecting individuals based on their race.38 Technological shortcomings may also 
occur due to the poor quality of technologies. If improperly controlled, digital tools 
employed by both private and public sectors can produce errors and bad decisions. For 
instance, research suggests that inaccurate facial recognition can produce biases against 
individuals39. It may lead to false identifications or a failure to recognise that prevents 
further, necessary actions. These mismatches increase opportunities for other negative 
effects, such as racial biases and targeting of specific groups. The adoption of such tools, 
often with very little public consent or knowledge, endangers the notions of democracy, 
civil liberties and human rights. This problem was the main topic of the 2018 UN World 
Economic and Social Survey, which called for greater transparency and accountability 
concerning AI-based decisions, to avoid the risk of reinforcing existing biases and forms of 
exclusion. These issues could potentially be avoided through the development and adoption 
of an AI ethical regulatory framework, which may in turn speed up adoption. 
Privacy and data access. Many researchers also worry about the violations of privacy 
that could arise from digital government transformation and personal data sharing. 
Unlimited government access to personal data could result in an Orwellian society, limiting 
civic participation and undermining the strength of democracies. Scholars are increasingly 
noting instances in which government access to data results in privacy violations, 
damaging the overall image of the government. Governments are often criticised for 
prioritising the use of digital, data-driven technologies over privacy concerns. In Europe, 
the Swedish government experienced a leak of the population’s personal vehicle data. This 
leak forced the Swedish government to restrict the outsourcing of private and sensitive 
data to third parties. In 2018, a hospital in Portugal received a fine for allowing 
indiscriminate access to, violation of and failure to ensure the continuing integrity and 
confidentiality of the personal data of users it processed. Other examples depict the 
                                           
35 See the seminal work by Autor (2015; 2013; 2008).  
36 See for instance: Acemoglu & Restrepo, (2018); Aghion and Jones (2018). 
37 See, among others, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017); Arntz et al. (2016). Bessen (2016; 2015); Bowles (2014); 
Chiacchio et al. (2018); Dauth et al. (2017).; Frey and Osborne (2017); Graetz and Michaels (2017).  
38 Pencheva, I. (2018). Big data and AI – A transformational shift for government: So, what next for research? 
39 Snow, J. (2018). Amazon’s face recognition falsely matched 28 members of Congress with mugshots. 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-
matched-28  
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intrusion into people’s lives by both private and public sectors. These incidents call into 
question the amount of power that digital technologies give to governments, and how that 
power could impact democracies. Government access to personal data can result in a ‘Big 
Brother’ type of surveillance, eliminating checks on government behaviour. In many case, 
digital tools are employed with little public oversight, creating opportunities for the 
unethical use of personal data. 
Private sector accountability. In the new era of digital transformation, the private sector 
has taken an undisputed lead. Some authors argue that the private sector’s leadership in 
digitalisation threatens to create power asymmetries between public authorities and 
private companies. The literature on AI-enabled public services points to the issue of the 
private sector’s domination of the development and delivery of public services. This 
increases information asymmetry, since governments purchase proprietary products and 
services that they do not understand and which they cannot build themselves. But the 
demand to continuously innovate prompts public authorities to collaborate with many 
private entities developing digital tools. As a result of this collaboration, the public sector 
is surrendering insights over government processes to the private sector. By 2014, the 
Danish Ministry of Tax had already admitted to having no control over more than 200 
systems that used machine learning algorithms to inform policy making that directly 
affected citizens. Outsourced decision making with dubious accountability and regulation 
has proven to be an alarming theme in the transformation of government processes, 
leading to questions over the extent to which governments should involve private sectors. 
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2.6 How to use DigiGov-F 
DigiGov-F contains elements that can be operationalised and used for implementation of 
digital government initiatives,40 as illustrated in Figure 14 below.  
Figure 14. Using DigiGov-F for implementation of digital government initiatives. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors.  
DigiGov-F is not linear and does not adopt any particular perspective concerning the stages 
of digital government, the antecedents and any potential negative effects and side-effects. 
For this reason, it can be employed in the initial phase when first deciding between 
competing allocations (deliberation), and then designing the initiative. In the absence of 
any linear and deterministic hypothesis that explains moving from one stage to another, 
we cannot be sure that what was successful in one initiative, or prescribed normatively by 
various sources, will work in another context. During the ex-ante evaluation phase, the 
most innovative stakeholders may want to try a modelling simulation inspired by 
complexity theory and consider several of the components presented in DigiGov-F. 
Measurement indicators can be developed for ex-ante, in itinere, and ex-post evaluation 
and monitoring. Counterfactual or theory-based evaluation, as presented earlier, can also 
be adopted.  
Our approach does not offer an alternative ‘magic bullet’ to the prescriptions of linear 
progression models, but rather a set of options inspired by methodological pluralism and 
by the recognition that, in the domain of Digital Government Transformation, we move 
within very complex ecosystems and are not under conditions of paradigmatic normality; 
it is not possible to provide unambiguous and prescriptive rules to predict the results of 
interventions.  
                                           
40 This section has been inspired by previous work conducted by JRC in the area of measuring the impact of social 
Innovation as part of the ICT-Enabled Social Innovation (IESI) research project. See Misuraca et al, 2017. 
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2.6.1 Deliberation and design 
When deciding whether or not to launch a digital government initiative, or choosing 
between different alternatives, it is not sufficient to look at good practice cases and 
champions. Just because a measure worked there, it does not necessarily follow that it will 
work here. One needs to consider the antecedents and determine if all the support factors 
are present. Below, we propose four tools with some exemplifications: problem tree; ex-
ante failure scenario with simplified causal model; step-by-step and backward theory-
based evaluation thinking; and quick exit tree  
Problem tree. Figure 15 below shows an example of a problem tree and analysis of 
support factors for an intervention by the Municipality of Trelleborg that used robotic 
process automation (RPA) to improve welfare support services.  
Figure 15. Problem tree: the Trelleborg case of using RPA for welfare support. 
Source: elaborated by the authors. 
From the problem tree above, we developed a configuration of the support factors that 
needed to be present in order to implement the Municipality of Trelleborg’s initiative to 
introduce RPA into welfare support services, and for the initiative to stand a chance of 
producing the desired outcomes.  
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Figure 16. Support factors for the Trelleborg case of using RPA for welfare support. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors. 
Ex-ante failure scenario. One alternative is to develop a simplified causal model of the 
intervention (such as the one depicted in Figure 17 below. Next, a group of policy makers, 
stakeholders and experts engage in the collective construction of an ex-ante failure 
scenario. They imagine that the intervention will fail, and from this reasoning they extract 
a list of factors that are necessary for the intervention to work. They must envisage that 
the intervention has been put in in place as planned, but that things have gone wrong – 
and must identify what could go wrong, and why, for the intervention to fail. 
Figure 17. Simplified causal depiction for the Trelleborg RPA case.  
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
Step-by-step and backward theory-based evaluation thinking. This approach is also 
referred to as ‘process tracing’. It aims to confirm the existence of a causal connection 
between start and finish, by checking a series of smaller causal steps in between, one by 
one, using the available evidence. Figure 18 below shows an example based on the data-
driven water management project implemented in Denmark.  
Organisation 
readiness 
Beneficiaries 
needs 
Public sector 
employees 
motivations
Inter-agency 
cooperation
Integrated 
digital 
systems
Support 
technologies
Capacity to 
reach entitled 
beneficiaries
Public sector 
employees 
digital skills
INTERVENTIONS OUTPUTS OUTCOMES
Awareness 
& 
information
Definition of 
the right 
technology
Employees 
focused on more 
complex tasks
Training of 
employees
Better 
service 
delivery
Reduced 
waiting time
Beneficiaries’
well-being
IMPACT
Introduction of 
RPA Platform
 58 
Figure 18. Backward thinking, based on the smart water network in Denmark. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors.  
Quick exit tree. Decision trees are a familiar tool to help decision makers figure out what 
to do.  
Figure 19. Quick exit tree for data-driven government initiative/strategy. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors. 
Within the more general category of decision trees, Quick Exit Trees (QETs) are simple 
tools used to eliminate options by answering binary Yes/No questions using evidence, 
logical reasoning, and judgement (usually involving stakeholders and experts in policy lab 
consultation). QETs provide clear-cut answers and may save efforts if ‘No’ comes up at the 
very beginning. In Figure 19 above we present an example of a QET for the Data-Centric 
Government Initiative and Strategy, which is based on the OECD working papers on the 
topic mentioned earlier (van Ooijen, Welby and Ubaldi, 2019). This instrument consists of 
a series of question on the presence or absence of conditions required for the intervention 
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to work. If the first answer is ‘Yes’, then one proceeds to the next; if the answer is ‘No’, 
one can stop and discard the intervention. The advantage of a QET is that it provides an 
unequivocal answer as to whether an intervention will work in a specific context. Achieving 
this, however, requires all of the possible conditions to be laid down in the tree, and for 
evidence and judgements to be gathered in order to answer all of the questions. In 
addition, the dichotomous nature of the answers provided by a QET does not allow for 
more nuanced answers or scores. It also requires that evidence is very robust in order to 
back a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer. 
2.6.2 Evaluation and measurement 
Figure 20 below represents an ex-ante Intervention Logic for a data analytics intervention 
introduced in France to fight fraudulent activities.  
Figure 20. Intervention logic: using data analytics to fight fraud in France.  
 
Source: elaborated by the author, based on OECD Working Paper on Public Governance No. 33 (p.24) 
 
From a logic sketch of this kind, one can derive measurement indicators that can be used 
in more pragmatic in itinere or ex-post evaluation. Some of these could then be considered 
as outcome variables in a counterfactual evaluation. Figure 21 below provides a generic 
example of a set of indicators for the intervention described above.  
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Figure 21. Micro-level measurement tool for data-analytics to fight fraud in France. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors, based on OECD Working Paper on Public Governance No. 33 (p.24) 
In this domain, a tool developed in an earlier project by the JRC could be adapted and re-
used to evaluate digital government initiatives, especially those addressing inclusion 
issues. The JRC has produced a tool which is available online, MIREIA eInclusion 
Intermediaries Impact Assessment Framework (MIREIA eI2-IAF, see Box 6 below), that 
practitioners can adapt for their specific purposes. 
Box 6. MIREIA eInclusion intermediaries impact assessment framework. 
The MIREIA eInclusion Intermediaries Impact Assessment Framework (mireia ei2- iaf) 
aims to measure the outputs, outcomes and impacts of eInclusion intermediaries.  
It includes a theoretical model, as well as operational guidelines for the evaluation of 
practices. It allows the systematic collection of end users’ micro-data through grassroots 
organisations, so that it can be aggregated at various levels, in order to facilitate the 
measurement of outcomes and the estimation of the impact on employment, education 
and social inclusion (Misuraca et al., 2014).  
The framework was developed under the Mireia project, conducted by JRC-IPTS and DG 
CNECT, which aimed to create appropriate instruments to show how eInclusion 
intermediaries contribute to the achievement of EU policy goals. 
 
As shown in Figure 22 below, the operational framework of MIREIA eI2-IAF and its related 
Toolkit consists of the following elements:  
1. The Impact Measurement Tool, which comprises the following sub-components:  
 The Context Analysis Checklist helps intermediaries to better 
understand the context in which they are operating, and helps them to 
define (ex-ante) baselines, target group characteristics, and the size of the 
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interventions to be implemented, and to update such information on a 
regular basis to support in-itinere and ex-post evaluations.  
 The System of measurement indicators assists intermediaries in 
monitoring and measuring their interventions (in-itinere and ex-post, but 
also in estimating ex-ante potential impacts) in relation to the resources 
allocated (inputs), the related services delivered to a target population 
(outputs), the direct and indirect outcomes generated, and the estimated 
contribution to specific and global impacts.  
 The Evaluation criteria enable the assessment of the outcomes and 
impacts generated by each intervention (i.e. micro-level), and the 
aggregated specific impact of interventions carried out by an intermediary 
organisation (i.e. at meso-level). They also help to estimate the 
contribution of eInclusion intermediary interventions towards achieving 
global impacts in their respective contexts (i.e. macro-level) efficiently, 
effectively and sustainably.  
 
2. Methodological guidelines for impact evaluation provide intermediaries with a 
scientific approach, based on counterfactual techniques, for evaluating cause-effect 
relationships between their interventions and the impacts they have generated. 
Although based on a micro-level approach, these guidelines serve to justify 
intermediaries' and policy makers' strategic choices and the planning and evaluation 
(ex-ante; in-itinere and ex-post) of their interventions (i.e. at meso and macro 
level).  
Figure 22. MIREIA eI2 IAF: operational framework and related toolkit. 
 
Source: European Commission (2014). 
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2.6.3 Mapping complexity through modelling simulation 
The issue of complexity has surfaced several times earlier in this report, particularly in 
Section 2.4, which deals with effects. In what follows, we briefly discuss complexity in 
order to preliminarily scope possible future explorations. This discussion will be refined and 
systematised in the final report of this study, when we will present recommendations on 
future applied policy research that may advance our understanding of Digital Government 
Transformation and our capacity to explain why and how it succeeds or fails.  
As stressed by Misuraca and Codagnone (2018) and by Misuraca, Geppert, and Codagnone 
(2017), which used the findings of a study that adopted the complexity approach to analyse 
and model social innovation, only recently has policy research and policy making begun to 
consider complexity and complexity theory. Often, policies do not deliver their full potential 
simply because they fail to fully consider all of the complexity angles involved. First, the 
various economic, social, and technological challenges addressed by the policies are 
themselves part of multiple complex and co-evolving ecosystems that involve many 
interacting interests and players. Second, and most importantly, policy makers and policy 
researchers are not always equipped with the right conceptual and analytical tools both 
ex-ante (when they design the interventions) and ex-post (when they evaluate them). The 
complexity of reality is not given full consideration, leading to misguided ex-ante 
assessments and designs as well as ex-post evaluations and policy recommendations. This 
is despite ample evidence that policy interventions often concern so-called ‘wicked 
problems’: issues that are characterised by multiple causes and which involve multiple 
actors and responsibility at many institutional levels.  
Within multi-level governance architectures in which cooperation must be maintained 
among the networks of actors, under conditions of uncertainty regarding problem-solving 
and policy outcomes, complexity is very high. Complex systems are usually defined as 
consisting of a large number of elementary units that interact with each other, typically in 
a non-linear fashion. These interactions give rise to collective behaviour that cannot be 
simply inferred from the behaviour of the individual units. These are the so-called emergent 
phenomena. In other words, some collective behaviour cannot be predicted by looking at 
the individual elements that make up the system. Emergent properties/effects are 
characteristic of what are also termed Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). From an 
epistemological point of view, the concept of emergent properties/effects represents an 
anti-reductionist view of reality. A set of entities at a certain level owes its existence to 
lower-level entities, but also presents a set of states/properties/regularity of its own, which 
may be studied independently.  
The relationship between the micro and macro level upon which the concept of emerging 
effects hinges is captured more analytically by the notion of ‘supervenience’. First, a 
higher-level structure depends ontologically on the lower-level one – that is, the former 
could not exist without the latter. Second, distinctions and variations within these higher-
level phenomena/structures – different performances, different fitness, different function 
– are necessarily based on differences at the lower level, but the reverse is not true: 
different individual configurations can give rise to the same phenomenon at macro level. 
Based on the considerations above, it follows that complex systems can be represented 
naturally, in mathematical terms, as networks. This network approach can be applied 
fruitfully in a variety of cases. In recent years, the consideration of complex networks has 
yielded important insights into the understanding of technological systems, financial and 
social networks, among others. In the study of complex, emergent, and self-organised 
systems, networks are becoming increasingly important as a universal mathematical 
framework, especially when massive amounts of data are involved. Networks are becoming 
the paradigm for uncovering the hidden architecture of complexity. The main benefit of 
studying complexity by means of the mathematical instrument of networks is the ability to 
measure – and therefore describe scientifically, in the sense of the ‘hard’ sciences – a 
variety of situations that were previously impossible to describe. Networks allow us to do 
this without imposing any ad hoc hypothesis. For example, concepts such as communities 
of people or their preferences can now be structured in the form of bipartite networks, 
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thereby providing a clear ‘spectroscopy’ of societal structure. This also applies to 
communities of companies and/or products. Networks not only describe the mechanisms 
of interaction between, for example, computers, people, ecological species, but they are 
also a powerful tool for information filtering.  
Thanks to the theoretical advancements in the recent years, the capacity to analyse and 
forecast on the basis of incomplete data has been increased (Squartini et al., 2018) through 
the use entropy-based techniques (Cimini et al., 2019). Such techniques make it possible 
to model various phenomena, with a margin of error and uncertainty, depending on the 
size of the sample analysed. Furthermore, network methods can be combined with Agent-
Based Models (ABM) to provide the most advanced form of Network Agent-Based Models 
(NABM). ABM are models with no representative agents, but which allow a large number 
of different agents with their own characteristic behaviours to be included into a model and 
allowed to interact via networks to produce emergent behaviours. NABM can simulate ex-
ante the potential results of any policy intervention, and then validate the results ex-post 
using actual data. In the context of Big Data and data analytics, the potential to apply 
these methods at various phases of policy making is vast.  
For all of the above reasons, and due to the possibility of emergent effects, the complexity 
approach is increasingly used in economics. The interaction between economics, society 
and policy interventions presents a level of complexity that should be modelled as the 
product of interactions between heterogeneous agents undertaking heterogeneous 
activities. Hence, the macro socio-economic system should be conceived as a Complex 
Adaptive System (CAS), in which myriads of agents with different interests and behavioural 
characteristics interact within inter-related domains (Arthur, 2013; Kirman, 2010). CAS 
are highly non-linear (often due to interactions) and are organised on many spatial and 
temporal scales. This inherent non-linearity leads to endogenous fluctuations and sudden 
regime changes from one type of regime to another. The properties of the system are 
modifiable as a result of interactions. The notion of CAS is particularly useful when one 
conceives of innovation in evolutionary terms (Dosi, 1988, 2013; Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Recently, the evolutionary theory of innovation has been embedded into Agent-
Based Models with truly remarkable results (Dosi et al., 2013; Dosi et al., 2015; Dosi et 
al., 2010), extending our understanding of the role of both innovation processes and 
technology policies on socio-economic dynamics (Dawid, 2006; Dawid et al., 2012; Dawid 
and Harting, 2012; Dawid et al., 2013; Dawid and Hellmann, 2014). This line of research 
converges naturally with the line of research that exploits ABMs to reveal the pro-cyclicality 
of the financial system in a Minskyan setting (Assenza and Delli Gatti, 2013; Assenza et 
al., 2015; Delli Gatti et al., 2011; Delli Gatti et al., 2008). Inspired by this, the JRC project 
i-Frame developed an application using an ABM to simulate the impact of some forms of 
ICT-enabled social innovation (see Misuraca and Codagnone, 2018).  
Because ICT-enabled social innovation overlaps in several ways with the provision of public 
services and the design of public policies in the domain of Government Digital 
Transformation, it would appear to be a natural continuation of the present study to apply 
modelling inspired by the epistemology and theory of complexity. All of this chapter, and 
particularly Section 2.1, illustrates the many factors that shape public sector innovation 
and the complexities it entails. When these elements are integrated into the proposed 
framework, a level of potential complexity emerges so starkly that it is self-evident and 
requires no further illustration. Understanding and explaining why and how some effects 
materialise, while others do not, requires the approach of complexity in relation to 
evaluation. The possible applications of complexity within the present domain of interest 
are therefore relevant and manifold. Complexity-inspired models can be used to deal with 
users’ adoption, or to understand the interactions between antecedents and effects, or to 
produce real-time, evaluative simulations that exploit the capabilities of Big Data analytics. 
Having briefly and preliminarily listed possible applications, below we discuss the various 
modelling approaches that could be used in future studies.  
A model is a simplified representation of reality that can be adopted when reality itself is 
too complex to be analysed in granular detail. 
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Figure 23.  Computer-based modelling simulations. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 23 above, when reality is too complex to study directly in view of 
various constraints (time, information, money, etc.), the experimental method may not be 
feasible. If some data are available and the problem at hand is not to complex, one may 
try to solve a model analytically, using data to estimate parameters; this is what traditional 
econometric models (as opposed to modelling tools) do. When reality is too complex to 
apply this approach, researchers resort to computer-based modelling simulations. In doing 
so, not all variables are of equal importance to the researcher, whose choices reflect 
implicit assumptions, rules and strategies used to solve problems that are explicit in the 
model. Based on this premise, in the following paragraph we present a synthetic 
comparison of different modelling approaches. The table below provides a synthetic 
comparison of different modelling tools.  
Traditional economic modelling tools rest on an unrealistic characterisation of 
representative agents and the unrealistic assumption of general equilibrium. They do not 
take into account the heterogeneity of both agents and activities. System dynamics (SD) 
is based on a top-down and aggregated view that offers strong explanatory power, but 
nevertheless reflects the mental models of the modellers or the group model-building 
exercises. It is mostly applied in managerial studies and, more recently, also in policy 
studies. SD is a perspective and set of conceptual tools that enable the understanding of 
the structure and dynamics of complex systems. SD is often used to build management 
‘flight simulators’: micro-worlds in which space and time can be compressed and slowed 
down in order to experience the long-term side-effects of decisions, as well as enabling 
speed learning, developing our understanding of complex systems, and facilitating the 
design of structures and strategies for greater success. State variables (stock and flows) 
are linked by algebraic differential equations. They are system-centred, and do not account 
for heterogeneity of agents and activities. 
 65 
Table 6. Comparison of models. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors.  
 
Discrete-event simulations use the concept of entities, resources and block charts to 
describe entity flow and resource sharing, with passive entities. Their focus is on 
‘processes’ rather than ‘agents’. In discrete-event simulation, the operation of a system is 
represented as a chronological sequence of events. Each event occurs at a point in time, 
and marks a change of state in the system.  
Agent-Based Models (ABMs) is a bottom up approach populated by agents that are 
autonomous, pro-active, reactive, spatial aware, able to learn and possess social abilities. 
These agents ‘live’ in an environment and are driven by behaviour rules defined by ‘state 
charts’. ABM is essentially a decentralised, individual-centric (as opposed to system-level) 
approach to model design. ABMs have been used in social simulations (Balke and Gilbert, 
2014) to explicitly describe human decision-making. They range on a continuum from fairly 
simple interactions among agents to deliberative/cognitive representations. When 
designing an ABM, the modeller identifies the active entities and agents (these can be 
people, companies, projects, assets, vehicles, cities, animals, ships, products, etc.); 
defines their behaviour (main drivers, reactions, memory, states, etc.); places them in a 
certain environment; establishes connections; and runs the simulation. The global 
behaviour then emerges as a result of interactions between many individual behaviours. 
ABMs combine elements of game theory, complex systems, emergence, computational 
sociology, multi-agent systems and evolutionary programming.  
Figure 24 below compares the three families of modelling simulation discussed above 
(traditional economic modelling tools are excluded from this comparison).  
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Figure 24. SD, discrete events and ABM. 
 
Source: adapted from Martin and Schlüter (2015). 
 
The Table 7 below zooms in more specifically on the comparison between SD and ABM. In 
our view, such a comparison clearly reveals the superiority of ABM in dealing with Complex 
Adaptive Systems characterised by emerging effects and properties. 
Table 7. SD and ABM compared. 
 SD ABM 
Perspective Top-down Bottom-up 
Main building block Causal loop Agent entities 
Unit of analysis System structure Rule of agent behaviour 
Level of modelling Aggregate system 
behaviour 
Individual agent behaviour 
System structure Pre-determined Evolvable 
Time handling Continuous Continuous or discrete 
Source: adapted from (Martin & Schlüter, 2015). 
ABMs are clearly preferable when dealing with situations characterised by the following: 
(a) identifiable and decentralised agents; (b) when the agents are varied or the 
environment is heterogeneous; (c) when the interaction between agents is local; (d) when 
agents are adaptive (and adapt their adaptation rules); (e) when individual behaviours 
(and destiny) matters; and (f) when agents have a spatial presence.  
Currently, there is much talk of the hybridisation of SD and ABM – although this something 
that is easier said than done. In the literature, the two models are presented as iconic 
model paradigms in the sense that they are considered as exclusive alternatives for the 
analysis of complex systems from either a top-down/aggregated or bottom-
up/disaggregated perspective (Swinerd and McNaught, 2012; Vincenot et al., 2011). To 
the best of our knowledge, such hybridisation has been used sequentially only when 
interfacing a social ecosystem (rendered using ABM) with a natural one modelled using SD 
(e.g. the condition of a lake) (Martin and Schlüter, 2015). If one starts from ABM model, 
then the inclusion of an SD module is equivalent to ‘back-boxing’ part of the system. 
Conversely, adding an ABM module to SD tools means opening a window into more realistic 
treatments of agent behaviour. Table 8 below compares the three possibilities: ABM, SD, 
and hybrid. 
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Table 8. Comparison of SD, ABM and a hybrid of the two. 
 ABM SD Hybrid 
Characteristic 
question 
How do emergent 
system-level patterns 
develop from micro-level 
interaction (e.g. spatially, 
between individuals)? 
How do stocks change 
or stabilise (given that 
rates are constant)? 
how do changing process 
rates (impacted by 
decisions) affect 
dynamics? 
Purposes 
 
To identify mechanisms 
(specific interactions) 
that are responsible for 
emerging system-level 
patterns (disaggregated). 
Which 
process/feedback is 
dominant? 
How do changing stocks 
affect agent states/the 
distribution of traits? 
Focus Generating hypotheses, 
exploring micro-level 
behaviour (Epstein, 
2008) 
Investigating system-
level dynamics 
(aggregated), stability 
properties of the 
system, loop 
dominance, explaining 
temporal dynamics, 
projection into the 
future 
Investigating different 
micro- or system-level 
mechanisms that drive 
certain dynamics; 
generating hypotheses 
concerning system state-
change (when does 
dominance of feedbacks 
change?) or structural 
development over time 
(when does an average 
trait of agents change?) 
Tests for 
model 
calibration 
Micro-level interactions 
between entities, 
network structure 
(heterogeneous 
characteristics of 
individuals/actors, 
temporal discrete 
behaviour), transient 
dynamics 
Processes driving 
accumulation in 
stocks at (sub-
)system level, stable-
states, feedbacks 
(balancing, 
amplifying), non-
linearities 
Processes of 
restructuring in a system 
that can focus either on 
a structure affecting the 
processes, or processes 
affecting the structure 
Suitable and 
traditional 
analysis tools, 
typical 
experiments 
Statistical pattern-
matching – can the 
model grow patterns that 
are found in reality? 
Stability analysis – 
under which 
parameters can fixed 
points/equilibria 
occur? How stable are 
they? 
Separate sub-system 
tests (paradigm-specific) 
and qualitative check for 
the coupled version 
Type of 
outcome 
Only through 
simulations, often with 
multiple repetitions 
because of stochastic 
elements: plotting 
group/system-level 
characteristics over time 
(average), evaluating a 
limited parameter range  
Simple models via 
analytical tools 
(basins of attraction, 
bifurcation analysis, 
overall stability), and 
more complex via 
simulations  
Via simulations, with a 
focus on either 
Source: Adapted from (Martin & Schlüter, 2015). 
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3 Case studies/experiments  
3.1 Highlights from case studies 
This second part of the report presents the four case studies, together with a proposal for 
a revision of DigiGov-F (conceptual framework), in light of some key findings emerging 
from the cases. 
We identified and conducted four case studies containing an experimental or quasi-
experimental dimension, in order to illustrate the possible impacts of Digital Government 
Transformation. Each of the case studies covers different context (city management, 
education, privacy, policing), and their results have implications for most phases of the 
policy cycle. In analysing the cases and the findings of their experimental or quasi-
experimental components, we pursue the twofold objective of validating and refining the 
conceptual framework, while at the same time exploring the real-life drivers and barriers 
in each case, as well as the outcomes actually produced, or that could potentially be 
achieved in the future. 
The four cases are to be considered as explorations that zoom in closely on the ‘nuts and 
bolts’ of the practice of Digital Government Transformation – although one can hardly 
generalise from just these four cases. Nonetheless, taken singularly and in a cross-case 
comparison, the four cases provide interesting insights and lend themselves to the 
formulation of hypotheses for new research, or appear to confirm theories and hypotheses 
presented in the literature analysing the previous waves of eGovernment activities.  
Seven main lessons can be extracted from the cases. These are used to various extents in 
the proposal for a revision of the conceptual framework presented in detail in Chapter 4 
and only briefly outlined here. 
(1)The limits of automation and of immediate productivity gains 
Although they emerge from different domains, the Tvarkau Vilnių (Lithuania) case and the 
case of body-worn cameras (BWCs) in the UK both converge the observation that there 
are limits to automation using AI; that the achievement of results still requires human 
interaction; and that, as has been known for decades, productivity achieved through the 
use of ICT occur with a lag time – and only when combined with a change in organisation 
and culture (referred to in our framework as ‘reframing’). Furthermore, both cases 
underscore the fact that outcomes are at times difficult to isolate at sectoral level, and 
should be considered at systemic level.  
(2)The importance of investments and of a dynamic perspective in the 
framework  
The cases show that in the short to mid term, duplication of efforts and stratification of 
delivery channels may actually increase, rather than decrease, the efforts and the costs of 
public administrations. When services are up and running, new needs emerge that require 
new investments and thus, a new iteration is needed to improve the service. The key 
implication for our framework is that greater emphasis needs to be placed on efforts and 
investments, and that a feedback loop should be built in to take into account of the dynamic 
and iterative process of Digital Government Transformation. 
(3)The corroboration of the reframing perspective adopted in our framework 
The cases corroborate the importance of reframing as defined in our framework, both as 
part of implementation and as one dimension of our taxonomy. The movement from 
eGovernment to Digital Government is a steady process that involves a number of practical 
issues pertaining to the implementation process and to the corresponding antecedents 
highlighted in our framework. 
(4)The strategic importance and twofold nature of legitimacy and trust 
Despite the potentially positive effects stemming from the use of technologies to deliver 
public services and improve operations, some important challenges must be addresses in 
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relation to trust and legitimacy. It can be concluded that legitimacy and trust are, at once, 
both an important process-level prerequisite and an end outcome. 
(5)Greater focus is needed on user adoption and potential new forms of digital 
divide 
From different angles, both the Tvarkau Vilnių (Lithuania) case and the online experiment 
point out the issue of user adoption as a specific focus for attention that will not come 
about automatically merely by adopting the best AI applications. In fact, these new 
technologies may actually generate new forms of digital divide, as evidenced in the online 
experiment. On the one hand, this underscores once more the importance, implicit in our 
network, of reframing the conceptual and cognitive routines to better focus on adoption. 
On the other hand, it suggests that the issue of adoption and of potential new forms of 
digital divide, should be given greater salience in a revised version of the framework. 
(6) Realism about engagement, open governance and co-production 
Tvarkau Vilnių (Lithuania) suggests that the claims heralded by supporters of open 
governance, co-production and civic engagement should be approached with caution. While 
an active portion of citizens will benefit from new technological possibilities, civic 
disengagement and lower political participation are secular trends in advanced democracies 
that cannot be reversed simply by deploying new and more potent technological means. 
(7)The importance of non-monetary effects 
Both the BWC case (UK) and the ‘Kids Go Green’ (Italy) case confirm the importance of 
outcomes beyond productivity and efficiency gains. Specifically, they point to the 
importance of effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness gains appear more prominently 
in the BWC case, and appear to contribute to the important outcome of increasing 
legitimacy through better policing behaviour and better accountability. The Kids Go Green 
case shows that the project (a) fosters inclusion by improving learning processes and 
creating a community network (inclusion); (b) modifies the teaching approach by offering 
new and innovative methods (teaching approach); and (c) improves the digital skills of 
both children and teachers.  
3.2 Case Study 1: Tvarkau Vilnių (Lithuania) 
3.2.1 Introduction 
3.2.1.1 Description of the context 
Over the last decade, mobile applications to report non-emergency issues to local 
governments have grown in popularity around the world41. For example, FixMyStreet42, 
developed by mySociety in 2007, has now expanded from the UK to Ireland, France, 
Switzerland, Slovenia, Belgium, New Zealand, Australia, Japan and other countries. Some 
alternatives include SeeClickFix43 and PublicStuff44 in the US, Verbeterdebuurt45 in the 
Netherlands, FixMyCity46 in Greece, and Tvarkau Vilnių47 (English: “I fix Vilnius”) in 
Lithuania. 
These applications usually allow the public to report non-emergency issues in the city to 
the authorities responsible by uploading a picture of a problem and selecting the precise 
location where it has occurred on a map. The issues reported can include misplaced 
rubbish, potholes, issues with public transport routes or delays, parking violations, etc. 
Various departments within the local government then investigate the problems and, where 
                                           
41 The study was written by Luka Klimavičiūtė (PPMI) and Egidijus Barcevičius (PPMI). 
42 https://www.fixmystreet.com/ 
43 https://seeclickfix.com/ 
44 http://www.publicstuff.com/residents 
45 https://www.verbeterdebuurt.nl/ 
46 http://glyfada.intelligentcity.gr/ 
47 https://tvarkaumiesta.lt/ 
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necessary, address them. The person who reported the issue is given a update on the 
actions taken by the public actor.  
Such applications have been lauded for offering various democratic advantages. Some 
scholars argue that they make the government more accountable by giving citizens a tool 
to exert pressure on authorities to address public issues48. Local councils provide public 
responses to users’ reports, enhancing the transparency of and trust in decision-making 
and resource-allocation processes49. These responses, combined with the reports 
submitted by other city residents, inform the public about their city50 and can foster greater 
citizen engagement51. These applications allow city councils to involve the public in 
municipal administration, thereby enabling co-production52. Through co-production, 
municipalities gather more information than they could using only internal resources, 
increasing the efficiency of their work53. Using the information gathered about problems in 
the city, local governments can also design better policies and public services in line with 
the reported needs of citizens54. 
However, some scholars have criticised such applications. Most notably, Baykurt (2011)55 
argues that they encourage passive and individualistic rather than collective action by 
citizens. In such individualistic action, the government plays the role of a service provider 
and the citizen, a client. Even though citizens are actively involved in helping to create a 
cleaner and better city, the problems reported are trivial as applications provide no 
opportunity to request more necessary long-term services. Participation beyond the 
submission of a complaint is discouraged, because users are not informed what to do if 
their report is ignored or not addressed in a satisfactory way. This limits accountability, 
too: although the public can hold governments accountable with regard to whether or not 
the issue is fixed, they have no say in how it is fixed. Furthermore, these applications raise 
questions about social exclusion, because a level of digital literacy, as well as access to the 
internet and possession of a computer or smartphone are required in order to submit 
reports. Several empirical studies have indeed found lower take-up among low-income and 
ethnically diverse communities56, as well as bias towards citizens with better education57. 
Scholars have even called into question the efficiency of these reporting methods, arguing 
that many of the reports submitted are either outdated or duplicated58. 
In the literature, both praise and criticism of these technologies often remain at the 
theoretical level, possibly because outcomes such as accountability, trust, transparency 
and citizen engagement are difficult to measure. Nevertheless, a few notable exceptions 
exist. After qualitatively analysing reports submitted to Urbanias – a site similar to 
FixMyStreet that operates in Brazil – Santos et al. (2012, p. 21, 24)59 concluded that the 
site “is not used for discussions about the city’s problems or broader issues of citizenship 
or even any form of mobilization or engagement… [the] website is excellent for generating 
reports/complaints, but… the website is basically effective for this purpose only”. By 
contrast, based on a survey of users of FixMyStreet and similar applications, Rumbul 
(2016)60 argues that these technologies help citizens feel that the government is 
responsive to their demands, and that they can hold it accountable.  
                                           
48 Meijer et al. 2009 and Rumbul R. (2016) ICT and Citizen Efficacy: The Role of Civic Technology in Facilitating 
Government Accountability and Citizen Confidence. In: Mata, F. & Pont, A. (eds) ICT for Promoting Human 
Development and Protecting the Environment. WITFOR 2016. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication 
Technology, vol 481. Springer, Cham. 
49 Baykurt, 2011; Chun et al., 2010; Nam, 2012 
50 Meijer et al., 2009 
51 Dörk & Monteyne, 2011 
52 Linders, 2012 
53 Baykurt, 2011; Trimi and Sheng, 2008 
54 Chun et al., 2010; Nam, 2012 
55 https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/spir/article/view/8811/7019 
56 Pak et al., 2017 
57 Helsper, 2008; Escher, 2011 
58 King and Brown, 2007 
59https://www.academia.edu/16902775/_2012_Fix_my_city_an_eparticipation_analysis_of_the_Brazilian_Urba
nias_initiative 
60 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-44447-5_20 
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Therefore, even if political participation using these apps or sites is of a limited nature, 
they can have spill-over effects that encourage citizen engagement in other ways. To 
explore these ways, Cantijoch et al. (2016)61 ran a regression analysis of mySociety survey 
respondents and found that particularised or parochial interaction via online sites such as 
FixMyStreet is associated with “community efficacy”, or a feeling that residents can impact 
their communities. However, this effect is significant only for multiple-time users, who 
already tend to be more politically active. 
Given that the effects of these applications remain relatively little explored empirically, and 
the studies that do exist arrive at different conclusions, below we present an in-depth case 
study of Tvarkau Vilnių – an app used to report problems to the city council in Vilnius, 
Lithuania. In particular, we explore to what extent the use of Tvarkau Vilnių fosters greater 
citizen engagement and trust in municipal government. Over the next two sections, we 
provide further context about the platform, including how it came about and what 
technology supports it.  
In Section 3.2.2, we explain the methodology used in our case study – including a 
randomised control trial, surveys, and interviews – to explore the effects of using Tvarkau 
Vilnių both for the municipality and for the public. We then present the results and discuss 
them according to different outcome dimensions highlighted in the conceptual framework, 
including productivity and efficiency; effectiveness, inclusion and sustainability; and 
legitimacy. We conclude by assessing the extent to which the conceptual framework helps 
us to understand this innovation, summarising the drivers and barriers relating to the 
successful implementation of Tvarkau Vilnių, and providing policy and research 
recommendations. 
3.2.1.2 Tvarkau Vilnių 
The Tvarkau Vilnių platform was originally launched in 2012 in order to streamline the 
process of gathering information from the public regarding issues in the city. Prior to 2012, 
Vilnius residents could call or e-mail the municipality regarding problems they observed, 
but the flow of information was irregular, and the municipality had to dedicate a lot of 
resources to respond to each inquiry and find the department responsible for addressing 
the issue concerned. Given that such a reporting method also required substantial effort 
from Vilnius residents, many issues remained unreported and unresolved. The city council, 
too, lacked the resources to identify all potential problems in the city in order to plan what 
needed to be fixed. 
As a solution, the municipality first developed an interactive register of the city’s 
problems62. To use this website, Vilnius residents had to register and sign in, select the 
type of the issue they wished to report, enter the address where it occurred, provide a 
description and (optionally) upload a picture. Each problem was given a unique ID and 
forwarded to a relevant council worker. Those who submitted reports could track their 
progress in real time and see the response from the municipality. Finally, users could also 
view reports submitted by others on a digital map of Vilnius. 
Roughly 2,000 reports were submitted via the portal each year in 2013 and 2014, by a 
little under 1,000 unique users63 (see Figure 26 below). Even though the public embraced 
the portal, there was room for improvement: the website was not designed to be used on 
mobile devices, meaning that those who reported issues could not do so immediately when 
they noticed a problem. Following requests for a more user-friendly tool, the municipality 
developed a mobile iOS application in 201564.  
                                           
61 Cantijoch, M., Galandini, S. & Gibson, R. (2016). “It’s not about me, it’s about my community”: A mixed-
method study of civic websites and community efficacy. New Media & Society, 18(9), 1896–1915. 
62 www.vilnius.lt/problemos. For more information, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j4VrIwwsZ2M.  
63 https://tvarkaumiesta.lt/statistics 
64 https://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/vilniaus-zinios/vilniuje-pranesti-apie-miesto-problemas-nuo-siol-
galima-ir-mobiliaisiais-telefonais-793-487537 
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Through various hackathons and other events, the team working on Tvarkau Vilnių also 
came into contact with a group of volunteer developers calling themselves Code4Vilnius65, 
who helped to develop an Android version of the mobile application, and continue to 
provide technical support on an ad-hoc basis. 
Figure 25. Issues reported to Vilnius municipality through the Tvarkau Vilnių problem register and 
mobile application, 2012-2018.66 
 
Following the development of Tvarkau Vilnių mobile applications for iOS and Android, 
between 2014 and 2015 the number of reports doubled, then nearly doubled again 
between 2015 and 2016 (see Figure 25 above). Take-up increased even further in 2017, 
when an option to submit reports anonymously was added. Users who submit reports using 
the mobile application are not required to include any identifying information. Users who 
notify the municipal administration through the website are asked to provide only their e-
mail address. Nevertheless, Vilnius residents can register and provide their personal 
information if they so choose. Signing in allows users to edit their reports later on and 
report certain issues (for example, parking violations), for which identifying information is 
required, in order that the police can issue fines to the wrongdoer.  
Anonymous reporting is one of the features that differentiates Tvarkau Vilnių from the 
more widely known FixMyStreet platform. In the UK, for example, FixMyStreet users must 
include their name and e-mail address when submitting a report. By default, the name will 
not be included in published reports, but will be entered into the municipal system. The 
creators of FixMyStreet argue that providing a name is necessary because (a) it is a 
mandatory field in most council systems; and (b) “When users are asked to provide contact 
details, the tone of their correspondence tends to be more constructive and less abusive.”67 
For the purposes of our case study, however, a platform that allows anonymous reporting 
is more suitable because we incentivise participants to report issues through Tvarkau 
Vilnių. If reporting were not anonymous, we would be likely to experience a very high 
attrition rate. Furthermore, given that trust in the municipality is the key focus of our 
study, whether and why participants submit issues anonymously can provide insights about 
trust in public institutions.  
                                           
65 https://atviras.vilnius.lt/iniciatyvos/code-for-vilnius 
66 https://tvarkaumiesta.lt/statistics. Note: the figure includes reported submitted by both registered and 
anonymous users. 
67 https://www.fixmystreet.com/faq 
696
2,153 2,235
4,775
7,986
21,100
34,100
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
 73 
Anonymous reporting also influences the volume of issues submitted. Manchester – a city 
in the UK with a population almost equivalent to that of Vilnius68 – has received just over 
14,000 reports from city residents since 200869. By contrast, in Vilnius, more than 34,000 
reports were submitted during 2018 alone70. Given that Vilnius experiences a very high 
volume of problem submissions, we expect that the Tvarkau Vilnių platform will have 
greater influence as a source of information for a municipal administration dealing with 
non-emergency issues than other, similar applications. This allows us to highlight various 
effects of the use technology on public institutions. 
Finally, the Tvarkau Vilnių case is interesting due to the institutional context in which the 
platform was created. In the US, similar platforms such as PublicStuff and SeeClickFix are 
run by private for-profit companies. In the UK, FixMyStreet is overseen by a private charity. 
By contrast, although municipal administration workers receive help from volunteer 
developers, the municipality itself is in primary charge of the platform. It is worth exploring 
why a public-private partnership was not chosen as a solution, given that such partnerships 
are prevalent when implementing digital tools in the work of governments (see D2). This 
case study could help to identify legal or institutional barriers to the creation of such 
partnerships. It could also identify risks relating to private sector involvement that might 
discourage public sector agencies from seeking out cooperation.  
Having described the way in which the Tvarkau Vilnių platform came about and why it is 
worth studying, in the next section we provide more information about the technology that 
supports the platform. 
3.2.1.3 Description of the innovation 
Figure 26 illustrates the Tvarkau Vilnių system, summarising the main actors involved and 
the technologies used to enable the submission of reports to the municipality.  
Starting from the top, when a person notices a problem and decides to report it using 
Tvarkau Vilnių, the Google Geolocation API71 is used to automatically detect the person’s 
location72. This means that when the user is asked to pinpoint the exact location where the 
problem occurred, they are taken to the area on the map that corresponds with their 
coordinates. The platform currently uses OpenStreetMap for its map services. Although 
Google Maps were used in the past, OpenStreetMap was eventually chosen as a cheaper 
alternative. 
After the user submits a report, it travels to an open-source MySQL database management 
system (DMBS)73. The system is integrated with both the municipality’s database, called 
@vilys (English: Hive), and with the Register of Administrative Offences74. The Register is 
an electronic database used by the police and other relevant institutions to process data 
and documents relating to administrative offences committed by natural and legal persons. 
A report is sent to the Register of Administrative Offences if the problem reported by a 
Tvarkau Vilnių user provides evidence that a law has been violated, and if the report 
includes enough information to identify the wrongdoer and the person reporting it.  
For example, where a Tvarkau Vilnių user submits a report about a parking violation, the 
report will be forwarded to the Register if the vehicle’s licence plate is visible in the photo, 
and Tvarkau Vilnių user provides his or her name, state-issued unique identification 
number, e-mail address and phone number.  
                                           
68 In 2016, Manchester had a population of roughly 541,000 residents, compared to 544,000 in Vilnius. 
https://secure.manchester.gov.uk/info/200088/statistics_and_intelligence/438/population; 
https://osp.stat.gov.lt/statistiniu-rodikliu-analize?hash=4afc61cc-bdb7-435f-9041-f8ba09de5b24#/ 
69 https://www.fixmystreet.com/reports/Manchester?zoom=11&lat=53.44247&lon=-
2.23337&status=open,closed,fixed&sort=created-asc 
70 https://tvarkaumiesta.lt/statistics 
71 https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/geolocation/intro 
72 Note that location detection is only available in the mobile application and not when submitting reports via the 
web portal. 
73 https://www.mysql.com/ 
74 https://www.ird.lt/lt/paslaugos/informacijos-rinkmenos/administraciniu-nusizengimu-registras 
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This personal information is required by the Code of Administrative Offenses75 in order to 
prepare a protocol about the offence. Once the police receive and review the report, if 
appropriate, they may issue an administrative penalty to the person who failed to comply 
with the law, hence addressing the problem. 
Figure 26. Diagram of the Tvarkau Vilnių system. 
 
It is also important to note that pictures that include visible licence plate numbers are not 
published on the Tvarkau Vilnių map for the public to see. The Tvarkau Vilnių team has 
purchased number-plate recognition software which automatically hides licence plates 
before the report is publicly shared.  
                                           
75 https://www.e-tar.lt/portal/lt/legalAct/4ebe66c0262311e5bf92d6af3f6a2e8b, article 609, paragraph 1. 
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If the report does not constitute an administrative offence, it travels to the municipal 
database. Here, the report is processed in order to determine which state agency or 
municipal department the report should be forwarded to. If the body responsible is a 
private entity contracted by the municipality, the report is first sent to council workers and 
then forwarded to the contractor. The entity tasked with dealing with the report then issues 
a response to the Tvarkau Vilnių user (hence, the arrows in the diagram point both ways). 
It then either addresses the issue, or includes it in the list of issues for potential inclusion 
in the following year’s budget. Information is passed on using an API developed by the 
Tvarkau Vilnių team. 
3.2.2 Approach and methodology 
To explore how the use of Tvarkau Vilnių impacts citizen engagement and trust in the 
municipal government, we employ a mixed-methods approach. Our methodology consists 
of three tasks that integrate with each other: (a) interviews with key stakeholders; (b) a 
randomised control trial; and (c) interviews with participants in the experiment. 
3.2.2.1 Interviews with stakeholders 
To identify the main goals behind the development of Tvarkau Vilnių and understand how 
it affects municipal administration, we conducted interviews with key stakeholders (n=6) 
within the Vilnius municipal administration. These included interviews with top officials, in 
order to better understand the institutional factors that may serve as facilitators or barriers 
to technological innovations in the public sector, as well as representatives from the Group 
for Innovation and Technologies, who are primarily responsible for overseeing the Tvarkau 
Vilnių platform. 
Interview questions focused primarily on the impacts – both positive and negative – of 
using Tvarkau Vilnių, in terms of service provision, the work of the administration and 
broader social effects (for example, with regard to how city residents perceive the 
municipality and their own role in the city’s development). We emphasised the distinction 
between potential effects that might take place in the future, and effects that had already 
been realised. 
3.2.2.2 Randomised control trial 
While the interviews helped us to contextualise how and why the app was created, we 
conducted an experiment to explore how Tvarkau Vilnių affects its users, with a particular 
focus on trust in the municipal government. We hypothesised that using Tvarkau Vilnių 
would enhance the user’s trust in the municipal government, because Tvarkau Vilnių users 
can see the problems they reported being fixed. 
In order to carry out the experiment, we first recruited 680 people via social media sites, 
offering EUR 20 in exchange for filling out two surveys and participating in an online game. 
The first survey, among other things, was intended to measure baseline characteristics (on 
a scale of 0-10). These included: 
 Trust in the municipal government. 
 Assessment of the municipality’s ability to solve problems effectively. 
 Perception of the competence of municipal staff. 
 Perception of the accessibility of municipal agencies. 
 
Out of an initial sample of 680 people, 539 filled out the first survey. Respondents who had 
used Tvarkau Vilnių during the previous year were then disqualified. These participants 
were excluded because the inclusion of people who had used the site might undermine the 
treatment. This left us with a sample of 453 research participants, whom we randomly 
assigned to treatment and control groups. Their socio-demographic characteristics are 
summarised in the table below. 
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Table 9. Socio-demographic characteristics of treatment and control groups after randomisation. 
 Treatment Control 
N 308 145 
Average age 25.6 24.9 
Gender Male 28% 31% 
Female 72% 69% 
Education High school 
diploma or less 
50% 53% 
Non-university 
tertiary education 
8% 8% 
BA 27% 26% 
MA or PhD 14% 14% 
Employment 
status 
Working 28% 31% 
Student 67% 64% 
Others 5% 6% 
Average trust in municipal 
government at baseline 
6.8 6.5 
 
We deliberately assigned twice as many participants to the treatment group because we 
expected greater attrition from the treatment group than from the control group. The 
treatment consisted of the following online game: after providing information about 
Tvarkau Vilnių, we asked the participants to use Tvarkau Vilnių at least once over the 
course of two months. Each time they used it, we asked them to fill out a form indicating 
what their reported problem was about and whether they submitted it with or without a 
picture. For every submission with a picture, participants received two points; every 
submission without a picture earned them one point. Twice over of the course of two 
months, we informed the respondents how they ranked against each other based on the 
total points they had received. The top 10 winners were promised ‘symbolic gifts’ for their 
participation, in addition to the EUR 20 remuneration for participating in the study.  
Although incentivising the use of Tvarkau Vilnių was our primary goal, we included this 
gamification element in order to test whether the treatment effect would be stronger 
among those who submitted more reports.  
As illustrated in Figure 27 below, the vast majority of participants submitted one Tvarkau 
Vilnių report. Meanwhile, the control group was informed that the first players in the online 
game are participating very actively, and so the control group would no longer be required 
to participate in the game. Note that neither the treatment group nor the control group 
were aware that they were participating in an experiment. 
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Figure 27. Number of Tvarkau Vilnių reports submitted by research participants. 
 
After the online game was completed, we sent both groups (treatment and control) a 
second survey. This consisted of questions about various digital services in Vilnius; the 
same perception questions about the municipality as in the first survey; and, if the 
respondent had used Tvarkau Vilnių over the previous two months, they were also shown 
questions about Tvarkau Vilnių. Ultimately, we sought to estimate whether trust in the 
municipality would change differently between the treatment and control groups over the 
course of the two months (for discussion of RCT results, see Section 3.2.3). 
As expected, we experienced attrition in both treatment and control groups. Out of 308 
people who were initially assigned to the treatment group, 167 took the second survey; 
out of the 145 people who were assigned to control, 126 took the second survey. This 
provided us with a final sample of 293 research participants. In order to ensure internal 
validity, we ran a logistic regression to check for differential attrition, the results of which 
are summarised below. 
 Table 10. Regression results in relation to differential attrition. 
 DV: dropped out of the study 
(Y/N) 
Treatment (ref.: Control) 6.072*** 
(1.817) 
Age 0.975 
(0.018) 
Male (ref.: Female) 0.953 
(0.242) 
Education (ref.: High school 
diploma or less) 
Non-university tertiary 1.769 
(0.908) 
BA 0.782 
(0.244) 
MA or PhD 0.693 
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(0.341) 
Employment status  
(ref.: Working) 
Student 0.875 
(0.313) 
Others 0.926 
(0.483) 
Gross income per month 
(ref.: EUR 0–500) 
EUR 501–1,000 1.524 
(0.397) 
 EUR 1,001+ 1.835* 
(0.672) 
Constant 0.248** 
(0.164) 
Observations 389 
Pseudo R2  0.107 
Note: coefficients are odds ratios. Values in parentheses represent robust standard errors; * denotes significance 
at 10%, ** represents significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%. Reference categories are specified next to 
each variable. 
The results of the regression show that those who were assigned to the treatment group 
were more likely to drop out of the study. This makes sense, given that they were required 
to participate in the online game whereas the control group was not. The only other variable 
that is significant is income, which shows that those in the EUR 1,001+ income bracket 
were more likely to drop out of the study than those in the EUR 0–500 bracket. This again 
makes sense because for those earning more, monetary reward might be a lesser 
motivator.  
The final treatment and control groups are nevertheless very similar. We state this based 
on the regression results above (no other variables are significant, and income is significant 
only with 90% confidence), as well as on a comparison of the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the final groups (see Table 11 below).From this we conclude that, with 
respect to socio-demographic characteristics, attrition was random. Hence, we maintain 
internal validity by running the analysis on the final treatment and control groups without 
imputing data from the dropouts.  
Table 11. Socio-demographic characteristics of the treatment and control groups at the end of the 
study. 
 Treatment Control 
N 167 126 
Average age 26.2 25.1 
Gender Male 30% 29% 
Female 70% 71% 
Education High school 
diploma or less 
52% 48% 
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Non-university 
tertiary education 
7% 8% 
BA 25% 29% 
MA or PhD 16% 15% 
Employment 
status 
Working 30% 29% 
Student 64% 64% 
Other 6% 6% 
Average trust in municipal 
government at baseline 
6.8 6.5 
3.2.2.3 Qualitative information from the participants 
Quantitative tools are useful for measuring technology effects and deducing differences 
between people who use certain technologies and those who do not. But in order to 
understand the experiences people have while engaging with technology, qualitative 
methods are much more useful. Surveys and experiments are limited in telling us how 
people feel when they receive a response from the authorities regarding the issue they 
reported, which is paramount when exploring whether Tvarkau Vilnių fosters citizen 
engagement or undermines it.  
To complement our experiment, we provided multiple opportunities for research 
participants to share their insights. First, respondents were encouraged to leave comments 
regarding specific questions in both surveys. In the first survey, these questions centred 
on participants’ opinions about various digital services (both private and public) in Vilnius 
and their influence on respondents’ quality of life. In the second survey, the questions 
related to the participants’ opinions about Tvarkau Vilnių and the responses they received 
from the municipality. The treatment group also had an opportunity to comment on their 
experiences each time they filled out a form informing us that they had submitted a 
Tvarkau Vilnių report. Finally, after the experiment we also reached out to the top 10 game 
winners via email or phone to ask why they participated in the game so actively, how the 
reports they submitted made them feel, and whether using Tvarkau Vilnių had changed 
their opinion about the municipal government. The qualitative information collected is used 
to complement our findings in the following section. 
3.2.3 Results and discussion 
In this section, we present our findings. These are relevant to both the city of Vilnius and 
to other cities planning to use ICT tools similar to Tvarkau Vilnių. We structure our 
discussion according to the main outcomes discussed in the conceptual framework Thus, 
we begin with productivity and efficiency, move on to effectiveness, inclusion and 
sustainability; and end with legitimacy. Please note that the main implications of this case 
study are also discussed in relation to the conceptual framework in Section 4. Box 7 below 
provides a very brief summary of the main findings presented in the upcoming paragraphs.  
Box 7. Main findings of Case Study 1, Tvarkau Vilnių (Lithuania). 
  Citizens are willing to contribute to joined-up service delivery; however, a 
systemic effect in terms of higher trust and legitimacy in institutions is only likely 
if participants can monitor implementation and feel that their contribution makes 
a difference. In other words, this study shows that the mere fact of using the 
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platform does not directly enhance trust in municipal government: impactful 
results are necessary. 
  Personal data management is an increasingly sensitive issue. If not carried 
out properly, it may undermine even the most well-meaning ICT-based solution, 
as this case shows. Our study shows that the use of the platform has increased 
significantly since anonymous reporting was introduced. Most of the respondents 
(62%) opted to submit their reports anonymously, and indicated that they would 
be less likely to submit reports if they had to provide their name. 
  Despite the potential efficiency gains stemming from this innovation (e.g. 
reduced administrative burden for citizens), in the short term the platform risks 
increasing rather than decreasing the efforts and costs of the public 
administration, which must now deal with more input channels than it did 
previously. 
3.2.3.1 Productivity and efficiency 
Efficiency gains achieved by the Tvarkau Vilnių platform depend on whose perspective we 
consider. There are clear gains for city residents. Because the process of submitting a 
report to the municipality has been streamlined, city residents no longer need to identify 
which department is responsible and look for its contact information; they can pinpoint the 
exact location where a problem has occurred using their phones, and add a picture for 
clarification. These functions make it easier and more time-efficient for residents to report 
problems, motivating more of them to take part. As one of our respondents explained, 
before using the app she knew that there were ways to report problems, but thought that 
she had to go via the municipality’s e-government portal, and look for something there. 
After trying Tvarkau Vilnių, the path to report problems was, as she put it, “several times 
shorter”. 
The mobile application in particular makes it easier to report problems: once the Android 
application was launched in 2014, the number of unique registered users of Tvarkau Vilnių 
almost doubled from 983 to 1,746, and has continued to grow steadily ever since (see 
Figure 28 below)76.  
Figure 28. Unique registered Tvarkau Vilnių users, 2012-2019.77 
 
 
                                           
76 https://tvarkaumiesta.lt/statistics 
77 https://tvarkaumiesta.lt/statistics 
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Efficiency gains for the municipality are not as clear-cut. On the positive side, according to 
the Tvarkau Vilnių team, one of the greatest benefits of the platform is that it automates 
the process of finding the people responsible for fixing a particular issue. In the past, when 
reports were submitted through e-mail or phone calls on an ad-hoc basis, it would take 
longer for various departments to find the agency or person who could address the 
problem, creating inefficiencies. Now, the platform asks the user what type of problem he 
or she is reporting, and automatically routes the issue to the desired department78. To that 
end, the development team is working further to create problem sub-types, as well as a 
function to route problems to a particular eldership depending on the geolocation of the 
report.  
Furthermore, the crowdsourcing aspect of the initiative allows the municipality to collect 
much more information about problems in the city than it could gather by relying on 
internal resources only. Cooperation with Code4Vilnius volunteers also lowers the cost of 
running the platform itself. In this sense, the platform also increases the productivity of 
municipal agencies. 
On the downside, the municipality suffers from the poor quality of the reports submitted. 
For example, users sometimes duplicate reports accidentally when they inform the 
municipality about an issue that has already been submitted. The Tvarkau Vilnių team also 
noted a few notorious cases in which the same user not only submitted tens of identical 
reports, but also asked friends to do the same, hoping that the volume of the reports about 
the same issue would pressure the municipality into taking action. Instead, such behaviour 
simply creates a backlog of reports, lowering the chances that the municipality will respond 
on time. The Tvarkau Vilnių team argued that they cannot block such spammers because 
the same users also report other issues that may be useful to the municipality. To address 
this problem, some applications in other countries79 have a dedicated person responsible 
for reviewing reports before they are directed to the departments responsible or published 
online. However, representatives from the municipality argued that this solution is too 
expensive in Vilnius because the sheer volume of reports submitted (in 2019, exceeding 
40 00080) would require an entire team dedicated to reviewing reports. 
Due to a backlog, not all reports are solved promptly. For example, in 2019 less than two-
thirds of all submissions were addressed on time.81 In addition to spam, other factors 
contribute to the backlog. For example, users do not know if the same problem has already 
been reported, leading to the possibility that they might unintentionally submit duplicate 
reports (in FixMyStreet, people are immediately taken to a map displaying all reports of 
that kind, so that they can see if something has already been reported in the same 
location). To illustrate this point, one of our respondents said that he “only later saw that 
someone else had already submitted the same problem” because the mobile application 
lacks a map displaying previously submitted problems. 
Furthermore, Tvarkau Vilnių users do not receive a notification when the municipality 
responds to their report: they can only see this response if they actively check their report. 
Therefore, almost of respondents those respondents in our survey who had submitted at 
least one Tvarkau Vilnių report did not know if it had been resolved (see Figure 29 below). 
Users who had not actively checked for a response might assume that their report had 
been ignored, and submit another report of the same kind. 
                                           
78 With the exception of issues that need to be addressed by private companies contracted by the municipality. 
In these cases, municipality employees are still involved in passing on the issue to the agency responsible. 
79 For example, see https://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1071&context=ecis2016_rp  
80 https://tvarkaumiesta.lt/statistics 
81 https://tvarkaumiesta.lt/statistics 
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Figure 29. Proportion of survey respondents who reported that their Tvarkau Vilnių reports had/had 
not been resolved (n=194). 
 
Note: the figure includes only those respondents who had used Tvarkau Vilnių at least once during the preceding 
two months before taking the survey. 
To enhance the productivity of the platform, Tvarkau Vilnių team has considered 
introducing elements of machine learning and Big Data analysis. For example, computers 
could automatically generate responses to the issues based on the keywords mentioned in 
the report. Big Data analytics would help to make sense of all the reports submitted, 
yielding insights about the most pressing issues which could in turn inform budget 
allocation and urban planning. Nevertheless, several challenges must be addressed before 
such ideas can become reality. From a technical point-of-view, reports are submitted using 
mostly open-ended text, which is difficult for machines to analyse. Furthermore, the 
introduction of such innovations requires substantial up-front investment, which is difficult 
to justify given the lack of information on how cost-effective these technological advances 
would be. Finally, these technologies would make some municipal employees redundant, 
and might therefore face some internal resistance. Nevertheless, the municipality has 
already robotised some processes in other departments, for example, regarding the filling 
out of forms. According to the head of Vilnius City administration, previous waves of 
automation by the municipality have not led to workers being laid off, because the 
institution is already understaffed. Instead, employees were reassigned to tasks that could 
not be automated. 
3.2.3.2 Effectiveness, inclusion and sustainability 
We now turn to address the claims concerning social exclusion found in the literature in 
relation to platforms like Tvarkau Vilnių. To reiterate, these platforms have been criticised 
(with some empirical evidence82) for limiting civic participation among those members of 
the public who lack access to the internet, as well as those who are less educated or of 
lower socio-economic status.  
Our case study was only able to assess these claims to a certain extent in the context of 
Vilnius. Because we recruited research participants via social media sites, by default all of 
them had a computer/smartphone and access to the internet. We cannot therefore explore 
how Tvarkau Vilnių affects those without digital access. Furthermore, according to our 
survey results, the vast majority of the research participants possessed more than basic 
                                           
82 Pak et al., 2017; Helsper, 2008; Escher, 2011 
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digital skills, limiting our ability to explore how those with lower digital literacy interact 
with Tvarkau Vilnių.  
Nevertheless, given such criticism of platforms like Tvarkau Vilnių, if those with greater 
socio-economic capital are more likely to submit reports, we would expect to see a greater 
number of reports submitted in more affluent areas of the city. Using a visual exploration 
of the reports submitted in 2019 (see the maps in Figure 30 below), it appears that the 
number of submissions closely reflects population density. Nevertheless, without 
equivalent visual data on median incomes in each of the city’s neighbourhoods, it is difficult 
to say with any certainty whether or not Tvarkau Vilnių users are more likely to submit 
reports in areas where residents typically earn more. 
Figure 30. Reports submitted via Tvarkau Vilnių, 201983 (left) and Vilnius population density 
(right)84. 
 
Instead, we asked our research participants (in both the treatment and the control group) 
whether they planned to use Tvarkau Vilnių (among other digital services) in the future. 
We then ran a logistic regression analysis, estimating the impact of belonging to various 
income brackets on the intention to use Tvarkau Vilnių in the future, and controlling for 
various demographic characteristics (see column 1 in Table 12 below)85. 
Table 12. Regression results regarding the characteristics of people who plan to use Tvarkau Vilnių 
in the future, and who reported finding Tvarkau Vilnių simple to use. 
 (1) 
DV: plans to use 
Tvarkau Vilnių in the 
future (Y/N) 
(2) 
DV: Simplicity of 
using Tvarkau 
Vilnių (ordinal) 
Treatment (ref.: Control) 5.027*** 
(1.433) 
 
Age 1.043*  
(0.025) 
1.018 
(0.030) 
Male (ref.: Female) 1.307  0.811 
                                           
83 https://tvarkaumiesta.lt/statistics 
84 https://maps.vilnius.lt/teritoriju-planavimas#layers  
85 Note that we cannot assess the impact of income/socio-economic status on actually using Tvarkau Vilnių, 
because all research participants in the treatment group were asked to do so. 
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(0.416) (0.330) 
Education (ref.: High 
school diploma or 
less) 
Non-university 
tertiary 
0.998 
(0.657) 
1.289 
(0.986) 
 BA 1.241 
(0.444) 
2.888** 
(1.466) 
 MA or PhD 0.731 
(0.460) 
1.933 
(1.416) 
Employment status 
(ref.: Working) 
Student 1.265 
(0.561) 
1.602 
(0.943) 
 Other  0.752 
(0.496) 
0.612 
(0.534) 
Gross income  
per month  
(ref.: EUR 0–500) 
EUR 501–1,000 0.817 
(0.256) 
0.789 
(0.332) 
 EUR 1,001 + 0.324** 
(0.152) 
0.311* 
(0.189) 
Method of submitting 
reports to Tvarkau 
Vilnių (ref.: Android 
app) 
iOS app  0.202*** 
(0.105) 
 Web  0.622 
(0.292) 
 Web and app  0.502 
(0.307) 
Constant 0.203** 
(0.164) 
 
Observations 254 133 
Pseudo R2  0.135 0.082 
Note: Coefficients are odds ratios. Values in parentheses represent robust standard errors for equation 1, and 
standard errors for equation 2; * denotes significance at 10%, ** represents significance at 5% and *** 
significance at 1%. Reference categories are specified next to each variable. Approximate likelihood-ratio test of 
proportionality of odds across response categories has been performed for equation 2 with no significant results 
(prob.> Χ2 = 0.458). 
The treatment effect appears to be both the most significant and has the largest impact. 
This is intuitive: given that participants in our treatment group were asked to use Tvarkau 
Vilnių and the control group was not, this finding simply means that people who have tried 
using Tvarkau Vilnių are more likely to use it in the future than those who have not. 
Regarding income, one of the brackets, EUR 1,001+, is significant – meaning those with 
this level of income are less likely to say they will use Tvarkau Vilnių in the future than 
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those who earn EUR 0–500 (the reference category). This contrasts with findings elsewhere 
in the literature that associate the use of problem-reporting aps with higher socio-economic 
status.  
Given the lack of significant results in other income brackets and education categories, we 
also tested the impact of income on the perceived simplicity of using Tvarkau Vilnių (see 
column 2 in Table 12 above)86. Our goal here was to see if there is a pattern that associates 
the perceived usability of Tvarkau Vilnių with a particular level of income or education. 
Here, we find that people in the higher income bracket (EUR 1,001+) are more likely to 
say that Tvarkau Vilnių is difficult to use than people in the lowest income bracket, but 
only at 90% confidence. If people in the lowest income bracket are more likely to use 
Tvarkau Vilnių in the future and they find it simpler to use, this suggests that, contrary to 
findings in the literature, this technology is not biased toward people with higher socio-
economic status. However, we also find that participants with a Bachelor’s degree rate 
Tvarkau Vilnių as easier to use than those with only a secondary school diploma. It would 
appear, therefore, that the concerns in the literature have some validity in our case, and 
it is possible that people with higher incomes do not plan to use Tvarkau Vilnių in the future 
for reasons other than accessibility. Possibly, these findings could indicate that people in 
higher income brackets have different (and potentially more demanding) expectations with 
regard to simplicity, interface and user experience. This could be an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
If Tvarkau Vilnių is more difficult to use for people with lower levels of education, it is 
important for the municipality to design a platform that is accessible to everyone. To make 
the platform more accessible, the Tvarkau Vilnių team plans to update the iOS app, which 
currently displays information in the same way as the web page. This is especially 
important, given that research participants who used the iOS version of the app found it 
significantly more difficult to use than Android users (see Table 12 above). Nevertheless, 
even though some groups find the platform more difficult to use than others, the vast 
majority of respondents still rated Tvarkau Vilnių as being easy to use (see Figure 31 
below), showing that the platform is relatively effective in simplifying reporting for citizens. 
Figure 31. Tvarkau Vilnių user-friendliness ratings. 
 
Although overall the platform is perceived as being user-friendly, Tvarkau Vilnių remains 
relatively little-known in Vilnius compared with other digital services. This is one of the 
strongest themes observed among comments from our research participants87: 
                                           
86 We employ an ordinal logistic regression with a dependent variable (simplicity of use), which is coded in the 
following order: difficult to use; somewhat difficult; somewhat easy; easy.  
87 Translated by the authors. 
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“The application is easy to use, but I personally didn’t know that it exists, 
so perhaps it would be necessary to inform the public about its 
existence”. 
“It is important that more citizens learn about this app. The whole 
summer, these stairs were broken and moving dangerously. As soon as 
I learned about the app, I immediately reported the problem and, to my 
surprise, it was fixed within two days. There just needs to be more 
information about this app.” 
“I have some course-mates who could submit reports or give 
suggestions on how to popularise the app… I asked around and none of 
them have heard of Tvarkau Vilnių”. 
The municipality’s administrative office, however, is not focusing on making the platform 
more popular for two reasons. First, they believe that the best way to spread the word is 
to let people recommend Tvarkau Vilnių to their friends. This idea is supported by 
comments from our participants, who said that they would let their friends know about the 
application if they saw their own problems fixed. Secondly, the municipality already faces 
a backlog of reports (see Section 3.2.3.1 on productivity and efficiency), so their priority 
is to speed up the processing of reports that have already been submitted rather than 
encouraging the submission of new ones.  
This calls into question the sustainability of the service: if the municipality struggles to 
process incoming reports when relatively few people know about the platform, would the 
system collapse if every city resident used it? To avoid such an outcome, the Tvarkau Vilnių 
development team is considering limiting the ability of users to submit reports 
anonymously. Their reasoning is that prior to 2017 when anonymous reporting was 
enabled, there were fewer submission and they were of better quality. 
Although 62% of our survey respondents submitted Tvarkau Vilnių reports anonymously – 
revealing a clear preference for this type of reporting – we decided to ask them directly if 
they would continue to report problems if they were required to log in. We specified that 
their name would not be displayed in public, but that the municipality would be able to 
associate every report with the name of the person who reported it. Presented with such 
a question, 68% of the respondents said that they would submit reports if they were 
required to log in, while 32% said they would not (see Figure 32 below). 
Figure 32. Proportion of respondents who said they would/would not submit Tvarkau Vilnių reports 
if required to log in. 
 
Yes
68%
No
32%
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We then investigated the demographic profiles of those participants who said they would 
be less likely to submit reports if they could not do so anonymously. This is important: if a 
particular group of people were to be discouraged, their views would be less likely to be 
taken into account when making city planning decisions. We ran a logistic regression with 
a dependent variable set to 1 if respondents said they would not submit a report if required 
to login, and 0 if they said they would. As explanatory variables we included trust in the 
municipality, age, gender, education, employment status, and income. The results are 
summarised in Table 13 below. 
Table 13. Regression results in relation to participants who would not use the platform if they were 
requested to log in. 
 DV: would NOT submit 
reports if required to log 
in (Y/N) 
Trust in municipality 0.767** 
(0.089) 
Age 0.945 
(0.038) 
Male (ref.: Female) 2.539* 
(1.233) 
Education (ref.: High 
school diploma or less) 
Non-university tertiary 7.456** 
(7.601) 
BA 0.828 
(0.515) 
MA or PhD 2.000 
(1.788) 
Gross income per month 
(ref.: EUR 0–500) 
EUR 501–1,000 0.361** 
(0.185) 
EUR 1,000+ 1.626 
(1.247) 
Constant 10.447* 
(12.776) 
Observations 109 
Pseudo R2  0.138 
Note: Coefficients are odds ratios. Values in parentheses represent robust standard errors; * denotes significance 
at 10% and ** represents significance at 5%. Reference categories are specified next to each variable. 
 
The results show that certain groups of people would be discouraged by such a change. In 
relation to demographic characteristics, those in the EUR 0–500 income bracket would be 
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less likely to submit reports than those in the EUR 501–1,000 income category. People who 
have acquired non-university tertiary education only would also be less likely to submit 
reports compared to holders of high school diploma (the latter group includes those 
currently pursuing BA). It is difficult to provide a clear explanation as to why these groups 
would be less willing to provide their name, unless we assume that such profiles are more 
likely to submit reports of lower quality. However, without any data on the quality of reports 
we cannot test such a claim. 
We also find that those with lower trust in the municipality would be less likely to submit 
reports if they had to provide their name. While this is unsurprising, the finding is important 
because people who lack trust in the municipal government might already be less likely to 
engage with it, so disabling anonymous reporting might limit their participation through 
Tvarkau Vilnių too. This is further supported by another survey question asking 
respondents to specify why they chose to submit reports anonymously (see Figure 33 
below). A quarter of respondents said that they do not trust their personal data to be 
handled properly, and one-fifth were worried about someone finding out that they reported 
a problem. 
Figure 33. Reasons why participants reported problems anonymously. 
 
These respondents’ concerns have some validity. According to various news articles88 and 
the Tvarkau Vilnių development team, cases have emerged in which the people against 
whom a claim was filed have gained access to the names of those who reported parking 
violations. This occurs when the accused disputes the fine issued by the police and requests 
evidence, which includes information about witnesses or injured parties. According to the 
Code of Administrative Offences, this information must be provided to the accused - but it 
illustrates how national laws can be at odds with personal data protection regulations in 
the realm of technology. 
When reporting parking violations, the Tvarkau Vilnių application requires users to provide 
their names, state-issued identification numbers and email addresses, and includes the 
following disclaimer89: 
“Your personal information is necessary to provide legal 
grounds for your report. Municipal workers will have access to 
your data and it may be passed onto public authorities 
responsible for issuing administrative fines.” 
                                           
88 https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/pranese-apie-pazeidima-taciau-nukentejo-pats-prabilo-dar-vienas-
vilnietis.d?id=73817700 
89 Translated by the authors. 
3%
5%
19%
26%
76%
I could not log in
Other
I don't want problems if someone finds out I
reported on them
I don't trust that my personal data will be properly
handled
It was easier
 89 
Nevertheless, the disclaimer fails to mention that users’ personal information might also 
be passed onto the vehicle owner if he or she objects to the fine. The municipality should 
therefore clearly indicate with whom users’ personal data might be shared, and under what 
circumstances. Such information, combined with an explanation of how data are used and 
protected in general, might help foster greater trust in the municipality and hence limit the 
exclusionary impact of disabling anonymous reporting. 
While we have discussed one of the challenges that threatens the sustainability of the 
platform – the backlog of incoming reports – it is also worth asking if the Tvarkau Vilnių 
institutional setup is sustainable. As previously mentioned, the municipality cooperates 
with volunteer developers from Code4Vilnius, who mostly help with the Android application. 
This cooperation helps the municipality cut down on resources and involves citizens in its 
initiative – both of which are, in themselves, benefits. However, the Tvarkau Vilnių team 
noted that the public perceives the platform as being completely in the hands of the 
municipality and are hence disappointed if some of their proposed changes or 
improvements are not addressed quickly. Meanwhile, the relationship between the 
municipality and the volunteers is not formalised, so the municipality cannot expect 
volunteers to adopt the proposed changes faster, because they are working during their 
free time. 
In a similar vein, it is worth exploring why the platform is not run by a private organisation, 
as similar platforms are in the US. The simplest answer is that no company came forward 
with a design for a platform like Tvarkau Vilnių before the municipality started to develop 
it. However, the Tvarkau Vilnių team also expressed some hesitation towards outsourcing. 
For example, when asked whether the platform is based on FixMyStreet or other open 
resources, the development team responded that they had created the platform “from 
scratch” because they wanted to maintain the know-how in order to be able to fix any 
problems that might arise in the future. 
This hesitation might in part be influenced by the experience of another municipal agency 
in Vilnius, which contracted a private company to develop a mobile app related to public 
transportation. After two years of work, the agency nevertheless ended up launching a 
new call for bids to develop the same application over again, because the existing 
contractor refused to provide the access keys necessary to make updates to the application 
– essentially forcing the municipal agency to contract the same provider every time 
updates were needed. The contractor claimed that such access keys were their intellectual 
property, and the contract did not specify that they must be passed on to the municipal 
agency.90 
Given that Vilnius municipality is still in its early days of providing digital services (Tvarkau 
Vilnių is one of six mobile applications overseen by the municipal government91), a lack of 
information about contracting with the private sector in the sphere of technology, as well 
as few legal precedents, might serve as barriers for public-private partnerships. That is not 
to suggest that such partnerships never happen. For example, the head of Vilnius City 
administration described a partnership with a private company that incorporates all 
information about different modes of transport into a single application92. However, he also 
noted that the municipality and the private company are still in the process of negotiating 
who will ultimately own the platform and the data generated from people’s trips, 
underscoring the importance of legal terms and contracts for a city that attempts to adopt 
digital innovations with the help of the private sector. 
                                           
90 https://m.diena.lt/naujienos/vilnius/miesto-pulsas/ismanieji-vilniaus-sprendimai-issvaistyti-pinigai-904821 
91 http://emiestas.lt/?cat=21 
92 The municipality provides its open data, API, and the information necessary to sell public transport tickets 
through the platform, whereas the private company supplies the municipality with the coordinates from which 
most trips originate. This helps the municipality to understand how most people get to public transport stops, 
and has informed decisions on where to build new footpaths. 
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3.2.3.3 Legitimacy  
Tvarkau Vilnių provides a new way for citizens to participate in governance. Yet are the 
people who use Tvarkau Vilnių the same ones who already engage with government 
through other means, as suggested in relation to a similar case by Cantijoch et al. 
(2016)93? Or does the platform encourage civic engagement from other residents too? 
Furthermore, what are the impacts of this engagement in terms of trust in municipal 
government, and the accountability of public bodies? Given the limited literature assessing 
these effects empirically, we now turn to the main results of the randomised control trial. 
Table 14. Regression results in relation to intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. 
 (1) 
DV: Trust in 
municipal 
government 
(2) 
DV: Index of 
opinion about the 
municipality 
Treatment (ref.: Control) -0.178 
(0.197) 
0.091  
(0.145) 
DV at baseline 0.692*** 
(0.051) 
0.711*** 
(0.048) 
Constant 2.379*** 
(0.740) 
2.032*** 
(0.343) 
Observations 293 293 
R2 0.446 0.520 
Note: Both equations were estimated ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions. Values in parentheses represent 
robust standard errors to adjust for heteroscedasticity; * denotes significance at 10% and ** represents 
significance at 5%. Reference categories are specified next to each variable. 
 
The table above summarises the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. We first tested the effect 
of asking participants to use Tvarkau Vilnių on the extent to which they trust the municipal 
government (on a scale of 0-10). We controlled for the level of trust in the municipal 
government they indicated during the first survey (baseline measure). Next, we created 
an index of opinions about the municipality, comprising an average of four measures – 
trust in the municipal government; the municipal government’s ability to effectively solve 
problems; accessibility of the municipal government; and how competent the staff of 
municipal administration are – each of which was measured on a scale of 0-10. In the 
second column, we show the ITT effect on this index, also controlling for the baseline 
measure. We do not include demographic characteristics as controls because both 
treatment and control groups are largely similar. 
The results show that our treatment – namely, incentivising the participants to 
use Tvarkau Vilnių – did not have a significant effect on (a) their trust in the 
municipal government, nor (b) their perceptions of municipal government more 
generally.  
As explained before, we reasoned that using Tvarkau Vilnių should enhance people’s trust 
in the municipal government if they see that their problems are being fixed. However, what 
if only some of the problems were fixed, while others were not? Could this explain why we 
                                           
93 Cantijoch, M., Galandini, S. & Gibson, R. (2016). “It’s not about me, it’s about my community’: A mixed-method 
study of civic websites and community efficacy. New Media & Society 18(9), 1896–1915. 
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see no association between the treatment and trust in the municipality? In order to test 
this hypothesis, we explore the data visually.  
The figure below presents four graphs, which respectively address (clockwise from top left) 
change in the participants’ trust in the municipality; change in the participants’ perception 
that the municipality solves problems effectively; change in the participants’ perceptions 
concerning the accessibility of municipal agencies; and change in the participants’ 
perception of the competence of municipal staff. These change variables were derived by, 
for example, subtracting the rating participants assigned to their trust in the municipal 
government during the first survey from the corresponding figure given in the second 
survey. The Y axis of each graphs represents one of the four variables, while the X axis 
shows the ratings participants gave to the responses they received from the municipal 
administration via Tvarkau Vilnių. Note that each dot can represent more than one 
observation. The orange line represents the line of best fit. 
Figure 34. Change in perceptions concerning the municipality plotted against the ratings assigned 
by participants to the responses received from the municipal administration. 
 
 
The lines of best fit in all four graphs have positive slopes (meaning that the more 
favourably the participants evaluate the municipality’s responses, the more their 
perceptions tend to change for the better). However, the slopes in each case are shallow 
(meaning that the impact is small). With regard to trust, the line appears almost flat – 
meaning that there little or no relationship between how people rated the responses they 
received from the municipal administration, and how much their trust in municipal 
government changed. The same applies to changes in people’s perception of the 
competence of the staff working for the municipal administration. There is slightly more 
evidence that positive evaluations of responses from the municipality can change people’s 
perception that the municipal government solves problems effectively, and that it is 
accessible. These findings need to be contextualised. Most of our respondents submitted 
only one Tvarkau Vilnių report. Therefore, observing even a slight impact on the way in 
which people perceive the municipal administration is noteworthy, especially given that 
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some respondents did not receive satisfying responses. Based on comments from research 
participants, they gave poor ratings to responses they perceived to be generic. For 
example, some respondents wrote94:  
“Regarding public transportation issues, the municipal government 
responded using very vague phrases – ‘we are investigating 
passenger flows, the frequency of buses, etc.’. I wish the response 
had been brief, clear and concrete. For example, regarding the 
pavement I received a concrete response, so I‘m happy with it“. 
“The report about the abandoned vehicle was examined, but [the 
municipal government] responded that it is parked on private 
property. Meanwhile my neighbour approached a different agency, 
which probably informed the vehicle owner, and he moved the car. 
So I think that often responses are standardised and the problems 
are passed on to other institutions. And whether the problem gets 
solved depends on the effectiveness of those institutions”. 
These comments also point to the issue of accountability, discussed in the literature in 
relation to other platforms similar to Tvarkau Vilnių. Respondents care about the responses 
they receive. and whether or not their problems are fixed. One way to express 
dissatisfaction with the response is by submitting another identical report, which – while 
creating inefficiencies for the municipal government – nevertheless demonstrates civic 
engagement. 
As already discussed, platforms such as Tvarkau Vilnių are criticised for not providing 
enough space for meaningful civic engagement because report submissions reinforce an 
individualistic client-provider type of relationship with the municipality , rather than 
promoting collective action.95 These scholars argue that online deliberation forums and 
spaces that offer the possibility of positive solutions - for example, where to build a 
community park – allow deeper participation in the governing process. In response, we 
asked our survey respondents whether they would use such spaces, and other features of 
similar platforms encountered in the literature. Figure 35 (below) illustrates their 
responses. 
Figure 35. Number of respondents who say they would use various platform features found in the 
literature. 
 
 
                                           
94 Translated by the authors. 
95 Baykurt (2011). 
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Half of respondents indicated that they would discuss ways to solve problems with other 
users. The more popular features included the ability to indicate to the municipality 
whether the report is urgent, and the opportunity to vote on which reports the municipality 
should prioritise. The results show that Tvarkau Vilnių users do not perceive the platform 
as a space for discussion, but they would be willing to deepen their engagement in other 
ways. 
Finally, comments from our respondents indicate that the submission of the report itself is 
a form of civic participation, and that the responses received from the municipality 
enhanced the participants’ feeling that they can contribute to making the city better. Asked 
why they submitted reports, some respondents said: 
“I won’t deny that the monetary reward was one of the incentives, but 
the main reason was the desire to express my opinion and thoughts; 
the hope that perhaps someone will take into account my opinion as a 
Vilnius resident.” 
“I want to help change the city. I understand that an ambulance 
doesn’t come if no one calls, and it’s the same with the city. If no one 
reports that the pavement looks like after a war, then we shouldn’t 
hope it will get fixed.” 
“I was most interested in receiving responses to my reports. Although 
I didn’t receive responses to all my reports, it’s nice feeling to be able 
to contribute to making your city, or at the very least your immediate 
environment, better and cleaner.” 
 
These quotes illustrate that crowdsourcing in the form of using Tvarkau Vilnių can foster 
connections between the users and the wider city. This contrasts with the claim that these 
platforms encourage only individualistic relationships. 
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3.3 Case Study 2: Body-worn cameras in policing (UK) 
3.3.1 Introduction 
3.3.1.1 Description of the context  
 
The use and prominence of body-worn cameras (BWCs) in policing has increased rapidly 
in recent years96. For example, the “President’s Task Force on 21st-Century Police” initiated 
by Barack Obama cited BWCs as one of its priority, and as one of the technologies having 
a (potentially) transformative impact on policing.97 Moreover, in addition to several pilots 
in the UK, which are the focus of this case study, the use of BWCs has been piloted since 
2007 by police forces across Europe.  
BWCs – small cameras worn on a police officers’ body – are one of the fastest-growing 
technologies in law enforcement (especially in the US).98 BWCs are used to record 
encounters between the public and the police.99 They tend to rely on the storage of vast 
amounts of data, which requires secure, high-capacity data storage, as well as capabilities 
within each force to either store or transfer the data, and the capability either within the 
police force or other law enforcement agencies to analyse the data.100 BWCs are 
increasingly used together with virtual forms of storage such as the cloud, to allow large 
amounts of data to be stored without the need for numerous hard drives.101 BWCs have a 
direct impact on daily policing practices through the recording of public-police encounters, 
but also affect the wider environment within which policing occurs, by placing demands on, 
for example, the IT infrastructure.102 
The reasons for the introduction of BWCs differ between organisations and countries, but 
the majority relate to expectations that the use of BWCs will potentially make policing safer 
by reducing assaults against officers as well as spurious complaints. It is also expected 
that they will make police more accountable by reducing the inappropriate use of force, 
and that they will generate better-quality evidence for prosecutions. For example, the West 
Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC)103 made the business case for BWCs by 
highlighting their benefits in areas such as increasing the number of early guilty pleas, 
providing increased support to victims and witnesses, and resolving public complaints more 
efficiently.104 In Sweden, an official statement by the Swedish police in a Swedish 
newspaper highlighted that the decision to roll out BWCs had been influenced by the 
perception among the police that they would reduce or prevent violence against police 
                                           
96 The BWC case study was written and quality assured by RAND Europe. The case study authors are Emily Ryen 
Gloinson, Katherine Stewart, Stijn Hoorens, and Salil Gunashekar. The authors would like to thank the many 
stakeholders who kindly agreed to be interviewed as part of this case study. The authors are grateful to the 
quality assurance reviewers at RAND Europe, Dr Advait Deshpande and Dr Camilla d’Angelo, for their critical 
review of this case study. The authors would also like to thank Dr Alex Sutherland for his helpful advice throughout 
the course of the study. 
97 President’s Task Force on 21st-Century Policing (2015). Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st-
Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 
98 Merola, L., Lum, C., Koper, C. S., & Scherer, A. (2016). Body worn cameras and the courts: A national survey 
of state prosecutors, Report for the Laura and John Arnold Foundation. Fairfax, VA: Center for Evidence‐Based 
Crime Policy, George Mason University. 
99 Rogers, C., & Scally, E. J. (2018). Police use of technology: insights from the literature. International Journal 
of Emergency Services, 7(2), 100-110. 
100 Rogers, C., & Scally, E. J. (2018). Police use of technology: insights from the literature. International Journal 
of Emergency Services, 7(2), 100-110. 
101 INT01; INT02; INT03: INT04: INT05; INT09 (throughout this case study, interviewee inputs are cited using 
the using anonymous interview identifiers ‘INT01’, ‘INT02’, etc.) 
102 Rogers, C., & Scally, E. J. (2018). Police use of technology: insights from the literature. International Journal 
of Emergency Services, 7(2), 100-110.; Also see INT06; INT03; INT05; INT08. 
103 Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) are publicly elected officials that are responsible for the totality of 
policing across police force areas in England and Wales, holding both the Chief Constable and the force to account. 
Association of Police and Crime Commissioners. 2019. ‘Role of the PCC.’ Association of Police and Crime 
Commissioners [online], 2019. As of 27 January 2020, available at: https://www.apccs.police.uk/role-of-the-
pcc/.  
104 https://www.westyorkshire-pcc.gov.uk/media/92443/item_6_report_on_bwv.pdf 
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officers.105 Similarly, in the Netherlands,106 an evaluation of five regional police forces found 
that police officers employed BWCs because they perceived that they could reduce the use 
of force against the police and improve police-citizen relations.107  
While there has been a rapid growth in the market for BWCs due to these perceived 
benefits, several barriers still exist to the use BWCs in policing. The necessary equipment, 
which includes cameras, hardware and back-end software, can be costly.108 These costs 
may increase with further requirements that equipment fulfil advanced functions) for 
example, the live-streaming of video or auto-uploading).109 Furthermore, with public and 
police concerns around the legitimacy of BWCs and a dislike of being filmed, issues around 
data protection and ethics are also cited as barriers to the implementation of BWCs.110 
The decision to adopt BWCs may influenced by a number of organisational factors. A study 
was conducted to examine some of these, drawing on responses from 823 agencies in the 
US.111 It found that the use of technology, and to a lesser extent the number of specialist 
units in an organisation (as a proxy for organisational complexity) and formalised 
procedures (as a proxy for organisational control over officer behaviour), were associated 
with the decision of an agency to use BWCs. Agencies with larger budgets and those able 
to engage in collective bargaining were less likely to use BWCs, which was attributed to 
increased leverage to reject pressure to use technology, which agencies may perceive as 
limiting police officer discretion. According to the study, other factors, such as educational 
requirements, measures of vertical differentiation (measured by salary differences) and 
occupational differentiation (measured by relative number of civilian workers) showed no 
significant relationship to the decision to use BWCs.112 
Box 8. The Rialto trial of BWCs in policing in the U.S. 
The Rialto trial in the United States constituted one of the earliest outcome evaluations 
of an experiment with BWCs in the Rialto (California) Police Department in 2012.113 The 
study measured the impact of cameras on officer behaviour, specifically the effect of 
videotaping police-public encounters on incidents of the police’s use of force and 
complaints. The trial found that with BWC use the likelihood of force decreased by half 
compared to those officers that did not wear BWCs and the number of complaints against 
officers decreased from 0.7 complaints per 1000 contacts to 0.07 per 100 contacts.114 
3.3.1.2 Body-worn cameras in the UK 
Forty-three regional police forces operate across England and Wales, while Scotland and 
Northern Ireland each have a single police force covering the entirety of their territory. 
                                           
105 Polisen. 2018. ‘Polisen inleder försök med kroppskameror.’ Polisen, 22 February 2018. As of 27 January 2020, 
available at: https://polisen.se/aktuellt/nyheter/2018/februari/polisen-inleder-forsok-med-kroppskameror/; 
INT06 
106 Van Ham, T., Kuppens. J. & H. Ferwerda. (2011). ‘Mobiel cameratoezicht op scherp.’ Bureau Beke, 2011. As 
of 8th April 2020, available at: https://www.bureaubeke.nl/doc/2011/2011-06-
21%20Cameratoezicht_op_scherp_definitief.pdf 
107 An interviewee (INT03) also noted that the implementation of BWCs was facilitated by increased willingness 
among officers in the Netherlands to record what they do, and increasing support among the public for 
surveillance. 
108 Joh, E.E. (2016). Beyond surveillance: Data control and body cameras. Surveillance & Society; Also see INT04 
109 van Schelle, F. (2018). Never forget a face? The rise of ‘live’ body-worn cameras. Biometric Technology 
Today. 4, 5-7. 
110 See INT07; INT08 
111 Nowacki, J.S. & Willits., D. (2016). Adoption of body cameras by United States police agencies: an 
organisational analysis. Policing and Society 28(7), 841-853. 
112 Nowacki, J.S. & Willits., D. (2016). Adoption of body cameras by United States police agencies: an 
organisational analysis. Policing and Society 28(7), 841-853. 
113 Ariel, B., Farrar, W. A., & Sutherland, A. 2015. The effect of police body‐ worn cameras on use of force and 
citizens’ complaints against the police: A randomized controlled trial. Journal of Quantitative 
Criminology, 31, 509–535. 
114 Ariel, B., Farrar, W. A., & Sutherland, A. 2015. The effect of police body‐ worn cameras on use of force and 
citizens’ complaints against the police: A randomized controlled trial. Journal of Quantitative 
Criminology, 31, 509–535. 
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Policing in England and Wales is governed by the Home Office, which answers to Parliament 
and the British public.115 In Scotland and Northern Ireland, primary responsibility for the 
police rests with the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice, 
respectively.116 Responsibility for delivering policing services is devolved to regional forces, 
with the responsibility for each force resting with either a Chief Constable or Commissioner. 
In addition, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) are elected officials who set the 
direction of the force and hold the police to account.117 In Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
the Scottish Police Authority and the Northern Ireland Policing Board oversee policing and 
hold the respective Chief Constables accountable.118  
The police also work closely with two independent partners for the purposes law of 
enforcement. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is a public agency that makes decisions 
independently of government and the police, and prosecutes criminal cases based on 
evidence gathered and provided by the police.119 The College of Policing is an independent 
professional body that provides an operational function for the police and determines 
frameworks for standards relating to operations and training, qualifications, development, 
skills and the knowledge base.120  
The first pilots of the use of body cameras took place in the UK in the early 2000s, and 
included a pilot involving head cameras in Plymouth in 2007 (Home Office, 2007), and the 
first major quasi-experimental study by a UK police force in Hampshire in 2011.121 By 2017, 
71% of UK police forces had adopted BWC technology.122 In 2017 alone, the UK police 
spent £22,703,235 and 47,922 body worn cameras were bought (in 2010, £2.2 million was 
spent on 2,834 cameras).123 It is worth noting that the growth in the market has not been 
accompanied by a growth in the number of providers of BWCs – in 2017, there were seven 
providers in the UK, and the market is dominated by two providers (which held 76% of the 
market in 2017).124 
This increase in the use of BWCs has been accompanied by the trialling and rolling out of 
BWCs in a number of other contexts, most commonly for security guards and enforcement 
officers across public and private organisations. BWCs have been piloted in recycling 
centres, by traffic wardens, and by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency in the UK125, 
security guards in healthcare126, the Environment Agency127, bailiffs128, transport129, and 
                                           
115 http://www.hse.gov.uk/services/police/organisation.htm 
116 https://www.justice-ni.gov.uk/topics/policing-and-community-safety 
117 http://www.hse.gov.uk/services/police/organisation.htm. In London, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime 
(MOPAC) fulfils this function for the Metropolitan Police, while the City of London Police is overseen by the City of 
London Corporation. 
118 http://www.hse.gov.uk/services/police/organisation.htm 
119 https://www.cps.gov.uk/about-cps 
120 https://www.college.police.uk/About/Pages/default.aspx 
121 Ellis, T., Jenkins, C. & Smith, P. (2015). Evaluation of the introduction of personal issue body worn video 
cameras, Operation Hyperion) on the Isle of Wight: final report to Hampshire Constabulary. Portsmouth, England: 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth.  
122 https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Smile-Youre-on-Body-Worn-Camera-Part-II-
Police-II.pdf  
123 https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Smile-Youre-on-Body-Worn-Camera-Part-II-
Police-II.pdf  
124 Other providers in the UK include Edesix, Pinnacle, B-Cam, Veho and Vievu. See: 
https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Smile-Youre-on-Body-Worn-Camera-Part-II-
Police-II.pdf) 
125 http://www.digitaljournal.com/pr/3687931 
126 https://www.cambridge-news.co.uk/news/cambridge-news/addenbrookes-body-worn-cameras-rosie-
14470368 
127 hhttps://www.gov.uk/government/news/body-worn-cameras-to-help-fight-fisheries-and-waste-crimes 
128 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49064504 
129https/www.standard.co.uk/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc3RhbmRhcmQuY28udWsvbmV3cy90cmFuc3BvcnQvYm9keW
NhbXMtbGVhZC10by1tYWpvci1yZWR1Y3Rpb24taW4tYXR0YWNrcy1vbi12aXJnaW4tdHJhaW5zLXN0YWZmLWEzO
TY0MzExLmh0bWw=;xKl4DMj5ZRpIFmrtw3yeC7Pe6TgqBg5l4k2bLCOOzr4= 
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in universities.130 Discussions have also been held within the NHS in the UK to look at the 
potential for rolling out BWCs for paramedics and nurses.131  
The main aim of BWCs in these contexts is to reduce incidents of abuse, as well as physical 
and verbal aggression against staff. BWCs have also been used for other purposes such as 
training by the military in the US and the Netherlands, and by civilians for private security 
purposes.132 
The use of BWCs in the UK is guided by a set of voluntary standards developed by the 
College of Policing. These include seven principles that provide a strategic underpinning for 
force policy.133 Broadly, these relate to the visibility of BWCs, the legality of BWC use, the 
guidelines regulating an officer’s discretionary use of cameras, data storage and use, and 
how to ensure that BWC use is proportional and legitimate. The use of BWCs must comply 
with common law, but also with data protection guidelines under General Data Protection 
Regulation and the Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information, which guides 
the collection and recording, evaluation, common process, and retention, review and 
disposal of police information.134 In addition, following the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act for surveillance, BWCs must be used overtly – verbal, audio and visual cues 
are given to indicate that a camera is on.135 In terms of data storage and use, non-
evidential recordings must be destroyed after 31 days. In addition, BWCs only support and 
cannot replace other forms of evidence gathering.136 Police forces are required to consult 
their local communities on the use of body-worn video in order to ensure that its use is 
proportional to the impact at the local level.137 Lastly, victims (not suspects) are allowed 
to request that cameras are switched off.138 This guidance is complemented by the 
Surveillance Camera Code of Practice, which also details how privacy impact assessments 
should be carried out.139 When considering the roll-out of surveillance cameras, the 
purpose of the system has to remain justifiable, a consultation has to take place with those 
who are most likely to be affected, and the impact on their privacy must be assessed.140  
The adoption and roll-out of BWCs in the UK has gained traction over recent years despite 
of what has been perceived as a fragmented technology and data-sharing landscape.141 
While the standards governing the use of BWCs are decided by the College of Policing, the 
purchase and roll-out of technologies, and the adherent management and storage of data 
from these technologies, are decided by each force.142 Similarly, the technology and data 
are managed by the chief police officer in each force according to the Code of Practice on 
the management of records issued under Section 46 of the Freedom of Information Act 
2000, creating a system of devolved control.143 Nonetheless, four interviewees in the UK 
felt that the use of BWCs in their force was fairly similar to that of other forces.144 
                                           
130 https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.767058!/file/CCTVPrivacyImpactAssessment2018.pdf; 
https://www.estates.manchester.ac.uk/services/security/ourservices/cctvmonitoringbodyworncamerainformatio
n/; https://www.dur.ac.uk/ig/dp/guidance/bwv/ 
131 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/may/01/body-cameras-protect-hospital-staff-patients-violence-
mental-health-wards.  
132https://www.marketresearchfuture.com/reports/body-worn-camera-market-2972; 
http://www.digitaljournal.com/pr/3687931 
133 Guidance updates and replaces the Home Office (2007) Guidance for the Police Use of Body-Worn Video 
Devices. 
134https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/information-management/management-of-police-
information/collection-and-recording/ 
135https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/information-management/management-of-police-
information/collection-and-recording/; Also see INT03 
136 http://library.college.police.uk/docs/college-of-policing/Body-worn-video-guidance-2014.pdf 
137 http://library.college.police.uk/docs/college-of-policing/Body-worn-video-guidance-2014.pdf 
138 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364915001454 
139 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/surveillance-camera-code-of-practice 
140https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/282774/
SurveillanceCameraCodePractice.pdf 
141 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhaff/515/515.pdf   
142 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhaff/515/515.pdf 
143 https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/information-management/management-of-police-
information/common-process/ 
144 INT01; INT02; INT03; and INT04 
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This devolved control over the technology in the UK is different from other EU contexts. 
For example, the Swedish145 and Dutch police146 both use a centralised model. An 
interviewee from Sweden noted that the devolved model for technology adoption is similar 
to the governance model that was used by the Swedish government until 2015147, in which 
national boards had an administrative function and the roll-out of technologies was decided 
regionally. However, according to the interviewee, it was felt that in the previous structure 
roles of responsibility were unclear and lacked coordination, and was therefore replaced 
with a centralised structure for data management, storage and the governance of police 
technology. The interviewee noted that such a centralised system ensured stronger 
oversight and trust in compliance with regulatory standards, but that the speed of adoption 
was slowed down by a more centralised and bureaucratic system.  
In the UK, several initiatives have been implemented at national level to improve 
coordination and interoperability. The National Law Enforcement Data Programme 
combines the functions of the Police National Computer and the Police National Database 
into a single technology platform to support law enforcement with current and connected 
information.148 The ‘Network Code’ aims to create national standards for forces to follow 
when they either upgrade or purchase an IT system.149 The Emergency Services Network 
Programme was intended to provide the emergency services with an advanced 
communication system, but has experienced significant delays that have complicated the 
roll-out of the programme.150 Several systems are therefore currently being developed to 
ensure greater interoperability between the systems and processes for technology adoption 
and data sharing between UK police forces. 
3.3.1.3 Description of the innovation 
BWCs are small cameras that contain at least one microphone as well as internal data 
storage for simultaneous audio and video recording.151 They are typically located on the 
officer’s chest, head or shoulder, with camera mounting on the chest being the most 
common.152 A mapping study by the United States Department of Justice found that some 
cameras also offer other functions such as infra-red illumination, and tend to provide either 
recording or live streaming functions.153 For example, some commercially available BWCs 
offer cloud storage that is managed by the BWC vendor for a recurring fee, while others 
use hardware that is purchased and maintained locally at police stations.154 
Each camera can record between 16 and 168 gigabytes of data. They tend to differ in terms 
of their capability to take still photos and video in low light conditions, and offer battery 
life of between 3 and 15 hours when recording.155 In terms of data capture, many BWCs 
are bundled with back-end software that can include capabilities such as searching, 
categorising and tagging.156 The back-end software may also be able to generate multiple 
types of reports for officers (e.g. daily or historical), perform automated deletion of 
                                           
145 INT06; Eneman, M. (2019). Exploring the emerging body-worn camera practice within the Swedish police. . 
Research-in-Progress Papers. 70. As of 11 September 2019, available at: 
https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2019_rip/70 
146 INT02 
147 INT06 
148https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/721542/
NLEDP_Privacy_Impact_Assessment_Report.pdf 
149 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhaff/515/515.pdf 
150https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/721542/
NLEDP_Privacy_Impact_Assessment_Report.pdf 
151 https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250382.pdf 
152 https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250382.pdf 
153 https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Smile-Youre-on-Body-Worn-Camera-Part-II-
Police-II.pdf; https://islanddailytribune.info/body-worn-camera-market-growth-enhancements-and-global-
developments-2019-pannin-technologies-digital-ally-vievu/54198/ 
154 Find differences in the UK. source: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250382.pdf 
155 https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250382.pdf 
156 https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250382.pdf 
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recordings that are set to expire, and provide data analytics on an incident157 (a facility 
that also varies between different types of BWC158). 
3.3.2 Approach and methodology 
3.3.2.1 Objectives 
This case study draws from existing experiments on body cameras to explore the 
implementation of a digital technology such as this in the context of policing. While the 
literature encompasses a large body of empirical work, it has been noted that to date, it 
has not focused in great depth on the different contexts in which BWCs have been 
implemented, and therefore (especially in light of contradictory results in some studies) 
the factors that may influence the extent to which their use is effective. Piza et al. (2019) 
note that procedural aspects of technology are interrelated, and that procedural and human 
factors need to complement the technology itself in order to maximise its benefits.159 In 
this regard, while divergent results have been observed in BWC studies, they are typically 
not accompanied by observations and discussion of the contextual factors that help to 
explain these divergent findings.160 The authors compare this to the literature on CCTV: 
whereas the literature relating to BWC has involved a wider range of outcome measures, 
and the studies are considered to have greater methodological rigour compared to 
equivalent literature on CCTV (which mostly looks at deterrent effects and is difficult to 
randomise, given its fixed location), the CCTV research has done more to look at 
heterogeneity: factors that promote or mitigate the observed effects. In relation to BWCs, 
there is limited evidence relating to the experience of downstream criminal justice partners 
and wider stakeholders.161 
This view is shared by others. As Flight (2018) notes, while there have been many studies 
relating to the outcomes of body cameras, few have sought to actively investigate the 
mechanisms underlying the observed impacts, or to assess why the cameras are effective, 
under what conditions, and for whom.162 Flight also notes that all major reductions in 
complaints and the use of force observed in the existing research evidence relate to 
evaluations in the United States, whereas those in the UK and Canada have observed 
smaller reductions. There are good reasons, therefore, for hypothesising that 
organisational or cultural factors specific to a country or policing context may affect the 
ways in which BWCs are used (and in turn their effectiveness).  
This case study aims to add to this literature by focusing closely on the dynamics of camera 
implementation in a single context – the UK – drawing on the evidence from a number of 
empirical trials and the wider literature. The aim of this is to explore the dynamics and 
impact of embedding a digital technology in a specific context; in turn, this identification 
of key factors will serve to highlight factors that may be similarly important in other policing 
contexts. 
                                           
157 https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p311-pub.pdf 
158 https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250382.pdf 
159 Piza, E.L., Welsh, B. C., Farrington, D.P., & Thomas, A.L. (2019). CCTV surveillance for crime prevention: A 
40‐year systematic review with meta‐analysis. Criminology & Public Policy 18(1), 135-159.; Ariel, B., Sutherland, 
A., Henstock, D., Young, J., Drover, P., Sykes, J., Megicks, S. & Henderson, R. (2016).“Contagious accountability” 
a global multisite randomized controlled trial on the effect of police body-worn cameras on citizens’ complaints 
against the police. Criminal Justice and Behavior 44(2), pp.293-316.; Flight, S. (2018). Opening up the black 
box: Understanding the impact of bodycams on policing. European Law Enforcement Research Bulletin, 4. As of 
02 September 2019, available at: https://bulletin.cepol.europa.eu/index.php/bulletin/article/view/321; Owens 
and Finn, 2017. Body-worn video through the lens of a cluster randomized controlled trial in London: Implications 
for future research. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice 12(1), 77-82. 
160 Piza, E.L., Welsh, B.C., Farrington, D.P. & Thomas, A.L. (2019). CCTV surveillance for crime prevention: A 40‐
year systematic review with meta‐analysis. Criminology & Public Policy, 18(1), 135-159 
161 Todak, N., Gaub, J.E. & White, M.D. (2018). The importance of external stakeholders for police body-worn 
camera diffusion. Policing: An International Journal 41(4), 448-464. 
162 Flight, S. (2018). Opening up the black box: Understanding the impact of bodycams on policing. European 
Law Enforcement Research Bulletin, 4. As of 02 September 2019, available at: 
https://bulletin.cepol.europa.eu/index.php/bulletin/article/view/321 
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3.3.2.2 Methodology 
To prepare the case study, an initial review of existing syntheses was conducted to identify 
evaluations and pilots implemented in the EU.163 Secondly, an English-language search 
was conducted for published literature catalogued by Google Scholar, Scopus and 
Google.com since June 2018 (the date of the literature search conducted for Lum et al. 
(2019)164), using variations of the following search string:  
(“body-worn cameras” OR “body-worn video” OR “body camera” OR “body 
video” OR "body cameras" OR "bodycam" OR "body-cameras" OR 
"wearable camera" OR “wearable cameras” OR “wearable video” OR 
“BWCs”) AND (police OR crime OR justice OR “law enforcement” OR 
“police officer” OR “police authorities” OR officers OR “police 
departments”) AND (outcomes OR experiment OR trial OR evaluation OR 
study OR review OR research OR pilot OR evidence) 
From this, any EU-based experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations were identified, 
and the full texts reviewed. These primarily included evaluations from the UK, but also a 
small selection of papers from the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. Additional UK 
evaluations were identified from the full-text review. The experimental and quasi-
experimental data for each pilot were reviewed and summarised, and factors relating to 
the wider implementation and administrative consequences of BWCs were identified. 
In addition, nine interviews were carried out with expert stakeholders with knowledge of 
BWCs in the UK policing context. These included individuals from police forces identified 
through the “acknowledgements” sections of the UK evaluation reports; interviewees 
suggested by an expert adviser previously involved in academic research relating to BWCs; 
and other individuals identified through UK news reports as having been involved in 
decisions relating to or implementation of BWCs at a UK police force. Interviewees were 
offered anonymity to encourage frank discussion in relation to their views on the utility of 
BWCs. For this reason, they are cited throughout this report as ‘INT01, INT02…’ and so on. 
Data from the interviews and the review of experimental data were reviewed together to 
explore the organisational and administrative consequences of BWCs in relation to each 
framework effect. 
3.3.2.3 Limitations 
This case study, like others, has a number of limitations, and its findings need to be 
interpreted bearing these caveats in mind. Foremost, that as a case study based upon 
existing pilots and literature, this study will share the limitations of the underlying data. In 
the case of the UK experimental pilots, these include limitations such as low sample sizes, 
low or unknown compliance with protocols surrounding the use of BWCs, and insufficient 
numbers of particular incident types (such as violent crime) to effectively measure any 
change as a result of BWCs. These are discussed under each pilot below. None of the pilots 
explored whether the changes observed were sustained over a longer period of time post-
trial, and therefore it is unclear whether some observed outcomes (such as officer’s 
adherence to protocol or reduced use of force) could have been affected by the “Hawthorne 
effect” (i.e. that research subjects change their behaviour as a result of being observed by 
researchers, in a way that does not necessarily endure after the observation period).165 
                                           
163 Cubitt, T.I., Lesic, R., Myers, G.L. & Corry, R. (2017). Body-worn video: A systematic review of literature. 
Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 50(3), 379-396; Maskaly, J., Donner, C., Jennings, W.G., Ariel, 
B. & Sutherland, A. (2017). The effects of body-worn cameras (BWCs) on police and citizen outcomes: A state-
of-the-art review. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 40(4), 672-688. ; Lum, 
C., Stoltz, M., Koper, C.S. & Scherer, J.A. (2019). Research on body‐worn cameras: What we know, what we 
need to know. Criminology & Public Policy 18(1), 93-118. 
164 Lum, C., Stoltz, M., Koper, C.S. & Scherer, J.A. (2019). Research on body‐worn cameras: What we know, what 
we need to know. Criminology & Public Policy 18(1), 93-118. 
165 Wickström, G. & T. Bendix. (2000). The “Hawthorne effect” – what did the original Hawthorne studies actually 
show? Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment & Health 26(4), 363-367. 
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Similarly, there are wider challenges in relation to the study of BWCs that should be taken 
into account. These include, for example, difficulties in the monitoring of criminal justice 
outcomes from the use of BWCs given long timelines and small samples; an unclear causal 
relationship for some observed outcomes (for example, whether observed reductions in 
citizen complaints and the use of force are the result of behavioural changes by citizens or 
by officers); and for other non-linear relationships between target outcomes (for example, 
more effective detection leading to an apparent increase in crime). 
3.3.3 Results and discussion 
In this section, we summarise a series of pilot experiments conducted across the UK and 
the European Union relating to the use of BWCs in policing. For each pilot, we present 
information on the scope and background, the design of the study, the key results, and 
(where available) the limitations of the study. Please note that the main implications of 
this case study are also discussed in Section 4, in relation to the conceptual framework. In 
the box below we provide a very brief summary of the main findings that are presented in 
the following paragraphs.  
Box 9. Main findings of Case Study 2: use of BWCs (UK). 
  Productivity gains in terms of cost and time savings (e.g. reduced workload 
for police officers) are contrasted with the presence of large quantities of BWC 
data that may give rise to time-consuming measures. Therefore, maximising 
efficiency and productivity outcomes depends on the ability to mitigate limitations 
in the technology itself. 
  Although BWCs might have contributed towards making policing more 
effective by reducing crime (e.g. through better evidence for prosecutions), it is 
difficult to conduct research into the longer-term impacts of this innovation on 
crime. There are also some risks associated with the expectation that BWC 
footage will always be available in court, and that this footage is generally 
infallible.  
  There is general support for the use of BWCs, both among UK police officers 
and citizens. However, further evidence on the impact of this innovation on police 
and citizen behaviour is inconclusive. While police wearing BWCs are less likely 
to be assaulted than officers without them, and qualitative interviews suggest 
that cameras may improve police behaviour as their actions are recorded, there 
is only anecdotal evidence to support these claims.  
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Table 15. Overview of quasi-experimental and experimental BWC pilots in the UK and a small selection of examples in the European Union. 
Where When Scope  Study design  Key results  Key limitations 
Isle of Wight 
(UK)166 
 
2013-
2014 
Measuring the 
impact on crime 
rates and 
complaints against 
police 
160 cameras issued to 
frontline officers  
A survey, observation, 
and semi-structured 
interviews with police 
officers  
A survey of the public 
 Incidence of crime: some reduction, but BWC-
affected crimes increased in Hampshire. 
Incidents converted into crime increased after 
BWCs used for domestic assault. Non-significant 
increase in incidents converted into crime for 
other offences 
 Reduction in minor complaints and serious 
complaints against police. No change observed 
in complaints of assaults or procedural 
complaints  
 Increase in public awareness of BWCs 
 High levels of support for BWCs for evidence 
gathering, identifying criminals, increasing 
convictions, improving training and police 
disciplinary procedures  
 Increase in public belief that the police should 
wear cameras 
 Officer opinion:  
o High level of agreement that it would help 
in gathering evidence, identifying 
criminals and reducing complaints 
o Low confidence that cameras would 
reduce assaults on police 
o High confidence that BWCs would reduce 
complaints against police 
o Frontline police officers generally more 
positive about BWCs 
 Crime figures are 
a relative rather 
than absolute 
measure  
 Not clear what 
instruction was 
given to police 
concerning the 
mandatory use of 
cameras 
 Study recorded 
large 
discrepancies 
between different 
teams in relation 
to the use of 
BWCs 
                                           
166 Ellis, T. Jenkins, C. & Smith, P. (2015). Evaluation of the introduction of personal issue body worn video cameras, Operation Hyperion) on the Isle of Wight: final report to 
Hampshire Constabulary. Portsmouth, England: Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth. As of 2 August 2019, available at: 
https://port.ac.uk/media/contacts-and-departments/icjs/downloads/Ellis-Evaluation-Worn-Cameras.pdf  
 103 
Where When Scope  Study design  Key results  Key limitations 
London 
Metropolitan 
Police 
(UK)167 
2014-
2015 
Impact on 
complaints against 
the police, 
frequency of ‘stop 
and search’ 
incidents and 
criminal justice 
outcomes 
Metropolitan Police 
administrative data to 
measure change with 
regard to the number 
of complaints and the 
number and type of 
stop and searches, as 
well as the proportion 
of arrests and charges 
for incidents, in order 
to measure change in 
criminal justice 
outcomes.  
Also included a survey 
of officers, 
observations and 
interviews and a 
survey of the existing 
general Public Attitude 
Survey (PAS) of 
residents carried out 
by MOPAC (the 
Mayor’s Office for 
Policing and Crime) 
 Stop and search: no significant difference 
between treatment and control groups, and no 
change in officers’ self-reported behaviour  
 Arrests: no significant impact on arrests for 
violent crimes  
 Greater availability of evidence, or the use of 
cameras to collect evidence  
 Charge rates following arrests: no significant 
impact (influenced by barriers in the justice 
pipeline) and no significant impact on the 
decision to arrest or charge for domestic abuse  
 Some reduction in overall complaints against 
the police, and reduction in reports of 
oppressive behaviour 
 High level of public support for the use of BWCs. 
Agreement that BWCs would make officers more 
accountable and more likely to follow correct 
procedure 
 Perception that there could be potential 
evidential benefits 
 Officers with BWCs felt more protected against 
complaints. However, no difference between 
treatment and control groups with regard to 
their self-reported perception of public 
behaviour; procedural justice in policing; use of 
force; compliance with protocols; or the belief 
on the part of officers that their behaviour 
would be challenged 
 Some boroughs 
had shorter trial 
periods than 
others  
 Use of cameras 
in the treatment 
groups varied 
widely 
 Not all officers in 
the treatment 
group were given 
a camera, and 
there was some 
shortage of 
training  
                                           
167 Grossmith, L., Owens, C., Finn, W., Mann, D., Davies, T & Baika, L. (2015). ‘Police, Camera, Evidence: London’s cluster randomised controlled trial of Body Worn Video’. 
As of 11 September 2019, available at: https://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/Police_Camera_Evidence.pdf  
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Where When Scope  Study design  Key results  Key limitations 
Essex 
(UK)168 
 
2014 Impact of BWCs 
on domestic 
violence responses 
Randomised control 
design 
Used police 
administrative data to 
study the outcomes of 
incidents and 
conducted a post-trial 
officer survey and 15 
interviews  
 No difference in the number of incidents  
 No significant difference in sanction detention  
 Charging rates were higher among the 
treatment group  
 Officer opinion:  
o 50% felt BWCs were ‘a good bit of kit’ 
o 20 out of 37 respondents in the officer 
survey disagreed with the statement that 
‘they felt uncomfortable using the camera’ 
o Small number of officers report a change in 
approach to situations after viewing their 
own footage  
o 50% split in the number of officers who 
wanted to be issued with a camera after 
the trial 
 Low use may 
have had an 
impact  
 Officers from 
treatment and 
control groups 
attended 
incidents 
together, leading 
to possible spill-
over effects. 
Community 
policing 
teams and 
Environment
al Warden 
services in 
Renfrewshir
e, Scotland 
(UK)169 
2009-
2010 
Impact of the use 
of BWCs on 
multiple policing 
outcomes, 
including crime 
rates, early guilty 
pleas and numbers 
of complaints 
against police 
Police and 
administrative data to 
compare year-on-year 
change in crime rates, 
complaints against 
police, and proportion 
of early guilty pleas 
Survey with the local 
community  
 Reduction in crime rates in study area and 
comparison area (might be partially due to the 
introduction of a new community policing model 
when the BWCs were introduced) 
 Early guilty pleas: small reduction  
 Police perception and complaints: insufficient 
numbers for analysis 
 Public opinion: nearly half of respondents felt 
safer, and greater numbers felt that BWCs 
reduced crime and anti-social behaviour 
 Lack of reporting 
on the use of 
cameras  
 Lack of 
transferability to 
a different 
context  
                                           
168 Owens, C., Mann, D., & McKenna, R. (2014). The Essex body worn video trial: The impact of body worn video on criminal justice outcomes of domestic abuse incidents. 
Ryton-on-Dunsmore, Coventry, England: College of Policing. As of 2 August 2019, available at: https://bwvsg.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/BWV_ReportEssTrial.pdf 
169 ODS Consulting (2011). ‘Body Worn Video Projects in Paisley and Aberdeen Self Evaluation.’ ODS Consulting [Online], July 2011. As of 2 August 2019, available at: 
https://bwvsg.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/BWV-Scottish-Report.pdf 
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Where When Scope  Study design  Key results  Key limitations 
 Cost savings: some estimated potential savings 
Grampian 
police, 
Aberdeen 
(UK)170 
2010  Impact of the use 
of BWCs on 
multiple policing 
outcomes, 
including crime 
rates, early guilty 
pleas, and 
numbers of 
complaints and 
assaults against 
police 
Three-month pilot 
Compared year-on-
year change in one 
local area and 
compared it to wider 
Aberdeen area  
Citizen’s Panel for 
Aberdeen was also 
consulted for public 
opinion.   
 
 
 Crime rates: reduction in local area of 26% 
compared to 1% in wider area.  
 Early guilty pleas: some effect  
 Assaults against police: not enough data 
 Complaints against police: insufficient numbers 
 Public opinion: less than half had heard about 
BWCs. Same numbers thought BWCs would 
make them safer, and more believed that BWCs 
would make their community safer 
 Some police officers felt that BWCs contributed 
to them not being assaulted 
 Cost savings: some savings as a result of BWCs 
 Use of cameras 
not reported  
 Lack of 
transferability of 
data to a 
different context 
Devon and 
Cornwall 
Constabular
y, Plymouth 
(head 
cameras) 
(UK) 171 
2006-
2007 
Testing the use of 
head cameras by 
police officers in 
the city of 
Plymouth 
Data on crime and 
complaints during the 
study period compared 
to the previous year  
Survey of the public 
and officers, and some 
interviews with 
officers 
 Some reduction in violent crime, but external 
factors are likely to have influenced this 
 Some increase in detection rate for violent 
crime and domestic violence, but overall impact 
on violent crime inconclusive  
 Small increase in detection attrition rate  
 Differences in responses to violent incidents  
 Longer average time to solve a crime  
 Some anecdotal evidence of cameras leading to 
early guilty pleas 
 Some reduction in complaints  
 Public opinion:  
 Officers were 
able to choose 
when they used 
a head camera - 
the police officers 
choosing to book 
out the cameras 
may generally 
have been more 
proactive, which 
may explain 
differences in 
policing 
outcomes. 
                                           
170 ODS Consulting (2011). ‘Body Worn Video Projects in Paisley and Aberdeen Self Evaluation.’ ODS Consulting [Online], July 2011. As of 2 August 2019, available at: 
https://bwvsg.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/BWV-Scottish-Report.pdf 
171 James, Z. & Southern, R. (2007). ‘Plymouth Head Camera Project: Public Relations Evaluation.’ University of Plymouth, Social Research and Regeneration Unit. 
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Where When Scope  Study design  Key results  Key limitations 
o High awareness of general use of cameras 
in the UK, but lack of awareness of use in 
Plymouth 
o Half felt that cameras prevent violence  
o More said they would feel safer 
o Three-quarters felt that cameras were a 
very good idea  
o Half of victims surveyed were positive 
about the use 
 Officer opinion:  
o Half of officers felt discomfort with cameras  
o Some officers not convinced that BWCs 
would save time  
o Found the quality of evidence to be the 
most positive aspect 
 Some evidence that less time was spent on 
administrative processes for officers, with more 
time spent on foot and mobile patrol. 
West 
Midlands 
(UK)172 
June-
Decem
ber 
2014 
Impact of BWCs 
on the use of force 
by police officers 
Six-month randomised 
control trial  
Officers were 
instructed to use a 
recording in all 
situations that would 
usually cause them to 
make a notebook 
entry 
 35% reduction in the use of force, although 
some variation in relation to different types of 
force  
 Small scale of 
the study; the 
authors could not 
provide clear 
estimates of the 
size of effects  
                                           
172 Henstock, D. & Ariel, B. (2017). Testing the effects of police body-worn cameras on use of force during arrests: A randomised controlled trial in a large British police force. 
European Journal of Criminology 14(6), 720-750. 
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Where When Scope  Study design  Key results  Key limitations 
Measured use of force 
by drawing on 
administrative data 
routinely recorded by 
police 
City of 
London 
Police 
(UK)173  
2014-
2015 
Impact on 
perceptions of 
BWCs and 
complaints against 
police 
Survey of frontline 
officers before and 
after the introduction 
of BWCs 
Qualitative interviews 
before and after the 
trial period  
Administrative data 
relating to complaints 
and early guilty pleas 
were analysed  
 Small increase in hearings resulting early guilty 
pleas  
 Some reduction in the number of complaints 
against police 
 Officer opinion:  
o Positive about the value of BWCs 
o Strong agreement about the utility of BWCs 
for evidence-gathering, chances of 
conviction, reduction in complaints against 
officers, and identifying criminals 
o Mixed agreement on whether BWCs would 
reduce crime  
o Mixed answers on the impact of BWCs on an 
officer’s life  
o Mixed views on whether BWCs would reduce 
complaints  
o Survey results were mixed in relation to the 
impact on civilian interactions 
 Decrease in the 
total number of 
hearings for early 
guilty pleas may 
have been 
caused by 
external factors  
 Complaints and 
early guilty plea 
data could not 
distinguish 
between officers 
                                           
173 Morgan, J. & Silverstone, D. (2017). ‘Trialling body-worn video cameras for City of London Police: officer perceptions and justice outcomes. A report for City of London 
Police’. As of 11 September 2019, available at: https://www.londonmet.ac.uk/media/london-metropolitan-university/london-met-documents/professional-service-
departments/engagement/pr-and-communications/press-release-pdfs/Trialling-body-worn-video-cameras-for-City-of-London-Police-officer-perceptions-and-justice-
outcomes.pdf 
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Where When Scope  Study design  Key results  Key limitations 
Multiple UK 
locations 
(UK)174 
 Testing the earlier 
results of the 
Rialto experiment 
in different police 
settings, and to 
providing sufficient 
statistical power to 
test the impact on 
the (relatively 
rare) incidence of 
complaints in 
different settings 
10 randomised control 
trials conducted across 
eight police forces in 
six jurisdictions 
Randomisation 
according to individual 
shifts  
 
 No significant difference between the treatment 
and control arms on the use of force by police 
 Increase in the use of force among the 
treatment group at some sites – secondary 
analysis showed that this was related to 
compliance with the protocol on use of BWCs. 
May also have been related to BWCs only being 
switched on during escalating encounters  
 Police perception and complaints: 93% 
reduction in complaints 
 
 
 Mixture of 
officers using and 
not using BWCs 
could have spill-
over effects on 
behaviour 
change more 
widely 
(‘contagious 
accountability’) 
Regional 
unit in 
Amsterdam, 
Dutch 
National 
Police 
(Netherland
s)175 
2017-
2018 
Determining 
whether body 
cameras should 
become standard 
kit for police 
officers 
Randomised control 
trial supplemented 
with questionnaires 
and in-depth 
interviews 
Analysis conducted on 
internal registration of 
violence against the 
police and log files 
 Crime, assault and charge rates: BWCs had a 
positive impact on decreasing violence against 
police officers. 
 Officer opinion:  
o Overall, officers were satisfied with the 
performance of BWCs  
o Some complaints about battery life and 
accessibility of recordings, as well as set-up 
being perceived as cumbersome 
 Findings based 
on anecdotal 
evidence 
                                           
174 Ariel, B., Sutherland, A., Henstock, D., Young, J., Drover, P., Sykes, J., Megicks, S. & Henderson, R. (2016). “Contagious accountability” a global multisite randomized 
controlled trial on the effect of police body-worn cameras on citizens’ complaints against the police. Criminal Justice and Behavior 44(2), 293-316; Ariel, B., Sutherland, A., 
Henstock, D., Young, J., Drover, P., Sykes, J., Megicks, S. & Henderson, R. (2016b). Wearing body cameras increases assaults against officers and does not reduce police 
use of force: Results from a global multi-site experiment. European Journal of Criminology 13(6), 744-755.; Ariel, B., Sutherland, A., Henstock, D., Young, J., Drover, P., 
Sykes, J., Megicks, S. & Henderson, R. (2016c). Report: Increases in police use of force in the presence of body-worn cameras are driven by officer discretion: A protocol-
based subgroup analysis of ten randomized experiments. Journal of Experimental Criminology 12(3), 453-463.; Ariel, B., Sutherland, A., Henstock, D., Young, J., Drover, P., 
Sykes, J., Megicks, S. & Henderson, R. (2018). Paradoxical effects of self-awareness of being observed: Testing the effect of police body-worn cameras on assaults and 
aggression against officers. Journal of Experimental Criminology 14(1), pp.19-47. 
175 Flight, S. (2019). Focus: Evaluatie pilot bodycams Politie Eenheid Amsterdam 2017-2018. The Hague: Politie & Wetenschap [Online] 2019. As of 2 October 2019, available 
at: https://www.politieenwetenschap.nl/cache/files/5d95bafc1c739PW93A.pdf 
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Where When Scope  Study design  Key results  Key limitations 
Some non-participant 
observation and 
training 
 Administrative impact: although not 
generalisable due to the active discouragement 
of the use of BWCs in the Amsterdam unit by 
senior leadership, the video recordings were 
rarely used and few recordings were made by 
the police 
 
Helsinki 
Police 
Department 
(Finland)176 
2015-
2015 
Investigating 
aspects that had 
been highlighted 
during the trial of 
30 cameras in 
national police 
forces 
Reported on legal and 
normative frameworks 
applicable to BWCs 
 Identified relevant national and international 
legislation  
 BWCs were also found to affect transparency, 
proximity to service users, neutrality and 
securing fundamental and human rights 
 N/A 
Malmö 
Police 
(Sweden)177  
 
2018 Pilot project aimed 
at reducing the 
use of force and 
threat against the 
police and 
improving the 
collection of 
evidence. 
Six qualitative semi-
structured interviews 
Web-based survey of 
police officers 
 Officer opinion:  
o Training methods were well received  
o Some wanted clearer guidelines on the use 
of BWCs  
o BWCS were found to be easy to use  
o Some felt the use of BWCs was cumbersome, 
but explained by being unused to using them  
o Some found it difficult to know when to 
switch on the cameras  
o Mounting of the cameras was a prevalent 
challenge  
o Felt that the cameras could have a positive 
impact on citizen interactions  
 Small-scale study 
and anecdotal 
evidence 
                                           
176 Poliisihallitus (2017). Selvitys haalarikameroiden käyttöönotosta poliiisissa. Työryhmän loppuraportti 2/2017. Poliisihallitus: Helsinki. 
177 Jonsson, E. & Wimmerdahl, E. (2018). Från Polisens Synsvinkel: Hur poliser i Malmö  upplevar kroppskameror som verktyg i det dagliga arbetet. Malmö Universitet, June 
2018. As of 10th October 2019, available at: 
https://muep.mau.se/bitstream/handle/2043/25374/Kandidatuppsats%20Emelie%20och%20Evangelinn.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
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Where When Scope  Study design  Key results  Key limitations 
o Felt that the cameras could have an impact on 
the integrity of both police and citizens  
o Majority did not think BWCs had an impact on 
their role  
o Some concerns relating to the use of BWCs for 
evidence-gathering  
o Some noted that BWCs could be integrated with 
other technologies 
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Drawing on information from the various experimental and quasi-experimental BWC pilots 
presented in the previous section, this section discusses BWCs in relation to three different 
key effects of digital transformation. In line with the core aims of the overall study, these 
key effects have previously been identified in the context of assessing how ICT-enabled 
innovations (i.e. BWCs in the present case study) can (potentially) transform the way 
governments deliver (public) services (in this case, policing). The effects specifically relate 
to the following elements of the conceptual framework, DigiGov-F, developed in another 
work package of the overarching study: (a) productivity and efficiency; (b) effectiveness, 
inclusion and sustainability; and (c) legitimacy. These effects comprise the “outcomes” 
elements articulated in the conceptual framework, i.e. the (potential) “effects” that are 
produced because of digital transformation in governments (e.g. through the introduction of 
new services or processes). Below, we present a discussion of the evidence regarding the 
outcomes of the use of BWCs in policing against these three specific effects. 
3.3.3.1 Productivity and efficiency 
Productivity and efficiency (as characterised in the DigiGov-F conceptual framework) relates 
to the potential for digital technologies to introduce efficiencies into processes, often by 
replacing or augmenting human activity. In the case of BWCs, this relates to the potential 
for the use of cameras to enable new forms of working or efficiencies in policing processes. 
However, the literature to date has focused heavily on outcome measures and has involved 
less discussion of the impact of cameras on the organisation and administration of policing. 
Box 10 provides an overview of some of the key findings in relation to the productivity and 
efficiency outcomes of the use of BWCs in policing.  
Box 10. Key findings related to productivity and efficiency outcomes of the use of BWCs in policing. 
 So far, opportunities to understand the overall impact of BWCs on system-wide 
productivity are limited.  
 BWCs might result in reduced workload for police officers, e.g. by reducing the 
time it takes to deliver footage to the police station for enquiries, to write reports 
on incidents, and the duration of police involvement in lengthy court cases.  
 Efficiencies and improvements may increase as further technical functions are 
made available.  
 The presence of large quantities of BWC data may give rise to time-consuming 
measures (particularly for downstream criminal justice partners).  
 Certain infrastructure and processes are necessary to make the most of the 
functionality of BWCs.  
 Interoperability of BWC software with existing and legacy systems may be a 
barrier.  
 Maximising efficiency and productivity outcomes depends on the ability to mitigate 
limitations in the technology itself.  
 Positive efficiency and productivity outcomes might result in cost and time savings 
(although the relationship is not linear).  
Productivity is usually defined as the most efficient use of inputs to maximise the outputs of 
any process: for example, using the smallest possible amount of materials and manpower 
(inputs) to create the largest possible number of products (outputs) in a factory. In this 
regard, a prominent driver for the use of digital technologies is often the perception that 
their use will increase the efficiency of administrative and backroom processes within 
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organisations, by allowing processes to be conducted at a higher speed, or to be automated 
entirely.178  
However, in the context of policing, as in the wider public sector, this relationship is not 
always straightforward. O’Hara notes three key ways in which the input-output relationship 
is complicated by the nature of police work.179 First, because efficiency does not necessarily 
mean effectiveness: high rates of arrest (high outputs), for example, may not necessarily 
be a more efficient or meaningful use of policing inputs if they relate to easy-to-convict, low-
impact crimes, and if this use of police time comes at the expense of solving more complex, 
high-impact crimes (lower but arguably more valuable outputs). (O’Hara notes this may be 
exacerbated by a need to “demonstrate” effectiveness to a public audience through policing 
statistics.) Second, because the overall efficiency of policing can only be measured at system 
level (i.e. including subsequent criminal justice processes), and any efficiency gain for one 
component may not be reflected in overall productivity if a lack of coordination between 
components means improvements in policing (e.g. the generation of video evidence) are 
not used effectively elsewhere in the system (e.g. the use of that video in a court of law) 
and vice versa. Third, because funding structures may act as a disincentive to higher 
productivity: a low arrest rate may be used as a case for higher funding.180 To these, we 
might also add potential feedback cycles between efficient processes and target outputs: 
while efficiency gains in backroom processes may, for example, result in more police on the 
streets (often a prominent political pledge in the UK), an increased police presence may 
result in the detection of more crimes, therefore generating additional paperwork and 
requiring more time to deal with those detections. 
Impact of BWCs on the efficiency of internal processes 
While understanding the overall impact of BWCs on system-wide productivity is beyond the 
scope of this study, we can explore how the use of cameras may affect the efficiency of 
existing police processes, whether positively or negatively. While this has not been a focus 
of the existing literature (which has tended to focus on outcomes), some examples from 
previous pilots have demonstrated potential savings through the use of BWCs to reduce time 
it takes officers to carry out regular policing activities, as well as speeding up processes.  
For example, Rowe et al. (2017), in a study of a UK police force, observed that a traffic 
officer, by using a camera to record the scene of a minor accident, could avoid the need to 
close the road. Likewise, an officer could use a BWC to record footage from a CCTV camera 
that might otherwise take several days to be delivered to the police station for use in 
enquiries.181 The authors also observed officers using footage to write reports after the fact, 
including one case in which a report was requested two months after the incident. In this 
case, the officer was able to check the footage in order to write his statement. In an evidence 
session to the Scottish Parliament on the use of BWCs, police stakeholders also noted 
potential time savings as a result of officers needing to spend less time in court, because 
the availability of video replaces the need for an in-person statement. In turn, this reduces 
the need to change shifts or cancel leave to accommodate court schedules.182 This point was 
echoed by UK police force interviewee, who felt there had been a “huge knock-on effect” on 
                                           
178 Hoorens, S., Gunashekar, S., Stewart, K., Knack, A. & Deshpande, A. (2019). Game-changing technologies: 
Transforming production and employment in Europe. Brussels, Belgium: Eurofund, 2019. As of 3 October 2019, 
available at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2020/game-changing-technologies-
transforming-production-and-employment-in-europe; see also Timan, T. (2013). Changing landscapes of 
surveillance: Emerging technologies and participatory surveillance in Dutch nightscapes. Enschede, Netherlands: 
University of Twente. As of 3 October 2019, available at: 
https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/files/6059635/thesis_T_Timan.pdf 
179 O’Hara, P. (1984). ‘Introduction’. Public Productivity Review. Vol. 8, No. 3, Symposium: Productivity in Law 
Enforcement?, pp. 199-206. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3380462 
180 O’Hara, P. (1984). ‘Introduction’. Public Productivity Review. Vol. 8, No. 3, Symposium: Productivity in Law 
Enforcement?, pp. 199-206. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3380462 
181 Rowe, M., Pearson, G. & Turner, E. (2017). Body-worn cameras and the law of unintended consequences: Some 
questions arising from emergent practices. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice 12(1), 83-90. 
182 Scottish Parliament (2017). Official report: Justice Sub-Committee on Policing 15 June 2017. Available at: 
http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=11022&i=100698&c=2011531 
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workload through the reduced need for police involvement in lengthy court cases.183 Another 
interviewee from a UK police force noted that they felt the use of cameras had reduced the 
time spent on complaint investigations, as the video could be used up front in place of 
written testimony.184   
In 2017, the UK Home Office tabled plans to potentially allow police to conduct interviews 
with witnesses and suspects at the scene or “on the spot”, rather than requiring them to 
attend a police station (although the authors note the need to ensure that such interviews 
are still conducted by specially trained officers where necessary, for example in cases of 
sexual assault).185 The Home Office is reconsidering 2017 consultation on using body-worn 
video to enable the interviewing of witnesses in the field using BWCs, and is currently 
backing a pilot to test this in Hampshire.186 In the Plymouth head camera pilot, there was 
some evidence that use of the cameras made some processes (such as post-arrest 
processing) more efficient (Home Office, 2017). An interviewee from a UK police force felt 
that the use of BWCs to take statements could significantly reduce costs as it would no 
longer be necessary to spend £400 on bringing a suspect into the police station.187 
Such efficiencies and improvements to existing processes may also increase if more 
advanced technical functions become available. For example, Bowling and Iyer (2019) give 
the example of a BWC company developing AI solutions to potentially “tag and flag” camera 
footage, for example to automatically detect various activities (such as entering a building 
or undertaking a chase), and to tag parts of the footage to enable quick curation, selection 
and editing at a later stage, as well as automatically redacting sensitive information, 
transcribing spoken dialogue in videos to text, and even drafting an accompanying police 
report on the basis of the footage.188 An interviewee noted that BWC footage can also be 
used to flag footage that might lead to early guilty pleas for the CPS, making processes 
more efficient.189 
However, it is not a given that the use of cameras will make processes more efficient. 
Notably, the presence of large amounts of additional data may represent a time-consuming 
element in its own right, particularly for “downstream” criminal justice partners, who have 
additional evidence to factor into criminal justice processes. While police officers interviewed 
in the Isle of Wight pilot were generally positive about BWCs, this positivity was observed 
to a lesser extent in personnel taking over the post-incident investigation processes, because 
it “had caused further complications for the processing of hand-over files”.190 The authors 
also noted a quote from the then-Director of Public Prosecutions about the wider provision 
of body camera footage to the CPS191 of “…the provision to CPS staff of excessive video 
material, much of which has no immediate relevance to the prosecution in question. Lengthy 
recordings have been known to arrive without any indication as to what part of the recording 
should be viewed”.192 
                                           
183 INT05 
184 INT04 
185 Bowling, B. & Iyer, S. (2019). Automated policing: the case of body-worn video. International Journal of Law in 
Context 15(2), 140-161. 
186 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/11/30/traditional-police-notebook-gives-way-body-worn-video-
police/; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/11/30/traditional-police-notebook-gives-way-body-worn-video-
police/: Also see INT08 
187 INT08 
188 Bowling, B. & Iyer, S. (2019). Automated policing: the case of body-worn video. International Journal of Law in 
Context 15(2), 140-161. 
189 INT08 
190 Ellis, T., Jenkins, C. & Smith, P. (2015). Evaluation of the introduction of personal issue body worn video 
cameras, Operation Hyperion) on the Isle of Wight: final report to Hampshire Constabulary. Portsmouth, England: 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth. As of 2 August 2019, available at: 
https://port.ac.uk/media/contacts-and-departments/icjs/downloads/Ellis-Evaluation-Worn-Cameras.pdf  
191 In the UK criminal justice system, decisions to prosecute suspects are taken by the CPS on the basis of evidence 
provided to them by police authorities.  
192 Ellis, T. Jenkins, C. & Smith, P. (2015). Evaluation of the introduction of personal issue body worn video cameras, 
Operation Hyperion) on the Isle of Wight: final report to Hampshire Constabulary. Portsmouth, England: Institute 
of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth. As of 2 August 2019, available at: 
https://port.ac.uk/media/contacts-and-departments/icjs/downloads/Ellis-Evaluation-Worn-Cameras.pdf  
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Merola et al. (2016) report that in a survey of prosecutors’ offices in the US, 54% of lead 
prosecutors felt that BWCs would increase case preparation time, while 56.2% felt it would 
make it more burdensome or difficult.193 Thirty per cent of lead prosecutors felt it would lead 
to delays in case processing or other court delays. Similarly, an interviewee in the UK argued 
that one of the biggest challenges in the use of BWCs is the devices create one of the largest 
datasets that law enforcement has ever dealt with.194 However, strong support was also 
recorded for their evidentiary value. Concerns about the time required to sift through BWC 
footage was also highlighted by Todak et al. (2018) in interviews with court stakeholders.195  
As noted by O’Hara (1984), improvements in the efficiency of one aspect of policing practice 
may not affect overall productivity if this cannot be effectively integrated with the wider 
system in which the process is embedded.196 In this regard, the ability BWCs to make 
processes more efficient may also depend on having the right infrastructure and processes 
to make the most of their functionality. For example, during the Metropolitan Police 
randomised control trial, the authors noted a lack of organisational support for some 
elements of proper implementation. Inadequate training meant gaps in process, for example 
with officers (incorrectly) believing they needed to write word for word what was said at a 
scene, thus increasing paperwork.197 In the City of London pilot, the authors noted that 
officers were not taught how to send data to the CPS (although some were doing so on an 
ad hoc basis, for example by developing a document that provided instructions for a 
prosecutor to access a recording)198. The authors concluded that further research should 
look into how these processes have developed and become formalised since the trialling of 
the technology. In the Isle of Wight pilot, the authors recommended that the 
“implementation of a single business process needs to be considered along the 
occurrence/crime/investigative continuum, so that officers’ difficulties with adapting to the 
requirements of digital evidence are addressed”.199 Todak et al. (2018) interviewing 
prosecutors about their experiences with BWCs, noted that some prosecutors felt that some 
protocols for reviewing and processing BWC evidence had not been fully fleshed out, causing 
tension between them and sending agency.200 One UK PCC interviewee noted that efforts to 
develop a single platform with criminal justice partners had not developed as they had 
hoped, and that the transfer of video footage within the criminal justice system was less 
than optimal, due to issues such as this.201 Similarly, an interviewee in the UK noted that a 
lack of strong infrastructure might lead to outsourcing of entire IT provision in police forces, 
potentially leading to conflicts between the police and the private company, as well as issues 
of IT compatibility and data protection.202 
 
                                           
193 Merola, L., Lum, C., Koper, C.S. & Scherer, A. (2016). Body-worn cameras and the courts: A national survey of 
state prosecutors, Report for the Laura and John Arnold Foundation. Fairfax, VA: Center for Evidence‐Based Crime 
Policy, George Mason University. 
194 INT04 
195 Todak, N., Gaub, J. E. & White, M.D. (2018). The importance of external stakeholders for police body-worn 
camera diffusion. Policing: An International Journal 41(4), 448-464. 
196 O’Hara, P. (1984). ‘Introduction’. Public Productivity Review. Vol. 8, No. 3, Symposium: Productivity in Law 
Enforcement?, pp. 199-206. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3380462 
197 Grossmith., L, Owens, C., Finn, W., Mann, D., Davies, T. & Baika, L. (2015). ‘Police, Camera, Evidence: London’s 
cluster randomised controlled trial of Body Worn Video’. As of 11 September 2019, available at: 
https://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/Police_Camera_Evidence.pdf 
198 Morgan, J. & Silverstone, D. (2017). ‘Trialling body-worn video cameras for City of London Police: officer 
perceptions and justice outcomes. A report for City of London Police’. As of 11 September 2019, available at: 
https://www.londonmet.ac.uk/media/london-metropolitan-university/london-met-documents/professional-
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cameras-for-City-of-London-Police-officer-perceptions-and-justice-outcomes.pdf 
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In addition to human processes, a similar concern concerns the interoperability of BWC 
software with existing and legacy IT. As already discussed, UK police forces are organised 
autonomously, with IT purchases often made at local force level, and involving the use of 
multiple criminal justice databases to store different types of information.203 An interviewee 
highlighted the fact that this differs from (for example) the Australian context. In Australia, 
due to the great physical distances between police forces, there has been a centralised push 
for the implementation of technology to ensure integration and connectivity.204 The 
interviewee also noted that the model of devolved control in the UK system would benefit 
from a single, standardised system facilitating the cross-force roll-out of technologies, as 
well as a system that can be easily used in collaboration with the CPS. 
In the case of body cameras, as noted by one author, the use of disparate databases for 
parts of the criminal justice process (such as separate ones for emergency calls and for 
investigations) may also hinder the later integration of BWC data (such as location and facial 
recognition data) with the current systems used for investigations.205  
At a more basic level, the use of the cameras to improve processes may also depend on the 
limitations of the technology itself and the mitigation of technical errors. For example, some 
studies have observed issues with regard to data transfer206, battery life207, bulky 
equipment208, audio or visual quality, loss of data such as user ID and date/time due to 
technical malfunction, human user error209, other technical faults210, as well as a lack of 
associated infrastructure such as docking stations211. The lack of infrastructure (e.g. 
connectivity) may also hinder the full spectrum of use, for example the use of footage “on 
the spot” or live-streaming to backroom officers. One police officer’s account cited in Ellis et 
al (2015) noted that his equipment had failed while he was conducting a search that the 
civilian later alleged to have been racially motivated, which led to accusations from seniors 
that the equipment had been switched off on purpose.212  
Nonetheless, one UK police interviewee, while acknowledging that it was difficult to quantify 
and attribute change to cameras alone, felt that cameras had made a “huge impact” on 
productivity at their force, due to a reduction in complaints.213 
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The impact of BWCs on policing costs 
In considering the potential impact of BWCs on productivity, another pressing concern 
relates to the potential of BWCs to lower costs within the criminal justice system, thereby 
reducing the resources (inputs) required to achieve the target outcomes. 
Naturally, the use of BWCs comes with the initial up-front costs of the technology itself: the 
cost of the hardware and software, as well as associated infrastructure costs (for example, 
additional data storage). Data storage costs have been previously cited as a reason for 
reluctance of police forces to adopt BWCs214 and thus may be an “unrecognised” influence 
on the nature and length of video footage captured by police.215 (This was echoed by an 
interviewee who felt that the main cost of implementation was the storage of data, but that 
this was small in relation to the efficiencies actually achieved216). Another interviewee felt 
that the initial cost-benefit analysis business case for the cameras perhaps “needed more 
refinement and development” at the time, but that they had proceeded due to the wider 
benefits of the cameras (e.g. evidentiary value); they found that the published research on 
BWCs provided some evidence for these benefits.217  
However, as discussed in the previous section, the use of cameras to make certain processes 
(such as providing evidence to criminal justice partners) more efficient, as well as potential 
reductions in the time required to deal with complaints or assaults against officers may result 
in savings of time or cost. In the two UK pilots (Aberdeen and Renfrewshire) for which the 
authors conducted a cost analysis, both estimated that the savings generated at system 
level as a result of increased early guilty pleas outweighed the initial costs to the police 
themselves of the BWC equipment and installation.  
However, as discussed above, the nature of policing may mean that such relationships with 
cost are not linear. Increases in everyday policing activities (for example, due to a reduction 
in the amount of time spent in court) may have cost and time implications of their own. Two 
studies reviewed by Lum et al. (2019) found that the time spent dealing with complaints 
went down as a result of BWCs (implying cost savings), although one study found that the 
use of BWCs resulted in a higher number of arrests and a decline in discretionary warnings, 
with a consequent increase in the processing time required.218 One interviewee felt that 
there had been cost savings through a reduction in complaints, but that more time was 
spent on analysis and disclosure activities (although they felt this was for the right 
reasons).219 
The introduction of BWCs may also have cost implications downstream for criminal justice 
partners. Merola et al. (2016) in a survey of prosecutors’ offices in the US found that, when 
asked about the resources needed to engage with camera footage, 65.4% reported the need 
for tech upgrades, while 46.3% highlighted the need to hire tech support personnel or for 
technical training.220 Fewer respondents reported need to hire additional support personnel 
(36.7%) or additional prosecutors (22.4%). One interviewee from a UK police force noted 
that criminal justice partners have been part of national changes to the processes 
surrounding the management and sharing of data. Investments have been made in 
technology and effective IT connections between the CPS and police forces in order to use 
and view video footage, and to handle the integration of footage from the 43 regional forces 
across England and Wales.221 
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Piza et al. (2019) note that studies may also underestimate the financial benefits of BWCs, 
for example by failing to fully consider reductions in use of force, which have not been 
systematically investigated.222 The authors note that the existing literature provides 
estimates of the cost of crime, which could potentially be integrated into a future cost-benefit 
analysis of camera use alongside associated costs (such as the cost of hospital treatment as 
a result of assaults), as well as other outcome measures suggested by Lum et al. (2015), 
such as officer compliance with standards, citizens’ willingness to call the police, police 
managerial systems, and the resolution of citizens’ complaints.223 
3.3.3.2 Effectiveness, inclusion and sustainability 
Effectiveness, inclusion and sustainability is characterised in the DigiGov-F conceptual 
framework as outcomes that relate to the effectiveness of the services delivered (e.g. 
improvements in the provision of public services, internal processes, the relationship 
between citizens and the government). Box 11 provides an overview of some of the key 
findings in relation to effectiveness, inclusion and sustainability outcomes from the use of 
BWCs in policing.  
Box 11. Key findings relating to effectiveness, inclusion and sustainability outcomes of the use of 
BWCs. 
 Training and innovative uses of BWCs (for example, to review the behaviour of an 
officer’s dog, use camera data in performance reviews, or to highlight potential 
gaps in policy) might have some impact on effectiveness, inclusion and 
sustainability. However, despite some examples of BWC use in training, it is 
unclear to what extent such measures are being used in practice.   
 Although BWCs may have contributed towards making policing more effective by 
reducing crime, it is difficult to conduct research on the longer-term impact of 
BWCs on crime.  
 BWCs can aid in the production of better-quality evidence for prosecutions by 
increasing the likelihood of early guilty pleas, the number of incidents that result 
in criminal charges, or to recall exact quotes or developments during an incidence. 
Cameras can also be used actively to scan a room or get a better view of the victim. 
However, it is difficult to measure the longer-term impact of these outcomes.  
 Some risks are associated with the expectation that BWC footage is always 
available in court, and that such footage is generally infallible.  
 BWCs can be used to enable advanced policing functions, e.g. BWC footage and 
live streams can be used as evidence for coroners, to provide a link to mental 
health practitioners who can review or provide support during an incident, or for 
intelligence purposes.  
 In the future, the use of BWCs could be integrated with artificial intelligence, Big 
Data, facial recognition technologies and natural language processing, although 
technological and ethical barriers still exist.  
The potential benefits of BWCs suggested in the literature may relate to their potential to 
reduce and deter crime, whether through direct deterrent effects, better-quality evidence 
leading to better criminal justice outcomes, or the use of BWCs to increase the capabilities 
of officers themselves. We discuss the evidence relating to these points below. 
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Use of BWCs in training 
A further way in which BWCs may have an impact on aspects of effectiveness, inclusion and 
sustainability relates to their potential use in training, which could (in theory) make police 
officers more effective at their work. 
Although the use of BWCs in training has not formed a prominent aspect of UK trials, it has 
been observed in some studies224, sometimes in innovative ways. For example, Rowe et al. 
(2017) observed the police, after carrying out a property search using a new piece of 
equipment, employing the footage immediately afterwards as a means to demonstrate the 
technology to their colleagues. Koen and Willis (2019) meanwhile noted an example of a 
police dog handler using the footage to review their dog’s behaviour.225 One quasi-
experimental study found no notable difference between a group of officers who undertook 
training with BWCs and a control group, in terms of aspects such as reflective thinking, peer 
learning or attitudes towards training. The study did, however, find the treatment group 
more likely to say that they had identified mistakes and recalled more instances of 
learning.226 However, as noted by Lum et al. (2019), the effects of this training on learning 
outcomes or police behaviour have not been widely tested.227 
Similarly, despite examples of the use of BWCs in training, it is not clear how widely such 
training using BWCs is carried out in practice. One interviewee from a UK police force felt 
that training was a highly under-utilised area of use for BWCs and that they had not seen it 
occurring in practice. They attributed this to people feeling uncomfortable with subjecting 
others to what they saw as criticism, and felt that BWCs would only be used in this way in 
the presence of a good leader and staff open to this type of training.228 
In a survey of officers interviewed for the City of London pilot, none felt that BWCs would 
be useful in training.229 In a study of the implementation of BWCs in a US police department, 
Koen et al. (2018) found that BWC footage was used for training in some cases where 
alternative video sources (e.g. from YouTube) were not available. BWCs did not otherwise 
greatly affect the training programme or performance management process.230  
Conversely, one UK police interviewee reported using video extensively for training within 
their organisation to highlight gaps in policy or training (using non-evidentiary footage). In 
particular, it was used to review defensive tactics, and for one-to-one learning and reflective 
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practice.231 The interviewee felt that this had made an impact on officers’ behaviour, and 
noted that the training department was now “dependent” on body camera footage to sign 
officers off as sufficiently competent to go on individual patrol. It was also used by managers 
for performance reviews.  
The barriers to the use of BWC footage in training were usually reported as involving 
concerns over embarrassing individual officers.232 Koen et al. (2018) also note that, in the 
context of policing, the use of BWC footage for performance monitoring is also hindered by 
the difficulty of establishing clear and systematic performance quality goals.233 
More effective policing to reduce crime 
One of the implicit aims of the introduction of cameras is to reduce crime through better 
policing. However, the nature of the criminal justice system – in which prosecutions may 
take place over an extended period, and may result from only a small sub-set of policing 
activities – means that conducting controlled or empirical research on the longer-term 
impact of BWCs on crime is difficult, and has not featured prominently in the existing 
literature.  
In the UK, three pilots – the Isle of Wight, Aberdeen and Renfrewshire – attempted to 
estimate the overall impact on crime, by comparing the change in overall crime rates in the 
pilot areas to that of the wider region. In all three, reductions in crime were recorded in both 
the treatment and control areas, but reductions were larger in the treatment areas. 
However, a further study in the US context, which compared the number of emergency calls 
from street segments being patrolled by officers wearing cameras to those patrolled by 
officers without, found an increase in calls from areas of “low crime density level”, but no 
effect in crime “hotspots”.234  
Lum et al. (2019) also reviewed evidence relating to other “proactive” behaviours by police, 
such as proactive stopping and searching of citizens, misdemeanour arrests, and traffic 
enforcement.235 As with arrests, results were mixed: three studies found the police initiated 
more proactive behaviours when using BWCs, while one found no significant impact; one 
study found evidence of a reduction in the incidence of stop-and-frisk in the US, but another 
found no effect; and one study found no impact on traffic stops. 
Use of BWCs to generate better evidence to aid prosecutions 
A more direct link between the use of cameras and service innovation may be the production 
of better-quality evidence for use in prosecutions. However, as with overall crime rates, the 
nature and length of the criminal justice process may make empirical research difficult, with 
the result that little research has been carried out in relation to criminal investigations, 
despite the ability to generate of evidence often being a key factor in decisions to adopt 
BWCs.236 Bowling and Iyer (2019) note that in the UK context, no records appear to be kept 
with regard to the use of BWC footage in trials, so no data is available to test a direct link 
between the use of BWC evidence and the administration of justice or sentencing.237  
However, other evidence does exist from the UK pilots concerning the impact of BWCs on 
evidence. The pilots in Renfrewshire and Aberdeen provide evidence that the use of cameras 
may enable an increase in early guilty pleas (a view also expressed by one PCC 
interviewee238). An officer providing evidence to the Scottish Parliament later noted that an 
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internal review of cases submitted to the prosecuting service over a 13-month period found 
that 91% of cases involving BWC evidence resulted in early guilty pleas, compared to the 
national average of 40%. Similarly, 51% of such cases were dealt with at the court of first 
instance, compared to 31% nationally.239 Anecdotal evidence of the utility of cameras in 
providing quality evidence was noted in the Plymouth trial (Home Office, 2007). 
While there was no significant difference in the Met Police pilot between the control and 
treatment group with regard to arrests for violent crime, a higher proportion of violent 
incidents attended by the BWC-equipped group were flagged as having evidence (28%, 
compared to 0.2% in the control group), which might imply that more evidence was available 
due to the use of cameras. In a survey, officers using BWCs also reported greater confidence 
that they were capturing good-quality evidence than the control group.  
The Essex pilot found no differences between treatment and control for the proportion of 
incidents recorded as crimes, or for rates of arrest. However, a significantly higher 
proportion of incidents attended by the treatment group resulted in criminal charges, 
compared with other types of sanction. No significant difference in charge rates occurred 
between control and treatment in the Met pilot, although the authors note that this may 
have been the result of barriers to the use of BWC evidence by criminal justice partners, or 
potentially the pursuing of fewer but stronger cases by the police. 
In the same vein, existing research and the interviews offer only anecdotal and qualitative 
evidence about the utility of cameras in the prosecution process. One interviewee with 
experience in a UK police force240 felt that BWCs allowed officers to have the “best” evidence 
at their fingertips, and that they made discussions between police and prosecutors a lot 
simpler, more direct and “streamlined”. They felt that some cases, particularly those 
involving assaults on officers, were only brought to court because of video evidence. 
Similarly, Merola et al. (2016), in their survey of prosecutors’ offices in the US, found that 
79.5% of prosecutors supported the use of BWCs, with strong support for the notion that it 
would help the prosecution more than defence and would improve the ability to prosecute 
cases.241 58.3% felt that it would help increase rates of conviction, while 62.3% felt it would 
increase the likelihood of plea bargains. Fewer than 10% of lead prosecutors disagreed that 
it would lead to these results. These findings were echoed by interviews undertaken by 
Todak et al. (2018) with stakeholders in the US courts, in which many felt that cameras 
provided clear evidence when otherwise the court would have to rely on the officer’s word.242 
One UK police interviewee felt that there was a consistently positive view of the use of BWCs 
across criminal justice partners, as all agreed on the value of video as evidence.243 
In studies of BWC implementation, Koen et al. (2018) and Owens, Mann and McKenna 
(2014) found that officers used BWC footage in reporting, including reviewing it to help them 
capture detail about the incident (such as suspects’ physical reactions) and recall exact 
quotes.244 In particular, in Koen et al.’s (2018) study of the implementation of cameras in a 
US police department, officers were observed to be using camera footage for “complex” 
cases that would attract scrutiny from supervisors and during legal proceedings, for example 
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to avoid prosecutors seizing on discrepancies between their statement and the other 
evidence in later court proceedings.245  
Some studies provided evidence of officers proactively using cameras to collect better 
evidence, rather than simply filming encounters. In the Essex pilot, a few officers noted that 
they deliberately used their cameras to scan the room in order to capture better evidence, 
or they positioned them to get the best view of the victim. One officer reported standing 
back to record an intervention by colleagues246. One interviewee who had worked with a UK 
police force noted that video footage allowed the police to translate comments made in non-
English languages and to identify whether they were potentially abusive (for example, 
homophobic or racist language that might aggravate a charge in the UK system).247 Such 
opportunities might not be possible without a camera if the officer present did not speak the 
language. 
In particular, the utility of cameras in producing better evidence was highlighted in studies 
focusing on the use of cameras in response to domestic violence incidents. In the Essex 
pilot, officers with BWCs highlighted the utility of cameras in capturing context, visible 
injuries and emotion, thus enhancing impact and displaying things that are difficult to 
capture in written statements.248 The potential value of “emotion” on tape was also 
mentioned by an interviewee in the City of London and Met pilots, as was the capturing the 
level of aggression of someone accused of a domestic violence incident.249 Officers 
interviewed by Lister et al. (2018) also noted that video evidence could be more impactful 
than written statements, for example if children were visibly upset on the video.250 They 
also found that police officers felt BWCs to be a useful tool to help reassure victims and 
witnesses and record evidence in the immediate aftermath of incidents of domestic abuse. 
The “reviewability” of the evidence also meant that officers could identify relevant evidence 
from video that they had failed to notice at the scene, and the nature of video meant that it 
would provide evidence even if victims and witnesses later chose not to testify. In this 
regard, the authors noted that BWCs were seen as a “support” mechanism with regard to 
discretionary decisions, such as whether to make an arrest, as well as being a safeguard 
against counter-narratives later in the process. An interviewee also felt that witnesses are 
more comfortable giving statements via BWCs, as it reduces the necessity to come in to the 
police station to give a statement.251 Lum et al. (2019) also cite a further study from the 
United States which found evidence that camera use may have a positive impact on the 
prosecution of cases involving intimate partner violence.252 
However, some evidence also points to a potential drawback of BWCs: that the availability 
of high-quality video evidence in some cases may introduce an expectation on the part of 
courts and juries that such evidence will always be available – and thus implicitly raise 
doubts about the strength of cases without such evidence. (A similar concern in relation to 
forensic evidence is known as the “CSI effect”, after the popular television show.)  
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Merola et al. (2016), in a survey of prosecutors’ offices in the US, found that 66.9% of 
respondents felt jurors would come to expect BWC evidence.253 The risk that something like 
the “CSI effect” could undermine cases without video evidence was also cited as a risk by 
officers interviewed by Todak et al. (2018), as well as by Koen and Willis (2019) – although 
the majority of interviewees in the latter study felt that this risk to officer “credibility” was 
outweighed by the overall benefits of BWCs.254 In a study on the use of cameras in domestic 
violence incidents by a UK police force, Lister et al. (2018) noted that some victims were 
reluctant to be filmed, but were also afraid that declining to do so would harm the prospects 
for their case.255  
A related risk raised by stakeholders is that the view of video as “infallible” could also be 
counterproductive if valuable context is left out of video (also noted by INT02). Bowling and 
Iyer (2019) note that the UK Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) has warned 
about undue weight being given to BWC footage, given that it might leave out key bits of 
context before or after the filming, whereas officers’ accounts may offer reasons for their 
decisions and additional details about the encounter that are not captured on video.256 For 
this reason, the authors stress the importance of training to ensure that officers integrate 
BWCs into their policing practice in a way that doesn’t undermine the quality of evidence. 
(The College of Policing guidelines note that video should complement rather than replace 
officer notes.) Merola et al. (2016) in a survey of prosecutor’s offices in the US found that 
48.7% had concerns about videos not necessarily reflecting the full events in a case.257  
On the other hand, some stakeholders have raised concerns that relying on both camera 
footage and accompanying personal accounts of incidence may also introduce difficulties 
with regard to prosecution, by allowing defence lawyers to seize upon inconsistencies such 
differences between the video testimony of the (distressed) victim at the scene, and later in 
formal statements.258 Merola et al. (2016), in a survey of prosecutors’ offices in the US, 
found that 44% agreed with the statement that the use of BWCs could introduce 
discrepancies between video and officer evidence that could be exploited by the defence.259 
In a study on the use of cameras in the handling of domestic violence incidents by a UK 
police force, Lister et al. (2018) noted the risk that a jury might judge a victim who didn’t 
appear to be sufficiently “distressed” in a video recording, thus exacerbating stereotypes 
about victimhood.260 
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Use of BWCs to enable advanced policing functions 
While cameras have primarily been used in pilots to date as a straightforward recording 
device to capture a specific incident on camera for posterity, there have been some examples 
of their use for other or more advanced functions. 
In the trial of BWCs use by the Metropolitan Police Service, Grossmith et al. (2015) noted 
other examples of the use of cameras by officers. These included to provide “quick” evidence 
to coroners; capturing the behaviour of individuals experiencing a mental health crisis, to 
support the response of health teams; and using footage as a source of intelligence.261 For 
example, one interviewee with experience of the UK policing context noted that officers used 
BWCs during searches to record the layout of the premises, which could then be used by 
intelligence analysts.262 The interviewee felt that there had been changes since the 
introduction of BWCs with regard to the way officers used them. For example, BWCs were 
used to record footage of statements given at the scene, to write up later. A second 
interviewee noted that BWCs had changed the way police interacted with partner agencies 
such as mental health services, as they could share footage from medical episodes (for 
example, in relation to mental health) with specialist practitioners who could make decisions 
for care, and provide medical help at the right time.263 
One interviewee with knowledge of police use of body cameras noted that during one pilot, 
cameras had also been used to live-stream footage to police headquarters.264 The 
interviewee felt this was one of the most promising ways to deploy cameras, although it was 
dependent on having a good live connection, which was not always available. Similarly, the 
utility of such a function would depend on someone viewing the footage who had the right 
training to act appropriately. One example the interviewee provided was of an officer who 
was in a building that was on fire, who was warned about a store of propane by an officer 
viewing the live stream. Another example was an incident in which an officer viewing the 
live stream noticed that a crowd at an incident were becoming aggressive, and was thus 
able to call in backup more quickly than the officer on the ground. 
In the longer term, the integration of other technologies with BWCs could enable more 
advanced functions. For example, Rogers and Scally (2017) note that BWCs may also enable 
the live-streaming of crime scenes, which could allow experts to view footage remotely and 
advise the officers at the scene in real time265; one interviewee noted this had previously 
been piloted in the Dutch trial.266 One UK police interviewee felt that the next generation of 
BWCs would include the ability to analyse data in real time, such as facial recognition or 
geospatial data.267 Examples of the potential integration of advanced technologies with 
BWCs are provided below. 
a) Using artificial intelligence to handle BWC data and automate policing processes  
Artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of an algorithm or computer-controlled machine to 
observe its environment, learn, and take intelligent actions based on the knowledge and 
experience gained.268 In policing, it has been suggested that AI technologies could be used 
to process large amounts of data and automate mechanical processes for decision-making, 
detection and control.  
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With regard to BWCs, for example, this could include: real-time monitoring of video streams 
to decide whether a BWC should record (e.g. according to the status of a police car or its 
emergency lights, if the GPS location of the officer indicates she is on her way to a high-risk 
call, and/or according to the officer’s heartrate), or to flag suspicious behaviour or 
circumstances (for example, immediately initiating a link to police command if an officer 
fires a weapon).269 The use of AI technologies could also automate many of the flagging and 
editing processes that are currently performed by humans, such as reconstructing the layout 
of a crime scene and attaching tags and descriptors to the various objects and scenarios 
caught on video (such as adding a flag to a video as a situation escalates, for later review), 
as well as the automated redaction of faces or sensitive data.270 Whereas some of these 
functions are starting to be built into existing camera functionality – for example, US police 
body cameras can use AI software to categorise video captured by BWCs271 – the use of AI 
technology linked to body cameras may face certain ethical and technical barriers. 
b) Integrating facial recognition and AI technologies with BWCs to constitute part 
of the real-time face recognition infrastructure  
Facial recognition technologies recognise a subject through his/her facial image using deep-
learning technology to map facial features based on biometric data.272 Several different 
types of facial recognition exist, including face matching, detection, and re-identification. 
Facial recognition uses algorithms to match a person’s face to one held in a database; face 
detection identifies the presence of a face; and face re-identification spots recurrences of 
the same face. Facial recognition is often combined with and employed through AI systems 
that can learn from previously matched faces for greater automation and increased 
accuracy. It can be used, as one interview noted, to speed up the processing of evidence 
and track the movement of an individual over time.273  
Facial recognition is currently used for video surveillance with eGates in some airports, to 
login to mobile phones and computers, and for safety purposes by a ride-sharing company 
in the Middle East274. The technology has, however, run into issues in the UK due to ethical 
concerns over its use. For example, although facial recognition has been deemed lawful by 
the courts, a shopper in South Wales brought a legal challenge against the police for using 
facial recognition technology, based on privacy and equality concerns.275 
However, many commentators (including some of the stakeholders we interviewed) suggest 
that a clear trajectory for BWCs will be the integration of facial recognition capabilities, to 
enable police to immediately identify or validate the identity of a suspect, or to undertake 
proactive policing.276  
Similarly, as with static CCTV, the use of facial recognition may run into significant 
challenges in terms of ethics and public opinion. Interviewees noted that there is a public 
                                           
269 https://www.ibmbigdatahub.com/infographic/body-worn-camera-analytics-helping-fight-crime; Bowling, B. & 
Iyer, S. (2019). Automated policing: the case of body-worn video. International Journal of Law in Context 15(2), 
140-161. 
270https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/artificial%20intelligence/applying%20artif
icial%20intelligence%20for%20social%20good/mgi-applying-ai-for-social-good-discussion-paper-dec-2018.ashx; 
see also: INT08; Biometric Technology Today (2017).’ Facial recognition boost police bodyworn camera systems.’ 
Biometric Technology Today 8, 11-12.  
271 https://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/axon-artificial-intelligence-software-lapd-body-camera-footage.html; 
https://www.bwctta.com/resources/commentary/view-body-worn-camera-auto-triggering-technologies; 
272  Glabally, J., Ferrara, P., Haraksim, R., Psyllos, A., Beslay, L. 2019. ‘Study on the Face Identification 
Technology for its Implementation in the Schengen Information System.’ Luxembourg:  Joint Research Centre, 
April 2018. As of 2 October 2019, available at: 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC116530/sis_face-
jrc_science_for_policy_report_22.07.2019_final.pdf.; https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Face-Off-final-digital-1.pdf 
273 https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Face-Off-final-digital-1.pdf 
274 van Schelle, F. (2018). ‘Never forget a face? The rise of ‘live’ body-worn cameras.’ Biometric Technology 
Today 4, 5-7.  
275 Rees, J. (2019). ‘South Wales Police use of facial recognition ruled lawful.’ BBC News 4 September 2019. As of 
2 October 2019, available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-49565287. 
276 van Schelle, F. (2018). ‘Never forget a face? The rise of ‘live’ body-worn cameras.’ Biometric Technology 
Today 4, 5-7. Also see INT08, INT05, INT04. 
 125 
backlash against the use of facial recognition because it is seen as state surveillance277; that 
the public are reluctant to see the role of BWCs move beyond being a “natural extension” of 
the police officer278; that facial recognition might not provide added value because the police 
often deal with known suspects and facial recognition technology would be costly279. The use 
of facial recognition technologies has also encountered wider issues in relation to the 
accuracy of its data. Facial recognition technology struggles with processing data in 
“complex” environments, and the use of BWCs will require live streaming and wireless 
connectivity to ensure that facial recognition tools can be used in real time.280 Moreover, 
recognition rates tend to create more false positives for races other than white, while 
simultaneously facial recognition tends to work less well on people of colour and women.281  
c) Using natural language processing (NLP) to automatically capture spoken and 
written text, thereby saving time on video review and transcription 
Automated text generation or NLP is the use of computational techniques or artificial 
intelligence to understand, produce and learn human language content.282 NLP is largely 
driven by computational statistics and models that try to capture language, text, and 
sentiments.  
For the police, the use of NLP to analyse body camera footage may reduce the hours and 
resources required for video management, review, and transcription.283,284  For example, 
NLP can automate the recording of licence plates and other text captured on body-camera 
footage or the automated transcription of conversations. Further ahead, software may also 
be able to automate the generation of draft police reports based on video footage.285 
However, there are both operational and societal barriers to the use of NLP, both at large in 
policing and together with BWCs. Developments in NLP in the areas of sentiment and facial 
analysis lag behind textual analysis.286 There are also challenges overall in ensuring that 
NLP provides a correct interpretation of the subject matter, and that the models are built 
with inherent biases. These challenges are even greater for NLP that is based on audio, video 
or speech.287 Furthermore, while NLP may reduce the cost of transcribing interviews, 
developments are likely to rely on a hybrid approach that incorporates human intervention 
to check the interpretation of the text, requiring the employment of personnel who have the 
appropriate capabilities to carry out such analysis.288 Significant challenges also exist in 
terms of AI being able to interpret the context and reasoning related to the language.289 The 
use of NLP by the police using BWCs is therefore likely to rely on whether it helps them to 
achieve adequate textual output in an efficient way.290 
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d) Using Big Data analytics to predict, prevent and measure crime based on 
information from BWCs and other sources  
Big Data analytics refers to the strategy of analysing large amounts of data (often using AI) 
often produced at a high speed from diverse sources such as sensors, machines, satellite 
imagery, digital pictures and video, and GPS signals.291 In policing, Big Data analytics can 
be used to analyse data automatically captured from BWCs and other sources such as licence 
plate readers, informational databases and geospatial data. It may be able to measure 
qualitative risks in single incidents, predict future criminal activity, and make predictions 
based on an individual’s network by connecting facial recognition with other sources. Big 
Data analysis can be used to carry out mass surveillance and constitutes part of the DNA 
collection processes of the police.292 
The nature of wearable cameras means that vast amounts of data on police-public 
interactions can be potentially recorded and analysed at a later date using Big Data analytics. 
However, the use of camera footage as Big Data has not been explored in depth in the 
literature, and no interviewees could provide examples of this being used in practice, with 
the exception of an interviewee who reported that metadata from cameras was being used 
to analyse usage patterns, to see which parts of the force were using them and what types 
of were was being stored and used.293 In the UK context, guidelines on the swift deletion of 
data not marked as evidence may also introduce key barriers to the use of footage for wider 
analysis. 
However, a more immediate use of Big Data analytics in relation to camera footage may be 
its application for wider research into police interactions. Since the widespread adoption of 
BWCs, a number of researchers have used body camera footage in the US as a dataset for 
wider academic research about police behaviour; for example, researchers have used body 
camera footage as a dataset to examine how the race of the citizen affects the language 
used by police during traffic stops.294 
3.3.3.3 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy, as characterised in the DigiGov-F conceptual framework, refers to outcomes 
that relate to the potential to increase participation and civic engagement and make 
government more responsive, transparent, and accountable. 
This is highly relevant to the most common justification for the use of BWCs: that they help 
to increase accountability and governance of policing operations by introducing the ability 
for third parties to review incidents to assess the appropriateness of behaviour on the part 
of both the police and the public. One study details four ways in which BWCs can achieve 
this: the deterrence of oppressive behaviour due to the fact of filming; greater compliance 
(conscious or unconscious) with process and procedure, with the result that the public 
perception of fairness and procedural justice improves; increased civility on the part of the 
public; and protection of the police from groundless allegations.295 Box 12 provides an 
overview of some of the key findings relating to legitimacy outcomes of the use of BWCs in 
policing. These are examined below. 
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Box 12. Key findings relating to legitimacy outcomes of the use of BWCs. 
 Strong support and internal legitimacy for the use of BWCs has been recorded 
among UK police officers, although some felt that BWCs can present some 
administrative difficulties and increase their workload.  
 Evidence on the impact of BWCs on complaints, as a proxy for police behaviour, is 
mixed. When positive effects are observed, these do not continue in the long term, 
offering little evidence on the sustainability of positive outcomes.  
 There is some evidence that BWCs can affect citizen behaviour, although evidence 
is mixed. For example, police with BWCs are less likely to be assaulted than other 
officers without BWCs. BWCs may also reduce spurious complaints against officers, 
although there is only anecdotal evidence to support this.  
 The impact of BWCs on officer adherence to procedure and protocols shows mixed 
results. Qualitative interviews with officers suggest that cameras can change their 
behaviour.  
 However, the police have not always been positive about BWCs. Some officers felt 
bound by strict procedures and unable to use their own discretion to adapt practice. 
 Strong public support in support of the use of BWCs has been recorded. Some 
studies also highlight that BWCs can enable the public to better understand the 
perspective of the police.   
Internal legitimacy of BWCs 
A significant portion of research on BWCs has focused on the perceptions and feelings of 
officers towards their use, often through survey-based research. In the UK pilots, strong 
support for the use of BWCs was recorded among officers, often on the grounds that it would 
help to protect them against complaints.296 In a synthesis of wider research, Lum et al. 
(2019) found that in many studies, officers’ feelings towards BWCs improved over time 
(either positively or towards a neutral stance), possibly because officers come to see the 
cameras as protecting them from complaints, or because they felt BWCs would improve their 
own behaviour (although a couple of studies also found scepticism on this latter point).297  
Some surveys also have found positive feelings among police towards the role of BWCs in 
helping to gather reliable evidence. An interviewee in the UK felt that cameras had been 
very positive for workforce morale since they had been implemented, and were accepted as 
a good investment.298 Meanwhile, surveys that recorded negative sentiment among officers 
tended to focus on specific concerns: for example, that BWCs presented administrative 
difficulties (specifically, downloading data) and increased workload; concern that recording 
may make officers more hesitant to react in some situations; as well as concern that footage 
would be used against officers themselves. One interviewee noted that police officers have 
traditionally worked on their own, and therefore away from the scrutiny enabled by digital 
                                           
296 Ellis, T., Jenkins, C. & Smith, P. (2015). Evaluation of the introduction of personal issue body worn video 
cameras, Operation Hyperion) on the Isle of Wight: final report to Hampshire Constabulary. Portsmouth, England: 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth. As of 2 August 2019, available at: 
https://port.ac.uk/media/contacts-and-departments/icjs/downloads/Ellis-Evaluation-Worn-Cameras.pdf; 
Grossmith, L., Owens, C., Finn, W., Mann, D., Davies, T. & Baika, L. (2015). ‘Police, Camera, Evidence: London’s 
cluster randomised controlled trial of Body Worn Video’. As of 11 September 2019, available at: 
https://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/Police_Camera_Evidence.pdf; Morgan, J. & Silverstone, 
D. (2017). ‘Trialling body-worn video cameras for City of London Police: officer perceptions and justice outcomes. 
A report for City of London Police’. As of 11 September 2019, available at: 
https://www.londonmet.ac.uk/media/london-metropolitan-university/london-met-documents/professional-
service-departments/engagement/pr-and-communications/press-release-pdfs/Trialling-body-worn-video-
cameras-for-City-of-London-Police-officer-perceptions-and-justice-outcomes.pdf 
297 Lum, C., Stoltz, M., Koper, C.S. & Scherer, J.A. (2019). Research on body‐worn cameras: What we know, what 
we need to know. Criminology & Public Policy 18(1), 93-118.; see also INT01, INT02. 
298 INT05. 
 128 
technologies, and that the reaction to BWCs was similar to that towards other digital 
technologies such as mobile phones with tracking capabilities.299  
Spencer and Cheshire (2017), in a review of the implementation of BWCs among a UK police 
force over the course of a decade, noted that a significant piece of learning was that in order 
to effectively embed the technology within the policing context, users need to “recognise 
the need” for BWCs and “want to use it”.300 An initial pilot using head-mounted cameras was 
considered unsuccessful, with officers finding them uncomfortable (with impractical wiring), 
potentially making them self-conscious when patrolling. The pilot also involved cumbersome 
administrative requirements, including the need to download video to two CD-ROMs. This 
put off the majority of users, who were unconvinced of the benefits. However, a small group 
remained keen on the technology, and were transformed over time into a formal BWC 
“champion” group internally, demonstrating their use to colleagues, providing credibility and 
assurance, and “product testing” the new BWCs once a decision was taken to develop their 
use. In this regard, the authors note that the “momentum of acceptance” increased as more 
“good news stories” were disseminated among the workforce. (One interviewee also noted 
the importance of “early adopters” in the roll-out of BWCs in another UK police force.301)  
The simplicity of the infrastructure and user-friendly practices were seen by the authors as 
key to increasing the confidence of officers in the use of BWCs. In this regard, the authors 
felt a common “journey” in relation to the technology (albeit at different speeds for different 
individuals) began with initial reluctance, followed by acceptance of the presence of BWCs 
but a position that they would not use it; then a move towards “I will use it if I have to”; 
followed by a preference for patrolling with a camera, and finally feeling invested in the 
technology to the extent that they look forward to better technology.302 
With the exception of a couple of papers, the existing literature does not focus in much 
depth on the impact of BWCs on management methods and working culture, and how these 
may influence officers’ use and reaction to BWCs. Interestingly, two studies reviewed by 
Lum et al. (2019) found a relationship between positive sentiment towards BWCs and 
officers’ positive perceptions of organisational justice, although this relationship was not 
observed when one of the studies was repeated in a different agency, or by another, 
separate study.303 One study found that officer “burnout” was greater among officers using 
BWCs, who also felt they had less organisational support.304  
The impact of BWCs on officer behaviour 
Research to date which has focused on the accountability of officers has often done so by 
using public complaints as a proxy, although it can be difficult to tell if improvements are 
the result of improved officer behaviour or a reduction in the number of spurious complaints 
(the latter are discussed below).  
As noted previously, protection from complaints is often cited by officers as a key benefit of 
cameras, or as a potential source of time and cost savings. However, the evidence in relation 
to the impact of BWCs on complaints is mixed. In the UK pilots, a drop in complaints was 
recorded in Plymouth and in the Isle of Wight compared to the wider region as a control, 
but with differences in the type of complaint (with no change for procedural or assault-
related complaints compared to the previous year). In the Metropolitan Police trial, the 
researchers observed an overall reduction in complaints, but with some pilot boroughs 
displaying (non-significant) higher rates of complaints than control sites. Interestingly, in 
the global multi-site study by Ariel et al. (2016), complaints reduced significantly compared 
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to the previous year for both the control and treatment group, which the authors hypothesise 
may be the result of “contagious accountability”: a general effect of improved behaviour 
across the organisation through the adoption of new norms as a result of the adoption of 
BWCs.305 
Similarly, in a wider review of (quasi-)experimental evidence, Lum et al. (2019) found 22 
studies that measured the impact of BWC on citizen complaints, as a proxy for officer 
behaviour. While the majority found a relationship between the use of BWCs and reduced 
numbers of citizen complaints, a smaller number of studies demonstrated unclear or non-
significant results306; Owens and Finn (2017) note that while various studies show a 
reduction in complaints, the extent of the reduction varies. This may be the result of study 
design or of differences in contextual factors.307  
Other studies have made use of administrative data or other measures to examine the use 
of force by officers. In their global multi-site trial, Ariel et al (2016b) found no significant 
difference in the use of force among officers in treatment and control groups when averaged 
across 10 trials, which the authors suggest may be the result of BWCs “inflaming” already-
tense encounters.308 Examining the data from one UK site (West Midlands) in greater detail, 
Henstock and Ariel (2017) found that the use of force declined in treatment compared to 
control, but differently across different types of force: treatment groups had lower odds of 
physical restraint and non-compliant handcuffing, but an increase in compliant handcuffing. 
There was no difference in “more aggressive” uses of force (albeit with small sample sizes). 
Faced with this counterintuitive result, the authors suggest that BWCs could produce 
unintended consequences by increasing tension in certain (but not all) situations, leading to 
the officer making an early intervention of compliant handcuffing before the situation 
escalates; that the increase is explained by officers being more diligent in their reporting of 
compliant handcuffing as a use-of-force event in light of the camera’s presence; or that it is 
the result of greater police adherence to procedure as a result of “being observed”, thereby 
increasing the instances in which they feel compelled to make an arrest where otherwise 
they may have let the behaviour slide. 
Similarly, Lum et al. (2019) found 16 studies that measured the reported use of force by 
officers, with mixed evidence.309 Four experimental and one quasi-experimental study found 
reductions in the use of force among officers wearing BWCs (compared to a non-BWC control 
group), with a follow-up study finding the effect was sustained over time. However, four 
other experimental studies and a further four quasi-experimental studies found no significant 
differences between officers wearing BWCs and those without, with the direction of the non-
significant effect not consistent across these latter studies.  
Even among those studies that have observed a positive effect of camera use on (a proxy 
for) officer behaviour, the majority used only short timeframes to examine the use of force, 
thus offering little evidence in relation to the sustainability of the effect observed. One 
exception is Koslicki et al. (2019), who used a time series analysis to test whether the effect 
on use of force in a US police force was sustained after an initial period, based on 
administrative use-of-force reports.310 After the first month of implementation there was a 
non-significant drop in the use of force incidents. This was followed by a steady, significant 
increase for every month that followed, until the use of force reached pre-BWC levels after 
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three years. The authors hypothesise that use of BWCs may influence the immediate 
behaviour of officers, but that this effect may diminish as use of BWCs becomes 
normalised.311 On the other hand, a follow-up to the Rialto study found that the fall in the 
rate of complaints against the police and police use of force recorded in the initial study was 
sustained at the four-year follow-up.312 
In considering the potential impact of cameras on the behaviour of officers, a key question 
is the discretion afforded to officers in relation to the use of the camera. For example, should 
it be used in all situations (raising potential privacy concerns313), or only in those in which 
the officer considers there to be a potential need for evidentiary footage, thus potentially 
allowing officers to use discretion over which of their behaviours are recorded, thereby 
undermining the accountability effects of wearing a camera.314 One interviewee noted that 
the discretionary use of cameras in the Netherlands was game-changing. It increased the 
use of BWCs seven-fold, because the police “knew that it was their recording” and that they 
could control its use.315 In the UK context, guidance by the College of Policing states that 
use of BWCs is discretionary; this is similar to the model followed in Sweden316 and the 
Netherlands317. Whereas in the US, some law enforcement interactions must be recorded as 
a matter of protocol for “all calls of service” relating to law enforcement (while pausing the 
use of BWCs during a lunch break, for example).318 319 In the Isle of Wight pilot (where no 
guidance was given to officers about their use), the researchers noted a high disparity in 
the use of the cameras by officers: some used them proactively (e.g. providing commentary 
and context during the recording), while others simply switched it on at start of incident, 
and off at end.320 The authors note that sites at which the project leader was on site made 
greater use of cameras, thus noting the importance of leadership in setting norms for their 
proper use. A secondary analysis of the global multi-site trial notably found a difference in 
line with the discretion afforded to officers in turning on their camera: officers who were 
given greater discretion over when the BWC unit was recording were more likely to use force 
than officers who had less discretion, and the use of force actually increased among the 
high-discretion treatment cohort compared to the control group. The authors suggest this 
may be the result of officers choosing to turn on the cameras only in hyper-aggressive 
situations in which force is likely (thus introducing a bias).321 For this reason, the authors 
conclude that mandating the use of cameras throughout an entire shift may be a way of 
addressing concerns about this counterintuitive effect, with the accompanying verbal 
warning acting as a “nudge” for both parties towards civility.  
One interviewee with experience in a UK police force felt that recording everything was 
impracticable and could heighten tensions in a situation, when officers might otherwise use 
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discretion.322 Similarly, the interviewee felt that their police force could not deal with the 
amount of data generated by a mandatory recording policy, given the need to also upload 
and store this data within eight hours, in order to be ready for the next tour of duty.323 
The impact of BWCs on citizen behaviour 
In addition to potentially improving officer behaviour, one mooted benefit of the use of BWCs 
is a potentially moderating influence on citizen behaviour: if citizens are aware they are 
being filmed, it is argued that they will be less likely to act in aggressive or illegal ways. 
In the UK, there was some evidence from the Aberdeen pilot that during the trial period, 
BWC-equipped officers were less likely to be assaulted than other officers operating without 
BWCs. However, in the global multi-site trial, Ariel et al. (2016) found that assaults against 
police increased on average in the treatment group, albeit with heterogeneous results across 
pilot sites.324 A later sub-analysis by Ariel et al. (2018) hypothesised that this might be the 
result of officers feeling more constrained in their actions while wearing a BWC, resulting in 
more instances in which force is used against them (rather than, for example, being halted 
as a result of escalation by the officer at an earlier stage).325 In interviews with officers 
concerning the use of BWC footage in domestic violence incidents, Lister et al. found that 
some (but not all) officers also felt that aggressors would “calm down” when they realised 
they were being filmed, which helped to defuse tension.326 In relation to the Metropolitan 
Police RCT, Owens and Finn (2017) noted that the view of officers they consulted was that 
responses by the public to the presence of a BWC were influenced by alcohol consumption 
and by a person’s familiarity with the criminal justice system.327 
In a study of the implementation of BWCs in a US police department, Koen et al. (2018) 
found that of the 23 officers they interviewed, 20 reported that they felt that BWCs had 
improved citizen behaviour. They attributed this to both the citizen’s awareness of their own 
behaviour being recorded, ad to reassurance on the part of the public of their increased 
safety from police abuse as a result of the camera’s presence.328 Lum et al. (2019) found 
nine studies that examined the impact of BWCs on citizen compliance with police, including 
for example violence against officers, resisting arrest, and injuries sustained by officers.329 
While six studies found no significant differences with regard to compliance with officers 
using BWCs and those without, one other pilot observed an increase in assaults against 
police officers wearing BWCs compared to a control group.330 
A related outcome of the use of cameras may be a reduction in the number of spurious 
complaints against officers, as video footage can be used to easily defend an officer from an 
allegation that is baseless, thus reducing the administrative resources spent dealing with 
complaint processes. While it is difficult to tell from quantitative data alone whether observed 
reductions in complaints are the result of improved officer behaviour or of fewer groundless 
complaints being progressed, some qualitative evidence from the pilots gives weight to the 
latter. Anecdotally, the use of camera footage to quickly assess and disregard baseless 
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complaints was observed in multiple UK pilots331. Similarly, in a study of the implementation 
of BWCs in a US police department, Koen et al. (2018) found that police officials reviewed 
the camera footage before the complaint was filed officially, meaning some complainants 
would withdraw their complaint before the formal procedure was launched, if the official 
considered the complaint to be unsupported. 
The impact of BWCs on officer adherence to procedure and protocols 
As Koen et al. (2018) note, the use of BWCs enables organisations to hold officers 
accountable against rules and procedures, enabling the smooth processing of incidents 
(regardless of whether said rules are themselves the most efficient).332 In addition to 
influencing officers’ use of force, some have suggested that cameras may result in a more 
nuanced form of accountability: the ability of supervisors and authorities to review footage 
at a later date may mean that police officers are more likely to follow rules and procedures 
more strictly.  
As a nuanced concept, this has primarily been explored to date by examining differences in 
policing behaviours between treatment and control groups. Lum et al. (2019) identified 14 
studies that examined the impact of BWCs on the number of arrests and/or citations 
(warnings) made by police.333 The results in relation to this measure were mixed, with some 
studies finding fewer arrests among officers wearing BWCs, while others found more arrests 
when compared to a control group, and some found no significant impact. In the UK pilots, 
two trials – the Isle of Wight and the Metropolitan Police – examined the difference in the 
number of stop-and-searches conducted by BWC-equipped officers, but found no significant 
differences between the BWC and control groups and, in the case of the Met’s pilot, 
heterogeneous results across the pilot sites.  
Qualitative evidence from the pilots adds further nuance to this outcome. Officers 
interviewed by researchers for the UK pilots provided examples of how cameras changed 
their behaviour. Officers in the Metropolitan Police trial spoke about how, being aware of the 
potential for footage to be reviewed, they would “perform” for the camera: for example, by 
asking questions to which they knew the answer, just to get the answer on tape, or by 
stating loudly “stop kicking me” when restraining someone to flag this behaviour for the 
camera.334 Officers interviewed for the Essex pilot felt that cameras increased accountability 
and made them more mindful of their behaviour, and some indicated that they would be 
more likely to arrest suspects when using a BWC, due to feeling they would otherwise need 
to justify their inaction.335 Conversely, in the Metropolitan Police trial, officers using BWCs 
were less likely to agree in a survey that they needed a stronger justification for actions 
than the control group; the authors suggest that rather than affecting decision-making, this 
may indicate that officers with BWCs may in fact feel more confident if challenged. 
In an ethnographic study of BWC implementation in a UK police force, Rowe et al. (2017) 
observed a subtle shift in behaviour among officers when a camera was turned on, with 
officers apparently more aware of their language and volume. For example, one officer 
reported legalistic reasons for a traffic stop while a camera was recorded, but spoke more 
freely about factors involving the driver’s age and vehicle condition after the recording 
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stopped, which the researcher interpreted as a “performance”.336 Similarly, in a study of the 
implementation of BWCs in a US police department, Koen et al. (2018) found that a number 
of officers reported that cameras made them more “legalistic” or reluctant to act leniently 
(such as letting off people with a warning in the case of minor offences), given that these 
decisions could now be scrutinised by others (including their superiors).337 While none of the 
23 officers they interviewed reported that BWCs had “fundamentally” changed the way they 
dealt with civilian interactions, half reported that they were more aware and cautious with 
regard to how they communicated when on camera, with a quarter taking care not to use 
profanities.  
However, this has not always been received as a positive step by officers. During the 
Metropolitan Police RCT, the authors noted resistance from officers who believed they should 
have more discretion over the activation of BWCs, as well as feeling that the use of BWCs 
would lead to a “drop in morale” as a result of officers feeling bound to follow strict 
procedures.338 In the Essex RCT, the authors observed a feeling among officers that later 
scrutiny of footage by solicitors or other colleagues might be done unfairly, given the benefit 
of hindsight.339 One officer interviewed by Rowe et al. (2017) reported that BWCs could “turn 
you into a robot”; other interviewees reported feeling constrained and scripted. The authors 
also note the risks this could have for intelligence gathering, by making interactions with 
the public more “artificial” in nature.340 In this regard, some researchers have spoken about 
the growth of a “police media economy” in which police officers have to accommodate media 
work and “create representations of their encounters”.341 In comparing the positive view of 
officers in the Met trial (of BWCs as a tool to reduce complaints) with officers concerned 
about a “hindsight police” in the Essex trial, Owens and Finn (2017) assess that these 
contrasting findings show the importance of context. Whereas officers in the Met trial found 
BWCs a supportive and empowering technology, in Essex it was introduced during scrutiny 
over the force’s response to domestic violence, leading to a different reaction.342 As the 
authors conclude, “the rationale for providing [BWC] to officers, and how that is 
communicated, is likely to affect officers’ reactions to it.” 
Equally, some officers interviewed in the UK pilots also raised concerns about the negative 
impact of BWCs in limiting the officer’s ability to use their discretion to adapt practice to the 
nuances of the specific context at hand. For example, in an ethnographic study of the use 
of BWCs in a UK police force, Rowe et al. (2017) observed the propensity for BWCs to limit 
discretion on the part of officers, for example by leading them to make arrests even in 
situations where officers believed it to be a waste of resources.343 (Conversely, some officers 
acknowledged that BWCs would limit the unlawful use of “stop and search” powers.) 
Similarly, officers reported that in addition to reducing the disproportionate use of force, 
they might be more reluctant to use force at all, for fear of it looking bad on camera – thus 
putting them at risk. In the Essex pilot, some officers noted they had to speak carefully to 
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victims about talking in front of the camera, in case the victims didn’t actually want the 
police to act upon something they disclosed on camera.344 
In discussing the possible effects of turning police into “machines”, Bowling and Iyer (2019) 
also raise the concern that limiting discretion on the part of officers may also serve to 
reinforce bias inherent in existing protocols, a challenge also seen in automation based on 
biased datasets or otherwise discriminatory existing practices. For a discussion of this issue 
with regard to predictive policing, see Meijer and Wessels (2019).345 In relation to this, they 
acknowledge the view of Hartzog et al. (2015) that “inefficiency is an effective safeguard 
against perfectly enforcing laws that were created with implicit assumptions of leniency and 
discretion”: in other words, “perfect and consistent law enforcement” may in some cases in 
fact be in tension with fair outcomes. However, the authors and others (such as Koen et al., 
2018) note that such uniformity in process may also serve to reduce potential bias on the 
part of the officers, for example in their treatment of different racial groups.  
The effect of BWCs on the public view of the police 
In the UK pilots which sought to examine the effect of BWCs on the public view of the police 
(Isle of Wight, Metropolitan Police and Plymouth), strong support for the use of BWCs was 
recorded on the part of the public. 
Lum et al. identified two studies that discussed the impact on citizens’ fear of crime. One of 
these focused on citizens, the other on victims of crime. Both found that BWCs increased 
the feeling of safety among respondents.346 However, as Lum et al. note, there may be 
important differences between different demographic and ethnic groups in this regard, in 
line with a number of other surveys that have found differences in citizens’ perception of the 
benefits of BWCs. Some surveys have reported lower support for BWCs among non-white 
respondents, younger respondents and respondents with a more negative perception of 
police performance and procedural fairness. One UK police interviewee noted that they had 
engaged heavily with minority groups during the roll-out of cameras to discuss their benefits, 
and that community members in the area had asked the police to record every stop-and-
search incident in the area by default (stop and search has been criticised in the UK for being 
used disproportionately against minority groups347).348 
Some interviewees also discussed the potential role of video footage in helping the public to 
understand the perspective of the police: for example, two interviewees noted that footage 
of an officer being attacked with a knife had been played in the media, and became a talking 
point for members of the public.349 Another UK interviewee350 felt that footage from BWCs 
could help the police to counter “unfair” press, and build understanding on the part of the 
public by making them think about what they would do in the same situation (which he 
noted was particularly important in the case of firearms incidents). The interviewee 
suggested that greater use of the footage in news media and in schools could help to change 
attitudes towards the police and build confidence in their role. 
Finally, in the table below, we summarise some of the common drivers and barriers to the 
use of BWCs identified in the literature and expanded on in Section 3.3.3. 
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Table 16. Overview of some barriers and drivers to the use of BWCs in policing. 
DRIVERS BARRIERS 
 Collecting evidence351  
 Reporting issues more efficiently352  
 Formalised procedures 
 Improving working environment for officers  
 Cost reductions353 
 More effective use of resources  
 Defence behaviour and practice 
 Improved rates of detection  
 Quality and quantity of evidence354 
 Increased support for victims and witnesses355 
 Reduces police use of force356  
 Reduced number of victims attending court357 
 Reduces violence against police358  
 More emotional weight than written 
statements359  
 Proactive monitoring and police/crime 
prevention behaviours360 
 The public welcoming their use361 
 Perceived to increase accountability and 
transparency of police362  
 Reduce public complaints363 
 Equipment is costly364 
 Technical limitations365  
 Organisations with larger budgets  
 Doubts among the police over too 
much importance being placed on 
video as a source of evidence366  
 Data protection issues367 
 Ethics368 
 Dislike amongst civilians and police 
of being filmed369 
 Costs of data storage and 
equipment370 
 Lack of knowledge and skills 
among police officers on how to use 
BWCs371 
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3.4 Case Study 3: Privacy and trust in new digital public services 
(Germany and Spain) 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Unlike the other three case studies, the present one does not focus on the introduction of a 
specific public sector innovation in a particular context372. Instead, it aims to explore, 
through hypothetical scenarios, a key issue in relation to the process of Digital Government 
Transformation: the relationship between privacy and trust, as it relates to new digital public 
services. This case study, which has been conducted as an online experiment in two 
countries (Germany and Spain), focuses on the introduction of digital public services in four 
different policy domains (transport, health, security and voting) and on the relationship 
between citizens’ privacy and trust. The four hypothetical scenarios used in the case study 
are based on real-life case studies in which the central issue was the use of a disruptive 
technology to transform existing public services. Even though the policy domains and the 
scenarios slightly differ, one to another, the focus of the research is the same. More 
specifically, the objectives of this case study are: 
1. To explore the trade-offs that citizens make between privacy and the benefits that 
stem from the use of new digital public services in various domains; 
2. To identify under what conditions citizens are willing to adopt new digital public 
services; and 
3. To understand what role trust in the public sector plays in the adoption of such 
services.  
This section introduces the key elements of the case study. First, relying on the literature 
review conducted by Barcevičius et al. (2019), we provide a description of the policy context 
and the relevance of the topic. Second, we provide a brief review of the literature on this 
issue, namely the surveys and opinion polls already conducted on the issues of privacy, 
security and trust. Third, we explain how this case study relates to the DigiGov-F conceptual 
framework. 
3.4.1.1 Description of the context 
The last ten years have seen significant technological advances, both in the private and the 
public sector, that rely on the extensive use of personal data. The uptake of digital 
technologies has progressed at an incredible pace. Moreover, the way in which data is 
collected, processed and accessed no longer resembles the methods that were used around 
two decades ago. These rapid changes have given rise to a number of concerns relating to 
data protection and privacy, as citizens sometimes perceive a lack of control over the 
personal data they provide online373. In response, back in 2012 the European Commission 
began the process of reforming data protection across the EU, which ultimately led to the 
introduction in 2015 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)374.  
Concerns over Privacy are not a new phenomenon in the literature on eGovernment. 
However, the intense reliance of many new technologies on personal data has caused many 
researchers to worry about the risk of privacy violations that could come with a new wave 
of Digital Government Transformation and personal data sharing. Several cases have already 
demonstrated that these worries are justified. For instance, the Swedish government 
experienced a leak of its population’s personal vehicle data. This forced the Swedish 
government to restrict the outsourcing private and sensitive data to third parties375. 
                                           
372 The study was written by Cristiano Codagnone (Open Evidence), Giovanni Liva (Open Evidence). 
373 Special Eurobarometer 431, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_431_en.pdf  
374 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 
375 Joinup (2017). Following security breach, Sweden shores up outsourcing rules. 
https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/following-security-breach-sw  
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Meanwhile in 2018, a hospital in Portugal received a fine for indiscriminate access to, 
violation of and failure to ensure the continued integrity and confidentiality of, processed 
personal user data376. These and other examples depict an intrusion into people’s lives by 
both public and private sectors, and have led the literature to explore the potential for data 
to be misused, as an increasing number of different actors gain access to personal 
information377. When government datasets are made publicly available, personal information 
may be disclosed and thus subject to open profiling or data mining for various private 
purposes378. Violations of data privacy arising from both the public and private sectors 
demonstrate that concerns over privacy and security are justified – a situation that may 
hinder the digital transformation of the public sector. 
The literature also identifies instances of ‘information asymmetry’, where governments 
purchase proprietary products and services that they do not understand and are not able to 
build for themselves379. But the demand to continuously innovate prompts public authorities 
to collaborate with many private entities that develop digital tools in order to seize the 
opportunities presented by Big Data. As a result of these collaborations, the public sector is 
already losing government processes and insights to private sector. In 2014, the Danish 
Ministry of Tax admitted to having no control of over more than 200 systems that used 
machine learning algorithms for policy making that directly affected citizens380. Scholars also 
suggest that so-called ‘smart’ cities are becoming overly dependent on private companies381. 
Government access to personal data can also result in ‘Big Brother’-type surveillance, 
leading to a type of government created not by people, but by algorithms382. The use of AI 
in facial recognition, sensor networks or social media tracking are widely popular with many 
governments383. 
As we move towards the wider use of AI and other technologies that rely heavily on personal 
data to develop algorithms that improve services, transparency and the ethical use of data 
have become critical issues. This is a key challenge for governments, as such concerns can 
become a serious barrier to digital transformation, mainly because a successful adoption of 
new technologies requires the trust and confidence of citizens.  
The issue of trust in e-government is not new. There is extensive literature discussing the 
fact that, despite their advantages, e-government applications may be met with fear and 
even outright rejection by the public384. Some authors have shown that one of the reasons 
for this rejection is that some citizens still do not trust e-government services, and that this 
has an impact their broader adoption385. Trust in e-government services is a complex 
relationship that includes many issues, but, as highlighted in D2, it is one of the most 
significant barriers to the successful digital transformation of governments386.  
The trade-off between the benefits from improved digital services and privacy, which this 
case study aims to explore, is the focus of attention for several scholars, particularly in 
relation to the private sector. Internet and tech companies have long attempted to 
                                           
376 Monteiro, M. A. (2019). First GDPR fine in Portugal issued against hospital for three violations. IAPP. 
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378 Scassa, T. (2014). Privacy and open government. Future Internet, 6(2), 397-413. 
379 Medhora, P.R., Awad, B., Boettger, S. et al. (2018). Data Governance in the Digital Age. Centre for International 
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personalise their services and offer tailored content and advertisements. However, it seems 
that this increased personalisation comes at the cost of privacy.  
As shown by Shoshana Zuboff387, the nature of targeted advertising and recommendations 
means that businesses know who their customers are and what they are interested in – and 
much of this information is extracted with little informed consent from the consumer. There 
is an ongoing debate as to whether consumers, if appropriately informed, would be willing 
to give up personal data in exchange for better and more personalised services. The majority 
of tech companies justify their data collection practices through the notion of a trade-off, 
depicting an informed public that understands the opportunities and costs of giving up its 
data, and makes the positive decision to do so. Contrary to this view, some authors claim 
that tech companies give policymakers false justifications for allowing the collection and use 
of all kinds of consumer data – often in ways that the public find objectionable388. In fact, 
the majority of people do not want to lose control over their personal information, but also 
believe that this loss of control has already occurred. This is what Zuboff called the 
“habituation phase”, when users have already benefitted and become used to a service, so 
that it becomes a great cost for them to opt out389. However, the problem begins with the 
issue transparency, as users are often not aware of that their personal data is being 
harvested, and are never presented with a real choice. As reported by the Special 
Eurobarometer 487a, only 13% of citizens fully read companies’ privacy statements390. This 
is often because these are long and difficult to read. Psychological research, in a famous 
article entitled “If it’s hard to read, it’s hard to do” shows that the more difficult instructions 
are to read, the less motivated people are to read them391. But when explicitly asked, users 
say that they do care about their personal data, and are not ready to trade them for free 
services. The results of an opinion survey in Special Eurobarometer 431392, conducted in 
2015, support this argument. In the survey, a majority (52%) disagreed with the view that 
they don’t mind providing personal information in return for free services online. Less than 
a third (29%) agreed with this statement. 
When it comes to the public sector, the most hotly debated issue is security. Difficult public 
policy decisions must often be made in relation to the broader security of the public versus 
individual freedoms and liberties such as privacy393. This debate is highly polarised, with 
those from the civil liberties community strongly arguing against any infringement of privacy 
and liberty, while those from the security and policing community arguing that in many 
cases, the end justifies the means. However, this debate does not apply exclusively security 
issues –the government and other agencies collect personal data in order to improve digital 
public services in the same way that the private sector does. Despite having different 
objectives from the private sector, and not being led by profit maximisation, citizens express 
similar privacy-related concerns when it comes to the collection of personal data by the 
public sector. 
3.4.1.2 Existing literature on privacy and trust 
Existing attempts to provide a base of evidence to understand users’ preferences in relation 
to privacy are largely based on opinion polls, surveys or qualitative research, each of which 
has its limitations. Since the 1970s, Dr Alan Westin has carried out various privacy-related 
surveys. Between 1978 and 2004, more than 30 surveys were conducted by Dr Alan Westin 
in relation to general privacy, consumer privacy, medical privacy and other related areas.  
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Based on these, privacy indices were created to summarise the results and illustrate 
trends394. These indices usually place people into one of three segmented categories, 
depending on their responses to various privacy segmentation questions asking them to 
indicate their level of agreement with a series of statements, such as these from a 2003 
Harris Poll395: 
- Consumers have lost all control over how personal information is collected and used 
by companies. 
- Most businesses handle the personal information they collect about consumers in a 
proper and confidential way. 
- Existing laws and organisational practices provide a reasonable level of protection for 
consumer privacy today. 
The General Privacy Concern Index from Westin’s 1990 and 1991 Consumer Privacy Survey 
identified the following classifications396: 
- Privacy Fundamentalists – people who are generally distrustful of organisations 
asking for their personal information, and who are worried about the accuracy of 
computerised information. About 25% of the (US) public are privacy fundamentalists. 
- Privacy Pragmatists – people who weigh the benefits of various consumer 
opportunities and services, protection of public safety or enforcement of personal 
morality against the degree of intrusiveness of personal information sought. Of the 
(US) population, 57% fits into this category. 
- Privacy Unconcerned – people who are generally trustful of organisations collecting 
their personal information and are ready to forgo privacy claims to secure consumer 
service benefits or public order values. About 18% of the (US) population fits into 
this category. 
While these explanatory descriptions of certain segments of respondents are imposed by 
researchers, the surveys attempt to understand what drives their responses – and what the 
impact of being placed into one of these categories means in terms of a person’s willingness 
to surrender their privacy to obtain commercial or public benefits. These indices have 
become popular as benchmarks and as a means to classify respondents in other countries, 
too. In 1994, the same methodology was used to generate a distrust index, which classified 
respondents as having ‘low’ (26%), ‘medium’ (38%), ‘high’ (31%) or ‘no’ (5%) distrust, 
according to their answers to a series of questions about levels of trust in government and 
the private sector397. 
In addition, the previously mentioned Special Eurobarometer was conducted in 2018 on 
behalf of the European Commission. This recorded citizens’ perceptions regarding data 
protection in the European Union398. The report shows that across the EU, half of the 
population is aware that government agencies collecting their citizens’ personal data for the 
purposes of national security. The largest group of respondents (46%) said the that these 
data collection activities had a negative impact on their level of trust in government, while 
40% said they had no impact on their level of trust. Around one-tenth (11%) said the impact 
on trust of such data collection had been positive. Interestingly, these attitudes vary 
relatively little according to socio-demographic characteristics.  
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In terms of respondents’ attitudes towards disclosing personal data, the same survey 
reported that over seven out of ten respondents agreed that providing personal information 
is an increasing part of modern life. A majority of people (56%) agreed that their national 
government asks them for an increasing amount of personal information. 
As can be seen from the brief summary above, the current methods used to collect data on 
individuals’ attitudes towards the trade-offs they make between privacy and the benefits of 
improved digital services, may be seen as blunt instruments. The results variously show 
majority support or opposition to various measures intruding on privacy, and only offer 
further insight into what motivates these responses via the use of simple follow-up 
questions. 
3.4.1.3 The experiment and the conceptual framework 
The present case study employs a discrete choice approach using stated preferences. This 
aims to elicit real preferences concerning the trade-offs users make between benefits and 
privacy. The use of this approach may allow a refined, bottom-up understanding of the 
importance individuals place on these factors. The details of the methodology will be 
discussed in Section 3.4.2. Meanwhile, in the present section we explain the rationale and 
the scope of the experiment.  
Rather than conducting a case study focusing on a specific public sector innovation in a 
single country, we decided to conduct an online experiment in two EU Member States, 
covering four digital innovations in different policy domains. The results obtained therefore 
allow us to compare different innovations, domains and countries in order to detect potential 
differences. Germany and Spain were selected, due to the different levels of trust in 
institutions among their national populations. As reported by the latest Standard 
Eurobarometer 90 (Public Opinion in the European Union), 54% of German citizens tend to 
trust the national government; in Spain, the corresponding figure is just 19%. Differences 
between the two countries are also remarkable in relation to trust in regional or local 
authorities (78% in Germany tend to trust them, versus 36% in Spain); the national 
parliament (58% versus 15%); and the national public administration (71% versus 37%). 
Nonetheless, trust in the internet399 is similar (30% versus 25%)400. 
While highly specific in nature, the design of the present case study is informed by certain 
elements of the DigiGov-F conceptual framework. In the hope of exploiting the potential of 
new technologies to improve public services, governments sometimes sacrifice 
accountability in relation to privacy and data protection. As Di Maggio and Powell401 note, 
governments (like all organisations) need to feel legitimate in their environment, in the 
sense of meeting societal expectations. Relying on Weber’s analysis of governmental 
bureaucracy402, we can state that governments sometimes pursue tangible performance 
objectives (i.e. the improvement of public services through the use of advanced 
technologies) while failing to pursue other symbolic objectives such as legitimacy and the 
trust of their citizens. The search for legitimacy and trust is an important dimension to 
consider. On the one hand, it can represent a significant barrier to digital transformation; 
on the other, it constitutes one of the potential positive effects that new technologies can 
produce, beyond efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
                                           
399 This is used by standard Eurobarometer surveys and it refers to the level of trust of people in the sources found 
online and it provides an indication of the confidence that users have about using internet. 
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In the current context of declining trust in both government and democracy403, governments 
need to do much more to increase their legitimacy and demonstrate their impact on citizens’ 
wellbeing. They have a chance to do this today via smarter policies, better-targeted services, 
greater openness and increased engagement. Public confidence – that is, the extent to which 
the general public trusts institutions to act competently and in support of the wider public 
interest – must be restored. Therefore, engaging stakeholders and citizens in the debate on 
privacy and data protection is crucial to achieving good outcomes. One example of this is 
represented by the use of facial recognition technologies by police. In the US, politicians 
have repeatedly pressed officials over the federal government’s use of facial recognition, 
while civil rights activists are pushing for an outright ban on the technology on the grounds 
of protecting privacy. A prominent argument is that citizens don’t expect to be surveilled in 
their daily activities, and the practice should be made more transparent in order to trigger 
an open discussion between government and citizens over such a sensitive issue.  
Despite the positive effects stemming from the use of technologies to deliver public services 
and improve operations, some important challenges must be addressed in relation to trust 
and legitimacy. In seeking to achieve the benefits of the use of technology, governments 
must not neglect these key concerns. First, clear and transparent communication on the use 
of new, data-centric technologies by government, public agencies and officials is the starting 
point for building relationships of trust with citizens in the era of digital transformation. 
Second, the potential of such technologies for contextualisation and personalisation should 
be used to produce better policies and services that achieve desirable outcomes, while 
avoiding discrimination and the infringement of privacy or democratic freedom. Reconciling 
these demands requires new forms of innovation, as well as collaboration between 
government agencies, businesses, non-profit organizations, universities, citizens and other 
actors – both in terms of policy formulation, and in the provision, consumption and 
intermediation of public service delivery. 
Many researchers are concerned about the privacy violations that could come with Digital 
Government Transformation and personal data sharing. Unlimited government access to 
personal data could result in an Orwellian society, limiting civic participation and 
undermining the strength of democracies. Scholars are increasingly noting instances in 
which government access to data has given risen privacy violations, damaging the overall 
image of the government. Governments are often criticised for prioritising the use of data-
driven digital technologies over the safeguarding of privacy. The leak of vehicle data in 
Sweden has heightened concerns over a combined intrusion into people’s lives by both the 
private and public sectors. Incidents such as this also call into question the amount of power 
given to governments by digital technologies, and how that power could impact democracy. 
Government access to personal data can result in ‘Big Brother’-type surveillance, eliminating 
checks on government activities. In fact, much of the time digital tools are employed with 
little public oversight, laying open the possibility for the unethical use of personal data. 
Through the use of an online experiment conducted in two Member States, this case study 
aims to address these fundamental issues, which go beyond the classical and widely 
discussed effects of Digital Government Transformation such as efficiency and effectiveness. 
By exploring the trade-offs that citizens make between privacy and the benefits that stem 
from the use of new digital public services in different domains, as well as examining the 
role that trust plays in the adoption of new digital services, we hope to promote fruitful 
discussions between governments and civil society, and pave the way for further research 
in this field. 
                                           
403 As reported in Richardson and Emerson (2018), the 2017 World Values Survey documented a worrying shift in 
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3.4.2 Approach and methodology 
This chapter describes our methodology for applying stated preference techniques to the 
challenge of understanding the trade-offs people make when confronted with choices about 
their privacy. We began by conducting a brief review of the literature on the topic. Following 
on from this, we devised a set of choice contexts in through which to present the 
experimental methodology, in order to circumvent the difficulties of presenting respondents 
with abstract and difficult-to-define concepts. Finally, we deployed this experimental 
methodology with online panels in Germany and Spain, each panel being socio-economically 
representative of the country’s population. 
The online questionnaire was divided in three parts: 
1. First, participants were asked various socio-demographic questions: age, gender, 
education, social class, living in a rural or urban area, internet use.  
2. The second part was devoted to the discrete choice experiment.  
3. The third and final section consisted of questions relating to trust, privacy and liberty.  
The experiment aimed to address three research questions: (a) exploring the trade-offs that 
citizens make between privacy and the benefits stemming from the use of new digital public 
services in different domains; (a) identifying under what conditions citizens are willing to 
adopt new digital public services; and (iii) understanding what role trust in the public sector 
plays in the adoption of such services. We designed the experimental task to address all of 
these issues, by identifying four dimensions we wished to examine. 
First, we assessed whether a respondent’s preference for a specific new public service based 
on the use of data varies depending on the domain it operates (Dimension 1). The four areas 
included are: transport, health, security and voting. Patil et al. (2015), for instance, found 
variations between areas, and reported that people were more willing to share their data in 
the domain of health404.  
Second, we assessed whether the respondent’s preference is affected by the type of 
organisation that has access to citizens’ data. Robinson et al. (2015), for instance, found 
that people were not willing to share personal data beyond the specific public service that 
was responsible for collecting it (in this case, the Identity and Passport Service)405. In that 
case, the authors reported a negative impact of sharing data within the private sector. Our 
experiment compares attitudes to data being used by a public authority, by a non-profit 
organisation, and by a for-profit private company (Dimension 2). We would expect that if 
data is shared with the for-profit companies, users’ willingness to adopt the service would 
decrease. In some cases, however, the option of a non-profit organisation taking care of the 
data might be unrealistic. Thus, we include two options in relation to public authorities (e.g. 
belonging to different levels or to different departments/services).  
The third dimension refers to the type of data shared. This includes an option that only 
requires citizens to share basic data, and another that involves sharing more sensitive data 
or keeping it for longer.  
Lastly, the fourth dimension concerns the benefits that citizens or society may gain from the 
system being implemented. Here, we present one case that involves an individual benefit 
that applies only to the citizen, while a second case presents a societal benefit that involves 
the whole society, and indirectly the citizen.   
The post-experimental questionnaire included questions relating to trust and privacy. The 
responses to these were used to interpret the experimental results and to address some of 
the research questions above. The first set of questions in this questionnaire relate 
                                           
404 Patil, S., Patruni, B., Lu, H., Dunkerley, F., Fox, J., Potoglou, D. & Robinson, N. (2015). Public Perception of 
Security and Privacy. Results of the comprehensive analysis of PACT’s pan-European Survey. RAND Corporation. 
405 Robinson, N., Potoglou, D., Kim, C.W., Burge, P. & Warnes, R. (2015). Security at what cost? Quantifying 
people’s trade-offs across liberty, privacy, and security. RAND Corporation. 
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specifically to privacy (see Table 17), and were used to build a privacy index406, while the 
second set relate to trust (see Table 18) and are used to build a distrust index407. In the 
upcoming section, we provide a more detailed explanation of how these indices were built, 
using the responses to these questions.  
Table 17. Questions on privacy. 
# We would now like to present you with some general statements about privacy 
and ask you to indicate how much you agree or disagree with them (on a scale 
from 1 to 5). 
1 Consumers are losing control over how personal information is collected and 
used by private companies. 
2 Citizens are losing control over how personal information is collected and used 
by Governments. 
3 Most businesses are handling the personal information they collect about 
consumers in a proper and confidential way. 
4 Governments are handling the personal information they collect about citizens 
in a proper and confidential way. 
5 Existing laws and organizational practices are currently providing a reasonable 
level of protection for consumer privacy. 
Table 18. Questions on trust. 
# Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements (on a scale from 0 to 4 - “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”) 
1 Technology has almost got out of control (it can produce many unintended 
negative consequences) 
2 Government can generally be trusted to look after our interests 
3 The way one votes has no effect on what the Government does 
4 In general corporations benefit us more than they harm us 
 
Discrete choice experiment  
Discrete choice experiments (DCE) provide a methodological toolkit for understanding and 
predicting how individuals make decisions between discrete (mutually exclusive) 
alternatives. DCE is a quantitative technique for eliciting individual preferences and 
understanding what specifically influences their choices. It requires respondents to state 
their choice in relation to sets of hypothetical alternatives. Each alternative is described by 
several characteristics, known as attributes Responses are used to infer the value the 
respondent places on each attribute.  
                                           
406 Taylor, H. (2003). ‘Most People Are “Privacy Pragmatists” Who, While Concerned about Privacy, Will Sometimes 
Trade It Off for Other Benefits: The Harris Poll No. 17’. Available online at 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=365 
407 Kumaraguru, P. & Cranor, L.F. (2005). Privacy indexes: A survey of Westin’s studies, Pittsburgh: Institute for 
Software Research International, Carnegie Mellon University, CMU-ISRI-5-138. 
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This method has its theoretical foundation in random utility theory. It relies on the 
assumptions of economic rationality and utility maximisation (Hall et al., 2004). In stating 
a preference, the individual is assumed to choose the alternative that yields his/her highest 
individual benefit, known as utility. Moreover, the utility yielded by an alternative is assumed 
to depend on the utilities associated with its composing attributes and attribute levels 
(Lancaster, 1966). In other words, is the utility of individual q for the ith alternative, and 
is assumed to be a function of its attributes:  
 
where  is a vector of attributes for the ith alternative accompanied by a set of weights, 
, that establish the relative contribution of each attribute to the utility associated with the 
ith alternative, and is the residual capturing the unobserved variation in the 
characteristics of different options and any measurement errors.  
DCEs are used to determine the significance of the attributes that describe a good or service 
and the extent to which individuals are willing to trade one attribute for another. In the 
present case, the DCE enables us to explore the trade-offs citizens make between privacy 
and the benefits that stem from the use of new technologies within various e-government 
domains, and to identify under what conditions citizens are more willing to adopt e-
government services.  
In our case, the services presented in each area (i.e. an e-government system based on 
citizens’ data) are characterised by three attributes: data access, type of data shared, and 
benefits (Dimensions 2, 3 and 4 in Table 19). Dimension 2 has three levels, while Dimensions 
3 and 4 have two.  
Table 19. Experiment dimensions. 
Dimension/attribute Levels 
1. Area  A1: Transport 
 A2: Security 
 A3: Health 
 A4: Participation 
2. Data access  D1: Public authority  
 D2: A non-profit organisation 
 D3: A for-profit private company 
3. Type of data shared  T1: Basic data 
 T2: More sensitive data/longer storage time 
4. Benefits  B1: Direct benefit (directly involving the citizen) 
 B2: Indirect benefit (benefitting society as a 
whole) 
Therefore, if every combination of levels for each of the three attributes (D2, D3, D4) is 
available, we have 3×2×2 = 12 possible options to choose from. Participants are presented 
with two of these options at a time and asked to choose their preferred one. In addition to 
the pair of options, in each choice, participants are presented also with the third option of 
opting out (i.e. choosing the option “I would prefer that none of these systems is 
implemented”). Participants are asked to make 12 consecutive selections. Based on 
respondents’ preferences regarding these pairings, the importance of each level in their 
decision will be identified. Table 20 below lists the 12 possible options. 
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Table 20. The 12 options available in the DCE. 
 
Once we had generated the 12 hypothetical alternatives using all attributes included in the 
study, we combined them to create 12 choice sets (pairs of options). A full factorial design 
was ruled out in favour of a fractional factorial design, because a full factorial design would 
have contained too many possible alternatives. This would have been unmanageable in 
practice for individuals to complete, or for a blocked questionnaire format to handle.  
In selecting the fractional factorial design, we ensured a balanced design in which each level 
of attribute occurs equally often. In addition, we ensured a minimal overlap, as according to 
the literature, each attribute level is only meaningful in comparison to others within the 
choice set408. In other words, no information is obtained on an attribute's value when its 
levels are the same across all alternatives within a choice set. 
Following these principles, and based on the 12 options above, we built 12 combination of 
options, or choice set, between which the participants choose. Note that a third option (opt-
out) is always present in each of the choice sets.  
Table 21. The 12 choice sets selected. 
 CHOICE SET 
1 Option 1 vs Option 8 
2 Option 2 vs Option 7 
3 Option 3 vs Option 10 
4 Option 4 vs Option 9 
5 Option 5 vs Option 4 
6 Option 6 vs Option 3 
7 Option 7 vs Option10 
8 Option 8 vs Option 9 
9 Option 11 vs Option 6 
10 Option 11 vs Option 2 
11 Option 12 vs Option 1 
12 Option 12 vs Option 5 
 
 
                                           
408 Mangham, L.J, Hanson, K. & McPake, B. (2009). How to do (or not to do)… Designing a discrete choice 
experiment for application in a low-income country. Health Policy and Planning 24(2). 
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After performing the experimental task, participants were asked a number of questions 
relating to privacy and trust. These provided further insights to use in interpreting the 
results. First, they were asked a set of five questions on their concerns about privacy, based 
on the General Privacy Concern Index from Westin’s 1990 and 1991 Consumer Privacy 
Surveys (presented in Section 3.4.1). The participants’ responses to these questions allowed 
us to divide them into the three groups and described earlier: Privacy Fundamentalists (i.e. 
high concern); Privacy Pragmatists (i.e. moderate concern); and Privacy Unconcerned (i.e. 
low concern). Second, participants were asked another set of four questions based on the 
distrust index developed by Westin in the 1994 Equifax-Harris Consumer Privacy Report to 
separate participants into three groups based on their level of trust in institutions and 
corporations409. 
3.4.2.1 Selection of cases studies 
The selection of four hypothetical case studies, to which participants were randomly 
allocated, was based on real case studies from various countries. The key element of all 
case studies is the introduction of a new technology to improve a public service. The four 
areas selected were: transport, health, security and voting. For each area, we developed a 
hypothetical scenario, which was presented to the participants as a vignette. 
A) Public transport 
This scenario is based on an initiative by Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) in Australia 
to provide open data from Sydney train commuters, collected via the smartcard used for 
public transport (the Opal card)410. Data about public transportation services can provide 
valuable information to researchers and municipal officials tasked with improving city 
services411. However, like other forms of open data, such information can compromise 
citizens’ privacy if ‘anonymised’ travel patterns are re-identified412. To mitigate this risk, in 
March 2017, TfNSW collaborated with Australia’s largest data and innovation group, Data61, 
to release open data about citizens’ use of Sydney’s public transport network, protected 
using privacy-preserving techniques. One drawback of using privacy-preserving 
mechanisms is that they can often reduce the utility of a dataset. In this instance, the 
application of differential privacy means that researchers cannot analyse users’ trips and 
journeys, because their ‘tap-ons’ and ‘tap-offs’ are not linked. Despite this trade-off, it is 
clear that the release of Sydney’s Opal data has the potential to yield some tangible social 
benefits. It also illustrates how governments can apply differential privacy to safeguard 
citizens’ personal data. Privacy is the utmost priority for all of TfNSW’s Open Data, and no 
information is released that can identify any individual in the Opal ‘tap on’ and ‘tap off’ Open 
Data. This means that any data that is, or can be, linked to an individual’s Opal card has 
been removed. 
As a result of the programme ‘TfNSW Opal data released for public use’, as noted by Culnane 
et al., 2017413), researchers and developers can now access and use the data to “innovate 
and gain insights for a huge variety of benefits for customers and organisations”. “The open 
data gives a detailed view of when passengers are arriving at or leaving the station, which 
could also help local councils, government authorities and service providers to better plan 
local works and services provision in the neighbourhood.” Furthermore, “researchers will 
also be able to incorporate the easily accessible data into planning, analysis and modelling 
at a level that has never been available before.” Small businesses could benefit from the 
data by knowing when local train stations are frequented and staff their premises according, 
rather than relying on an “anecdotal, trial-and-error process.” 
                                           
409 Kumaraguru, P. & Cranor, L.F. (2005). Privacy indexes: A survey of Westin's studies, Pittsburgh: Institute for 
Software Research International, Carnegie Mellon University, CMU-ISRI-5-138. 
410 https://www.sgsep.com.au/maps/thirdspace/sydney-visualising-opal-data/ 
411 https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/DECODE-2018_report-smart-cities.pdf 
412 Culnane, C., Rubinstein, B.I.P. & Teague, V. (2017). ‘Privacy Assessment of De-identified Opal Data: A report 
for Transport for NSW.’ arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.08547. 
413 Ibid. 
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Based on this case, the participants were presented with the following scenario: 
Imagine that the local authority has implemented a new system for the public transport, 
in which each citizen has a personalised electronic card that must be used each time the 
person gets on and off. The authorities are studying the implementation of a system to 
analyse this data, with the aim to improve the management of the public transport. There 
is a consultation to ask citizens what system they prefer. Please select the option that you 
like the most. 
The hypothetical alternatives between which respondents are asked to choose, combine the 
elements displayed in Table 22.  
Table 22. Attributes and levels relating to the transport scenario. 
Attributes Levels 
Data access  D1: The data is stored and analysed by the local authority.  
 D2: The data is stored and analysed by a research group on 
urban planning.  
 D3: The data is stored and analysed by the private company 
in charge of the IT system. 
Type of data 
shared 
 T1: The system collects data on your trips in an anonymised 
way (i.e. the tap on and tap offs cannot be linked and your 
individual trips cannot be identified). 
 T2: The system collects data on your trips linked to your 
personal identification.  
Benefits  B1: This system manages to reduce your travel time. 
 B2: This system manages to cut emissions. 
Table 23. Example of a choice set for the transport scenario. 
Option #1 Option #2 Opt-out 
DATA ACCESS DATA ACCESS  
The data is stored and 
analysed by the local 
authority. 
The data is stored and 
analysed by the private 
company in charge of the IT 
system. 
I would prefer that none of 
these systems is 
implemented. 
TYPE OF DATA SHARED TYPE OF DATA SHARED 
The data collected refers to 
your trips linked to your 
personal identification. 
The data collected refers to 
your trips in an anonymised 
way (i.e. the tap on and tap 
offs cannot be linked and your 
individual trips cannot be 
identified). 
BENEFITS BENEFITS 
This system manages to 
reduce your travel time. 
This system manages to cut 
emissions. 
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B) Health  
This scenario is based on an application developed by the MD Anderson Cancer Center at 
the University of Texas, and IBM Watson414. This application, called the Oncology Expert 
Advisor (OEA), uses massive amounts of patient data and medical literature to assist 
oncologists with evidence-based care decisions on first-line therapy that are tailored to each 
patient. In the context of cancer care and research, the OEA is being trained to take in 
complex structured and unstructured information from a variety of real-world sources – 
patient records, physician notes, laboratory results – and weigh these patient attributes 
against its ever-expanding corpus of medical knowledge, oncology literature and treatment 
guidelines to propose appropriate evidence-based treatment options, based on each 
patient’s unique disease profile. This application has proved to be a successful way to rapidly 
assess the best treatments for an individual patient, based on the latest evidence. The 
overall accuracy of the application’s recommendations in the cases of 200 test patients with 
leukaemia was over 80%415. 
While personalised treatment is still very much in the trial stage, it has significant potential 
due to the vast quantities of patient genomic data that is coming online via several 
initiatives416.  
Based on the above case, the participants in the experiment were presented with the 
following scenario: 
Imagine that the Ministry of Health wants to implement a new programme that uses 
artificial intelligence to pool and analyse large amounts of patient data. There is a 
consultation to ask citizens what system they prefer. Please select the option that you like 
the most. 
The hypothetical alternatives between which respondents will be asked to choose, combine 
the elements displayed in Table 24.  
Table 24. Attributes and levels relating to the health scenario. 
Attributes Levels 
Data access  D1: The data is stored and analysed by the public authorities. 
 D2: The data is stored and analysed by a medical research 
foundation.  
 D3: The data is stored and analysed by the private company 
in charge of the IT system. 
Type of data 
shared417 
 T1: The system collects data related to your basic health: 
blood group, allergies, diabetic group, etc. 
 T2: The system collects data related to all your health 
conditions, including disabilities, cancer, mental health, sexual 
health, and addictions.  
Benefits  B1: This system manages to personalise the treatments that 
you are receiving  
 B2: This system helps advance healthcare research 
                                           
414 http://www.tmc.edu/news/2014/08/ibm-watson-joins-md-anderson-in-cancer-fight/ 
415 Stein, A. (2014). IBM Watson Joins MD Anderson in Cancer Fight Texas Medical Center. Retrieved 28 June 2017 
from http://www.tmc.edu/news/2014/08/ibm-watson-joins-md-anderson-in-cancer-fight/ 
416 Tito, J. (2017). Destination unknown: Exploring Artificial Intelligence in Government. Centre for Public Impact. 
Retrieved from https://publicimpact.blob.core.windows.net/production/2017/09/Destination-Unknown-AI-
and-government.pdf 
417 Based on Patil, S., Patruni, B., Lu, H., Dunkerley, F., Fox, J., Potoglou, D. & Robinson, N. (2015). Public 
Perception of Security and Privacy. Results of the comprehensive analysis of PACT’s pan-European Survey. 
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, and Cambridge, UK. 
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Table 25. Example of a choice set for the health scenario. 
Option #1 Option #2 Opt-out 
DATA ACCESS DATA ACCESS  
The data is stored and 
analysed by the public 
authorities. 
The data is stored and 
analysed by the private 
company in charge of the IT 
system. 
I would prefer that none of 
these systems is 
implemented. 
TYPE OF DATA SHARED TYPE OF DATA SHARED 
The system collects data 
related to all your health 
conditions, including 
disabilities, cancer, mental 
health, sexual health, and 
addictions. 
The system collects data 
related to your basic health: 
blood group, allergies, 
diabetic group, etc. 
BENEFITS BENEFITS 
This system helps advance 
healthcare research. 
This system manages to 
personalise the treatments 
you receive. 
 
C) Security 
This scenario is based on a system of facial recognition used by the police and implemented 
in some regions in China418. Police have used sunglasses including built-in facial recognition 
since 2018 to check travellers and car registration plates against the government’s blacklist, 
which includes criminals, journalists, political dissidents and human rights activists, among 
others. Powered by artificial intelligence (AI), the new technology provides police with 
instant and accurate feedback compared with the lag and static nature of facial recognition 
carried out via CCTV. This novelty has led to growing concerns that China is developing a 
sophisticated surveillance state that will lead to intensifying crackdowns on dissent. 
However, those who back the proposal in China (such as the CEO of the company 
implementing the technology) say that people should not be worried about privacy concerns 
because China’s authorities were using the equipment for “noble causes”, catching suspects 
and fugitives from the law. The technology was quickly praised by authorities for helping to 
identify several individuals who had previously committed crimes, from human trafficking to 
traffic infringements. 
Automated Facial Recognition has also been used by UK police in South Wales, which had  
trialled this technology for a number of years before the implementation and has consistently 
defended it, saying that it has been used to help detect and prevent crime. However, the 
use of facial recognition technology South Wales Police, which is able to match a person’s 
likeliness to a pre-defined database of images, was challenged in the High Court419. The civil 
rights group, Liberty, contended that the system indiscriminately captured data on people 
in public places, and that its use was not proportionate. Liberty claimed that the data 
captured is similar to obtaining an individual’s DNA or fingerprints and says that each frame 
captured by a camera can identify up to five faces.  
                                           
418 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china-surveillance-technology.html?module=inline 
419 https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-49565287 
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The judges found that although amounted to interference with the right to privacy, there 
was a lawful basis for it, and the legal framework used by the police was proportionate. 
Similarly, in the US, citizens and politicians recently raised concerns about the new 
technology. A bipartisan group in Congress is working on legislation that could regulate the 
use of facial recognition by the private sector, federal government, and law enforcement420. 
At the same time, this issue has been debated recently in Europe. EU leaders are considering 
a ban on the use of facial recognition in public spaces for up to five years until safeguards 
to mitigate the technology’s risks are put in place421. 
Based on the cases above, the participants were presented with the following scenario: 
Imagine that the police officers in your city plan to start wearing facial recognition glasses 
in order to better identify offenders. There is a consultation to ask citizens what system 
they prefer. Please select the option that you like the most. 
The hypothetical alternatives between which respondents are asked to choose, combine the 
elements displayed in Table 26 below.  
Table 26. Attributes and levels relating to the security scenario. 
Attributes Levels 
Data access  D1: The data collected by these glasses is stored and analysed 
by the local government.  
 D2: The data collected by these glasses is stored and analysed 
by the local police.  
 D3: The data collected by these glasses is stored and analysed 
by the IT company who provides the system. 
Type of data 
shared 
 T1: The data regarding your face features and location are 
stored for two weeks and then erased if not matched with any 
offender in the existing database.  
 T2: The data regarding your face features and location are 
stored for five years. 
Benefits  B1: This system has been tried in other cities, resulting in a 
decrease in the homicide rate. 
 B3: This system has been tried in other cities, resulting in a 
decrease in vandalism towards public property. 
Table 27. Example of a choice set for the security scenario. 
Option #1 Option #2 Opt-out 
DATA ACCESS DATA ACCESS  
The data collected by these 
glasses is stored and 
analysed by the local 
government.  
The data collected by these 
glasses is stored and 
analysed by the IT company 
who provides the system. 
I would prefer that none of 
these systems is 
implemented. 
TYPE OF DATA SHARED TYPE OF DATA SHARED 
                                           
420 https://venturebeat.com/2020/01/15/congress-moves-toward-facial-recognition-regulation/ 
421 https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-considers-temporary-ban-on-facial-recognition-in-public-spaces/ 
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The data regarding your 
face features and location 
are stored for five years. 
 
The data regarding your face 
features and location are 
stored for two weeks and 
then erased if not matched 
with any offender in the 
existing database. 
BENEFITS BENEFITS 
This system has been tried 
in other cities resulting in a 
decrease in vandalism 
towards public property. 
This system has been tried in 
other cities resulting in a 
decrease in the homicide 
rate. 
 
D) Voting 
The final scenario used in our experiment is based on the e-voting systems implemented in 
certain countries. Internet voting systems have achieved some success in Estonia, Canada, 
Brazil, France and Switzerland. However, experiences from Norway also point to security 
concerns regarding election fraud422. The literature reviewed in D2 reveals that the use 
blockchain could arguably help to address these security issues. Some work on the design 
of such systems has already been undertaken423, and prototypes exist. Nevertheless, the 
underlying issue relating to blockchain-based e-voting systems is the fact that personal 
authentication must occur outside of the blockchain424. So far, e-voting systems have used 
standalone electronic voting machines (also called EVMs) or computers connected to the 
Internet. A group of researchers at the University of Melbourne in Australia have twice 
demonstrated massive security flaws in the online voting systems used in state elections in 
Australia – including one of the largest deployments of online voting ever, the 2015 New 
South Wales (NSW) state election, in which 280,000 votes were cast online425. 
Voter privacy is of utmost concern when considering which voting systems to use. The risks 
to internet voting include all of the dangers typically associated with online transactions. For 
those planning to vote in the election via the internet, a denial-of-service attack could mean 
the difference between being able to vote or not426. Such threats must be adequately 
addressed while maintaining the privacy of the voter to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of the voting system.  
Based on the cases above, the participants were presented with the following scenario: 
Imagine that the government is planning to implement internet voting for the next 
legislative elections. There is a consultation to ask citizens what system they prefer. Please 
select the option that you like the most. 
The hypothetical alternatives between which respondents are asked to choose, combine the 
elements displayed in the table below. 
                                           
422 Warkentin, M., Sharma, S., Gefen, D., Rose, G.M. and Pavlou, P. (2018). Social identity and trust in internet-
based voting adoption. Government Information Quarterly, 35(2), 195-209.  
423 Tarasov, P. & Tewari, H. (2017). The future of E-voting. International Journal on Computer Science and 
Information Systems, 12(2), 148-165; R Riemann, R. & Grumbach, S. (2017). Distributed protocols at the rescue 
for trustworthy online voting. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Information Systems Security 
Privacy (pp. 499-505). 
424 Shen, C. & Pena-Mora, F. (2018). Blockchain for Cities - A Systematic Literature Review. IEEE Access 6, 76787-
76819. 
425 Halderman, J.A., & Teague, V. (2015). The New South Wales ivote system: Security failures and verification 
flaws in a live online election. In International conference on e-voting and identity (pp. 35-53). Springer, Cham. 
426 Simons, B. & Jones, D. (2012) “Internet Voting in the U.S.,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 55, no. 10, 68-
77. 
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Table 28. Attributes and levels relating to the voting scenario. 
Attributes Levels 
Data access  D1: Your vote is stored and processed by the government. 
 D2: Your vote is stored and processed by an independent 
electoral authority427. 
 D3: Your vote is stored and processed by the private company 
providing the IT system. 
Type of data 
shared428 
 T1: Your vote is encrypted and cannot be linked to your 
personal identification. 
 T2: Your vote is not encrypted.  
Benefits  B1: This system reduces greatly your voting time. 
 B2: This system increases turnout. 
Table 29. Example of a choice set for the voting scenario. 
Option #1 Option #2 Opt-out 
DATA ACCESS DATA ACCESS  
Your vote is stored and 
processed by the 
government.  
 
Your vote is stored and 
processed by the private 
company providing the IT 
system. 
I would prefer that none of 
these systems is 
implemented. 
TYPE OF DATA SHARED TYPE OF DATA SHARED 
Your vote is not encrypted. 
 
Your vote is encrypted and 
cannot be linked to your 
personal identification. 
BENEFITS BENEFITS 
This system reduces greatly 
your voting time. 
This system increases 
turnout. 
3.4.2.2 Implementation and distribution of the sample 
The online experiment was conducted in Germany and Spain, 23-30 September 2019. In 
total, 1,400 participants (700 per country) were recruited from a nationwide panel of 
internet users, with each group being representative of the general population of the 
country.  
The table below shows the socio-demographic breakdown of the sample overall and by 
country. The two panels were relatively similar in terms of gender, age groups, occupation, 
and self-reported social status429 – although there was a larger share of retired participants 
                                           
427 International IDEA. Electoral management design database. Glossary. Accessible at: https://www.idea.int/data-
tools/data/electoral-management-design  
428 Based on Robinson et al. (2015). 
429 Self-reported social status was measured by asking respondents, based on their income, where they would 
position themselves from a scale from 0 to 10.  
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in Germany than in Spain. In terms of education, however, there was a large difference 
between the two countries. Many of the German panel had not attended university, while 
we observed a high level of university degrees in Spain. Our interpretation of this difference 
is that the German educational system encourages students who do not wish to continue 
their academic studies to obtain early technical (i.e. vocational) training, enabling them to 
gain employment and earn income at an early age.430 Spain, on the other hand, encourages 
its citizens to attend higher education in order to improve their employment opportunities. 
Table 30 simplifies the classification of participants’ education into three levels (Level 1 = no 
university; Level 2 = university degree; Level 3 = post-graduate), where these country 
differences can be observed. Lastly, we observed a significant higher share of urban 
residents in Spain compared with Germany, which is in line with the general population 
statistics of the two countries.  
More interestingly, in line the literature on trust and privacy presented in Section 3.4.1, we 
segmented the respondents based on their responses to the post-experimental 
questionnaire on privacy and trust. First, based on the type of the responses received, and 
partially following Taylor (2003)431, we divided the respondents in three groups: those whose 
concerns about privacy were high (28%), medium (64%) and low(8%). Based on the 
responses received on our distrust index, we divided the respondents into another three 
groups, following Westin and Harris (1994)432: high level of distrust (21%), medium (66%) 
and low (11%). This further segmentation has proved to be particularly useful in interpreting 
some of the results of the experiment.  
Table 30. Socio-demographics of survey sample (N=1,400). 
Variable Total sample 
(%) 
Germany 
(%) 
Spain 
(%) 
Gender (female) 49.79 50.43 49.14 
Age group 
18-24 12.57 12.57 12.57 
25-54 56 54.14 57.86 
55-74 31.43 33.29 29.57 
Education433 
Level 1 47.51 63.72 31.29 
Level 2 43.28 29,57 57 
Level 3 9.21 6.71 11.71 
Occupation 
Self-employed 8.21 6.57 9.86 
                                           
430 https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/how-germanys-vocational-education-and-training-system-works  
431 Taylor, H., (2003).‘Most People Are “Privacy Pragmatists” Who, While Concerned about Privacy, Will Sometimes 
Trade It Off for Other Benefits: The Harris Poll No. 17’. Available online at 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=365 
432 Kumaraguru, P. & Cranor, L.F. (2005). Privacy indexes: A survey of Westin's studies, Pittsburgh: Institute for 
Software Research International, Carnegie Mellon University, CMU-ISRI-5-138. 
433 Education levels were defined as follows: Level 1 education refers to those who reported “no official education”, 
“primary school” or “high school” – of which, the last two partly include vocational/technical training; Level 2 refers 
to those who attended “some years of university (not completed)” or had completed a university degree; Level 3 
reported having post-graduate level education.  
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Managerial position  11.43 9.43 13.45 
Other white collar434 29.71 31.29 28.14 
Manual worker 14.14 13.43 14.86 
Unemployed 5.79 4.29 7.29 
Retired 14.21 19 9.43 
Student 8.79 8.71 8.86 
Non-employed435 7.71 7.29 8.14 
Residence  
Urban 62.64 49 76.29 
Suburban 18.14 24 12.29 
Rural  19.21 27 11.43 
Social status scale  
Social scale: 1-2 5.22 7.14 3.29 
Social scale: 3-4 17.43 20.43 14.43 
Social scale: 5-6 42.71 40.43 45 
Social scale: 7-8 31.86 29.28 34.43 
Social scale: 9-10 2.78 2.72 2.86 
Distrust level 
Low 11.5 14.71 8.29 
Medium 66.57 60.29 72.86 
High 21.93 25 18.86 
Privacy concern level  
Low 8 10.29 5.71 
Medium 64 62.86 65.14 
High 28 26.86 29.14 
  
                                           
434 e.g. customer support, market research, engineer, etc.  
435 e.g. disabled, stay-at-home persons, not in education, employment or training.  
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3.4.3 Results and discussion 
In this chapter, we present the results of the experiment, along with a description of the 
type of analyses conducted. A discussion of the results in the light of the literature reviewed 
and the conceptual framework is then provided in Section 4. In Box 13 below, we provide a 
very brief summary of the main findings of this case study.  
Box 13. Main findings of Case Study 3: online experiment (Germany and Spain). 
  The results show that trust plays a key role in the introduction of new digital 
services that rely on the use of personal data. Most of respondents were strongly 
opposed to private companies processing their data. However, our evidence also 
shows that those respondents who are generally more distrustful and privacy-
concerned tend to prefer having their data processed by independent organisations 
rather than public authorities and governments. Therefore, the public sector cannot 
consider itself immune from the concerns of citizens in relation to privacy. 
  Participants were not willing to make trade-offs when it came to personal 
data and privacy. When presented with the choice, irrespective of the type of 
benefits, the respondents preferred to provide anonymised data, and for it not to 
be processed by private companies. Moreover, the results call into question the 
general view that citizens are more willing to adopt new digital services when they 
receive more personalised benefits. 
  There is a new potential form of digital divide shown by the results, which is 
not simply linked to a lack of accessibility or skills. The majority of respondents 
who decided not to adopt the new digital services were either old or possessed 
lower level of education and lower socio-economic status. The level of trust among 
these groups of people was generally much lower, confirming that digital 
transformation may leave out those who tend to distrust the institutions and so do 
not adopt new services. 
The analysis of the results presented in this chapter followed a number of steps, each of 
them enriching the results of the previous. 
First, we sought to understand the values that respondents placed on the level of attributes 
for each of the four dimensions. This provided us with an initial understanding of the 
preferences of the participants for each attribute. For instance, from the first analysis, we 
immediately observed that in terms of type of organisation, respondents preferred having 
their data processed either by a public authority (transport and security) or by an 
independent organisation (health and participation). Furthermore, in all domains, the 
majority of respondents expressed a preference to share only anonymised or basic data 
when given the choice. This first level of analysis is presented below, divided into each of 
the four domains and showing for each attribute the level of preference among respondents.  
Second, we segmented the population using the responses given to the socio-demographic 
questions and the questions relating to trust and privacy, to see if any significant differences 
could be found. As expected, we observed that the higher the level of distrust, the higher 
the preference of respondents for anonymised data. Conversely, respondents who were not 
particularly concerned about privacy were more inclined to share their data with a private 
company. Lastly, it was observed that older participants were more likely to be concerned 
over privacy, while respondents with higher self-reported social status reported lower levels 
of privacy concerns.  
Third, we analysed the results to detect a potential ‘country effect’ in the responses. Slight 
differences were found between the two countries in each of the four dimensions. In Spain, 
people were more inclined to prefer the societal benefits stemming from the introduction of 
digital services (transport and health). In the security domain, a strong preference for having 
personal data stored for a shorter period was evident in Germany, while in Spain it was 
preferred by a more limited margin. 
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Fourth, we analysed the levels of adoption of the four hypothetical digital services by 
observing the number of participants who chose the opt-out option, i.e. respondents who 
preferred not to adopt the new service, irrespective of the conditions of data access and 
benefits. This produced some interesting results. For instance, as expected, older people, 
those with a high level of distrust, and those from lower socio-economic brackets were more 
likely to opt out. Furthermore, in terms of the domains, we observed that the security and 
participation domains were the ones in which the highest number of respondents chose to 
opt out. This coincides with the finding reported in the literature that people are generally 
sceptical about facial recognition technologies and e-voting solutions. 
Lastly, we conducted further analysis to explore the trade-offs in terms of attributes that 
participants implicitly made by choosing one option over another. It is important here to 
mention that our analysis only provides correlations between preferences, from which we 
cannot infer a causal link. Having said that, the results were interesting. For instance, with 
regard to health, the small number of respondents who indicated a preference for private 
companies appeared to be indifferent to the types of data (basic or sensitive) shared. 
Furthermore, among those respondents who were willing to allow private companies to 
access their data, we observed no significant differences in preferences as to the benefits 
received. Finally, we found that trust plays an important role in distinguishing those 
participants who favour an independent organisation processing their data (low level of 
trust), and those who favoured public authorities.  
In the next section, we describe in greater detail the types of analysis conducted, and the 
results in quantitative terms. 
3.4.3.1 Modelling results 
Our analysis used a multinomial logistic regression, which was performed using the software 
‘R’, to determine the stated preferences of respondents in Spain and in Germany, while 
taking into account their various socio-demographic characteristics as well as behaviours or 
biases. In reporting our results, we present four model fit statistics, as described in the table 
below, for each sector.  
Table 31. The four models. 
Model Description 
Model I A multinomial logistic regression using attributes only, to 
analyse the levels of each attribute.  
Model II Same model as model I, with control variables included (socio-
demographic characteristics and level of trust and privacy). 
Model III Model I applied to respondents in Germany only. 
Model IV  Model I applied to respondents in Spain only. 
In interpreting the coefficient values presented in Tables 32-35 below, the following points 
should be considered: 
 A positive coefficient (reported as “ESTIMATE”) implies that the level has a positive 
impact on utility, and so reflects a higher probability of choosing the alternatives to 
which it is applied to. In other words, it implies that the feature is preferred to the 
base category.  
 A negative coefficient signifies that the level has a negative impact on utility, and 
so reflects a lower probability of choosing the alternative to which it is applied. In 
other words, the attribute is less preferred than the reference category.  
 The p-value indicates the statistical significance of the estimate. In our tables, three 
levels are reported next to the estimates: *** is significant at the 0.01 level436; ** 
at the 0.05 level; and * at the 0.10 level. A p-value ≤ 0.05 is a common threshold 
                                           
436 In other words, it represents a 1% chance of being wrong. 
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for researchers and indicates strong evidence437. In other words, the estimate is 
shown to be statistically significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level.  
 Attribute coefficients, as categorical variables, reflect the total increase or decrease 
in utility for that variable, relative to a reference category (or a base situation). The 
rows in italics in each of the tables below represents the reference categories for 
each attribute. 
 If the odds are lower than 1, the feature is less preferred than the reference category.  
 The R2 of the model is included as a goodness-of-fit measure for the linear 
regressions.  
A sector-specific analysis follows, analysing respondents’ choices in relation to each of the 
four sectors under Dimension 1 separately; namely, transport, health, security and 
participation. We include a breakdown by country and a specific analysis of the privacy and 
distrust indices. The next section looks into socio-demographic features of specific profiles. 
A) Transport 
The results of the transport domain choice experiment revealed that respondents 
preferred to have their data stored and analysed by the local authority rather than by a 
private company or an independent research group on urban planning. In addition, they 
strongly preferred the option of having the data regarding their trips anonymised. This 
strong aversion to de-anonymised data is captured in the statistics. When presented with 
the option between two potential benefits of the systems, there is evidence that participants 
prefer the option to reduce emissions (indirect or societal benefit) over reducing their own 
travel time (direct benefit). In sum, the data showed that respondents value the 
anonymisation of their data much more than which entity accesses this data, or than the 
benefits received from data sharing. In other words, respondents prefer their transport data 
to remain anonymised and to be accessed only by local authorities.  
Further analysis did not show any significant results. In fact, none of the additional control 
variables (i.e. socio-demographics) are significant when included into the model (See Model 
II), and the sign and significance of the attribute levels remained unchanged. While the sign 
and significance also remained unchanged in the country breakdown, it revealed several 
context-specific characteristics. Germany appears to strongly favour local authorities over 
private IT companies for the management of transport data. In terms of benefits, 
participants in Spain were found to prefer the reduction of emissions (indirect benefit) more 
strongly than the German respondents. Overall, however, the key finding that respondents 
display a stronger preference for the anonymisation of their transport data, as compared to 
all other attributes, remains the same across both countries.  
Next, we included the levels of distrust into the model by stratifying the sample into three 
levels. As expected, the findings were consistent with the literature. In fact, the preference 
for sharing anonymised data over personalised data increases with the level of distrust. An 
additional analysis was also carried out by stratifying respondents according to the privacy 
index, i.e. participants’ level of concern regarding privacy. The model was applied 
separately to those with a low, medium and high level of concern for privacy in relation to 
the transport sector. As expected, those with a higher level of concern over privacy were 
more strongly opposed to sharing data that can be linked to personal identification, with 
everything else held constant. Furthermore, the privacy index score does not appear to 
affect the utility stemming from direct or indirect benefits, with all estimates having a 
positive and significant estimate. In other words, irrespective of their level of privacy 
concern, respondents in the transport sector preferred reducing emissions (indirect benefit) 
over reducing their travel time (direct benefit)438. 
 
                                           
437 Hair, J.F. Jr., Black, W.C., Babin, B.J. & Anderson, R.E. (2009). Multivariate Data Analysis. 7th Edition, Prentice 
Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
438 The associated estimate increases from 0.28 for those with a Low level of privacy concern to 0.35 for those with 
a High level of privacy concern.   
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Table 32. Transport sector: main results of the discrete choice experiment (n=350). 
Attributes and Levels 
Model I Model II model III (DE) Model IV (ES) 
ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS 
D
a
ta
 a
c
c
e
s
s
 
The data is stored and analysed by the private company in 
charge of the IT system. (D3) 
-0.46 ***  
(0.06) 
0.63 -0.47 ***  
(0.06) 
0.63 -0.52 *** 
(0.08) 
0.60 -0.41 *** 
(0.08) 
0.66 
The data is stored and analysed by a research group on 
urban planning. (D2) 
-0.18 *** 
(0.06) 
0.84 -0.17 *** 
(0.06) 
0.84 -0.18 ** 
(0.08) 
0.84 -0.17 ** 
(0.08) 
0.84 
Reference category: The data is stored and analysed by the 
local authority. (D1) 
        
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
d
a
ta
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
The system collects data on your trips linked to your 
personal identification. (T2) 
-1.08 *** 
(0.04) 
0.34 -1.07 *** 
(0.04) 
0.34 -1.08 *** 
(0.06) 
0.34 -1.08 *** 
(0.06) 
0.34 
Reference category: The system collects data on your trips 
in an anonymised way (i.e. the tap on and tap offs cannot 
be linked and your individual trips cannot be identified). 
(T1) 
        
B
e
n
e
fi
ts
 The system manages to cut emissions. (B2) 0.29 *** 
(0.04) 
1.34 0.29 *** 
(0.04) 
1.34 0.19 *** 
(0.06) 
1.20 0.39 *** 
(0.06) 
1.48 
Reference category: The system manages to reduce your 
travel time. (B1) 
        
 Intercepts  - -0.11 -  -  - 
 Controls No  Yes  No No 
 Pseudo-R2 0.35  0.61 0.58 
*** Significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level
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B) Health 
The results from the health choice experiment (see Table 33) advance a different narrative. 
Provided that all other attributes are held constant, as with other domains, respondents 
strongly preferred for their health data to be stored and analysed by public authorities rather 
than by the private company in charge of the IT system. However, participants prefer the 
option of an independent medical research foundation over the public authorities, when 
presented with this alternative choice set. In terms of the type of data shared, respondents 
once again tended to choose to share only basic health data and not more sensitive data 
(e.g. disabilities, cancer, mental health, sexual health and addictions). However, in contrast 
to the previous choice experiment, there is no evidence that participants prefer either direct 
or indirect benefits (p-value=0.21). In other words, there is no significant difference in 
preferences between a system that is able to personalise individual treatments, or a system 
that helps to advance health care research, signifying that these attributes are equally 
relevant and/or important to respondents. 
When conducting the second analysis, as shown in Model II, we found that none of the 
control variables was significant. The size and magnitude of the estimates of the attributes 
are consistent with those of Model I, meaning that socio-demographic characteristics have 
no particular impact on the results. In terms of the country break-down, several country-
specific differences were found. Participants in Spain were indifferent to whether data was 
held and analysed by the public authority or by a medical research foundation. In both 
countries, however, participants were strongly opposed to their health data being held by 
private companies. Similarly, to the findings for the transport sector, in Germany 
participants favoured the anonymisation of their health data more strongly than in Spain. 
Lastly, in terms of benefit, participants in Spain slightly favoured a system that would help 
to advance health care research (indirect benefit), whereas Germans were showed no clear 
preference between societal or personal benefits.  
When looking at the distrust index, participants’ level of distrust did not seem to affect 
their opposition to data access by a private company. However, as might be expected, those 
with a high level of distrust prefer data linked to their health to be held by an independent 
medical research foundation. We ran a regression on the privacy index for the health 
sector. Respondents placed less utility on choice sets that included data access by private 
companies than on choice sets in which public authorities access the health data, with an 
estimate of -0.81 at the 0.01 level. In addition, those with a medium level concern over 
privacy preferred the collection of basic data rather than sensitive data, with everything else 
held constant (-0.20). Those with a high level of privacy concern significantly preferred a 
system in which health data is held by a medical research foundation, and are strongly 
opposed to sharing sensitive health data. It appears that the more concerned with privacy 
is the participants were, the more they preferred access by independent organisations, and 
the more reluctant they are to share sensitive data. It does not, however, appear to have a 
bearing on the type of benefit preferred. 
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Table 33. Health sector: main results of the discrete choice experiment (n=350). 
Attributes and Levels 
Model I Model II Model III (DE) Model IV (ES) 
ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS 
D
a
ta
 a
c
c
e
s
s
 
The data is stored and analysed by the private company 
in charge of the IT system. (D3) 
-0.85 *** 
(0.05) 
0.43 -0.87 *** 
(0.05) 
0.42 -0.91 *** 
(0.08) 
1.48 -0.81 *** 
(0.07) 
0.45 
The data is stored and analysed by a medical research 
foundation. (D2) 
0.17 *** 
(0.05) 
1.19 0.17 *** 
(0.05) 
1.19 0.39 *** 
(0.08) 
0.40 -0.01 
(0.07) 
0.99 
Reference category: The data is stored and analysed by 
the public authority. (D1) 
        
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
d
a
ta
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
The system collects data related to your health 
conditions, including disabilities, cancer, mental health, 
sexual health, and addictions. (T2) 
-0.25 *** 
(0.04) 
0.78 -0.22 ** 
(0.04) 
0.80 -0.32 *** 
(0.06) 
0.73 -0.19 *** 
(0.05) 
0.83 
Reference category: The system collects data related to 
your basic health: blood group, allergies, diabetic group, 
etc. (T1) 
        
B
e
n
e
fi
ts
 The system helps advance healthcare research. (B2) 0.05 
(0.04) 
1.05 0.04 
(0.04) 
1.04 -0.01 
(0.06) 
0.99 0.09 * 
(0.05) 
1.10 
Reference category: The system manages to personalise 
the treatments that you are receiving. (B1) 
        
 Intercepts  - -0.43 -  -  - 
 Controls No Yes No No 
 Pseudo-R2 0.10  0.61 0.50 
*** Significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level. 
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C) Security 
The results of the discrete choice experiment on the security sector are presented in Table 
34. Here, respondents strongly preferred for their data (i.e. facial images and geo-
localisation) to be managed by the local government rather than by the IT company 
providing the system. However, when comparing the local government against the local 
police, they showed a preference for their data to be managed by the local police. 
Respondents also preferred for their data to be stored for two weeks and then erased if it 
did not match any offender in the existing database, compared to alternative of longer 
storage for five years. In terms of benefits, in the security sector respondents favoured 
direct benefits instead of indirect benefits. Namely, they choose a system that results in a 
decrease in homicide rate (personal benefit) over a system that decreases vandalism 
towards public property (societal benefit). 
For the further analysis presented in Model II, we observed again that none of the control 
variables were significant and that the sign and significance of the attributes remained 
unchanged. This again reveals that socio-demographic variables did not have a significant 
impact on choice outcomes. The country breakdown reveals several differences between 
Germany and Spain. German respondents appeared to be indifferent between data being 
accessed by the local police or by local government, but were strongly opposed to data 
access by private companies. In contrast, Spanish respondents favoured local police over 
local government at a significant level, while showing a similar but less pronounced 
opposition to data access by private companies. In terms of the type of data shared, data 
anonymization was preferred by both groups, i.e. shorter storage of data in this particular 
sector, although Germany reveals a stronger preference for this feature (-0.90) than Spain 
(-0.57), as captured by the magnitude of the estimates. The preference for direct benefits 
(decrease in homicide) over indirect (decrease in vandalism) is consistent across both 
countries, as it is in the model for the total sample.  
We did not find significant results when conducting the distrust index analysis for this 
particular sector, meaning that the level of trust does not have a significant influence in this 
context. Similar to other sectors, the privacy index analysis for the security sector reveals 
that for a higher level of privacy over concern corresponds with an increased preference for 
sharing encrypted rather than unencrypted data, when all other factors are equal. 
Respondents with a high level of concern over privacy report a stronger preference (-0.59) 
for receiving the direct benefit, i.e. a decrease in homicide rate. Those with a low and 
medium level prefer this too, but to a lesser extent. While those who scored low in the 
privacy index are indifferent to who accesses their data, those scoring medium and high are 
strongly opposed to data access by private companies. Furthermore, those with a high level 
of concern over privacy significantly preferred for the local police to store and analyse the 
data collected by the facial recognition glasses, rather than local government (0.23). 
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Table 34. Security sector: main results of the discrete choice experiment (n=350). 
Attributes and Levels 
Model I Model II model III (DE) Model IV (ES) 
ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS 
D
a
ta
 a
c
c
e
s
s
 
The data collected by the glasses is stored and analysed by 
the IT company who provides the system. (D3) 
-0.55 *** 
(0.06) 
0.58 -0.56 ***  
(0.06) 
0.57 -0.64 *** 
(0.09) 
0.53 -0.48 *** 
(0.07) 
0.62 
The data collected by the glasses is stored and analysed by 
the local police. (D2) 
0.13 ** 
(0.05) 
1.14 0.13 ** 
(0.05) 
1.14 0.08 
(0.08) 
1.08 0.17 ** 
(0.07) 
1.19 
Reference category: The data collected by the glasses is 
stored and analysed by the local government. (D1) 
        
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
d
a
ta
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
The data regarding your facial features and location are 
stored for five years. (T2) 
-0.71 *** 
(0.04) 
0.49 -0.69 *** 
(0.04) 
0.50 - 0.90 *** 
(0.06) 
0.41 -0.57 *** 
(0.05) 
0.56 
Reference category: The data regarding your facial features 
and location are stored for two weeks and then erased if not 
matched with any offences in the existing database. (T1) 
        
B
e
n
e
fi
ts
 The system has been tried in other cities resulting in a 
decrease in vandalism towards public property. (B2) 
-0.40 *** 
(0.04) 
0.67 -0.41 *** 
(0.04) 
0.67 -0.42 *** 
(0.06) 
0.66 -0.39 *** 
(0.06) 
0.68 
Reference category: The system has been tried in other cities 
resulting in a decrease in the homicide rate. (B1) 
        
 Intercepts  - 0.20 -  -  - 
 Controls No Yes No No 
 Pseudo-R2 0.12  0.63 0.50 
*** Significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level.  
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D) Voting 
The results for the participation scenario are presented in Table 35 and align strongly with 
the responses from the Health scenario, except in terms of benefits. Similarly to the previous 
scenarios (with the notable exception of that relating to the transport sector), participants 
showed an inclination toward a system in which votes are stored and processed by the 
government rather than by a private IT company. However, given the choice, they revealed 
an overall preference for a system in which votes are managed by an independent electoral 
authority, rather than by the government. As expected, a strong preference for encrypted 
votes was clearly captured in the statistics. Respondents appeared to strongly prefer a 
system in which votes are encrypted and cannot be linked to their personal identification. 
As in the health scenario, respondents showed no preference between direct and indirect 
benefits. This indicates that they attribute equal importance to a system that reduces the 
time it takes to vote as they do to a system that increases turnout. 
When looking at socio-demographics, none of the control variables were found to be 
significant, and the signs and magnitudes of the estimates under Model II are consistent 
with those from Model I. Instead, some differences exist between the two country groups. 
Respondents in Spain were indifferent to whether the voting system was run by the 
government or by the private sector – although the sign remains negative. It appears that 
for the data access attribute, Spanish respondents only show a significant preference for an 
independent electoral authority–more so than their German counterparts. Participants in 
Germany were found to value vote encryption more strongly than those in Spain. No 
significant results were found for either country in terms of preferred benefits. 
Lastly, according to the distrust index analysis, all respondents favour the encryption of 
their votes; however, those with a high level of distrust also strongly prefer voting data to 
be handled by an independent electoral authority rather than by the government. In 
addition, analysis of the privacy index reveals some interesting insights in this scenario. 
Overall, the preference for the type of data shared is consistently in favour of encrypted 
votes, but it is much stronger (-2.31) among those with a rated high on the privacy index, 
as compared to those with a low privacy index (-1.47). In terms of data access, those who 
were not greatly concerned with privacy (low privacy index) were indifferent to which type 
of entity accessed their data (p-value  0.05), while those that were concerned with a 
medium or high level of concern over privacy favoured data access by an independent 
electoral authority, with estimates of 0.34 and 0.66 respectively. 
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Table 35. Participation sector: main results of the discrete choice experiment (n=350). 
Attributes and Levels 
Model I Model II model III (DE) Model IV (ES) 
ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS ESTIMATE 
(SE) 
ODDS 
D
a
ta
 a
c
c
e
s
s
 
Your vote is stored and processed by the private company 
providing the IT system. (D3) 
-0.15 ** 
(0.07) 
0.86 -0.17 ** 
(0.07) 
0.85 -0.26 ** 
(0.12) 
0.77 -0.06 
(0.09) 
0.94 
Your vote is stored and processed by an independent 
electoral authority. (D2) 
0.35 *** 
(0.07) 
1.42 0.34 *** 
(0.07) 
1.41 0.33 *** 
(0.11) 
1.38 0.37 *** 
(0.09) 
1.45 
Reference category: Your vote is stored and processed by 
the government. (D1) 
        
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
d
a
ta
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
Your vote is not encrypted. (T2) -1.69 *** 
(0.05) 
0.18 -1.67 *** 
(0.05) 
0.19 - 1.91 *** 
(0.08) 
0.15 -1.53 *** 
(0.07) 
0.22 
Reference category: Your vote is encrypted and cannot be 
linked to your personal identification. (T1) 
        
B
e
n
e
fi
ts
 The system increases turnout. (B2) 0.06 
(0.05) 
1.06 0.05 
(0.05) 
1.05 0.10 
(0.08) 
1.11 0.03 
(0.07) 
1.03 
Reference category: The system reduces greatly your 
voting time. (B1) 
        
 Intercepts   0.16 
(0.39) 
-  -  - 
 Controls No Yes No No 
 Pseudo-R2 0.35  0.74 0.62 
*** Significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level 
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3.4.3.2 Further results 
We ran a linear regression of the scaled distrust index on the socio-demographic 
variables, both for the sample overall and for each country individually, to identify any of 
these factors could be determinants of the distrust level. In other words, we wanted to 
understand whether the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics and the country 
they came from had an impact on the level of distrust. In the overall sample, both gender 
and education were significant, where the gender variable correlates positively with 
distrust, implying that females were more likely to be distrustful of organisations seeking 
their personal information. In Germany, education was significant at the 0.05 level with an 
estimate of -0.124, implying that education correlates negatively with distrust. In other 
words, people who had attained a higher level of education had a tend to show greater 
trust. In Spain, the results were similar but slightly more significant. When the country 
variable is used instead as a regressor, Spain was found to be positively related to distrust, 
and all other socio-demographic variables became insignificant. This implies that the 
between-country difference in distrust is much greater than the within-country difference. 
Table 36. Regression on distrust index results. 
Variable Linear 
regression 
Spain Germany Country 
regressor 
Gender 0.203 0.274 0.137 -0.032 
Education -0.120 -0.124 -0.122 -0.002 
Age 0.003 0.006 -0.000 0.001 
Country (Spain) - - - 0.192 
Intercept  5.600 5.426 5.787 5.537 
 
As expected, among those respondents who were in favour of the government managing 
their data, the level of trust was higher. In addition, a two-sample t-test was performed to 
determine if a significant difference existed in the average level of distrust (i.e. the mean) 
between respondents who selected a system managed by an independent organisation 
(mean=5.44) and those who selected a system run by the government (mean=5.11). From 
the analysis, we found that respondents who preferred an independent organisation were, 
on average, less trusting than those who favoured the government.  
We then analysed the levels of adoption among the sample of the four hypothetical digital 
services, by observing the characteristics of the preferences for the opt-out option, i.e. 
respondents who preferred not to adopt the new service, irrespective of the conditions 
regarding their data, and of the benefits of the service. To analyse this, we regressed the 
opt-outs on individuals’ socio-demographic information. In the overall sample, age, levels 
of distrust, and the security and participation dimension all correlate positively with the 
preference of opting-out. Hence, older respondents and those with a low level of trust were 
more likely to opt out. For the opt-out analysis, we include the sectors as a regressor to 
understand which dimensions respondents were more likely to opt out from. The results 
suggest that the participation and security dimensions correlate positively with opting out, 
meaning that respondents are on average more reluctant to adopt new digital services in 
these domains. Then, we also controlled the level of opt-out for the different countries to 
see if there was a country effect. In Germany, distrust is highly significant, implying that 
a high level of distrust correlates with a high frequency of opt-outs. Self-reported socio-
economic status was also significant in Germany, with people in lower socio-economic 
brackets more likely to opt out. In Spain, the distrust index and self-reported social status 
had the same effects on opting out, although with slightly smaller magnitudes. 
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Furthermore, age was also found to be significant and positively related to the frequency 
of opt-outs, indicating that older participants were more likely to opt out. Running a linear 
regression with the country variable as a regressor instead, we found that the variable for 
Spain has an estimate of -2.80; in other words, people in Germany are more likely to opt 
out. The other significant variables are in line with those from the general regression.  
Table 37. Regression on opt-out results. 
Variable Linear 
regression 
Spain Germany Country 
regressor 
Distrust Index 0.60 *** 0.45 ** 0.68 *** 0.60 *** 
Education -0.13 -0.15 0.49 0.24 
Age 0.03 ** 0.05 ** 0.01 0.03 ** 
Health sector 0.08 -0.41 0.61 0.12 
Security sector 1.34 ** 0.60 2.03 ** 1.37 ** 
Participation sector 1.74 *** 1.26 2.21 ** 1.76 *** 
Self-reported social 
status 
-0.56 *** -0.44 ** -0.61 *** -0.56 *** 
Country (Spain) - - - -2.80 *** 
(Intercept) 3.73 2.46 3.08 3.79 
*** Significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level. 
Next, we regress the privacy index on the socio-demographic variables for the overall 
sample, as we did for the distrust index. From the analysis, we found that age, self-
reported social status and distrust level are all significant. In particular, older participants 
are more likely to be concerned over privacy (0.05), while higher self-reported social status 
correlates with lower privacy concerns (-0.44). When performing the regression 
individually for each country, social status has a significant estimate of -0.091 in Germany 
and -0.135 in Spain. Higher self-reported status correlates lower concern over privacy. 
Another linear regression was run, including a country variable (Spain) as a regressor. 
Here, we find a significant estimate of 0.19, which suggests that respondents in Spain are, 
overall, more concerned about privacy than those in Germany.  
Table 38. Regression on privacy index results. 
Variable Linear 
regression 
Spain Germany Country 
regressor 
Gender -0.049 0.021  -0.121  -0.053 
Education 
 
0.032 0.053 0.042 
Age 0.067 0.003 -0.003 -0.000 
Health sector -0.000 -0.093 0.177 0.040 
Security sector 0.042 -0.186 0.081 -0.053 
Participation sector -0.051 -0.298 0.149  -0.075 
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Self-reported social 
status 
-0.074 -0.135 *** -0.091 ** -0.109 *** 
Country (Spain) -0.109 *** - - 0.192 ** 
(Intercept) - 6.424 5.967 6.068 
*** Significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level. 
 
Cross-attributes analysis  
Lastly, we conducted further analysis to explore specific profiles by analysing which other 
attributes they would favour. We first analysed the attributes preferred by those indicating 
a preference for private companies. In the health sector, these respondents appeared to 
be indifferent as to the type of data they shared, whether basic or sensitive. However, in 
all other areas, they had a strong preference for anonymisation of the data or shorter-term 
storage. In terms of benefits, there were no significant results in the area of health and 
transport, indicating that respondents were indifferent to what type of benefits (personal 
or societal) received from a system run by private companies. However, for participation 
(voting) and security, respondents who favoured private companies preferred direct 
benefits, i.e. reduced voting time and reduced homicide rates, respectively. We then turned 
to respondents who indicated a preference for their data to be handled by independent 
authorities. Overall, these participants were in favour of encrypted data being used in all 
sectors, but to a less degree than those who preferred the private sector. This may be due 
to their higher level of trust in independent authorities. Interestingly, in the areas of health 
and security, respondents who opted for the government to handle data were indifferent 
to the type of data they shared, whether sensitive or generic.  
Second, we analysed whether those respondents who preferred an independent 
organisation over government has particular level of trust. To do this, we performed a two-
sample t-test to determine if there is a significant difference in the average (mean) level 
of distrust between respondents who favoured independent organisation, and those who 
favoured the government. From this analysis, we found that the level of trust is higher 
among respondents who favour the government. In terms of the data they were willing to 
share, respondents who opted for data to be handled by the government were indifferent 
to the type of data shared in the health and security sectors, with no significant estimates. 
In the areas of transport and participation, this respondent profile significantly favoured 
sharing only encrypted data; this preference was stronger in the area of participation, as 
expected.  
Third, we found that respondents who were willing to share personalised data were 
indifferent as to whether the public administration or non-profit organisations should 
handle this data. These results were similar across all domains. However, these 
respondents appeared more willing to provide personalised data to public authorities than 
to private companies, particularly in the area of health. These respondents appear 
indifferent to the type of benefit received (direct/personal versus indirect/societal) in the 
areas of transport and participation. Direct benefits are favoured in the area of security 
and health (namely reduced homicide rates and personalised treatment, respectively). This 
may imply that when providing personal data, respondents want to see a direct benefit 
from the service. 
Lastly, in the security example, we see that most respondents favoured a shorter period 
of storage for data. Respondents who preferred lengthier data storage were also 
indifferent as to whether this data was handled by local government or by an independent, 
non-profit organisation. However, they preferred to provide data to the government when 
faced with the choice between local government and a private company. They also 
favoured the direct benefit of a reduced homicide rate over the indirect (societal) benefit 
of reduced vandalism against public property.  
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3.5 Case Study 4: Kids Go Green (Italy) 
3.5.1 Introduction 
3.5.1.1 Description of the context 
This case study439 analyses the impacts of Kids Go Green, a project designed and 
implemented by Fondazione Bruno Kessler440 (hereinafter ‘FBK’) in the schools of the city 
of Trento, the autonomous province of Trento, and the city of Ferrara. The project consists 
in a tech-based educational game that involves the school, the children and their families 
in an education adventure around the world and promotes more sustainable mobility. After 
kickstarting the project, FBK now plays the role of technology provider and monitor, while 
providing research and evaluation capacity rather than management. Initial funds to 
develop Kids Go Green came from the EIT programme Climate-KIC441, but a self-supporting 
model is currently being developed.  
‘Gamification’ has shown its potential as a strategic socio-technical technique to increase 
participation and engagement, and to promote sustainable behaviours such as ethical, 
social, environmentally friendly, or healthy habits442. Serious games, persuasive games as 
well as gamified interactions have all proven themselves to be useful tools not only for 
raising awareness about a topic or issue, but also to promote changes in attitudes or 
behaviours. The key idea behind gamification is to increase people’s motivation take certain 
decisions or to carry out certain tasks which are instrumental to achieving certain desired 
objectives, by turning them into fun and rewarding experiences. Environmental 
sustainability is an area in which gamification has been widely applied. Examples range 
from energy savings443 and sustainable mobility444 to other environmental issues, such as 
community-wide environmental missions445, the participatory governance of urban 
neighbourhoods446, or educational city discovery447.  
The use of gamification for environmental awareness and sustainability has proven 
successful in several such cases; however, its impact is often transient and tends to 
diminish with time448 unless it is reinforced with opportune motivational prompts449, along 
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with corresponding elements of game design and mechanics450. The recognition of the role 
of education as a key enabler for sustainable development has grown steadily, leading to 
its prominence in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Climate 
Change Agreement. However, despite the considerable efforts and relevant steps made in 
recent years (with many frameworks, programmes, and policies put in place at 
international and national levels), both schools and local authorities encounter hurdles in 
promoting the systematic adoption and implementation of environmental education451.  
Gamification can therefore play a key, threefold role in this context: supporting the long-
term sustainability of environmental education initiatives; promoting engagement of the 
community at large; and fostering creativity and active participation. Gamification has been 
successfully used to promote healthy and sustainable lifestyles among children and their 
parents452. However, there are still few examples of gamification approaches that 
specifically target children’s environmental education, the aim of Kids Go Green. ECOMobile 
for instance, applies a situated learning approach for learning about ecosystem science. 
This can be used to organise playful augmented-reality field trips for children to local pond 
environments453. Its combination of a gamified, augmented-reality experience with 
environmental probeware has proven to be very effective in fostering children’s 
understanding and interpretation of water quality measurements. 
3.5.1.2 Description of the innovation 
The Kids Go Green project454 (hereinafter ‘KGG’) was launched by the city of Trento, in 
partnership with FBK, as part of CLIMB455 – a wider programme relating to children’s 
sustainable and autonomous mobility. KGG involves the creation of a cooperative, playful 
experience that involves schools, children and families in an adventure to discover the 
world while incentivising new green mobility practices. The game targets children attending 
primary school, involving them in an explorative game in which their progress depends on 
the mobility practices they perform on their daily route to school. The game was designed 
to ensure an intuitive and motivating experience, with an attractive and modern interface 
to promote innovative teaching. Furthermore, the flexibility of the game allows parents 
and teachers to customise the experience in accordance with their objectives. 
The CLIMB programme is based on an open source technology platform developed by FBK 
that comprises: an Internet of Things (IoT) layer that manages information derived from 
multi-channel and multi-protocol data collection from sensors and devices; a data layer to 
process data; and a service layer for services and APIs. The platform offers an extendable 
set of enabling components, providing both generic and domain-specific functionalities at 
different layers456. One such component is the gamification engine used to develop and 
implement KGG. 
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Offsetting up a KGG experience involves three key steps: 
1. Creating the journey. Using the web app, teachers can plan a virtual journey, 
featuring different places of the world. These represent intermediate ‘stage goals’ that 
children can reach using the kilometres they collect by sustainably travelling to school each 
morning. When they reach these virtual locations, they can access multimedia content that 
the teacher has as teachers uploaded for each stage. Children do not collect kilometres 
individually, but rather as a school or cohort. Journeys are tailor-made by teaching staff, 
according to the educational needs and the grade-specific teaching plan. The length of the 
journey (both in terms of its physical distances in kilometres its duration across the school 
year), as well as the disciplines involved, optional after-school activities and other optional 
experiences, are all decided by the teachers. Some journey examples include: (a) across 
Europe; (b) from one school to a girl’s school in Kangole (Uganda) with which the school 
was twinned as part of a solidarity project; (c) following the journey of the Greek hero 
Ulysses; (d) travelling across the countries of origin, for children with migrant backgrounds.  
2. Updating the Mobility Journal. Once children arrive at class, their teacher logs in to 
the platform using the LIM (interactive multimedia whiteboard), so that children can fill in 
their Mobility Journal. This consists of reporting how they travelled from home to school. 
Different forms of mobility are given different colours. In this way, children can easily 
record and track their contribution. The sustainable kilometres each child covers (on foot, 
by pedibus, by bike, by school bus) advance the group along its defined journey. To 
maintain interest, as well as helping the group to cover long distances, the game includes 
bonuses (e.g. kilometres by train or hot-air balloon), which can be earned by braving bad 
weather or winning collective mini-challenges (e.g. no cars for a week). 
3. Stage goals. Once a stage goal has been reached, the multimedia content uploaded by 
the teacher are unlocked. Here, the choice of interesting content is critical to keeping 
children motivated to complete the journey. For example, the children who travelled across 
Europe got to earn about the phenomenon of the aurora borealis and Santa Claus (thanks 
to the participation of a grandfather) in Finland; Tchaikovsky’s music in Moscow; the 
Sacher Torte in Vienna; John Paul II in Krakow; Galileo Galilei and the scientific method 
(grade I-II) and the Fibonacci sequence (grade V) in Pisa; the tarantella folk dance in 
Apulia; the Riace bronzes in Calabria; and the Archimedes techno-park in Sicily. Children 
who journeyed through their classmates’ origins, thanks to the robust participation by both 
foreign-born and Italian parents, familiarised themselves with the culture, language and 
culinary habits of Romania, Ukraine, Moldova, Kosovo, Albania, Poland, Pakistan, Morocco, 
Tunisia and Ecuador. 
3.5.1.3 Objectives 
From its inception, KGG has been designed to focus on mobility and changing 
habits/behaviours in relation to young citizens’ lifestyles. As a programme, it is thus 
conceived to respond to the undesirable phenomenon of the “backseat generation”: the 
tendency for children to be driven to school, rather than walking. This has been proven to 
have a number of negative impacts, including: (a) increased pollution and traffic, affecting 
the safety of roads surrounding the school; (b) accustoming children to a sedentary 
lifestyle (increasing the risk of health conditions such as childhood obesity); (c) obstacles 
to the children’s personal and social growth, as they have less access to their surroundings. 
Together these circumstances trigger a mechanism by which parents are less willing to let 
their children walk around the school neighbourhood, affecting parent-child trust and 
pushing families to provide children with mobile phones for safety purposes457. 
KGG provides a solution to this combination of context and behaviour, by using a digital-
based classroom game that involves all pupils. The game can be played in conjunction with 
the pedibus (a form of transport that multiple children power by pedalling), as well as by 
occasionally involving children’s families in school activities. KGG is always supervised by 
                                           
457 Marconi, A., Schiavo, G., Zancanaro, M., Valetto, G., Pistore, M. (2018). Exploring the world through small 
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the teaching staff, even after the preliminary planning and coordination phases. The main 
objectives KGG seeks to achieve are: (a) to commit children to walking for the time-span 
of the game (usually a little less than a school year) in order to encourage more active and 
sustainable mobility practices, hopefully leading to the forming of a longer-term habit; and 
(b) to integrate with ordinary educational activities during school time. The implementation 
of KGG revealed, however, that it not only has impacts on the mobility of children and 
families, but also potential a multitude of other effects that this case study aims to better 
explore, such as: (a) engagement with the game (collecting kilometres); (b) interest in 
the educational subject matter that unfolds at each stage of the journey via the multimedia 
content chosen; (c) educational value, through exposing children to multicultural 
experiences, a reality also in the close surroundings of children themselves; and (d) 
cooperation and team building among the teaching staff458.  
Given the richness of results reported over recent years through the implementation and 
monitoring of the program, the general ambition of this case study is to pave the way for 
the future observation and measurement of all impacts of KGG. This will be achieved by 
highlighting its transformative capacity as well as its as-yet-unexplored potential, casting 
particular light on the effects obtained thanks to the use of gamification and through its 
innovative approach to service delivery. 
3.5.2 Approach and methodology  
3.5.2.1 Methodological strategy 
The case study will be analysed via a combination of theory-based evaluation (using 
realistic evaluation and the theory of generative mechanisms), and a process-tracing 
approach.  
Theory-based evaluation (often referred to as ‘theory of change’ or ‘programme theory’) 
seeks to identify and, more specifically, constructs, one or more theories explaining the 
change that is expected to be brought about by a programme. The theory is a tool to 
investigate the programme’s capacity to achieve all of the expected goals in terms of 
implementation and results, while also putting forward possible explanations for the 
programme’s success or failure. It originates from an understanding of what determines 
or contributes to an undesirable state of affairs (inappropriate/suboptimal behaviour, 
discriminatory practices, social inequalities and imbalance, etc…) and moves on to 
speculate on ways in which these patterns can be altered. Changes in patterns of 
behaviour, systemic practices or conditions are then generated by bringing fresh inputs 
into the system in order to achieve a new and desirable status quo. In this sense, 
programmes are theories incarnated459. Applying theory-based evaluation means breaking 
down the hypothetical causal chain (intended to be inherent to a programme) into a series 
of potential triggers that are capable of explaining to what extent, for whom, and why the 
programme may or may not be achieving its goals460. Realistic evaluation can be 
considered a specific method of theory-based evaluation461, insofar as it explores 
programmes using causal mechanisms (generative causation). 
Process tracing, on the other hand, recognises that not all traces are equally informative. 
Consequently, it focuses on assessing the quality, strength, power or probative value that 
selected pieces of evidence hold in support of or against the causal mechanism462. One of 
the advantages of process tracing is that it allows a clear distinction to be made between 
absence of evidence (which has little or no inferential power and adds little value to what 
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the researcher already knows), and evidence of absence, which on the contrary can be 
used to strongly challenge a hypothesis (if it contradicts the observable implications that 
stem from it)463.  
The added value in tackling the analysis by making use of causal mechanisms is that this 
approach looks into the causal ‘black box’ that links a programme and its implementation 
context with the observed results. Mechanisms are theoretical constructs, conceived to 
bring to bear causal power within a programme and hence enable its outcomes. Their 
epistemic function is therefore to explain the process by which a programme can modify, 
within a certain context, the initial situation – and, as such, to explain why the pattern of 
outcomes turn out as they do. A mechanism explains how the outcome pattern is 
generated, hence the term “generative causation”. 
This approach enables us to understand how the programme works by interpreting its 
intermediate outcomes (which are understood as segments of the path leading from the 
programme’s implementation to its expected final outcome). When separately applied to 
the contexts and target types, as well as the hypotheses relating to the intervening causal 
mechanisms, their effectiveness can be evaluated and tested against empirical evidence, 
enabling a rich hypothesis about the programme’s capacity to succeed. 
3.5.2.2 Implementation and data gathering  
The hypotheses formulated within this case study are not tested through empirical work in 
an independent and unconnected way. They are instead combined into target-mechanism-
outcome (TMO) theoretical architectures, the robustness of which is evaluated against both 
interviews and surveys, in order to fully understand the functioning of the intervening 
mechanisms and define the limits of their validity (and hence the extent to which these 
observations can be generalised). Thus, case study seeks to answering not only what 
works, but also for whom, how, and in what circumstances.  
Figure 36 below represents the rationale explained above. The problem that the 
programme seeks to address is pictured at time t0: a situation in which certain mechanisms 
exist that affect types of actors, and which trigger the undesirable outcomes targeted by 
the programme. The programme is designed to change this state of affairs via actions that 
trigger new mechanisms that preventing the original set of mechanisms from operating, 
by modifying the volitions, ideas, interests and objectives of the target population. Hence, 
the implementation of the project is expected to lead, at time t1, to the consolidation of a 
new configuration of causal mechanisms that generate desirable outcomes. Particular 
attention must be paid to the contexts in which TMOs exist, in order to account for possible 
biases and distortions they might produce. 
Figure 36.  Diagram of methodological strategy. 
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Data for the case study are collected via the following methods: 
• Semi-structured interviews with teachers involved in the project (during the 
current and previous school years) 
• Survey of teachers involved in the project in the past and in the upcoming school 
year 
• Survey of teachers who are getting involved in the project for the first time  
• Survey of parents whose children have taken part in the project in previous 
school years  
• Survey of parents whose children are taking part in the project for the first time 
• Access to databases of information relating to the project compiled by FBK over 
previous school years 
Interviews with teachers were used to frame the context of the project, to collecting 
feedback about teachers’ experiences, and to refine the surveys. Together with the 
literature review and previous studies on KGG464, the interviews allowed the definition of 
TMO configurations that function as hypotheses for the case study, by confirming the 
expected impacts on mobility and bringing to the surface other potential impacts. 
Moreover, interviewees spontaneously shared observations about the spectrum of 
programme beneficiaries and proved to be very aware of the context in which the 
programme operates. We were thus able to systematise KGG’s targets, the variety of 
contexts in which KGG is implemented, along with its expected outcomes and impacts. 
However, in order to test our hypotheses by the means described in the methodological 
diagram, they needed to be operationalised, and hence translated into variables. To this 
end, mechanisms served to construct independent variables, while the detailed outcomes 
serve as dependent variables and are operationalised according to target, and 
corresponding to the expected impact. The surveys were then written in order to look for 
correlations between the identified constructs of the mechanisms (independent variables) 
and the outcomes, as well as to collect data on the recipients’ (teachers’ and families’) 
perceptions of the programme465. Databases compiled by FBK cover a window of time 
starting in 2017, and were in their turn based on surveys (distributed before and after the 
project began) that aimed to test whether or not the short-term commitment to walk, 
which was expected to induce more active and sustainable mobility practice, was also 
leading to a long-term habit. 
3.5.2.3 Expected impacts and outcomes 
The DigiGov-F conceptual framework broadly defines impacts as long-term results in terms 
of the following: the creation of value; changes in public organisations; improved 
democratic dynamics; general environmental benefits; social inclusion and participation466. 
                                           
464 Marconi, A., Schiavo, G., Zancanaro, M., Valetto, G., Pistore, M. (2018). Exploring the world through small 
green steps. Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Advanced Visual Interfaces - AVI ’18; Farella, 
E., Schiavo, G., Ferron, M., Giovanelli, D., Leonardi, C., Marconi, A., Massa, P., Murphy, A.L., Nori, M., Pistore, 
M. (2020). CLIMB: A Pervasive Gameful Platform Promoting Child Independent Mobility. IEEE Pervasive 
Computing, 19(1), 32–42. 
465 Note that these surveys were issued pre- (and will be issued post-) the running time of the project, and thus 
fall beyond the scope of this case study. The results reported here come from the survey distributed before the 
programme started (i.e. once schools had completed their deliberations over taking part in the programme. A 
different set of questions will be distributed at the end of the project, possibly coinciding with the end of the 
school year, to capture hypotheses of behavioural changes as well as the target response. The initial survey, 
distributed during November 2019, aimed to draw the baseline, hence it was built upon the expected outcomes. 
The final survey, to be distributed at the end of the school year 2019-2020 will capture the presence of both 
mechanisms and outcomes. Both results will be tested against the baseline. 
466 European Commission 2018, 'Impact Assessment on the Review of the Directive 2003/98/EC on the Reuse of 
Public Sector Information'; 'Alford, J., O’Flynn, J. (2009). Making Sense of Public Value: Concepts, Critiques and 
Emergent Meanings. International Journal of Public Administration, 32(3–4), 171–191. In this sense, no major 
changes are expected to be achieved in the way schools are organised , and neither is an immediate impact (in 
terms of epistemic steps) on the strength of democracy, unless of course we o consider any improvement of the 
education system as an investment on the future. 
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We identified six dimensions of impacts, specified and detailed by a list of expected 
outcomes. As explained in our methodology, in order to formulate complete hypotheses, 
these outcomes are then associated with categories of targets, and a hypothesis developed 
about the intervening causal mechanism.  
Table 39. Dimensions of impact and contexts.  
Dimensions of impacts Contexts 
 Mobility – sustainability 
 Mobility – lifestyle 
 Inclusion – community creation 
 Inclusion – learning process 
 Innovation in teaching approach 
 Digital skills 
 City centre / outskirts and suburbs / 
countryside 
 Close-knit community / unbounded 
neighbourhood  
 Multicultural neighbourhood / mostly 
Italian and gentrified neighbourhood 
 Large school / small school (number of 
children) 
Table 40. Targets of the programme. 
Beneficiaries 
 
Categories of beneficiaries 
School 
children 
 Grade (age range): I-II; III-V 
 Migrant background  
 Language barriers (possibly associated with migrant background) 
 Learning difficulties (disabilities and /or behavioural obstacles) 
 Physical disability (mobility impairment) 
Families  Migrant background 
 Engagement and cultural background467 
Teachers  KGG coordinator for the school / simply involved 
 Intrinsic commitment to the values promoted by KGG  
 Collaborative attitude towards other teaching staff 
 Willingness to involve families in school activities 
 Willingness to explore new means or methods of teaching 
                                           
467 The first round of interviews highlighted a meaningful categorisation amongst children and families based on 
the richness of their cultural background, in a way that is independent of economic or social capacity. 
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Figure 37. Application of methodology. 
 
As explained above, the six dimensions of impacts are grouped in four main sets of target-
mechanism-outcome (TMO). These are presented in the Tables 41-44. Each of these tables 
includes a list of expected outcomes.  
Table 41. TMO 1 – Mobility: healthier and more sustainable habits. 
Target Mechanism Outcome 
School 
children 
 Stimulus: realistic self-challenge.  
 Stimulus: competition with other classes/schools  
 Avoidance of blame: effort to meet peers’ 
expectations. 
 Focus: other public programmes contribute to the 
habit (e.g. PedibusSmart). 
 Motivation: the game provides a reason to want to 
go to school. 
 Deadline effect: the goal of completing the journey 
by the end of the school year strengthens the 
effort. 
 Novelty: the game captures children’s attention at 
the outset, but this fades over year. 
 Value endorsement: the game stimulates thinking 
about sustainability, leading to its 
acknowledgement as a value per se.  
 Development of sustainable 
habits. 
 Improved ecological 
awareness. 
 Development of ecological 
conscience. 
 Improved awareness about 
a healthy lifestyle. 
 Development of healthier 
habits. 
 Adopting of a safer 
behaviour as pedestrians. 
Families  Additional effort: walking children to school takes 
more time and organisation than driving them.  
 Identity development: the requirement of the 
game (sustainable mobility) provides the 
conditions for children to develop a role within their 
families. 
 Legitimation of children’s autonomous mobility, 
based on acquired capabilities. 
 Development of sustainable 
habits. 
 Development of healthier 
habits. 
 Improved trust relationship 
with children. 
 improved involvement with 
school and school-related 
activities (pedibus) 
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Table 42. TMO2 – Inclusion: better learning process and the creation of a community network. 
Target Mechanism Outcome 
School children  
 (Grades III-
V) 
 Confidence building: the game offers the 
opportunity to play a role in the class. 
 Earning ‘brownie points’: acquiring 
reputation among peers. 
 Opportunity to become familiar with the 
urban surroundings of the school and people 
from the local community. 
 Improved inclusion of 
children of foreign origins. 
 Improved inclusion of 
children with learning or 
physical impairment. 
 Improved bonding among 
fellow school children. 
 Improved multicultural 
awareness.  
 Increased liveliness of the 
school surroundings: it 
becomes apparent to the 
neighbourhood that school 
children are part of the 
same community. 
School children  
 Migrant 
background 
 Learning 
difficulties 
 Physical 
disability  
 Blending in/belonging: opportunity to take 
part in activities relating to the game.  
 Blending in/belonging: logging in to the 
platform each morning, and the unveiling of 
multimedia content, allow participation that 
is not based on faster or more refined 
learning ability (which is usually the case in 
traditional teaching).  
 Reciprocity: exchange of opinions, 
knowledge and experiences between 
children. 
 Identity recognition/affirmation: the 
unfolding of material at each stage of the 
journey creates the conditions for children to 
bring their thoughts and experiences into 
the discussion. 
 Opportunity to become familiar with the 
urban surroundings of the school and people 
from the local community. 
 Encouraging collaboration: logging in to the 
platform each morning stimulates a 
shared/joint effort (e.g. a system of shifts). 
Families 
 Migrant 
background 
 Bandwagon effect: if a critical mass of 
families takes part in activities, others will 
join. 
 Brokerage: connecting actors who are given 
a common goal within the programme. 
 Repeated/systematic interactions. 
 Opportunity: the game provides a social 
platform to introduce knowledge about one’s 
own culture. 
 Creation of new 
interpersonal networks. 
 Increased awareness of 
multiculturalism/diversity. 
 Improved mutual 
knowledge and respect. 
 Mutual trust building. 
Families 
 Engagement 
and cultural 
background 
 Opportunity to engage in social activities 
and perform roles relating to civic 
responsibility and participation. 
 Creation of transport 
networks. 
 Increased cooperation 
between schools and 
families. 
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Table 43. TMO3 – Teaching approach: innovative methods and new means. 
Target Mechanism Outcome 
School children  
 Language 
barriers 
 Learning 
difficulties 
 Blending in/belonging: logging in to the 
platform each morning becomes the 
responsibility of children and allows 
participation that is not directly based on 
knowledge transmission. 
 Accessibility of multimedia content, together 
with a moment of more passive learning, eases 
the process of memorisation. 
 Encouraging collaboration: logging in to the 
platform each morning stimulates a 
shared/joint effort (e.g. a system of shifts)  
 Better retention of learnt 
notions. 
 Improved attention and 
interest. 
 Creating a connection 
between learnt notions 
and experience (e.g. 
travelling with families to 
the places seen during 
the KGG journey).  
 Improved results. 
Teachers  Opportunity: KGG provides a formal framework 
for pushing forward a commitment to 
innovation. 
 Opportunity: KGG provides a formal framework 
for pushing forward a commitment to one’s own 
beliefs. 
 Leadership: KGG coordinators lead the whole of 
the teaching staff in a shared effort and shared 
results.   
 Student-led planning: integration of the KGG 
experience with mandatory ministerial plans.  
 Focus on aspects of teaching that go beyond the 
transmission of knowledge, i.e. striving for 
social, emotional, relationship effects on 
children.  
 ‘Free-rider’ behaviour: avoiding the use of the 
platform or of putting effort into collecting and 
uploading content. 
 Resistance to change: avoiding the use of the 
KGG platform, perceiving it as a loss of time for 
more institutionally traditional activities. 
 Improved cooperation 
among teaching staff. 
 Exploring new ways of 
delivering lectures. 
 Spreading innovation 
culture throughout the 
school staff.  
Table 44. TMO4 – Digital skills: spread of digital literacy. 
Target Mechanism Outcome 
School children 
Teachers 
Families 
 Developing habits: the platform (accessed in the 
classroom and accessible from home) becomes an 
occasion to use digital means. 
 Stimulus: the context of the platform and interest 
in the content stimulate the use of software to 
produce outputs. 
 Opportunity: access to a digital tool other than a 
smartphone or tablet, usually a means for 
entertainment rather than education. 
 Supervision: time spent using digital means is 
limited in a top-down manner and controlled. 
 Improved digital skills. 
 More frequent use of 
LIM (interactive 
multimedia whiteboard. 
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3.5.3 Results and discussion 
In this section we present the results of the case study, as well as describing how the 
approach was operationalised. As previously mentioned, the results presented here refer 
to the two academic years, 2017-18 and 2018-19, when the surveys were conducted. The 
programme has also been monitored during the current academic year (2019-20) and new 
surveys will be conducted by FBK at the end of the year to compare the results we present 
here.  
The results are structured as follows. First, we present a table with all the independent and 
dependent variables measured. Each of these is linked with the target-mechanism-
outcome (TMO) of reference, i.e. mobility (TMO1), inclusion (TMO2), teaching approach 
(TMO3) and digital skills (TMO4). Then, after this presentation of the operationalisation, 
we present the results in section 3.5.3.2 and the conclusions in the following section. 
However, the discussion of the results in light of the literature reviewed and the conceptual 
framework is finally provided in Chapter 0, next to the other case studies. In Box 14 below 
we provide a very brief summary of the main findings of the present one.  
Box 14. Main findings of Case Study 4: Kids Go Green (Italy). 
  The project generated new types of relationships between school actors, 
deepening the involvement of families in school-promoted activities, and of the 
teaching staff with each other and with the management. In other words, the 
results show that the project has changed the relationships between the 
institution and the citizens involved, for the benefit of the users, i.e. children. 
  The results show further potential for the inclusion of disadvantaged 
groups. On the one hand, all families were engaged equally by the programme, 
instead of limiting interactive initiatives to the most proactive parents. On the 
other hand, according to teachers the programme’s digital content and teaching 
methods have proved, more effective than traditional methods, particularly in 
relation to less able clusters of pupils. 
  The case study clearly shows a change towards more sustainable 
lifestyles, as families have shifted towards choosing more sustainable transport 
modalities. Moreover, the programme has stimulated debate about 
environmental issues among children and families.  
3.5.3.1 Operationalisation 
Table 45. Independent and dependent variables. 
TMO Independent variables 
(based on mechanisms) 
Dependent variables 
Outcomes Impacts 
1 Stimuli and motivations to walk to school: 
 Realistic self-challenge and competition with 
other classes/schools  
 Effort to match peers’ expectations 
 Participation in PedibusSmart programme 
 Playing the game to reach the goals within the 
journey 
School children 
develop/improve 
sustainable habits 
Mobility – 
sustainability 
 
Survey of: 
families 
1 Engagement with the PedibusSmart programme 
and/or putting in additional effort to walk children to 
school. 
Families 
develop/improve 
sustainable habits 
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1 Value endorsement: the game stimulates thinking 
about sustainability, leading to its acknowledgement 
as a value per se. 
School children and 
their families 
develop/improve: 
 ecological 
awareness 
 ecological 
conscience 
1 Stimuli and motivations to walk to school: 
 Realistic self-challenge and competition with 
other classes/schools  
 Effort to match peers’ expectations 
 Participation in PedibusSmart programme 
 Playing the game to reach the goals within the 
journey 
School children 
develop/improve: 
 awareness 
about a healthy 
lifestyle and 
healthier habits 
 safer behaviour 
as pedestrians 
Mobility –
lifestyle 
 
Survey of: 
families 
1 Families are stimulated to keep focusing on walking to 
school, as this may involve some additional effort from 
them.  
Hence, children develop a role within their families 
and, step by step, gain autonomy in relation to 
walking in the city. 
Families 
develop/improve: 
 relationship of 
trust with 
children 
 involvement 
with school and 
school-related 
activities  
Children’s 
autonomous 
mobility 
 
Survey of: 
families 
2 The morning activities of walking to school and logging 
in to the platform provide: 
 the opportunity to play a role within a peer 
group 
 the opportunity to take part in easy and 
accessible activities (related to the game)  
 
The unveiling of multimedia content allows: 
 participation that is not based on faster or 
more refined learning ability 
 the conditions for children to bring into the 
discussion their own thoughts and experiences 
 hence, exchange of opinions, knowledge and 
experiences among children 
Improved inclusion:  
 children of 
migrant 
background 
 children with 
learning or 
physical 
disabilities 
This, in general: 
 deepens the 
bond among 
school children 
 improves their 
multicultural 
awareness  
Inclusion – 
learning 
process 
 
Survey of: 
families, 
teachers 
2; 3 Teachers manage KGG’s processes and contents in 
order to: 
 encourage children to cooperate during each 
morning’s logging-in to the platform, joining 
forces to share effort (e.g. a system of shifts) 
 providing children with multimedia content, 
which is naturally more accessible and eases 
the process of memorisation   
 allowing participation that is not based on 
faster or more refined learning ability (sharing 
thoughts and experiences does not require 
School children, 
especially those 
facing linguistic 
barriers or learning 
difficulties, 
experience: 
 better retention 
of notions 
learnt  
Inclusion – 
learning 
process 
and 
Innovation in 
teaching 
approach 
 
Survey of: 
teachers 
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children to master correct notions or 
solutions) 
 improved 
attention and 
interest 
 a connection 
between 
notions and 
experience  
 hence, 
improved 
results 
2 Children’s participation in the game on the way to 
school provides them and their families with: 
 an opportunity to become familiar with the 
urban surroundings of the school and people 
from the local community 
 a connection with other families, thanks to a 
common goal – hence, an incentive to join  
 the habit of interacting with other children and 
parents within a peer group 
 
Children’s participation in the game during school 
activities (reaching stage goals within the journey) 
provides them and their families with a platform to: 
 share knowledge about one’s own culture 
 engage in performing ideas relating to civic 
responsibility and participation 
Children and their 
families experience: 
 improved 
liveliness of the 
school 
surroundings  
 mutual 
knowledge, and 
hence respect 
and trust, 
leading to:  
 new 
interpersonal 
networks 
 multiculture 
awareness / 
awareness of 
diversity 
 greater 
cooperation 
between 
schools and 
families 
Inclusion – 
community 
creation 
 
Survey of: 
families, 
teachers 
3 The programme provides an occasion to revise the 
governance of teaching, in several ways: 
 pushing forward a commitment to innovation 
 leadership dynamics among teaching staff  
 cooperation dynamics for a shared effort and 
result   
 ‘free-rider’ behaviour compared with more 
engaged colleagues 
 resistance to change 
The programme provided a framework for thinking 
about the phase of teaching delivery, in several ways: 
 integration of the KGG experience with 
mandatory ministerial plans  
 going beyond the transmission of knowledge, 
i.e. striving for social, emotional, relationship 
effects on children.  
 push forward a commitment to one’s own 
beliefs, embodied in the programme (e.g. 
ecological conscience) 
Teachers 
experience: 
 better 
cooperation 
with colleagues 
 innovative ways 
of delivering 
 innovation 
culture in their 
work 
environment 
Innovation in 
teaching 
approach 
 
Survey of: 
teachers 
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4 At school, the programme provides an opportunity for 
children to: 
 develop the habit of using digital devices other 
than a smartphone or tablet  
 develop the habit of using digital devices for 
education 
 use software to produce outputs for their 
education, independently or with their parents 
 spend time using digital devices in a 
supervised (and hence regulated) manner  
Children and 
teachers engage in 
wider use of LIM 
(interactive 
multimedia 
whiteboard) and 
improve their digital 
skills. 
 
Families become 
familiar with digital 
devices. 
Digital skills 
 
Survey of: 
families, 
teachers 
3.5.3.2  Results 
A) Historical data on mobility: sustainability, lifestyle, autonomy 
The KGG pilot took place during the school year 2017-2018, and the project has continued 
to grow since then. Given that KGG is framed in terms of mobility policies, FBK conducted 
research in both 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 in relation to children’s mobility habits and 
lifestyle, as well as their autonomous mobility. Data were collected via a total of four 
surveys, all targeted at families. These were delivered at the beginning (initial surveys) 
and at the end (final surveys) of the school year. Initial surveys were intended to draw a 
baseline based on habits and opinions; final surveys captured families’ level of satisfaction 
with the project and their perception of its impacts. 
Surveys were distributed on paper and FBK provided the authors of this case study with a 
raw database containing the results of these surveys, compiled via manual data entry. The 
following actions were performed to clean the database: 
- deleting empty lines 
- deleting incomplete answer sets 
- identifying and accordingly deleting invalid items (data entry mistakes, invalid 
answers, duplicates) 
As a result of this cleaning, the final samples comprised: 
- 2017-2018 initial (pre): 400 respondents 
- 2017-2018 final (post): 318 respondents 
- 2018-2019 initial (pre): 753 respondents 
- 2018-2019 final (post): 578 respondents 
The children whose families completed the survey all attended elementary school and were 
aged between 6 (grade I) and 11 (grade V). During the school year 2017-2018, six schools 
took part to the project, all of them in Trento; during the school year 2018-2019, 12 
schools took part to the project – 10 in Trento, two in Ferrara. 
The graphs that follow illustrate the means of mobility used by children to get from home 
to school: 
- Figure 38 shows a comparison between the beginning of the school year (before 
KGG began) and the end of the school year (that is, after the treatment for the year 
2017-2018). Note that the numbers of children travelling by bike and public 
transport are very low (respectively 1 and 1 in the initial survey; 4 and 4 in the final 
survey) 
- Figure 39 shows the same comparison for the year 2018-2019. Note that in the 
initial survey, no respondent declared that their child travelled to school by public 
transport. 
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- Figure 40 and Figure 41 unpack the before / after treatment comparison for school 
the years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 by grade, based on the same data presented 
in Figure 38 and Figure 39. 
Note that the label “mixed” denotes those cases in which respondents indicated more than 
one means of mobility, despite the survey question asking for the main means. However, 
the number of such cases suggested the need to consider these answers not as invalid, 
but rather to treat them as a category of their own. 
Figure 38. Means of transport before and after treatment, 2017-18. 
 
Figure 39. Means of transport before and after treatment, 2018-19 
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Figure 40. Means of transport 2017-18: segmentation by grade. 
 
Figure 41. Means of transport 2018-19: segmentation by grade. 
 
In 2018-2019, the survey questions relating to the means of mobility also contained  
double options in relation to travel on foot or by bike, with the purpose of ascertaining 
whether children did so in a supervised manner or on their own, hence assessing their 
autonomy. In order to conduct a specific analysis, shown in Figure 42, these answers were 
counted independently of the means of transport, and were based instead on the type of 
company/supervision children usually relied on when travelling to school. Here, children 
counting as going “Alone” are either walking or cycling on their own; “Supervised” label 
denotes children who travelled under supervision on foot, by bike or car in a privately 
organised way; while “Schoolbus/Pedibus” denotes children who travelled to school within 
a system organised and managed by the school, the CLIMB framework, and/or an 
institutionalised groups of volunteers. “Unclassified” denotes mixed means of mobility, 
public transport or other means. 
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Figure 42. Autonomy of children travelling to school, 2018-19. 
 
Understanding children’s mobility and the potential drivers or obstacles affecting KGG 
requires an understanding families’ motivations and constraints in organising their 
children’s daily routine. Thus, the final survey for the school year 2017-2018 and the initial 
survey for the school year 2018-2019 asked parents about their reasons for choosing their 
children’s of means mobility: 
- Figure 43 presents parents’ responses to such questions. Note that in 2017-2018, 
respondents were offered multiple choices, while in 2018-2019 a Likert scale was 
used (1 = not at all; 6 = a lot). Also, in 2018-2018 the sample was limited to those 
respondents whose children had already taken part in KGG during the 2017-2018 
school year. 
- Figure 44 cross-compares data concerning the reasons for mobility, choices against 
parents’ awareness of KGG, measured by a Likert scale (To what extent do you 
know about KGG? 1 = not at all; 6 = a lot). 
- Figure 45 crosses-compares data concerning the reasons for mobility choices 
against the level of interest children have shown interest in KGG, measured by a 
Likert scale (Did your child tell you about KGG over the past months? 1 = not at 
all; 6 = a lot) 
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Figure 43. Reasons for parents’ mobility choices. 
 
Figure 44. Mobility choices: segmentation by family awareness. 
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Figure 45. Mobility choices: segmentation by children’s engagement. 
 
Lastly, both final surveys asked parents about changes they have perceived in their own 
and their children’s behaviour that they explicitly attribute to their participation in KGG. In 
both cases, the question was structured using a Likert scale (1 = not at all; 6 = a lot). The 
results are reported in Figure 46 and Figure 47. 
Figure 46. Perceived effects of KGG on the behaviour of children. 
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Figure 47. Perceived effects of KGG on parents’ behaviour. 
 
B) Newly collected data: testing the hypotheses on teachers 
Before the KGG project began again in school year 2019-2020, a new survey designed by 
PoliMi was conducted. The survey was composed of two parts, each of which was sub-
divided into two sections. The first main part concerned teachers’ habits in their everyday 
job, both during and outside class. The questions focused on teaching style, relationship 
with pupils and the use of digital tools. The first half of these questions targeted all 
responding teachers, while the second targeted teachers who had taken part in the KGG 
programme during previous school years. These latter questions aimed to identify how 
teachers’ habits had been transformed (or not) during their involvement in the project, as 
well as their perceptions of the effects of KGG. The second part aimed to capture teachers’ 
view of the programme’s effects on pupils. Similarly, the first half of these questions were 
targeted at all teachers, to draw a baseline; the second half were addressed to teachers 
whose pupils had already taken part in KGG during previous years. This last section of the 
survey could be reiterated in order for teachers to answer in relation to up to three cohorts 
of pupils they had taught. Respondents were asked to indicate their age and number of 
years in teaching, the grade of the pupils about whom they were answering, and the 
school/district in which they work(ed).  
Most responses took the form of a Likert scale, with the obvious exception of descriptive 
answers and multiple choices concerning the adoption of digital tools. Where meaningful, 
data analysis was performed through unpacking the answers by context (whether in the 
city of Trento or Ferrara), or by age (a line was drawn at the birth year 1975). Altogether, 
sample comprised 27 teachers, distributed equally (in absolute numbers) between Trento 
and Ferrara, of whom 19 had already participated in KGG during previous years. The 
hypotheses formulated were tested throughout all sections of the survey, with the results 
being presented according to the TMO they measured, rather than according to the survey 
structure. 
TMO 2, which focuses on social inclusion, learning processes and the creation of 
community. Questions to teachers helped to measure their perceptions in relation to the 
attainment of the following outcomes: 
- improved inclusion of children with migrant backgrounds 
- improved inclusion of children with learning or physical disabilities 
- improved bonding among fellow school children 
- improved mutual knowledge and respect 
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- greater cooperation between schools and families 
- improved attention and interest 
- creating a connection between notions and experience  
- improved academic achievement  
The results are presented as follows: 
- Figure 48 presents data on the opinions of all teachers on various aspects of 
inclusion. 
- Figure 49 presents data on the opinions of teachers who had already participated 
in KGG during previous school years. Scores represent teachers’ perceptions of the 
effectiveness of unlocking content when children reach each stage of their journey. 
- Figure 50, based again on the sample of teachers with previous experience of KGG, 
presents teachers’ perceptions of the general effects of KGG on inclusion. 
Figure 48. Teachers’ perspectives on inclusion (all teachers). 
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Figure 49. Perceived effects of KGG on inclusion (1) 
 
Figure 50. Perceived effects of KGG on inclusion (2) 
 
TMO3 was employed to hypothesise on changes in teaching methods and school 
governance. The following graphs illustrate results for the following expected outcomes:  
- Improved cooperation among teaching staff. 
- Exploring new ways to deliver lectures. 
- Spreading a culture of innovation throughout the whole school staff. 
Specifically: 
- Figure 51 illustrates teachers’ opinions concerning vertical and horizontal 
approaches to the management of teaching (based on the whole sample.) 
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- Figure 52, based on the sample of teachers who had already taken part in KGG 
during previous school years, illustrates teachers’ perceptions of the effects of the 
project on the vertical and horizontal management of teaching delivery. 
Figure 51. Teachers’ perspectives on the management of teaching 
 
Figure 52. Teachers’ perceptions of the effects of KGG on teaching governance. 
 
Finally, the survey explores the use of digital means during classes/lectures and in 
teachers’ other everyday work-related activities, as a proxy for their digital skills level, as 
well as their engagement in transmitting digital skills to their pupils. Data are presented 
as follows: 
- Figure 53 presents teachers’ habits in relation to the use of digital devices and the 
most common software, together with the extent to which teachers perceive that 
KGG has improved their use of such tools. 
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- Figure 54 presents teachers’ habits in relation to the use of digital sources of 
information, together with the extent to which teachers perceive that KGG has 
improved their use of such sources. 
- Figure 55 compares the customary usage of digital tools and content during 
teaching delivery in the classroom, with the extent to which teachers perceive that 
KGG has improved their use of such tools. 
Note that each of these figures, the graph on the left is based on the whole sample, while 
graph on the right is based on the smaller sample of teachers who had already participated 
in KGG. 
- Figure 56 unpacks by context (schools located in Trento or Ferrara) teachers’ 
perceptions of the effects of KGG had on their skills, and those of their pupils, as 
well as its effect on pupil performance. 
Figure 53. Teachers’ use of digital devices and software (and effect of KGG). 
 
Figure 54. Teachers’ use of digital information sources (and effect of KGG). 
 
 192 
Figure 55. Use of digital devices and software in class (and effect of KGG). 
 
Figure 56. Perceived effects of KGG on digital skills  
 
3.5.3.3  Conclusions 
KGG’s initial aim was to change mobility practices towards healthier and more sustainable 
habits, as well as increasing children’s autonomy in relation to mobility. However, as the 
project has progressed, the actors involved have noticed that it also appears to: (a) foster 
inclusion, improving the learning process and creating a community network (inclusion); 
(b) modify the teaching approach, offering new and innovative methods (teaching 
approach); (c) improving the digital skills of both children and teachers. 
Evidence collected in relation to mobility appears to show a shift towards the use of more 
sustainable transport modalities. In fact, the overall data shows a rise in children travelling 
to school on foot, and a consequent reduction in the number of children travelling by car. 
Moreover, the level of families’ awareness and knowledge about KGG and the level of 
children’s involvement appears to influence mobility choices, shifting parents’ attention 
towards sustainability as well as children’s needs (autonomy and amusement). 
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KGG also appears to have had effects on inclusion. In particular, from the perspective of 
the teachers, the interactive and playful way of learning promoted by KGG is helping to 
maintain children’s attention and foster cooperation between peers. The hypothesis in 
relation to the inclusion of the disadvantaged children appears not to be verified, with lower 
impacts being perceived. Moreover, KGG’s ‘going to school’ game helps children to become 
accustomed to the surrounding urban architecture, with evidence for this appearing more 
robust among older children. 
The project also appears to have had an effect on teaching approach. In particular, it has 
helped to increase awareness of the importance of extracurricular activities, and the 
willingness of teachers to participate in such activities. Although to a lesser extent, a 
majority of respondents agreed that KGG also had positive effects on fostering a 
collaborative environment amongst teachers. Finally, teachers reported an overall increase 
in the use of digital tools, especially during lectures. They also recognised an improvement 
in their digital skills. 
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4 Conclusions: reflecting empirical results into DigiGov-F 2.0 
4.1 Key implications of the case studies 
The results presented in the case studies address many aspects of the DigiGov-F 
conceptual framework. We have discussed in depth the effects of the introduction of this 
innovation, in terms of the outcomes of efficiency, effectiveness and inclusion and 
legitimacy. Here, we propose a final discussion of these main outcomes and implications 
for future research and policy, together with other relevant issues such as the need for 
digital investments, the shift from eGovernment to Digital Government, and the need to 
protect privacy and personal data.  
Case Study 1: Tvarkau Vilnių (Lithuania) 
The evidence from the case study shows that simply using the Tvarkau Vilnių platform does 
not directly enhance a person’s trust in municipal government, although there is some 
evidence linking the way people perceive the accessibility and effectiveness of municipal 
institutions with their perceptions of the municipality’s response to reports submitted using 
Tvarkau Vilnių. In other words, as corroborated by open responses to our surveys, it is 
important whether users consider the municipality’s response to be standard/vague or 
specific/to-the-point, and whether or not the issue was fixed. This is in line with some of 
the literature on accountability and co-production, and is pertinent both to the development 
of ICT-based public services and to broader discussion of the use of digital government to 
address systemic issues. In essence, our study shows that citizens are willing to play their 
part in joined-up service delivery; however, a systemic effect in terms of, for example, 
higher trust and legitimacy, is only likely if participants can monitor its implementation and 
feel that their contribution makes a difference.  
This finding resounds perfectly with many socio-economic and socio-technical 
scientific works that have analysed previous waves of eGov investments: namely, 
that technology by and of itself does not produce expected outcomes. It is not 
sufficient to provide a smart application to increase engagement and/or trust, 
unless users can monitor and are informed about what happens after their 
contribution. Unless we expect all citizens to become experts in Big Data experts, 
a lot of important work still requires direct human interaction. 
Another angle from which the example of Tvarkau Vilnių can be used to discuss trust is the 
question of reporting issues anonymously vs. revealing personal details. The use of the 
platform increased significantly after anonymous reporting was introduced in 2017. Most 
respondents (62%) in our research group opted to submit their reports anonymously, and 
one-third of respondents said they would not use the app if they were required to log in. 
Also, we find that those who lack trust in the municipality would be less likely to submit 
reports if they had to provide their name. This reveals several things. First, as 
demonstrated by numerous articles, the level of trust within Lithuanian society is low (this 
trend is common in most CEE countries). In this context, platforms such as Tvarkau Vilnių 
are all the more important if they can increase trust by helping to fix issues, as discussed 
in previous paragraph. However, such trust may easily be breached due to, for example, 
legal complications concerning anonymity, as was the case in Vilnius. Personal data 
management is an increasingly sensitive issue and may undermine even the most well-
meaning ICT-based solutions, if not handled properly. If privacy is compromised, an ICT-
based platform may become a factor undermining legitimacy rather than contributing to 
it. 
The issues of trust and privacy, already prominent in earlier stages of government 
digitalisation, are becoming even more salient given both the great potential and 
great risks presented by the use of AI. 
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The case study also aims to contribute to the discussion as to whether platforms such as 
Tvarkau Vilnių provide sufficient opportunity for meaningful civic engagement – or, on the 
other hand, they foster a more individualistic, client-provider relationship between citizens 
and public institutions. According to our evidence, when asked to make a choice between 
deliberative engagement on the one hand and the straight provision of inputs on the other, 
people choose a point somewhere in-between. In other words, they are not necessarily 
eager to engage in discussion with others, but they support functionalities that would allow 
them to help the municipality select the most urgent issues (e.g. through voting), or would 
allow them to engage in more direct contact with the public officials (e.g. the ability to 
respond to the municipality’s response). This does not necessarily cancel out the argument 
in favour of community engagement; however, based on the findings of this and other 
studies, meaningful engagement requires significant effort, while people naturally differ in 
their propensity to offer the necessary commitment. In addition, the effect of engagement 
depends greatly on the process and facilitation. It can be argued that platforms such as 
Tvarkau Vilnių offer a favourable setting for testing out engagement, but this depends less 
on the technology itself (as the relevant functionalities may be added relatively quickly), 
but more on the administrative capacity and priorities of the organisation running the 
platform.  
The above is an important finding that helps to moderate the claims and promises 
heralded by supporters of open governance, coproduction and civic engagement. 
While an active portion of citizens will benefit from new technological 
possibilities, civic disengagement and lower political participation are secular 
trends in advanced democracies that cannot be reversed simply by deploying new 
and more potent technological means. 
We also considered the Tvarkau Vilnių app from the perspective of efficiency, which is often 
the starting point for consideration of most ICT-based solutions. Our study shows clear 
efficiency gains (e.g. in the form of reduced administrative burden) from the perspective 
of city residents, as it enables them to report an issue relatively quickly, pin-pointing the 
exact location. From the perspective of the municipality, the evidence is mixed. In the past, 
receiving complaints and requests from city residents was certainly more complex and 
cumbersome. Nonetheless, Tvarkau Vilnių has not become a ‘one-stop shop’ for reporting 
issues. It has been developed as a useful and convenient way for citizens to provide their 
inputs, but the municipal administration now has to deal with more input channels than it 
previously did. Next, the quality of reports tends to be low, especially since anonymous 
reporting was introduced, and includes numerous instances of duplicates as well as spam. 
Again, we stumble into evidence that has been available for some time: ICT 
investments produce productivity effects with a time lag, and only when 
combined with complementary organisational and cultural changes, which in our 
framework are termed ‘reframing’. Furthermore, in the short to mid-term, the 
duplication of efforts and the stratification of delivery channels may increase 
rather than decrease efforts and costs on the part of public administrations. 
In view of these issues, various solutions are being considered, including the introduction 
of machine learning and AI to help the municipality to prioritise issues, assign 
responsibilities and react more quickly. In line with the conceptual framework of this study, 
this means that Tvarkau Vilnių platform is moving from the realm of eGovernment to Digital 
Government. The study also provided some pertinent evidence concerning the practicalities 
of such a shift. Firstly, the key driver can in fact be the administrative complexities, 
inefficiencies and lessons learned from previous eGov solutions. Secondly, the need for 
upfront investment is significant and difficult to obtain – not least because it is not easy to 
provide a convincing, evidence-based case for the cost-effectiveness of such a solution. 
Finally, the familiar argument of AI-based solutions leading to redundancies and thus being 
unfeasible politically, was also brought up in some interviews. However, previous rounds 
of automation by the municipality have not led to workers being laid off, with employees 
instead being assigned to other tasks.  
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The considerations above both corroborate, and call for integration into, our 
framework. This corroboration comes from the fact that reframing is important 
to achieving results, because the shift from eGovernment to Digital Government 
entails a number of practical issues pertaining to the implementation process, 
and to the corresponding antecedents highlighted in our framework. Our 
reference to possible integration relates to the need for greater emphasis to be 
placed on efforts and investments, and for a feed-back loop to be built into the 
framework to take into account the dynamic and iterative process of Digital 
Government Transformation. This case study shows that once a service is up and 
running, new needs may emerge, requiring new investments and thus a new 
iteration may become necessary to improve the service. 
Our research leads to a number of policy pointers and recommendations that could enhance 
the use of ICT-based solutions to address systemic issues. 
First, the impact of ICT-based solutions is less about the sophistication of the technology 
itself and more about proving to the users that it will help to fix issues and get things done. 
It is therefore important to ensure users can easily monitor the progress of their inputs. 
People should be informed when their report has been solved – this will both potentially 
enhance trust and reduce the number of duplicate reports. If users’ contributions are not 
acted upon in full, the reasons for this must be explained in clear and plain language. The 
public or (non-governmental) sector could also aim for better civic engagement and joined-
up responsibility rather than a client-provider relationship. While an ICT solution to achieve 
this can be designed relatively quickly, the key challenge is to ensure the process is well-
facilitated, open to various inputs, and conducive to finding common ground in face of 
conflicting interests.  
The above recommendations once again underscore the importance of reframing, 
adding an additional focus on adoption that is implicit in our framework, but could 
be given greater salience in the next revision. 
Second, trust-building starts with the protection of privacy and personal data at the level 
of the ICT-based solution. Anonymous communication is always an option at the beginning. 
Nevertheless, it is important that at some point the users are encouraged to identify 
themselves and provide inputs using their real names. This adds to the quality of 
submissions and is more likely to lead to a responsible dialogue. The personal data that 
results with this switch to non-anonymous communication must be treated (a) 
transparently (i.e. every user must know what data is being collected and how it may be 
used); and (b) with caution (i.e. data must only be collected and used to the extent that it 
is necessary in order to have a meaningful engagement). As demonstrated in the case 
study, cases will occur in which different streams of legislation, such as personal data 
protection law and administrative law, will come into conflict with each other. In such a 
case, legislative action is necessary to update the legislation and ensure that public trust 
is not breached. 
Again, the trust and privacy that were important in previous waves of eGov, are 
now becoming increasingly strategic. This is already underscored in our 
framework, but could possibly be given greater salience. 
Finally, it may be difficult (especially at the beginning) to make the case for the cost-
effectiveness of an ICT-based solution – particularly if it operates alongside other, more 
traditional channels of public service provision. As demonstrated by the case of Tvarkau 
Vilnių, the initial, experimental initiative may come from the voluntary sector, which shows 
that public officials should be open to such cooperation and engage in partnerships through 
hackathons, eGov labs and other formats. At some point, however, the public sector must 
become fully involved and make the ICT-based solution an integral part of its operations. 
Further and more substantial investment into Digi Gov initiatives may be difficult to justify 
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given that innovative solutions are always subject to risk and uncertainty, and may be 
developed through trial and error. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the Vilnius case, the 
status quo may become untenable – due in part to the success of the ICT-based solution, 
as an increasing number of submissions may leads to backlogs. This creates pressure for 
further innovation, such as the introduction of AI-based solutions. In order to justify this, 
however, a more fundamental revision of internal procedures is necessary. This may 
include streamlining the organisation’s public service channels, with savings being used to 
fund the introduction of the innovation. 
 
Case Study 2: Body-worn cameras in policing (UK) 
This case study examines the direct and indirect implications of (potential) digital 
transformation in policing in the UK using body-worn cameras (BWCs), as well as the 
drivers and barriers to implementation. We have drawn lessons from a series of 
experiments carried out in the UK to test the effectiveness of digital transformation in 
policing using BWCs. We have also considered, where possible, developments in a small 
selection of other EU Member States that have recently piloted or implemented BWCs.  
As noted in Section 3.3.3, the three ‘effects’ of digital transformation in terms of outcomes 
are defined in the DigiGov-F conceptual framework as productivity and efficiency; 
effectiveness, inclusion and sustainability; and legitimacy. Our analysis in this case study 
explores the organisational and administrative consequences of using BWCs in policing with 
specific reference to these three outcomes. Here, we offer some concluding remarks in 
relation to these outcomes. We also summarise some of the main drivers and barriers to 
the use of BWCs in policing. 
The effects on productivity and efficiency of the introduction of BWCs in the UK context are 
not straightforward. It is perhaps best to think of BWCs in the UK context not as an 
automating technology (which is usually understood as driving productivity gains by 
reducing costs/increasing outputs), but an augmenting one. BWCs currently ‘automate’ 
one thing very well – namely, recording visual data for use in evidence processing, 
comparable to the previous task of incidents being written up by  a human scribe. However, 
it cannot currently automate the full process in and of itself: there are aspects of this 
process (e.g. the interpretation of context and reasoning) which must currently be carried 
out by a human. Therefore, many of the processes involving a camera – such as the 
generation of evidence – still require a human process (such as supplying a statement) to 
operate alongside. As highlighted by researchers in the context of BWCs, “machines are 
replacing police manual labour with more powerful sensory capacities than human beings. 
The machines never tire and have infinitely greater memory, search, data-processing, 
data-linking and analytical capacities. In other instances, to paraphrase Arendt, machines 
are guiding the hands of the police, transforming the nature of policework such that human 
beings and machines work together seamlessly.’468  
From a different angle, this case – like the previous one – demonstrates that not 
every task can be automated. Hence, strictly defined productivity and efficiency 
gains are not as linear and straightforward as one might expect. 
There is, however, some evidence relating to the potential for BWCs to speed up specific 
processes. These include taking witness statements, reducing the overheads relating to 
complaints, and decreasing court time thanks to an increase in early guilty pleas. However, 
these relationships are not clear-cut or well-evidenced at present (particularly in relation 
to other criminal justice stakeholders), and some interviewees tended to focus on more 
effective policing outcomes as the key driver in comparison to cost-benefit analyses (and, 
indeed, cost remains an often-cited barrier to the wider use of BWCs). Similarly, because 
these effects are felt at system level (including the wider criminal justice system) rather 
than at organisation level (e.g. individual police forces), understanding overall productivity 
                                           
468 Bowling, B. & Iyer, S. (2019). Automated policing: the case of body-worn video. International Journal of Law 
in Context 15(2), 140-161. 
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gains is complex. Therefore, it could be reasonable to assume that BWCs will lead to 
efficiency gains with regard to some specific processes. However, the nature of policing as 
an iterative public service means that such efficiency gains may not necessarily translate 
into the other outcomes often associated with digital technology, such as the ability to 
reduce human work hours, costs and throughput. In the future, more advanced functions– 
such as integration and use of facial recognition – may bring further efficiency gains.  
It is also important to stress, as a possible item to be given salience in the 
framework, that sectoral gains may not be visible but may contribute to system-
level impacts. It is also clear that the importance of reframing, as defined in our 
framework, is corroborated by the considerations above, and by the more 
detailed analysis of this case presented in Chapter 3 of this report. 
Stronger evidence exists in relation to the potential impact of BWCs on the effectiveness 
of policing. While it is difficult for experimental research to explore specific outcomes 
relating to crime and justice, there is evidence that BWCs are able to produce better-quality 
evidence than before, although norms surrounding the use of such evidence may not be 
fully developed at this stage. BWC use in training may also improve service delivery by 
developing officers’ skills. Future capabilities such as the linking of data and live streaming 
may also enable more effective policing in this regard, by enabling analytics in relation to 
BWC footage.  
Effectiveness gains appear more prominent, but there is still a lack of knowledge 
and capacity to measure them. 
Compared with the first two outcomes (productivity and efficiency; effectiveness, inclusion 
and sustainability), a stronger, clearer link exists between the use of BWCs and legitimacy 
goals. One of the main mooted benefits of BWCs is their ability to act as a check on the 
behaviour of police officers (‘guarding the guardians’) and therefore, in theory, encourage 
better application of the law by ensuring officers follow and are accountable to legal 
protocols. This is unsurprising, as such a hypothesis is at the heart of any surveillance – 
although questions remain regarding the extent to which this kind of surveillance is 
legitimate in the context of policing, and this may not be consistent across EU countries. 
For example, an observational study of the implementation of BWCs in a US police 
department found that use of BWCs strengthened what they termed the “people-
processing” aspects of policing practice, by encouraging greater adherence to processes 
and policies, and making processes (such as the complaints procedure) more efficient. 
However, BWCs had less impact during the study period on what they termed the “people-
changing” aspects, such as new forms of training, supervision or behaviour, as the BWCs 
did not alter the overarching structures (such as performance measurement processes) to 
incentivise this.  
Conversely, BWCs may also strengthen accountability in the opposite direction, by 
changing citizen behaviour and, as hoped by some interviewees, enabling greater 
understanding on the part of the public about the reality of police work. However, key 
ethical questions remain about the future use of technologies such as facial recognition. 
The way in which these are used and introduced to the public may be a key factor in the 
future impact of BWCs on police legitimacy. As noted by researchers placing BWCs in the 
context of future, deeper automation: “The integration of video cameras into police 
uniforms provides an indication of how police robots will function and offers an opportunity 
to think about public awareness and perceptions of automated policing and the 
mechanisms that are required to regulate it.”469  
Currently, BWC appear to contribute to the important outcome of increasing 
legitimacy through better policing behaviour and better accountability; however, 
the prospect of further automation will need to be well conceived if it is to avoid 
creating new concerns and distrust. 
                                           
469 Ibid. 
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Case Study 3: Privacy and trust in new digital public services (Germany 
and Spain) 
This case study examines the relationship between privacy and trust as regards the 
introduction of new digital public services. We addressed this key issue in Digital 
Government Transformation through an analysis of the demand side. In contrast to the 
other three case studies, this investigation was conducted as an online experiment in two 
countries (Germany and Spain), focusing on the introduction of new technologies to 
improve public services in four different policy domains (i.e. transport, health, security and 
voting). We collected primary data from 1,400 respondents, applying stated preference 
techniques to the challenge of trying to understand the trade-offs that people may make 
when confronted with choices about their privacy. Here, we aim is to link the objectives 
and results of the case study to the main elements of the conceptual framework that are 
addressed.  
This case study relates to some key aspects of the DigiGov-F conceptual 
framework. The framework outlines three main ‘effects’ of digital transformation 
in terms of outcomes, namely: productivity and efficiency; effectiveness, 
inclusion and sustainability; and legitimacy. In addition, the framework 
incorporates the potential negative effects or side-effects that digital innovations 
may produce. Our analysis of this case study specifically addresses the potential 
privacy issues experienced by citizens when new technologies relying on the 
extensive use of personal data are introduced in order to improve public services. 
As already explained, beyond efficiency and effectiveness, the search for 
legitimacy and trust represents an important dimension for governments to 
consider when introducing service innovations. On the one hand, this can 
represent a significant barrier to digital transformation, while on the other, it 
constitutes one of the potential positive effects that new technologies can 
produce, beyond efficiency and effectiveness. 
The four hypothetical scenarios presented to the participants in the experiment all fall 
under the definition of what we term, in the first part of this report, “service innovation”. 
This refers to the creation of new public services or products470, or significant improvement 
to an existing service471. At the core of the digital innovations considered in this study is 
what the OECD defines as a Data-Driven Public Sector (DDPS)472. Figure 57 below identifies 
the value chain in a non-linear, recursive manner, with feedback loop within the necessary 
steps, and involving the creation of public value. After the first two steps is a loop that 
goes between sharing and using/re-using data which, once launched, can retroactively 
positively feed and reinforce the first two steps. For the digital transformation promise of 
a DDPS to be realised, intensive work is required to make use of the available data. 
However, other prerequisites are also extremely important – and the lack of these may 
significantly hinder the promised transformation and the related positive outcomes.  
                                           
470 De Vries, H., Bekkers, V. & Tummers, L. (2016). Innovation in The Public Sector: A Systematic Review and 
Future Research Agenda. Public Administration 94(1), 146-166. doi:10.1111/padm.12209 
471 Windrum, P. (2008). Innovation and entrepreneurship in public services. In: Windrum, P. & Koch, P. (eds.), 
Innovation in Public Sector Services. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
472 van Ooijen, C., Welby, B. & Ubaldi, B. (2019). A data-driven public sector: Enabling the strategic use of data 
for productive, inclusive and trustworthy governance. OECD Working Papers on Public Governance No. 33. Paris. 
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Figure 57. Value chain for the Data-Driven Public Sector. 
 
Source: van Ooijen, Welby & Ubaldi (2019), p. 11. 
In line with the conceptual framework, we explored one of the four essential 
prerequisites for digital transformation: legitimacy and public trust concerning 
the ethical use of data by public sector organisations, as well as privacy, 
transparency and the risks of which governments and citizens need to be aware. 
More specifically, our experiments aimed to: (a) understand what role trust in 
the public sector plays in the adoption of such services; (b) identify under what 
conditions citizens are willing to adopt new digital public services; and (c) 
explore the trade-offs citizens make between privacy and the benefits that stem 
from the use of new digital public services in various domains. 
The results of the experiment show that trust plays a key role in the introduction of new 
digital services that rely on the use of personal data. The most direct effect is on the type 
of organisations that process the data. Overall, respondents were strongly opposed private 
companies processing their data. This becomes relevant given that, as presented in the 
Conceptual Framework, the literature on AI-enabled public services shows that the private 
sector plays a leading role in the development and delivery of public services, which often 
involves the processing of data. An extremely low level of trust in private companies may 
become problematic once citizens realise their involvement in delivering digital public 
services promoted by the government. The basis for these concerns is clearly shown in the 
example of the Danish Ministry of Tax, which admitted in 2014 to having no control of over 
more than 200 systems that used machine learning algorithms for policy making that 
directly affect citizens. However, our evidence shows that those respondents who were 
generally more distrustful and concerned with privacy also tend to prefer having their data 
processed by independent organisations rather than public authorities or government. This 
trend was particularly significant in relation to two sensitive domains: health and voting. 
This evidence shows that governments cannot consider themselves immune from citizens’ 
concerns over privacy. It may be that governments and public authorities are sometimes 
perceived by the public as being not entirely reliable in managing their data, thus raises 
pressing questions of accountability. 
Any AI enabled digital transformation of public services should therefore 
carefully take into account the perceptions of citizens and, where necessary, raise 
awareness and build trust not just through regulation, but also via direct 
consultations and education campaigns. 
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The results also show that participants were unwilling to make trade-offs when it comes to 
personal data and privacy. When given the choice, irrespective of the type of benefits 
offered, the respondents preferred to provide anonymised data, and not to have their data 
processed by private companies. Moreover, the general view that citizens are more willing 
to adopt new digital services when they receive more direct and personalised benefits was 
not borne out by our results. In terms of the benefits that stem from new digital services, 
in the domain of health an equal number of participants demonstrated preferences for 
personalised treatments (direct benefit) and advances in health research (an indirect, 
societal benefit). Somewhat surprisingly, in the domain of transport, participants showed 
a preference for a societal benefit, the reduction of emissions, compared to the individual 
benefit of reduced travelling time.  
The assumption that users are willing to trade off privacy and personal data in 
return for receiving services should be reconsidered. This may be the case for 
services such as social media, to which users have become accustomed and are 
therefore unwilling to give up, but is not necessarily true for other types of 
service. 
When it comes to privacy and the processing of personal data, what appears to be relevant 
is not the type of benefit provided by the improved services, but the level of trust citizens 
have in the type of organisation that accesses their data. In the current context of declining 
trust in both government and democracy473, governments need to do much more to 
increase their legitimacy and accountability in processing personal data to improve public 
services. This aspect seems to be more important to many respondents than the impact 
that any new services may have on citizens’ wellbeing.  
Transparently engaging stakeholders and citizens in the debate on privacy and 
data protection is therefore crucial to achieving good outcomes. 
The results of the case study also provide some interesting insights into the adoption of 
public sector innovations that involve new technologies. First, there are two signals from 
the results that reveal a potential new form of digital divide. Similar challenges have 
previously been documented in the literature, such as the potential exacerbation of existing 
disparities in the accessibility of health care474 due to the digital divide475. However, our 
results suggest something different from a digital divide in terms of access and skills476. 
We observe that those who reported the highest level of distrust at the same exhibit the 
lowest level of adoption (measured by the ’opt-out’ preference in the experiment). This 
group, group contained older people, who may be not be comfortable with these new digital 
services, as already observed by another survey477. But the group also includes those with 
a lower level of education and with lower socio-economic status, confirming that trust is 
lower among disadvantaged groups. Interestingly, we noticed that the two domains in 
which hypothetical adoption is lower (i.e. there are more opt-outs) are security and voting. 
This means, as reported by the literature, that people are generally wary about the use of 
facial recognition technologies and e-voting solutions. 
                                           
473 As reported in Richardson & Emerson (2018), the 2017 World Values Survey documented a worrying shift in 
attitudes toward democracy. While in the 1960s around three-quarters of respondents said it was essential to 
live in a democracy, less than one-third of millennials believe this today; OECD data on citizens’ trust in 
government across its member states show that the level in 2014 was just at 41.8%, compared to 45.2% in 2007 
(http://www.oecd.org/gov/trust-in-government.htm ) 
474 Jung, C. & Padman, R. (2015). Disruptive Digital Innovation in Healthcare Delivery: The Case for Patient 
Portals and Online Clinical Consultations. In The Handbook of Service Innovation (pp. 297-319). 
475 Goldzweig, C. L., Orshansky, G., et al. (2013). Electronic patient portals: evidence on health outcomes, 
satisfaction, efficiency, and attitudes: a systematic review. Annals of internal medicine, 159(10), 677-687. 
476 Andreasson, K. (Ed.). (2015). Digital divides: the new challenges and opportunities of e-inclusion (Vol. 195). 
CRC Press.  
477 European Commission. (2017). Attitudes towards the impact of digitisation and automation on daily life. 
European Commission. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/attitudes-towards-
impact-digitisation-and-automation-daily-life  
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The issues of adoption, and of a potentially new form of digital divide, should be 
given greater prominence in the revised version of the framework. 
These last results on the adoption of new technology-enabled services confirm what has 
been previously discussed: that governments and other organisations must address 
legitimacy and trust in order to deliver beneficial outcomes. On its own, the promise of 
potential efficiency gains stemming from the introduction of new technologies is probably 
not enough where these new services rely heavily on the use of personal data. Citizens – 
in particular those who are disadvantaged ones – are more likely to provide their data in 
exchange for improved public services, if they perceive the institution to whom they give 
the data to be trustworthy.  
Despite the potential positive effects that stem from the use of technologies to 
deliver public services and improve operations, some important challenges need 
to be addressed in relation to trust and legitimacy. Clear and transparent 
communication concerning the nature of new, data-centric technologies used by 
government, public agencies and officials is the starting point for building 
trustworthy relationships with citizens in the era of digital transformation. It can 
be concluded that legitimacy and trust are simultaneously an important process-
level prerequisite, and an end outcome. 
 
Case Study 4: Kids Go Green (Italy) 
This case study examines the impacts of Kids Go Green (KGG), a project designed and 
implemented by Fondazione Bruno Kessler478 (hereinafter ‘FBK’) in the schools of the city 
of Trento, the autonomous province of Trento, and the city of Ferrara. The project uses a 
tech-based educational game that involves the school, the children and their families in an 
educational adventure around the world, and promotes more sustainable mobility. The 
case study employed a mixed approach, which combined theory-based evaluation (using 
realistic evaluation and the theory of generative mechanisms) with process-tracing, and 
used target-mechanism-outcome (TMO) theoretical architectures, whose robustness was 
evaluated through both interviews and surveys. The case study therefore analysed not only 
what works, but also for whom, how, and in what circumstances.  
As noted in Section 3.5.3, the results of this case study can be mapped against some of 
the outcomes of the DigiGov-F conceptual framework. The results of KGG that the project 
(a) fosters inclusion, improving learning process and creating a community network 
(inclusion); (b) modifies the teaching approach, offering new and innovative methods 
(teaching approach); (c) improves the digital skills of both children and teachers. These 
results are particularly important in relation to two main outcomes of the conceptual 
framework: the second pillar (inclusion and sustainability), and the third pillar (trust and 
legitimacy) in terms of the change of governance.  
This is an unusual sector, seldom considered in traditional eGovernment 
research, and demonstrating potentially promising results with respect to two 
important outcomes. It suggests that the framework should be presented as 
being widely applicable to the entire public sector, and as the starting point for 
future refinements and operationalisation into the different verticals of which the 
public sector is comprised. 
Among KGG’s outputs, the programme provides a new outlook on processes and 
governance. The use of gamification to incentivise children’s journey from home to school, 
and its link to the teaching programme and learning experience, has fundamentally altered 
the way in which this journey is thought about. Once their carers drop them off in the 
                                           
478 https://www.fbk.eu/en/ 
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morning, children fall within the legal responsibility of the institution (the school). From 
that moment, the school is in charge of both children’s safety and their education and 
personal development. While KGG has not extended the scope of schools’ responsibility, 
by turning the journey to school into the focus of teaching activities, it has broadened the 
time and space in which the institution interacts with its community. While KGG is in 
operation, the planning of educational activities, integration into ministerial programmes 
and the involvement of families and the community, all depend de facto on the school 
managing (without additional legal burden) the way its users reach its gates.  
From the point of view of governance, the results show that KGG generated new 
dynamics among the interested actors, by deepening the involvement of families 
in school-promoted activities, and increasing the cooperation of teaching staff 
with each other and with the management. In these two senses at least, KGG has 
changed the relationship between the institution and the actors involved with it, 
for the benefit of the users of its main service – namely, the children.  
Looking at the outcomes that gamification has triggered (and which it is expected to 
trigger), the results point to the need for deeper investigation of KGG’s success in 
bolstering inclusion and sustainability. The case study highlights the project’s potential 
improve the inclusion of more disadvantaged groups of citizens and users. On the one 
hand, all families are engaged equally by the programme, instead of participation being 
limited to the most proactive parents. On the other hand, the secondary output of the 
programme (i.e. the content and methods of teaching) has proved, according to teachers, 
more effective than traditional methods in relation to disadvantaged clusters of pupils. And 
in relation to sustainability, the case study results show that, in the perceptions of families, 
KGG has brought about an adjustment in mobility habits towards a more sustainable 
lifestyle, as well as stimulating debate about environmental issues.  
In conclusion, despite the impossibility of statistically testing the hypotheses (due to the 
limited number of respondents), the case study shows some positive effects. This provides 
new evidence on the way in which new digital technologies, if properly implemented and 
adapted to context, can be a useful instrument for improving the overall school experience 
and creating benefits for all the actors involved. 
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4.2 Lessons learned from cross-case analysis 
As explained in the introduction to this report, four case studies alone are not sufficient to 
draw generalised conclusions. Nevertheless, they provide interesting suggestions and 
hypotheses that can be further explored in future studies, and which will be incorporated 
into the recommendations and prospective exercise that will be the core of the Final Report 
of this study.  
In the previous four sections we have highlighted the main points of relevance in around 
20 boxes. Now we group these highlights into seven major lessons learned. Some of which 
corroborate our framework, while others point to the need for further integration/revision.  
More space is devoted to discussing the first of these seven themes, which concerns the 
limits of automation and of immediate productivity gains. This is for three reasons. First, 
because a rich literature of labour economics exists that can be applied indirectly and by 
analogy to the context of the public sector. Second, because it confirms evidence 
accumulated over decades of scientific work on the impact of ICT in general, and on the 
public sector in particular. Third, because it challenges common hype and rhetoric, and 
helps to introduce a very healthy dose of realism. 
 
(1) The limits of automation and of immediate productivity gains 
The case studies looking at the Tvarkau Vilnių platform and at body-worn cameras (BWCs), 
while in different domains, converge in pointing out that there are limits to automation 
using AI; that the achievement of results still requires human interaction; and that, as has 
been known for decades, ICT productivity gains occur with a time lag and only when 
combined with changes in organisation and culture –what is referred to in our framework 
as ‘reframing’. Furthermore, they underscore that at times, outcomes difficult to isolate at 
sectoral level and should be considered instead at system level. To infuse the current 
narratives about AI and other new technologies in the public sector with a dose of realism, 
we delve a little further into the issue of the limits to automation using insights from labour 
economics. As illustrated by Arntz et al.479, technology experts tend to overestimate the 
potential of new technologies. Technological capabilities do not always or automatically 
translate into possibilities. Technologies must be embedded into socio-economic settings, 
which may delay and/or limit their full deployment. The extent to which human wisdom 
and pattern recognition can be really dispensed with and embedded instead into machines 
is still debated, and often overstated. According to Bessen, it is too simplistic to think that 
simply because computers can perform some tasks, jobs will be eliminated480. As an 
example of the opposite, he notes that during the 1990s, the number of automated teller 
machines (ATMs) installed across the USA increased enormously, reaching more than 
400,000. Following a technologically deterministic argument, one would expect a large 
reduction in the number of human bank tellers; instead, these have grown consistently 
into 2000s. In Bessen’s analysis, this happened because banks increased their number of 
branches, and because those tasks that could not be automated became more valuable: 
“as banks pushed to increase their market shares, tellers became an important part of the 
‘relationship banking team’”. Many bank customers’ needs cannot be handled by machines 
– particularly those of small business customers. Tellers who form a personal relationship 
with these customers can help to sell them high-margin financial services and products. 
This analysis is still valid, despite the more recent shift of banking services to the internet. 
A more recent paper published by the same author shows that today’s technologies may 
cause some industries to decline and others to grow481.  
                                           
479 Arntz, M., Gregory, T. & Zierahn, U. (2016). The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries: A Comparative 
Analysis. Paris: OECD. 
480 Bessen, J. (2015). Toil and Technology. Finance & Development 52(1), 16-19. 
481 Bessen, J.E. (2017). Automation and jobs: When technology boosts employment. Boston Univ. School of Law, 
Law and Economics Research Paper (17-09). 
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Automation might not cause mass unemployment, but it may well require workers to make 
disruptive transitions to new industries, requiring new skills and occupations. In the 
example above, the skills of the teller changed: cash handling became less important, while 
human interaction became more important. This can be also understood from the 
taxonomy in Figure 58 below, which summarises the ‘Routine Biased Technical Change’ 
(RBTC) hypothesis, rooted in the seminal work of David Autor and colleagues482. It clearly 
shows that full automation is possible only under certain circumstances. 
Figure 58. Typology of task and task model prediction. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors. 
 
Autor himself, has recently presented a more realistic approach to the problem of 
automation by asking the question: why there are still so many jobs?483. According to 
Autor, one of the effects of automation on the labour market is also that of increasing the 
value of the tasks that workers uniquely can supply. This points to both substitution and 
complementarity between labour and machines, and the current polarisation of the labour 
market may not continue into the future. Aside from the implication that concerns over 
jobs losses may be exaggerated, the main implication for digital government 
transformation is that the promise of automating entire public sector processes and reaping 
huge productivity gains may simply be the product of hype and consulting companies' 
glossy brochures. Such benefits are likely only in very delimited and vertical routine 
circumstances such as those illustrated in D3 in the municipality of Trelleborg in Sweden, 
where robotic process automation (RPA) of processes  relating to welfare support (such as 
home care applications, sickness, unemployment benefits, tax and duties) has entirely 
substituted human labour (see D3, Box 4, p. 45). As regards the measurement of 
productivity and efficiency gains, the cases also suggest that the framework should 
emphasise the fact that gains may not be visible at sectoral level but that digital initiatives 
may contribute to system-level impacts. 
                                           
482 See among others: Autor, D. (2008). The Economics of Labor Market Intermediation: An Analytic Framework. 
Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research; Autor, D., Levy, F. & Murnane, R. 
(2003). The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 118(4), 1279-1333; Autor, D. H. & Dorn, D. (2013). The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the 
Polarization of the US Labor Market. American Economic Review 103(5), 1553-1597. 
doi:10.1257/aer.103.5.1553; Autor, D.H., Katz, L.F., & Kearney, M. S. (2006). The Polarization of the U.S. Labor 
Market. American Economic Review 96(2), 189-194. doi:10.1257/000282806777212620 
483 Autor, D. (2015). Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? Journal of Economic Perspectives 29 (3), 3–30. 
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(2) The importance of investments and of a dynamic perspective in the 
framework  
Cases show that in the short to mid-term, duplication of efforts and stratification of delivery 
channels may increase, rather than decrease, the efforts and costs of public administration. 
When services are up and running, new needs emerge that require new investments, and 
so a new iteration is necessary to improve the service. The implication for a possible 
integration into our framework is that greater emphasis should be placed on efforts and 
investments, and that a feed-back loop should be built in to take into account the dynamic 
and iterative process of Digital Government Transformation. 
 
(3) Corroboration of the ‘reframing’ perspective adopted in our framework 
The cases studies corroborate the importance of reframing as defined in the DigiGov-F 
framework, both as part of implementation and as one dimension of our taxonomy. The 
move from eGovernment to Digital Government is a steady process involving a number of 
practical issues that pertain to the implementation process and to the corresponding 
antecedents highlighted in our framework. 
 
(4) The strategically important and twofold nature of legitimacy and trust 
The Tvarkau Vilnių case shows the potential of technology to increase trust, but also 
demonstrates that such trust may be breached due to reasons internal to the public 
administration. The management of personal data, in particular, is an increasingly sensitive 
issue. In such situations, an ICT-based platform may actually become a factor undermining 
legitimacy rather than contributing to it. Situations will always arise in which different 
streams of legislation, such as personal data protection and administrative law, will 
contradict each other. In such cases, legislative action is necessary to update the legislation 
and ensure that public trust is not breached. Thus, the issues of trust and privacy, already 
prominent in earlier stages of government digitalisation, are becoming even more salient 
given the great potential – and great risks – that AI entails. In this respect, the finding of 
this case study is corroborated and fully resonates with the more in-depth analysis carried 
out through our online experiment, which focused on privacy and trust in public services.  
The search for legitimacy and trust, beyond efficiency and effectiveness, is an important 
dimension for governments to consider when introducing service innovations. On the one 
hand, legitimacy and trust can represent a significant barrier to digital transformation; on 
the other, they constitute potentially positive effects that new technologies can produce, 
beyond efficiency and effectiveness. Following the conceptual framework, we explored 
legitimacy and public trust in various settings, including the ethical use of data by public 
sector organisations, privacy, transparency, and the risks that governments and citizens 
need to be aware of. More specifically, through our experiments we tried (a) to understand 
what role trust in the public sector plays in the adoption of such services; (b) to identify 
under what conditions citizens are willing to adopt new digital public services; and (c) to 
explore the trade-offs that citizens make between privacy and the benefits that stem from 
the use of new digital public services in various domains. Any AI-enabled digital 
transformation of public services should therefore carefully take into account the 
perception of citizens and, where necessary, raise awareness and build trust not only 
through regulation but also through direct consultations and education campaigns.  
We should reconsider the assumption that users are prepared to trade off privacy and 
personal data in return for services; this may be the case for services such as social media, 
to which users have become accustomed and are therefore unwilling to give up, but this is 
not necessarily the case for other services. Transparently engaging stakeholders and 
citizens in the debate on privacy and data protection is therefore crucial to achieving good 
outcomes.  
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Despite the potentially positive effects that stem from the use of technologies to deliver 
public services and to improve operations, some important challenges need to be 
addressed in relation to trust and legitimacy. Clear and transparent communication on the 
nature of new, data-centric technologies used by government, public agencies and officials 
is the starting point for building relationships of trust with citizens in the era of digital 
transformation. It can be concluded that legitimacy and trust are, simultaneously, an 
important process-level prerequisite, and an end outcome. 
 
(5) Greater focus is needed on user adoption and potential new forms of 
digital divide 
Both the Tvarkau Vilnių case and the online experiment, from two different angles, 
highlighted the issue of user adoption as a specific focus for attention that will not come 
automatically merely through the adoption of the best AI applications. In fact, these new 
technologies may generate new forms of digital divide, as evidenced in the online 
experiment. This once more underscores the importance of reframing implicit in our 
framework – in this case, with regard to conceptual and cognitive routines – to better focus 
on adoption. It also suggests that the issue of adoption, and of potentially new forms of 
digital divide, should be given more salience in the revised version of the framework. 
 
(6) Realism about engagement, open governance and co-production 
The Tvarkau Vilnių case suggests that the claims and promises heralded by the supporters 
of open governance, coproduction and civic engagement should be approached with 
caution. While an active portion of citizens will benefit from new technological possibilities, 
civic disengagement and lower political participation are secular trends in advanced 
democracies that cannot be reversed simply by deploying new and more potent 
technological means. 
 
(7) The importance of non-monetary effects 
Both the BCW Kids Go Green cases confirm the importance of outcomes beyond 
productivity and efficiency gains - first and foremost, they emphasise effectiveness and 
legitimacy. Effectiveness gains appear to be more prominent in the BWC case, where they 
appear to contribute to the important outcome of increasing legitimacy through better 
policing behaviour and better accountability. The results of the Kids Go Green study show 
that the project (a) fosters inclusion by improving the learning process and creating a 
community network (inclusion); (b) modifies the teaching approach by offering new and 
innovative methods (teaching approach); (c) improves the digital skills of both children 
and teachers. In terms of the change in governance, these results are particularly 
important in relation to two main outcomes of the conceptual framework: the second pillar 
(inclusion and sustainability) and the third pillar (trust and legitimacy). Although it must 
be stressed that the KGG programme relates to an unusual sector seldom considered in 
the traditional eGovernment research; it shows potentially promising results. This suggests 
that our framework should be presented as being widely applicable to the entire public 
sector and as the starting point for future refinements and operationalisation into the 
different verticals of which the public sector is comprised. Finally, it must be stressed that, 
exactly as we have stated in the various versions of our framework, we are still far from 
having reliable and robust indicators for the evaluation and measurement of these 
domains. There is still a clear lack of knowledge and capacity to evaluate and measure 
them. 
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4.3 DigiGov-F 2.0 
Overall, the results of the four cases corroborate the good fit of the proposed Digi-Gov-F.  
The main adjustments that are presented in this section thus concern: 
 Giving greater prominence to inputs (efforts / investments): a new box relating to 
input has been added into the graphic snapshot of the new version. 
 Introducing a dynamic feed-back loop between implementation, service in 
production, first results and following iterations. A new box labelled “delivery”, 
denoting that either the provision of a new service or the application of a new policy, 
has been added into the new version’s graphic snapshot, together with a new arrow 
notation aimed at conveying the dynamic of possible multiple iterations.  
 Giving greater prominence to user adoption: a new box relating to adoption has 
been added into the new version’s graphic snapshot. 
 Further underscoring the issue of trust and legitimacy, not only as outcomes but 
also as drivers and facilitators; this is done discursively. 
These four changes are partially rendered graphically and partially added in the textual 
comments to the new version of DigiGov-F.  
 
Figure 59 below integrates in a syncretic manner the analysis of innovation antecedents, 
institutional settings and technology presented earlier, with the organisational change 
perspective applied to the ICT-enabled transformation of government, and with the 
perspective of the role played by external factors. 
Figure 59. From antecedents to internal and external change factors. 
 
Source: elaborated by the authors.  
 
 
 
Attributes of digital 
innovation
Relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, 
triability
Visions & strategies of 
needed change
Unmet needs to  be tackled 
through digital innovation 
Restructuring
Resources, leadership, 
structure and processes, 
employees 
New technological 
combination
Legacy silos, system 
integration, data availability 
and sharing 
Reframing
Culture, cognitive and 
behavioural routines and 
frames
Inter-organisational 
networks of influence
Participation in networks 
possibly leading to 
isomorphism processes
Demands/Pressures
Constituency 
needs/demands, and related 
discourses/pressures
Institutional features & 
levers
Institutional settings, policy 
& regulatory levers, 
governance
External factors
AS IS
(Internal appraisal) 
Change strategy
TO BE
(Internal factors) 
 209 
When considering a hypothetical public agency, the appraisal of the current situation as 
being not fully satisfactory is considered as the starting point. Based on internal vision and 
strategy, a certain need of a given constituency may be identified as being not fully met. 
More generally, the agency may decide to become more responsive to its user base by 
reorganising itself from siloed functions to demand-driven horizontal task forces and also 
pursuing the reduction of costs and efficiency gains. The internal vision and strategy will 
certainly be based on evidence, but will inevitably be influenced by external factors such 
as pressures from media and politicians, and/or in response to policy/ regulatory directives 
and levers. The decision to change could also be fostered by networks of influence, leading 
to processes of convergence toward what other similar organisations are doing, and what 
a consulting company says the organisation should do. The strategic appraisal leading to 
a strategy for change entails the consideration of the factual or perceived attributes of 
digital innovation (relative advantage, compatibility, etc.), including some kind of ex-ante 
vision as to how it can contribute to achieving the desired transformation (the ‘to be’ state), 
with improved performance. An important motivating factor when considering an 
innovation’s attributes, will be how the innovation might improve the public’s perception 
of the organisation. In this respect, external pressures and influence may shape both the 
appraisal of the innovation’s attributes and the strategy for change selected by the agency. 
Should the relative advantage not be clear and supported by evidence, this could lead to 
the moral hazards of under- or over- investment.  
Given the lessons learnt from the cases, the strategy should also carefully consider, plan, 
and steer three important aspects: 
 The allocation of adequate resources in terms of the personnel and money needed 
for the relevant technological investments (broadly defined input). 
 It should start from users’ demands and needs, and define actions that may 
increase adoption and avoid new forms of digital divide. 
 It should define key strategic actions aimed at building trust in AI and other new 
technologies that touch upon privacy issues and require the use of personal data. 
The latter two points will also be influenced by external factors, but they also concern 
design, implementation, and delivery and should be concretely followed both in the choice 
of technology and in the process of internal reframing of the organisation, and of the 
actions taken to interact with its constituency. 
On the other hand, policy and governance levers (incentives and top-down mandatory 
directives) can have a positive impact on agency motivation and offset the risk of moral 
hazard. Political leadership and public administration norms and values (to be considered 
as part of institutional settings), together with the presence of champions from previous 
successful experiences (organisational readiness), are also important factors. Networks 
and influence-shaping public discourses on innovation can increase the perceived 
legitimacy of an innovation, which can lead to its adoption as a result of institutional 
isomorphism. Strong societal demands and needs have a clear impact on how the relative 
advantage of an innovation is framed and, subsequently, evaluated.  
When the innovation is adopted and the process of implementing change begins, internal 
factors come to the fore. Assuming that the starting point is a siloed organisational 
structure and fragmented information systems and data storage, the challenging job of 
redesigning organisational processes and structure redesign will have to go hand in hand 
with the integration of IT, as well as the engineering and structuring of data sources. This 
is even more challenging when the digital innovation is not self-contained within a single 
public agency, but involves other actors within government, and possibly also non-
governmental actors and data sources. In this scenario, policy and regulation levers, 
together with governance mechanisms, are a strategic external input to provide both 
incentives for sharing and collaborating, and the regulatory and ethical framework for the 
use of personal data. The availability (or lack) of slack resources, leadership, and 
committed and skilled employees can function as a driver (or barrier) to these processes.  
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Aside from the tangible internal factors described above, equally important are changes in 
organisational culture towards sharing and collaboration and, in particular, to the 
organisation’s cognitive and behavioural frames and routines. We refer here to the 
introduction of new concepts, as well as to the normative and cognitive routines concerning 
the internal functions and external environment. These help to reframe the definition of 
the problems and their solutions, leading to new ways of thinking that change the 
assumptions or behavioural intentions underlying the development and deployment of 
policies and services. This can lead to improvements in the identification of the needs of 
constituents, as well as shorten the time required to develop, test, implement and diffuse 
a policy, and promoting the adoption of new languages, concepts and new methods to 
influence behaviour.  
This reframing is important, since the digital transformation of government will only occur 
when: (a) there is access to a constellation of different sources of information that can be 
linked together; and (b) new analytical techniques are employed with new and appropriate 
frame of mind. This is to say that the transformative potential of new technologies is linked 
to the introduction of new concepts and new ways of thinking that challenge the 
assumptions that underlie processes, services and products. It also involves a change in 
the behavioural intentions than underpin policy development. For example, Big Data must 
be handled using new analytical techniques that require a change in the culture of 
modelling and entail extensive algorithm-based analysis (Veltri, 2017). Previous research 
into citizens’ needs, attitudes and behaviours has been based on limited sample methods, 
most of which (except experiments) relied on self-reported information that could suffer 
from biases. Big Data now provides real time information about what people really do (e.g. 
transactional and activity-generated data) or think (social media). New analytical and data 
processing techniques can improve policy implementation by better targeting different 
audiences and combining the power of Big Data analytics with insights from behavioural 
economics and the ‘nudge’ approach. To take advantage of this, the public sector must 
develop a new culture of data gathering and engineering (alongside improvements in its 
internal analytical capacity and a restructuring of the underlying sourcing and storing 
processes). There is also a need for a paradigm shift in the way new insights are sought 
and used. This must be combined with new approaches to data governance that ensure 
security and privacy. 
Finally, cognitive change is also required in relation to the way governments view 
collaboration and co-creation in order to advance beyond hype and rhetoric. This entails 
creating trust and opening up to insights and contributions from outside government. More 
generally, maximising adoption and avoiding the emergence of a digital divide, while 
building trust regarding relation to privacy and personal data, require both savvy 
technological choices and a cognitive and communication reframing. However, digital 
government transformation requires a two-sided reframing, which includes tangible 
(organisations and processes) and intangible (conceptual and cognitive) aspects. 
Reframing is therefore not limited to cognitive/communication issues, but should also 
involve the redesigning of the institutional-organisational models governing how 
government functions. As noted in the first part of this report, the tangible aspects that 
should be redesigned involve both changes to the internal functioning of public 
administration (refitting government functions, reorganising administrative structures, 
reengineering processes) and also changes to external relationships with citizens and other 
stakeholders (i.e. governance mechanisms). 
Figure 60 below presents a graphical representation of the DigiGov-F 2.0 framework, and 
condenses all of the discussion presented in the first part of the report, together with the 
changes suggested by the case studies and summarised at the beginning of this section. 
As such, it requires only a very concise narrative illustration highlighting a few key points.  
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Figure 60. Graphical representation of DigiGov-F 2.0.  
 
Source: elaborated by the authors. 
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